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Abstract 
 
In his many writings and interviews, Elliott Carter frequently stresses the connection 
between human experiences of opposition and conflict and the opposition he composes 
into his musical interactions. While these concepts have received much attention in the 
scholarly literature over the decades, in this dissertation I examine the role of opposition 
in Carter’s music by bringing Carter’s aesthetic into contact with an Adornian tradition 
of dialectical aesthetics, something new to Carter scholarship. In particular, I harness 
Adorno’s concept of the social mediation of music materials to shed light on Carter’s 
linking of the musical and the human in his highly abstracted music. Central to this 
mediation is the way materials respond immanently to social conditions. I show how 
Carter conceives of musical form and temporality in terms closely aligned to Adorno, 
particularly with respect to non-repetition and freedom of formal design. However, I 
also argue that the way in which Carter worked with his musical materials did not 
remain static but responded to a changing modernism around the turn of the twenty-first 
century. Through an analysis of two of Carter’s late-late orchestral compositions, I 
examine how the notion of dialectical opposition finds expression in sonic images of 
lightness, effervescence and human fragility rather than the explosive oppositions of 
Carter’s middle period music. Part 1 of the thesis identifies traces of dialectical thinking 
in Carter’s writings and interviews and interprets these through an Adornian lens. Part 2 
presents technical analyses of both the Boston Concerto (2002) and the ASKO Concerto 
(2000), focusing on how the repetition built in to the ritornello form of both pieces is re-
formed by way of Carter’s dialectical handling of form and content. Part 3 offers a 
‘second reflection’ in which philosophical concepts in Part 1 and technical concepts in 
Part 2 are drawn together into a critical analysis of how both materials and composer are 
mediated by the social. 
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 “ I feel about the future that in the end what we’re living through at the present 
time—a kind of strange mixture and confusion—will wear itself out and people 
will become much more sensitive and aware than they are now. They will have to 
be because as society becomes more complicated, more full of people and more 
different kinds of things happening, people will have to become much cleverer 
and much sharper.  And then they will like my music ... [smile]” — Elliott Carter 
 
Elliott Carter: A Labyrinth of Time, 1h29’30” 
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Chapter 1 
Music dialectics and Carter contextualized 
 
1.1 “a kind of dialectic” 
Elliott Carter’s music has been characterized as a music of opposition. The theme of 
opposition is one introduced by Carter himself after the composition of his String 
Quartet No.2 (1959), the piece that marks in most narratives the beginning of his mature 
music. Carter explains the idea of opposition in the Second Quartet not with the term 
‘opposition’ however, but instead with the term ‘dialectic’: 
… the piece was never conceived of as an ensemble work in the ordinary sense of 
theme and accompaniment but a conception that all these instruments were somehow 
related more by a kind of dialectic, by a way of discussing things.1 
What did Carter understand by his use of the term ‘dialectic’? In his writings of the 
1960s and 1970s, the word occasionally pops up in different contexts, and although 
Carter never fully explores its meaning, he uses it consistently in reference to the way 
he conceives of the interaction between his instrumental parts. Carter elaborates a little 
on the nature of this “kind of dialectic” in a statement in Flawed Words and Stubborn 
Sounds: 
And of course in any “dialogue”, musical or otherwise, there must be areas of overlap 
and interchange as well as points of divergence. Thus in my music there is a kind of 
ongoing dialectic of affirming and contradicting the character of the instruments 
involved…2 
Perhaps not surprisingly for a student of Classics, Carter’s use seems to fit best with the 
‘dialectic’ of Greek philosophy—not yet burdened by the weight of German Idealism—
as an exchange of conflicting or contradictory propositions.  The definition of ‘dialectic’ 
in A Dictionary of Critical Theory Online begins by referencing the Greek origins of the 
word: 
                                                
1 Elliott Carter, “Dartmouth Lectures,” (Elliott Carter Collection, Paul Sacher Stiftung, August 12, 1963). 
cited in Daniel Guberman, “Composing Freedom: Elliott Carter’s ‘Self-Reinvention’ and the Early Cold 
War” (PhD. diss., University of North Carolina, 2012), 201. 
2 Allan Edwards, Flawed Words and Stubborn Sounds: a conversation with Elliott Carter (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1971), 69. 
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A method of argument based on the idea of two people in dialogue each putting 
forward a proposition that the other counters and by this means arriving at an ultimate 
truth. The word originates in Classical Greek philosophy—its invention is sometimes 
attributed to Zeno, but it was Socrates and Plato who popularized it as a means of 
obtaining truth by a process of asking questions.3 
The word thus began life in antiquity, although the concept of the dialectic did not 
remain static. The shift in its meaning over the course of the history of Western 
philosophy up to the twentieth century is neatly summarized by Peter Singer in the 
Oxford Companion to Philosophy:  
In ancient Greece, dialectic was a form of reasoning that proceeded by question and 
answer, used by Plato. In later antiquity and the Middle Ages, the term was often used 
to mean simply logic, but Kant applied it to arguments showing that principles of 
science have contradictory aspects. Hegel thought that all logic and world history 
itself followed a dialectical path, in which internal contradictions were transcended, 
but gave rise to new contradictions that themselves required resolution. Marx and 
Engels gave Hegel’s idea of dialectic a material basis; hence dialectical materialism.4 
Singer captures the basic change of implicit meaning that the notion of ‘dialectic’ 
undergoes throughout a period of more than two centuries. The goal of resolving the 
dialectic by attaining an ultimate truth gradually becomes more complicated over time. 
Importantly, by the time we get to Hegel we find that contradiction or conflict is 
considered to be the basic state of things.5  Ian Buchanan explains that “[c]entral to 
Hegel’s notion of the dialectic is the constant presence of contradiction: as Hegel points 
out, identity contains its opposite, namely difference, inasmuch that to be one thing 
something must also not be another thing.”6 Awareness of this inherent state of conflict 
is necessary for the progress of human consciousness, which in Hegel’s scheme follows 
a process of overcoming contradictions out of which new contradictions arise until an 
                                                
3 Ian Buchanan, “Dialectic,” A Dictionary of Critical Theory Online. Accessed 20 September, 2016, DOI 
10.1093/acref/9780199532919.013.0183. 
4 Peter Singer, “Dialectic,” Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Online ed. 2005. Accessed 20 September, 
2016, http://www.oxfordreference.com/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-
629. Another excellent discussion of the changing meaning of dialectic is Kim O’Commer, “Dialectic,” 
Univerity of Chicago Theories of Media Keyword Glossary. Accessed 20 September, 2016, 
http://csmt.uchicago.edu/glossary2004/dialectic.htm. 
5 It is acknowledged that Hegel is revisiting Heraclites with this idea. See Martin Heidegger, “Hegel and 
the Greeks,” in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Also 
Michael Cherlin, “Dialectical Opposition in Schoenberg’s Music and Thought,” Music Theory Spectrum 
22, no. 2 (2000). 
6 Buchanan, “Dialectic.” 
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ultimate freedom or a transcendental state is achieved for human consciousness.7 The 
essentially Hegelian notions of the dialectic that shaped modern European philosophy 
converged, for interesting reasons, with developments in musical thinking that were 
shaping the European music world during the nineteenth century.8 As Julian Horton 
notes, both musical and philosophical spheres of activity were being formed by “strands 
of idealist thought, as well as a complex of social, cultural and political forces, in which 
many of the structures of contemporary musical life have their origin.”9 Michael Cherlin 
similarly draws attention to the fact that the notion of the dialectic “as adapted and 
profoundly developed by Hegel, and later by Karl Marx and subsequent philosophers, 
becomes diffused through the general culture so that thought in terms of dialectical 
opposition becomes a basic constituent of German and Austrian culture through the 
nineteenth and continuing into the twentieth century.”10  In light of these definitions and 
this significant historical context, I wish to re-examine Carter’s meaning of the term 
‘dialectic.’ As mentioned above, Carter’s uses of the term could be taken at face value 
in its popular, uncomplicated sense of an exchange of differing views, “a way of 
discussing things” as Carter puts it, in line with a Classical philosophical understanding. 
A second possibility is that Carter’s understanding of the term ‘dialectic’ inherits 
underlying Hegelian implications from the nineteenth and twentieth-century cultural 
milieu because of the historical context in which Carter’s compositional aesthetic 




What I investigate in this thesis has two intertwined components.  One component is the 
study of Carter’s musical aesthetic through the lens of a dialectical thinking inherent to 
aesthetic modernism of the first part of the twentieth century—its traces in Carter’s 
conception of his own compositions and of the role of modern music in society more 
generally. While much has already been said about Carter’s compositional aesthetic, no 
specific connections have been made to a dialectical mentality, one that influenced so 
many of Carter’s (particularly European) contemporaries. The understanding gained 
                                                
7 See Max Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 112-
16. Also Robert McKinney, “The Origins of Modern Dialectics,” Journal of the History of Ideas 44, no. 2 
(1983). 
8 See the extensive discussion of this connection in Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical 
Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
9 Julian Horton, “Dialectics and music analysis,” in Aesthetics of Music: Musicological Perspectives, ed. 
Stephen Downes (New York and London: Routledge, 2014), 112. 
10 Cherlin, “Dialectical Opposition in Schoenberg’s Music and Thought,” 162. 
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from this aesthetic perspective on Carter’s work feeds into the second component of this 
study, which is an analysis of form in two of Carter’s post twentieth-century 
compositions, with a distinctly dialectical reading of opposition within the music. 
Carter’s compositional career spanned a large part of the twentieth century and 
extended into the early part of the twenty-first century. His mature music of the 1960s 
developed at a point in time that was socially, politically and culturally laden with 
concerns that came to be viewed somewhat differently by the turn of the twenty-first 
century. I argue that Carter’s compositional aesthetic remains grounded in the 
dialectical notions he consolidated in his early mature period but that the changed shape 
that these aesthetic ideas take in his late-late music represents Carter’s response to a 
changed socio-cultural reality, one that had moved through a modernist period to a post-
modernist and a late-modernist context. To this end, I have chosen to analyse two early 
twenty-first century compositions that share ritornello form as their underlying formal 
design: the Boston Concerto (2002) and the ASKO Concerto (2000). These 
compositions provide a clear example of a dialectic between musical content and 
musical form, precisely because of the historical nature of ritornello form with its in-
built repetitive design that is in conflict with Carter’s aesthetic of formal innovation 
through non-repetition and content-driven musical structures rather than anachronistic 
use of pre-established forms. As I shall argue, the pieces represent Carter’s dialectical 
engagement not only with musical materials but also with the historically changing 




Interestingly, the term ‘dialectic’ all but disappears in Carter’s writings and interviews 
after the 1970s, and the idea of a ‘music of opposition’ takes hold in the general and 
scholarly literature on Carter’s music. While ‘opposition’ and ‘dialectic’ both share 
concepts of adversary, conflict, and antagonism, ‘opposition’ does not imply inherent 
contradiction nor a process of evolving truth that emerges by continually overcoming 
contradiction, notions that are defining of modern dialectical thought. Furthermore, 
‘opposition’ often implies resistance to something external; ‘dialectic,’ on the other 
hand, internalizes the protagonist and the antagonist, and implies that these 
contradictory terms are defined, out of necessity, by each other. David Schiff’s first 
edition of The Music of Elliott Carter (1983) takes up the theme of opposition, 
incorporating the idea that ‘opposites’ in Carter’s music are in motion, changeable, 
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responsive to each other. The book opens with the sentence “Elliott Carter makes music 
out of simultaneous oppositions.” The next paragraph begins: “Carter has an appetite for 
opposites. He is not interested in reconciling them, as a romantic composer would be; 
nor does he ignore them. He delights in them.” And in the third paragraph, on the same 
opening page, Schiff claims: “Carter’s taste for opposition manifests itself throughout 
his musical life, from his boyhood through his education and onwards through the slow 
process of creative self-discovery.”11   Further on in the introduction, Schiff creates an 
image of the composer himself in a state of constant struggle: 
 It was out of the many contradictory forces he was experiencing that Carter chose to 
make his music. Every work would be a ‘crisis in my life’. The conflicting claims of a 
mechanized society and individual freedom, of order and disorder, European tradition 
and American innovation, would not be obstacles to creation but would become the 
subject of creation. Each work would be a summation of opposites, and each new 
work would be a fresh start, a new crisis.12   
In the later revised edition (1998), Schiff expands on this image of the struggling 
modernist composer, but this time he unfolds a framework for understanding Carter’s 
music with more explicit dialectical implications. In the book’s introductory essay, the 
‘opposition’ of the first edition has now primarily become ‘conflict.’ Carter’s biography 
is filtered through a broad concept of “transatlantic cultural conflict” permeating 
Carter’s own “inner struggles”13 as well as his artistic goals and methods, and out of 
which Carter ultimately creates not “a summation of opposites” but a synthesis: Ives 
with Boulanger, American ultramodernism with European high modernism, Copland’s 
French-influenced neo-classicism with Ives’s home-grown experimentalism, and even 
Schoenbergian expressionism with Stravinskian neo-classicism. According to Schiff:  
The transatlantic conflict that had haunted Carter’s work now assumed a fundamental 
structural role; out of the argument within himself, to paraphrase Yeats, Carter created 
                                                
11 David Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter, 1st ed. (London: Eulenburg Books, 1983), 13. 
12 Ibid., 21. No doubt Schiff’s book would have influenced scholarship with respect to the emphasis on 
“opposition” in Carter’s music, although this book does not reject the dialectical as such and even uses 
the word occasionally, such as on page 193, where Schiff talks of Carter “selecting influences 
dialectically.” However, it is interesting to note that Shreffler points out the significance that Cold War 
thinking had for scholarship in the arts more generally and the loss of a dialectical engagement with 
music history from the discipline of musicology in particular (see Anne C. Shreffler, “Cold War 
Dissonance: Dahlhaus, Taruskin, and the Critique of the Politically Engaged Avant-garde “ in Kultur und 
Musik nach 1945: Asthetik im Zeichen des Kalten Krieges, ed. Ulrich Blomann (conference report from 
Hambacher Schloss, 11.-12. March 2013, Saarbrüken: Pfau-Verlag, 2015).) 
13 David Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter, 2nd ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 1998), 14  
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a music of argument. By giving the clash of styles and character a structural role, 
Carter had found a way to make his music European and American at the same time.14  
Schiff’s conclusion suggests that it was a dialectical engagement with the history of 
musical materials that formed the basis of Carter’s mature compositional developments; 
in other words, Carter synthesized the stylistic antagonisms of a previous era into a new 
form of music.  
 
What Schiff largely leaves aside is the question of the ultimate goal of such a musical 
dialectic—is it merely a means of fulfilling the modernist call to “Make it new!”?15 Or 
is it in fact a means of arriving at the ‘truth’ of some (musical) proposition or claim, as 
the dialectics of the ancient Greeks through to the nineteenth century German 
philosophers would ultimately have it?  It is clear from all of his writings that if Carter 
did think of his compositional work as purposeful in that sense, its goal was that of 
communication and transmission of a message about the possibility of an alternative 
(utopian) way of coexisting with difference and with conflict: a depiction of the ‘truth’ 
of the world as he saw it or would have liked it to be.16 This truth lay in confronting 
conflict in such a way that an alternative could emerge.17  In discussing the direction in 
which he developed compositionally after the War, Carter said in a 1984 interview: 
Well, as one lived through those changing times during and after the Second World 
War, it became obvious that there was a permanent extravagant part of people’s 
experience and actions that had to be faced. We don’t want to run around like wild 
people and hurt each other at every turn but one [sic] the other hand we do have that 
wild side and it has to be fitted into a socially effective situation if we are going to live 
together and profit by it. It seems to me that this could be part of the message of my 
music. It could be seen as a way of trying to deal with this irrational, rather 
extravagant and violent side of ourselves.18 
Seen in this light, Carter’s reference to the ‘dialectic’ in his Second String Quartet rather 
than simply opposition is in fact not without significance.  Carter’s desire to construct 
                                                
14 Ibid., 26. 
15 Carter: “Of course my particular generation was stimulated by one statement made by one of our 
important poets, Ezra Pound, who said: ‘Make it new’.” In Sue Knussen, “Elliott Carter in interview,” 
Tempo no. 197 (1996): 4. 
16 See for example Carter talking about this aspect of his work in Frank Scheffer, “Elliott Carter: A 
Labyrinth of Time,” (Allegri Film BV, DVD, 2004), 1h24’30” onwards. 
17 I discuss how Carter expresses such an alternative in Chapter 3. 
18 Elliott Carter, “Elliott Carter in conversation with Robert Johnston, Michael Century, Robert Rosen, 
and Don Stein (1984),” in Elliott Carter: A Centennial Portrait in Letters and Documents, ed. Felix 
Meyer and Anne C. Shreffler (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2008), 255. 
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his music out of the dialectical oppositions of other musical styles—or perhaps more 
accurately, out of the compositional principles associated with musical styles which had 
historically been pitted against each other19—was entangled with his desire to 
communicate a message through abstract musical means about “dealing with” two 
contradictory modes of being: a social way of being in which individuality was kept in 
check for the greater good, but that also risked at its extreme a radical subservience; and 
an individual way of being that included an “extravagant part” but that at its extreme 
risked violating others. Such a conception of artistic endeavours needing to carry a 
message about the conflict between society and the individual suggests that Carter’s use 
of the term ‘dialectic’ is in fact very much bound up with his own historical context of 
twentieth-century modernism.  
1.2 Modernism and Carter revisited 
This context is by no means easily characterized, as recent scholarship on modernism in 
the humanities has demonstrated.20 Definitions of musical modernism remain 
problematic because of the danger of applying potentially restrictive terms to such a 
complex notion.  Nevertheless, authors continue to find a need to offer specificity to the 
idea of musical modernism in order to render it useful as a concept. In this respect, Max 
Paddison’s description seems to accord with many recent authors on musical 
modernism. He defines twentieth-century modernism as:  
a range of often conflicting responses to a common dilemma, that of the process of 
societal modernization itself. Furthermore, an important feature of all modernist 
positions, however contrary, is resistance to commodification, even when employing 
the material and the means of mass culture itself.21 
                                                
19 For an analysis of stylistic conflicts in new music debates in the post-war period and Carter's thinking 
about and contribution to these debates, especially in relation to his Cello Sonata see Guberman's 
“Chapter 1: The Cello Sonata: Mediating Schoenberg and Stravinsky in Early Cold War America” in 
“Composing Freedom: Elliott Carter’s ‘Self-Reinvention’ and the Early Cold War.” For an extensive 
perspective on Carter's relationship to serial composition, see also Daniel Guberman, “Elliott Carter as 
(Anti-)Serial Compser,” American Music 33, no. 1 (2015): 68-88. 
20 See for example Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1991); Marjorie Perloff, 21st Century Modernism: The “New” Poetics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Andrew Bowie, Music, Philosophy, and Modernity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
21 Max Paddison, “Postmodernism and the Survival of the Avant-garde,” in Contemporary Music: 
Theoretical and Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Irène Deliège and Max Paddison (Ashgate Publishing, 
2001), 206. 
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Paddison points to the split between a commodified ‘mass culture’ and a culture aiming 
to resist commodification as an essential element in the modernisation process. 
Paddison argues that this cultural split represents something of the lived experience of a 
modernising world rather than an abstract notion applied to art.  An overarching 
preoccupation of the modernist artistic response to modernisation was the rupture 
between individual needs and societal demands in a century characterized by the 
recurring experience of world conflict and unprecedented scales of human destruction. 
This dialectic is analysed by Critical Theorists in terms of an increasingly technocratic, 
rationalized and administered society reliant on commodification and reification on the 
one hand, and on the other hand the increasing alienation of the individual and the 
fragmentation of subjective experience, giving rise to various forms of revolt and 
resistance.22 Aesthetic modernism believed in its own power to transform social 
consciousness and steer it on a path to a utopian alternative.23 “The autonomous, self-
reflective art work”24—with its abstracted, non-signifying materials generating form out 
of content, while transforming traditional materials and forms—was conceived as 
standing outside of processes of commodification and of forms of expression that 
supported capitalist ideology and thereby capable of critiquing them.25 Thus, aesthetic 
modernism carried the hope of conceiving of an emancipated future. Diverse as the 
artistic responses may have been, aesthetic modernism has been identified as such to 
group together artistic pursuits that shared a goal for the function(ing) of art, 
underpinned by a pervasive Hegelian dialectical inheritance, through Marx, Weber, and 
later the Frankfurt school.26 
 
Anne Shreffler nicely summarizes how modernist music in this tradition engaged both 
the musical materials and the listening audience in its pursuit of ‘truth’ through musical 
autonomy: 
                                                
22 See for example discussion of the work of the Frankfurt School in J.M. Bernstein, “Introduction,” in 
The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture, by Theodore W. Adorno, ed. J.M. Bernstein 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1991). 
23 For the use of the term “aesthetic modernism,” see Paddison, “Postmodernism and the Survival of the 
Avant-garde,” 210-14. 
24 Ibid., 210. 
25 See Martin Scherzinger, “In Memory of a Receding Dialectic: The Political Relevance of Autonomy 
and Formalism in Modernist Musical Aesthetics,” in The Pleasures of Modernist Music: Listening, 
Meaning, Intention, Ideology, ed. Arved Ashby (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2004), 79 
and 86 including fn.48. 
26 For a discussion of Hegel’s influence on modernist musical thinking see for example Cherlin, 
“Dialectical Opposition in Schoenberg’s Music and Thought.” 
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… the modernist model of progressive music, received its most extensive, and 
extreme, treatment in Theodor W. Adorno’s Philosophie der neuen Musik of 1949, 
although the basic ideas had already been articulated in the 1920s by Adorno and 
others. This viewpoint sees musical language evolving as an inevitable result of 
historical forces. In using an ‘advanced’ idiom – for example an atonal, twelve-tone, 
or serial language – music resists being co-opted into the commercial sphere, or being 
used as a symbol of state power. Responsible art music embodies all the 
contradictions and ‘crises’ of society in its forms and language; in its autonomy, it 
holds up a mirror to the flawed society and serves as a locus for structural critique. 
Specifically, in the 1930s and 1940s it was held to represent an anti-Fascist stance. 
Advanced musical languages moreover prevent a passive, ‘culinary’, purely emotional 
reception of music on the part of the listener; the goal is to get the listener to think, 
and even to change the listener’s consciousness.27 
The themes encapsulated here—of “responsible art music” being autonomous, anti-
Fascist, materially advanced, challenging the “listener’s consciousness”—are discussed 
by Shreffler in relation to Luigi Nono’s Il Canto Sospeso.  As we will see, they are also 
themes that preoccupied Carter throughout much of his musical career. However, as 
Shreffler discusses, social and political critique also took different forms in music: 
Shreffler identifies what she calls the “popularist model” and analyses how Eisler’s 
‘Comintern Song’ and Copland’s Lincoln Portrait each deliberately used musical means 
that would easily and immediately resonate with the ‘masses.’ This type of artistic 
response also had significance for Carter since in the early years of his career he held a 
firm belief in the need for a high level of accessibility of his music in order to reach a 
large audience with which to communicate. Carter’s relationship to the modernist 
movement was therefore especially interesting because of his differing musical response 
at various points in its history. As has been widely discussed, Carter was attracted by all 
that was artistically modern, particularly during the 1920s as a young person in New 
York. However, a rapidly changing world brought on by war prompted Carter to doubt 
his youthful interest in early twentieth-century modernism.  The reality of hardship and 
human atrocities during the depression of the 1930s and the years surrounding World 
War II made the modernist position with its resistance to the masses seem less tenable.28 
Reflecting on Varèse and the question of popular and experimental music at this time, 
Carter says: 
                                                
27 Anne C. Shreffler, “‘Music Left and Right’: A Tale of Two Histories of Progressive Music,” 
Proceedings of the British Academy 185 (2013): 71. 
28 For example see Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter, 114. 
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It’s true that Varèse … seemed very melancholy during this period, which was turning 
toward new, more populist artistic aims, thus putting into question the more 
experimental attitudes of the best artists of his generation.  It was easy for me to 
sympathize with both the old and the new of that time. … Surrounded by so much 
violence and so much need, one could not help wondering whether such a thing as 
advanced modern music with its élite audience wasn’t just beside the point … I’m 
sure that Varèse felt the same way, and perhaps doubted that his kind of music was 
worth anything in the light of the problems facing us then, even in the United States. 
We lived in the midst of a state of affairs that urgently demanded solutions and that 
made it very hard to find the peace of mind to carry on one’s work.29 
Carter captures the sense of irrelevance and lack of valuable contribution which was felt 
by many making experimental art at this time. For some, such as Ruth Crawford and 
Charles Seeger, leaving behind the ultramodern goals and following the “turning 
towards, new, more populist artistic aims” was politically and socially important.30 
Carter, on the other hand, was yet to compose in an ‘advanced’ modernist idiom 
himself. Despite his exposure to and interest in the group surrounding Ives as well as 
the Second Viennese School, Carter initially embraced the neoclassicism he had been 
schooled in by Nadia Boulanger and turned it to political purpose in his early 
compositions (albeit with more latent programmatic content and greater musical 
complexity than other composers).31 However, post war, the heroism and nationalism to 
which Copland’s neoclassic music became the soundtrack seemed to Carter equally out 
of step with the social reality of the then present: 
Many people felt—and I certainly was one of them (perhaps not rightly)—that the 
whole German cult of hypertrophic emotion could have been held responsible for the 
kind of disaster we were witnessing then in front of our noses (certainly Brecht came 
to hold this view). This is why, in my opinion, many of us became interested for a 
time in neoclassicism as a way of ‘returning to reason’ and to a more moderate point 
of view about expression, as well as to a more accessible vocabulary. After a while, 
though, before the end of the Second World War, it became clear to me, partly as a 
result of rereading Freud and others and thinking about psychoanalysis, that we were 
living in a world where this physical and intellectual violence would always be a 
problem and that the whole conception of human nature underlying the neoclassic 
                                                
29 Edwards, Flawed Words, 59-60. 
30 Judith Tick, Ruth Crawford Seeger: A Composer’s Search for American Music (New York, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 180-200. 
31 See Annette van Dyck-Hemming, “Words and Music in The Defense of Corinth,” in Elliott Carter 
Studies, ed. Marguerite Boland and John Link (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Also 
Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter, 76. 
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esthetic amounted to a sweeping under the rug of things that, it seemed to me, we had 
to deal with in a less oblique and resigned way.32 
Carter discusses the return of his interest in modernist expression as a response to a 
changed understanding of “human nature” coupled with concern shared by a whole 
civilisation for preventing another war—not, however, by way of a popular, appeasing 
aesthetic but precisely by returning to an aesthetic of autonomy. Importantly for post-
war modernists, this was where the critical and utopian potential was to be found, 
within the material means themselves which were seen as inaccessible to commodifying 
or corrupting mechanisms.  While it was a return to an aesthetic interest Carter had held 
in earlier years, for Carter this aesthetic move was the beginning of his creative 
maturity.  In fact, Carter’s mature music is not infrequently cited as an example of a 
recalcitrant modernist thinking, as many of Carter’s major “works of opposition” were 
composed in the 1960s and 1970s when yet another change in the landscape was 
developing: the ‘new’ postmodern musical imagination had begun to take flight.33  
 
The postmodernist attitude challenged modernism’s musical autonomy once again, as a 
bourgeois cultural relic, inaccessible and irrelevant to most of post-war society—in fact, 
the post-modern critique followed more or less the very terms that had also been used 
by neoclassicists to challenge the modernist aesthetic pre-war, albeit for different 
reasons. The challenge this time came not only from composers and audiences but 
equally from within the academy. A good example is found from possibly the least 
dialectical of musicologists, Richard Taruskin. Taruskin puts the reductionist view that: 
The essential question of modern art, as it was understood by modern artists during the 
first two-thirds of the twentieth century, and the essential debate, was whether artists 
lived in history or in society. … In the minds of many, one served one’s art or one’s 
society, and loyalty to the one precluded loyalty to the other. One had to choose.34 
As an example of polar extremes in his somewhat caricatured world of artistic 
modernism, Taruskin pits Carter against Benjamin Britten. According to Taruskin, 
Britten, through his explicitly programmatic music concerned with social issues, is an 
                                                
32 Edwards, Flawed Words, 61. 
33 John Link, “Elliott Carter’s Late Music,” in Elliott Carter Studies, ed. Marguerite Boland and John 
Link (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Link has argued that the persistence of the image 
of Carter as uncompromising modernist has failed to keep pace with Carter’s late music which itself has 
been responsive to late modern concerns. 
34 Richard Taruskin, “Chapter 5: Standoff (I),” Music in the Late Twentieth Century, Oxford University 
Press (New York, USA, n.d.). Accessed 20 September, 2016, 
http://www.oxfordwesternmusic.com/Volume5/actrade-9780195384857-chapter-005.xml. 
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artist ‘loyal to society.’ By contrast, Taruskin assesses Carter’s move from neoclassic to 
atonal composition as evidence of his disloyalty to society: “It took [Carter] a decade to 
reconcile the contradictions in his own esthetic sensibility; and he only succeeded by 
resolutely purging it of social aspirations.”  Accordingly, Taruskin finds for example 
that Carter’s Concerto for Orchestra (1969), “from the moment of its unveiling, was a 
historic work in the narrowest sense of the word—the sense that, according to the 
ideology we have been tracing, specifically excluded the social.”  Engaging with a 
critical evaluation of Taruskin’s lengthy chapter on Carter is beyond the point here.35 
However, Taruskin himself stands as an example of an extreme pole of 
(postmodernist?) critic who restricts musical modernism to categories such as heroic, 
historic, asocial, conspirator of cold-war ideology, protagonist of social elitism, and so 
forth.36 Martin Scherzinger reframes the notion that autonomy, or formalism, in music 
equated to a rejection or denial of the social as follows: 
Broadly, what has been disregarded in recent critical accounts is the socially critical 
and provocative side of the formulation of aesthetic autonomy as it was elaborated 
within a dialectical tradition. In other words, the antagonistic side of aesthetic 
autonomy, which was tied to notions of critique and negativism, has largely been 
forgotten. What should be remembered is that, by resisting absorption into the terrain 
of everyday meaning, the inherently non-discursive, absolutely musical work also 
defied the ideological hold of such meaning. This distance between music and society, 
which Lydia Goehr calls a “critical gap,” was its social praxis.37  
Scherzinger’s account is a reversal of Taruskin’s: it is precisely by “serving one’s art” 
that one served one’s society. According to Carter, each change in his musical style had 
                                                
35 A number of people have critiqued Taruskin on Carter, some extensively such as Charles Rosen, 
“Music and the Cold War,” New York Review of Books 7 April 2011; “From the Troubadours to Frank 
Sinatra,” New York Review of Books 9 March 2006; Guberman, “Composing Freedom: Elliott Carter’s 
‘Self-Reinvention’ and the Early Cold War.”). Others have commented more briefly, for example Arnold 
Whittall, “Review of Elliott Carter: A Centennial Celebration; and Elliott Carter: A Centennial Portrait 
in Letters and Documents,” Music and Letters 90, no. 4 (2009); and James Wierzbicki, Elliott Carter 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2011), 98. 
36 See Shreffler, “Cold War Dissonance.” Shreffler gives a balanced and insightful assessment of what 
Shreffler calls “Taruskin’s desire to identify and, if possible, to eliminate vestiges of German romantic 
thinking wherever they occur, historically or in contemporary musicology.” For critiques of Taruskin’s 
Oxford History of Western Music see J.P.E. Harper-Scott, “Modernism as We Know it, Ideology, and the 
Quilting Point,” in The Quilting Points of Musical Modernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012). And also Whittall in “Twentieth-Century Music in Retrospect: Fulfilment or Betrayal?,” The 
Musical Times 140, no. 1869 (Winter, 1999). 
37 Scherzinger, “In Memory of a Receding Dialectic,” 69. Here Scherzinger is referencing Lydia Goehr, 
The Quest for Voice: Music Politics, and the Limits of Philosophy (Berkely, Los Angeles, London: 
University of California Press, 1998). 
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at its base a concern for how new music could ‘serve’ society.38  Far from “resolutely 
purging [his music] of social aspirations,” Carter was attempting to respond artistically 
to the complex problem of saying something that was for him both socially and 
musically truthful at different points in time.39  As I aim to demonstrate, Carter’s 
modernist musical response chose art as social critique in line with the ‘dialectical 
tradition’ that Scherzinger outlines above.40 
 
What does it mean to say that Carter’s compositional aesthetic followed a tradition of 
dialectical thinking about music? The study of contact between dialectical thought and 
musical thought has a history stretching back to Plato but for our modern era can be 
found perhaps most famously in the Hegel-Beethoven nexus.  As Julian Horton puts it 
in ‘Dialectics and Music Theory’: 
In the history of ideas, the dialectical shift is a major element of the Sonderweg, or 
‘special path’ that German intellectual life arguably pursued from the later eighteenth 
century [and which included] … a sense of shared cultural identity oriented around 
Beethoven, which is coeval with the idealist philosophy of Hegel and the poetry of 
Hölderlin.41 
In Horton’s “prefatory appraisal of Hegelian and Adornian dialectical mentalities,” he 
provides a three-way view of Hegel’s notions of the dialectic which, at the risk of 
oversimplifying, I will summarize here as a useful outline. Firstly, Hegel’s dialectic was 
a response to the contradictions of formal logic or systematic methodology (in 
                                                
38 Martin Brody’s account of Babbitt’s immersion in the 1930s and 1940s political and cultural scene in 
New York provides an important insight into the environment which likewise surrounded Carter. Brody 
explores the influence of John Dewey, Dwight McDonald, Clement Greenberg, and the various 
communist organisations and publications shaping the priorities for American culture at the time. Martin 
Brody, “‘Music for the Masses’: Milton Babbitt’s Cold War Music Theory,” The Musical Quarterly 77, 
no. 2 (Summer, 1993). Guberman has also theorized about the enduring influence on Carter of debates of 
that time, particularly around questions of mass culture and elite culture, in his discussion of the influence 
of politics on Carter’s music in Guberman, “Composing Freedom: Elliott Carter’s ‘Self-Reinvention’ and 
the Early Cold War,” chapter 3. For an exploration of material means reflecting social aims, see Dörte 
Schmidt, “‘I try to write music that will appeal to an intelligent listener’s ear.’ On Elliott Carter’s string 
quartets,” in Elliott Carter Studies, ed. Marguerite Boland and John Link (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 169-72. 
39 An excellent example of this problem can be found in Shreffler’s comparison of Nono’s Il Canto 
Sospeso with Copland’s Lincoln Portrait and Schoenberg’s Ode to Napoleon. Shreffler, “‘Music Left and 
Right’: A Tale of Two Histories of Progressive Music.” 
40 Martin Brody makes a similar case for Wolpe, drawing on Arendt and Adorno to argue against views 
put by Taruskin and Whittall:  “In both accounts, social engagement is taken to be incompatible with 
‘abstraction’; unresolved conflicts in Wolpe’s psyche inhibit motion on the path of artistic fruition; the 
composer retreats into esotericism.” (p. 206) Brody argues instead for hearing “the composer’s musical 
forms as modelling critical subjectivity and social engagement.”(p. 208) Martin Brody, “‘Where to Act, 
How to Move’: Unruly Action in Late Wolpe,” Contemporary Music Review 27, no. 2/3 (2008). 
41 Horton, “Dialectics and music analysis,” 112. 
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philosophy), as identified by Kant. Hegel’s critique of Kant lead him not to an 
alternative formal logic but to the notion of the dialectic as “‘the grasping of opposites 
in their unity or of the positive in the negative’.”42 In other words, for Hegel 
contradiction could not be avoided as it is immanent to all things. Secondly, Horton 
says that according to Hegel “[t]he ontological explanation of the dialectic posits it as 
the mechanism of the progressive self-understanding of consciousness (the Spirit or 
Geist).”43 The experience of existence is understood as one of ‘becoming’ (rather than 
the dualistic and static opposition of being/nothingness), a continual process of self-
reflection on the contradictions of subject and object which puts consciousness in 
motion towards transcendence.44  Finally, for Hegel this dialectical process constitutes a 
model of the progress of history since “the progress of Spirit towards self-understanding 
is also the engine of human history.”45 
 
While Carter was in no way self-consciously a Hegelian (like, for example, Wolpe 
was),46 we may nonetheless examine aspects of Carter’s aesthetic in this light since, as 
we saw above, this kind of thinking undergirded the modernist mentality more 
generally.  Furthermore, the notion of the unity of opposites pervades the technical as 
well as programmatic aspects of Carter’s mature music.  It manifests itself in the 
broadest sense in the poetry Carter chose to associate with his compositions and in the 
way he built dramatic musical scenarios out of the fundamentally contrasting way 
musical instruments can produce their sound. For example, Carter wrote pieces that 
brought together sustaining and non-sustaining instruments specifically in order to 
emphasize their fundamentally different sonic characteristics, such as the Duo for 
Violin and Piano or the Double Concerto for Piano and Harpsichord. Carter also 
composed pieces in which he deliberately highlighted the differences between similar 
instruments: he purposefully super-imposed contrasting playing techniques of 
instruments from the same family, such as the sustain and the staccato of the flute and 
clarinet in Esprit Rude/Esprit Doux or the myriad ways the strings can distinguish 
themselves from each other in the String Quartets, while contrasting these with textures 
in which the individual instruments blend together. Unity of opposites also manifests 
itself in specific techniques related to working with pitch and interval aggregates, which 
                                                
42 Ibid., 114, quoting Hegel. See also McKinney, “The Origins of Modern Dialectics.” 
43 Horton, “Dialectics and music analysis,” 114. 
44 Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music, 113-16. 
45 Horton, “Dialectics and music analysis,” 115. 
46 See for example Matthew Greenbaum, “Stefan Wolpe’s Dialectical Logic: A Look at the ‘Second Piece 
for Violin Alone’,” Perspectives of New Music 40, no. 2 (Summer 2002). 
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Carter splits up to make unique contrasting musical identities that are each other’s 
opposites (mutually exclusive yet sourced from a single origin). These partitioned 
aggregates are pitted against each other but also united into new sonorities over the 
unfolding of a piece. The unfolding, or form, of a Carter piece is in continual motion, 
flow, ‘becoming,’ where the opposing sonorities interact and transform each other, 
never returning to a previous sonic state, but nonetheless never entirely discarding or 
losing their identities.  Carter’s attitude towards the development of new musical form 
and material reflects a dialectical model of progress: novelty that negates or denies its 
inheritance, or the re-use of past forms and materials which ignores its contemporary 
context, fail to lead to a true new music. Instead a dialectical approach requires music to 
build on inherited material and form, incorporating and transforming the past in the new 
context of the present (more on this in Chapter 2: Tracing the dialectical in Carter’s 
compositional aesthetic).   
  
According to Horton “… it is entirely reasonable to argue that music written in the age 
of Hegelianism absorbs something of that epistemological context.” And, he adds, 
“[t]his argument can be extended to encompass Adorno as well.”47  Adorno, as heir to 
the Hegelian dialectical tradition, has had the most significant influence on dialectics in 
musical thought in the twentieth century (with a lineage continuing from him to Carl 
Dahlhaus and Herman Danuser). While Adorno’s negative dialectics does not seem to 
hold much resonance with Carter’s musical aesthetic—as many have noted Carter was 
too much of an optimist48—Carter was nonetheless composing and writing about music 
not only in the wake of the era of idealist philosophy but in the era of its critical re-
appraisal, the ‘era’ of Adorno. Adorno’s dialectics, while grounded in a Hegelian-
Marxist tradition, is also a critique of Hegel, his utopianism in particular. For Adorno 
like other twentieth-century philosophers, there is no “progress of Spirit,” no 
reconciliation of individual and collective possible.49 Adorno’s analysis of the 
disintegration of society and the disintegration of modern music is mostly interpreted as 
a bleak prognosis for society and art music alike; as Carter said of Adorno’s 
                                                
47 Horton, “Dialectics and music analysis,” 111. 
48 Paul Giffiths sees in Carter “an optimism and brightness” (Michael Anthony, “Elliott Carter: America’s 
greatest living composer or alienating ogre?,” The Star Tribune 3 March 2006 ). Whittall sees Carter’s 
attitude as radically opposed to an aesthetic of alienated anguish or melancholia (“The search for order: 
Carter’s Symphonia and late-modern thematicism,” in Elliott Carter Studies, ed. Marguerite Boland and 
John Link (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 71-72 and 77. Max Noubel also portrays 
Carter as an optimist in Elliott Carter ou le temps fertile (Genève: Èditions Contrechamps, 2000), 59-60. 
49 Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music, 265. 
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Philosophie der neuen Musik “It is depressing…”50  Recent studies of Adorno’s later 
work do discuss Adorno as showing signs of a rethinking of his earlier conclusions.51 
However, regardless of this, what is significant for music and music analysis is 
Adorno’s theorising of how autonomous structures of music mediate structures of 
society. In other words, as Horton notes, for Adorno 
 [m]uscial works, like all art, constitute ‘the unconscious historiography of their 
epoch.’ Their social ‘essence’ can therefore be read from their technical, structural 
components; the intra-musical embodies the extra-musical, because the former is the 
dialectical partner of the latter.52 
In other words, music—like all other aspects of culture and society—is a product of its 
history, unconsciously and inescapably. In fact, according to Adorno the musical work 
sits within a network of mediations: it is mediated autonomously within itself, it is 
socially mediated, and historically mediated; and the same categories apply a second 
time around to the work’s performance. But the musical work is engaged in this 
mediation ‘intentionlessly.’ Paddison explains: 
This totality of mediations is the work’s context of meaning, and constitutes its 
gesture, its physiognomy, the face it makes at us, its expression. This is all the work 
fulfils, without intending or meaning to—in the sense in which Adorno uses the term 
‘intentionless’—and it is precisely in this that the meaning of the work lies, in what he 
calls its ‘mimetic being’ rather than in the amount of intention invested in the work by 
the composer (or indeed by the performer or listener).53 
Thus, composers need not themselves be conscious of the processes of mediation in 
their work.54  In fact, as Paddison points out, the composer’s intentions may differ from 
the “true” meaning of the work. All the same, it is possible that there exists a degree of 
                                                
50 Letter from Elliott Carter to Bayan Northcott, Elliott Carter Collection, Paul Sacher Stiftung, March 15, 
1974. 
51 See especially Julian Johnson, “‘The Elliptical Geometry of Utopia’: New Music Since Adorno,” in 
Apparitions: New Perspectives on Adorno and Twentieth Century Music, ed. Bertohold Hoeckner (New 
York and London: Francis and Taylor, 2006). 
52 Horton, “Dialectics and music analysis,” 116. 
53 Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music, 274 but see also 65. 
54 Paddison gives a great example of a composer’s ignorance of the social “embeddedness” of his art: 
“The wonderful irony of Schoenberg’s alleged statement in support of an uncompromising art-for-art’s-
sake position, that ‘music has no more to do with society than a game of chess’, is telling on all counts, 
given the formal clarity with which the hierarchy of mediaeval society is represented on the chessboard.” 
Ibid., 259-60. 
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accord between composer intention and the “intensionless” work, even if the 
composer’s freedom with his/her materials may appear greater than it really is.55  
 
What interests me in the first part of this study is the significance Carter himself places 
on the social aspect of his musical thinking. This is illustrated in a somewhat grandiose 
statement Carter made in a 1973 interview: 
Sound for its own sake is of very limited interest to me. Human beings, I think, come 
to expect more from music than entertaining patterns of tone-colors. Mine uses a large 
variety of these but, I hope, always to transcend the medium of sound completely and 
present a more significant human message.56 
In this statement, Carter not only makes the claim that his music is about more than the 
music itself, he places the significance of the social above that of the purely artistic.  It 
is in this aspect of Carter’s aesthetic that we find evidence for the claim of a critical 
function for formalist music. What is more, while Carter’s musical innovations remain 
entirely about the musical materials—his compositions do not transfer their message 
programmatically as Taruskin would have liked—the explanations he gives of his 
compositions, nevertheless, make recourse to anthropomorphising the instruments and 
tying the musical drama to human scenarios of conflict and opposition, albeit often 
somewhat abstracted ones. For example, the “dialectic” of the Second Quartet to which 
Carter makes reference in the opening quote to this chapter concerns the interaction of 
the musical material as played by the instruments (“all these instruments were somehow 
related more by a kind of dialectic”), but Carter’s explanation that the instruments 
interact by “discussing things” makes use of a human metaphor.57  Thus, in Carter’s 
aesthetic, there exists a complex relationship between musical material (the technical) 
and “human message” (the social). I wish to tease out this relationship by way of an 
                                                
55 This interesting web of connections between composer intention and intentionlessness of the work are 
touched on by various of authors. Julian Johnson discusses Feldman’s music in relation to these notions 
in Johnson, “‘The Elliptical Geometry of Utopia’: New Music Since Adorno.” Peter Edward discusses the 
interaction of Ligeti’s music philosophy and musical form as well as Adorno’s influence on him in Peter 
Edwards, “Convergences and Discord in the Correspondence Between Ligeti and Adorno,” Music and 
Letters 96, no. 2 (23 April 2015). And Martin Brody discusses the way Wolpe presents his materials as 
having independent agency in Brody, “‘Where to Act, How to Move’.” esp. 214. 
56 Carter, “Elliott Carter, Interview with Stuart Lieberman (1973).” Quoted in Henning Eisenlohr, 
Komponieren als Entscheidungsprozess: Studien zur Problematik von Form und Gestalt, dargestellt am 
Beispiel von Elliott Carters Trilogy for Oboe and Harp (Kassel: Gustav Bosse, 1999), 243. 
57 See John Roeder, “‘The matter of human cooperation’ in Carter’s Mature Style,” in Elliott Carter 
Studies, ed. Marguerite Boland and John Link (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), esp. 114-
15 and 22. 
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interpretive/analytical perspective informed, at least in part, by an Adornian aesthetics 
of music. 
 
* * * 
 
My interest in this study lies in the reciprocal influence felt at the boundary between 
technical analysis and aesthetic interpretation. It is not necessary to set out to find in the 
music what we think the composer might have put there; at the same time, however, 
there is an interplay between the body of thought that produces analytical 
understandings and that which created artistic works—the composer in this case is 
situated in the same social world as the analyst, even if they are at an historical distance 
from each other. Adorno claimed technical music analysis to be necessary before any 
other reflection can take place but that technical analysis was not sufficient reflection in 
and of itself: a philosophical and sociological analysis is required to be able to find the 
true link between the purely musical thought and its dialectical partner, the social world 
from which it emanated.58 How to go about this linking task, whether following Adorno 
or within other epistemological frames (feminist, queer, post-colonial, linguistic, etc.), 
has been the challenge to musicology and music analysis since Adorno and the question 
has resulted in particularly innovative responses from the 1980s onwards.59 In the next 
section I turn to examining some of the issues of Adorno’s legacy to music analysis 
before returning to a detailed outline of the aims of this study. 
1.3 Music dialectics and Adorno’s legacy 
Interpreting and re-interpreting Adorno’s legacy to musicology steadily gained 
momentum in the English-speaking world after Rose Rosengard Subotnik’s ground-
breaking books.60  As this legacy has been so wide-ranging, scholarship in musicology 
                                                
58 Theodor W. Adorno, “On the Problem of Musical Analysis,” Music Analysis 1/ii (1982): 176-77. See 
also Max Paddison, “Immanent Critique or Musical Stocktaking? Adorno and the Problem of Musical 
Analysis,” in Adorno: a critical reader, ed. Nigel Gibson and Andrew Rubin (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001); 
Henry Klumpenhouwer, “Late Capitalism, Late Marxism and the Study of Music,” Music Analysis 20, 
no. iii (2001): 368. 
59 See Andrew Edgar, “Adorno and Musical Analysis,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 57, 
no. 4 (Autumn, 1999): 448. 
60 For this view on Subotnik’s influence see Tia DeNora, After Adorno: Rethinking Music Sociology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), xv; and Robert Witkin, Adorno on Music (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1998), 5. The works referred to are Rose Rosengard Subotnik, Developing 
Variations: Style and Ideology in Western Music (Minneapolis: Univeristy of Minnesota Press, 1991); 
and Deconstructive Variations: Music and Reason in Western Society (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996). 
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has focussed on many diverse aspects of Adorno’s thought and for many different 
purposes.61 Analysis of nineteenth century music, particularly responding to Adorno’s 
writings on Beethoven, Schubert, Mahler and Wagner, seems to have stimulated 
perhaps the greatest interest.62 Adorno’s assessment of jazz and popular music have also 
provoked wide-spread responses (both dismissive and constructively critical),63 often 
linked to critiques of Adorno’s sociology of music, with Tia DeNora’s ‘rethinking’ of 
Adorno’s music sociology representing the most constructive.64 Engagement with 
Adorno’s aesthetics of music from a philosophical standpoint is at its apex in the works 
of Lydia Goehr, of Max Paddison, and of Andrew Bowie.65 Recent contributions in 
Berthold Hoeckner’s collection Apparitions: New Perspectives on Adorno and 
Twentieth-Century Music offer some of the finest representations of the current diverse 
interests of musicological scholarship.66   
 
The specific focus of the questions, issues and points of contention in studies that deal 
with Adorno’s legacy to music(ology) depends significantly on the disciplinary starting 
point.  The shortcomings of Adorno’s thinking to the music philosopher (for example, 
the lack of a sufficiently developed concept of mediation) may be incidental to the 
questions pursued by the music sociologist (for whom Adorno’s lack of empirical 
evidence may cause his theories to run aground).67 Furthermore, music analysts are 
faced with trying to understand how to carry out “immanent music analysis” in the 
almost complete absence of concrete analytical examples provided by Adorno.68 In 
what follows I will sketch a brief picture of the historical context of Adorno’s music 
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aesthetics within his broader philosophical theory, before discussing Adorno’s notion of 
form-content dialectic in music, the mediated nature of musical materials, and the role 
of music analysis. I do not engage with a critique of Adorno’s philosophy of music as 
such—as a music analyst and composer such a critique is well beyond my area of 
expertise. What I do examine are re-interpretations of aspects of Adorno’s musical 
thought by scholars wishing to identify the critical power that Adorno ascribes to music 
but in the context of a changed social, cultural and intellectual reality of the decades 
around the turn of the twenty-first century. In this discussion I identify writings and 
analytical approaches of significance for my own analysis of Carter’s aesthetic and 
compositions. 
1.3.a Adorno’s music aesthetics contextualized 
While it is true that Adorno’s aesthetic theory remains resistant to summary, it is also 
true that a number of excellent overviews have been written, making Adorno’s thought 
more easily available to those practicing music analysis whose experience lies outside 
of a philosophical training.69 Perhaps the most significant first point that these writings 
make is that Adorno’s aesthetics of music sits within a much broader interdisciplinary 
project and, while his aesthetic theory bears directly on music (its social, technical, and 
psychological constituents), the concepts and categories developed about music stem 
from Adorno’s philosophical and sociological critique of reason, the principle 
motivation of Adorno’s life work.70  Tia De Nora, in After Adorno: Rethinking Music 
Sociology, explicitly states that her introduction is not an introduction to Adorno, but 
perhaps because of this, she gives the most helpful outline of the central philosophical 
themes that underpin Adorno’s work. As DeNora says, Adorno  
sought to understand what he perceived as a transformation of consciousness, one that 
fostered authoritarian modes of ruling. … Adorno’s critique of reason centres on the 
idea that material reality is more complex than the ideas and concepts available for 
describing it. … Reality … cannot be fully addressed by words, measurements, 
concepts, and categories, all of which must be understood at best as approximations of 
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reality, as socially constituted ideas or images of phenomena. … His work highlighted 
the disjunction between ideas and material reality, a gap within which the former 
might be useful, indeed, even ‘effective’, but never be eternally or comprehensively 
‘true.’71 
Thus, the way we think about and articulate reality is not the same as reality itself.  As 
human beings, the communication of thought is a necessity of our existence. However, 
we build up complex ways of thinking about our world and us in it, which are in turn 
constantly changing as human conditions of existence change. But precisely because 
our way of reasoning can change, it is also incapable of being identical to fixed material 
reality (Adorno was a materialist, not an idealist).72 
 
Taking a step further back, Adorno’s critique of reason must be situated within the 
historical context of modernity since the Enlightenment. As scientific reason and 
individual rationality gradually got the upper hand over more speculative modes of 
reason and over collective thinking, the “gap” between reason and reality became 
gradually more apparent. The question that faced the post World War II generation 
perhaps most urgently, is put by Horton as follows: 
If the achievement of the Enlightenment was to emancipate the individual by asserting 
the primacy of rational autonomy [of the citizen-subject] over social function or 
convention, then the question arises as to what kind of a society can be devised, which 
respects this autonomy while also preserving a notion of collective responsibility. The 
great bourgeois aspiration is the attainment of such a social order, the citizens of 
which could act freely in accordance with the dictates of reason and simultaneously 
fulfil their communal responsibilities … Adorno’s historical model is in essence the 
narrative of this aspiration’s failure.73  
Thus, the bourgeois idea of individual freedom within collective responsibility did not 
match the reality of experience. In fact, the inability to identify this gap was seen by 
Adorno as fundamental to how reason was constituted under Enlightenment tenets. 
Reason and culture had a tendency to engage in a kind of deception, or self-deception, 
of believing that ideas were fixed (could not change) and that they faithfully represented 
how things really were—a process Adorno termed objectification. Objectification was 
dangerous because of what it then made possible in terms of the way human beings 
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could act or the kind of actions of others they might accept. It “dehumanised 
consciousness” and made it “amenable to externally imposed relations of ruling.”74 
Scherzinger points out that: 
 … for Adorno, totalitarianism was not an irrational eruption in an otherwise 
progressive continuum of Enlightenment logic, but a refinement of some of its central 
tenets. The Nazi industrialization of death, for example, was both a perversion and an 
embodiment of the instrumental principle of efficiency and self-interest. For Adorno, 
Enlightenment reason needed to remain allied to other (“non-identical”) concepts of 
truth and ethics if it was, politically, to resist the power of the totalitarian state, and, 
economically, to resist the movements of brazen monopoly capital.75 
The “non-identical” refers to all that is opposite, contradictory, excluded, different from 
a defined concept; it is the particular individual case within a universalising category.  
As DeNora puts it, in his philosophical project, “Adorno sought to illuminate difference 
and contradiction—the residual, the ill-fitting, non-sense, in short, anything that did not 
‘fit’ within existing categories of thought.”76 
 
Adorno’s philosophy of music is an application of his critical theory to a cultural 
product that has unique non-representational and temporal properties which, according 
to Adorno, enable it to critique reason through means other than reason itself (i.e., a 
social critique mediated though music). Adorno theorized that the arrangement of 
musical materials within a composition’s form could affirm the existing social order, or 
alternatively it could show up how the existing social order was an idea that excluded 
from itself the reality of individual experience and at the same time it could offer an 
alternative for organising individual and collective needs.  Most significantly, this 
critique was not made by way of metaphor or analogy to the real world: music did not 
‘represent’ actual society. Rather, the manner in which the musical materials of the past 
were reshaped into something new illustrated a process of handling one type of material 
reality (i.e., musical materiality) that could stand as an example of how other areas of 
material reality could be reshaped. Music was so important to Adorno because, as we 
saw above, “the intra-musical embodies the extra-musical, because the former is the 
dialectical partner of the latter.” In other words, music is the dialectical partner of 
conceptual reason, since music itself is without concepts.  However, for music to carry 
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out a critique it must not be put to the services of instrumental reason.  Scherzinger 
notes that for Adorno “[t]his is where the principle of aesthetic autonomy played a 
pivotal role.” He continues: 
Adorno considerably invested autonomous modernist artworks with the ability to 
resist undesired political and economic developments. Art’s very aesthetic autonomy 
freed it from the instrumental reason that operated only to secure the ends of certain 
(market-driven) means. In the words of Adorno, “The uncalculating autonomy of 
works which avoid popularization and adaption to the market, involuntarily become 
an attack on them.”… Hence, the formalist autonomy of these works rendered them 
recalcitrant to permanent (and therefore exploitative) values. They were a dialectical 
“challenge [to] the lying positivism of meaning.” In other words, the formal aesthetic 
dimension, however hermetic and receding in itself, was relevant to aspects of 
political struggle.”77  
Precisely because of the autonomy of these works, they were able to reach into the 
consciousness of the audience and make them feel uneasy about something about 
contemporary existence that was almost impossible to acknowledge. In other words, the 
inaccessibility of these works to logical reason protected them from corruption. As an 
example of how even words can escape this logical reasoning, Adorno wrote of Samuel 
Beckett’s plays “no-one can persuade himself that these eccentric plays and novels are 
not about what everyone knows but no-one will admit.”78 According to Adorno, 
Schoenberg’s music worked in a similar way in relation to the logic of the musical 
language of a previous era, as Scherzinger points out: “Likewise, the atonal works of 
Schoenberg put into question their very own compositional procedures.”79  
 
At the core of Adorno’s concern in his aesthetics of music, as far as I understand it, is 
the way in which these compositional procedures—the music materials and their 
structuring—not only resist corruption but also undertake the task of immanent social 
critique.80 Adorno’s claim that ‘radical’ music is able to make such a social critique is 
made by way of a complex and idiosyncratic style of argument that (as already noted) is 
grounded in Hegelian dialectical thought. Max Paddison’s book, Adorno’s Aesthetics of 
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Music, demonstrates the complexity of the “constellations” of thought that lie behind 
Adorno’s theory of music. His work is invaluable to anyone attempting to undertake 
music analysis that is informed by Adornian thought. It is not my aim here to try to 
summarize Paddison’s work, even less Adorno’s aesthetic theory; nevertheless many 
ideas have their basis in pre-established philosophical and musical understandings and 
categories that make up the conceptual framework from which to begin to approach 
Adorno’s “immanent dialectic of musical material.”  In what follows I am guided by 
Paddison’s work and only highlight concepts that specifically relate to the task of 
technical formal analysis at this point. Others I address in the course of this thesis. 
1.3.b Form-content dialectic  
Some of these concepts are familiar: the form-content dialectic famously shaped many 
debates in new music post 1945, to which Adorno but also many others contributed, 
such as Pierre Boulez and Elliott Carter. Boulez’s 1960 Darmstadt lecture entitled 
“Form” opens with an orientation to the modernist re-conception of possibilities for 
large-scale musical organisation: 
[In the past] the composer was working in a universe clearly defined by general laws 
that already existed before he embarked on his composition. From this it followed that 
all “abstract” relationships implicit in the idea of form could be defined a priori, and 
this gave rise to a certain number of schemes or archetypes that existed ideally before 
being realized in any actual work . . . This whole scaffolding of “schemes” had 
eventually to make way for a new conception of form as something that could be 
changed from one moment to the next. Each work had to originate its own form, a 
form essentially and irreversibly linked to its “content.”81 
Carter, in his 1958 essay “A Further Step” written two years before Boulez’s lecture, 
similarly discusses the break with what he called “pre-established patterns” in the 
twentieth century. He explores his idea of an “emancipated musical discourse” in which 
new music must re-examine the premises of musical continuity: 
Up to now, twentieth-century composers have explored new domains of harmony and 
their implications and have tried experiments with new materials in familiar contexts, 
and often produced expressive or formal effects similar to those found in older music. 
But today—as befits an art whose formative dimension is time—the technique of 
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continuity and contrast, of qualities and types of motion, of the formation and 
development of a musical idea or event, and in general the various kinds of cause and 
effect patterns that can be suggested in musical flow, occupy the attention of 
composer more than harmony or other matters, of which now become simply details 
in a larger kind of concern. In this view, no item, no unifying principle or method of 
continuity is self-evident or considered a given part of musical process, but all are 
considered in light of the whole and included or worked over so as to be able to fit the 
general scheme. Such a reexamination of musical discourse seems inevitable now, and 
a necessary culmination of all the different efforts of composers in our century.82 
In their different ways Boulez and Carter each express the relationship of form to 
content as needing to be dynamic and responsive to the ‘new’ materials. Carter goes on 
to explore examples of music that demonstrate this dynamic relationship both to new 
materials and to materials of the past, and also provides contrasting examples of music 
which ignore these demands (including serial music that is purely constructivist). 
Adorno creates a more complex schema than the ‘form-content’ opposition of Boulez 
and Carter in order to accommodate a number of other concepts.83 Nevertheless, what is 
shared by all three is the broad idea that musical materials and their relationship to pre-
established formal types had broken down out of necessity, and that the treatment of the 
materials themselves commanded a new formal response.  
 
In Adorno’s theorising of the relationship of form and content, he distinguishes between 
‘material’ and ‘content.’ For Adorno, ‘content’ addresses ‘what goes on in the piece’ in 
the process of its unfolding (the establishing and treatment of material relationships), 
while he designates the term ‘material’ to the elements of music (pitch, rhythm, texture, 
timbre etc.) with their ‘pre-formed’ historical meanings, which also include ‘forms’ in 
the sense of historical formal types (sonata form, rondo etc.)  At base, Adorno’s concept 
of musical ‘material’ is not especially unfamiliar: ‘material’ is not neutral but is made 
up of ‘sedimented historical meaning.’ A simple example is that of the diminished 
seventh chord, which in Beethoven’s era had dramatic meaning that became trivialized 
by overuse for dramatic effect by Romantic composers and in the post-tonal world can 
no longer escape any of its implied (historically sedimented) meaning except if treated 
in a way as to explicitly avoid conjuring up that past sound world.  But Adorno’s 
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‘material’ may also include forms and genres that have been handed down through 
history; the composer must equally be cognisant of the historical meaning of these 
formal types and respond to them from the present historical situation of music, and, as 
Boulez and Carter say above, not use them anachronistically as the architectural 
“scaffolds” into which “new” content is poured. 
 
Adorno also has a separate concept of ‘form,’ as the counterpart to ‘content’ and 
‘materials,’ which comes about as a response to the particular continuity of individual 
musical moments that are not subjugated to the demands of an overall form structure 
but can exist and move according to their own spontaneous requirements; the 
consistency of the piece’s organisation results from a unity of the musical ideas with 
their formal unfolding.84 While Adorno shares with Boulez and Carter the idea that 
form must respond to material, for Adorno form always involves a tension between 
sedimented historical meaning present in the material and new meaning that comes 
about by the composer’s re-contextualisation and deconstruction of the pre-formed 
material.  This ‘dealing with the past’ congealed within musical material is crucial to a 
dialectical approach.85 Something truly new can only come about by first showing up 
and dismantling how things have been: revealing what has been left out, what does not 
fit, what contradicts the current organisation of ideas and expectations.  Furthermore, 
Paddison says, for Adorno the essential problem of musical form in modern music is 
how “to construct a unity which does not conceal the fragmentary and chaotic state of 
the handed-down musical material, yet which does not simply mirror fragmentation 
through identification with it …”86  In other words, while unity and consistency are 
required for form to be articulated, the truth of the materials is that they are coming 
apart, that they no longer have a fixed function in a shared system of organisation (i.e., 
tonality)—how can these two be reconciled? 
 
The example that might best be given is that of Berg’s Sonata for Piano Op.1 since it is 
the piece of which Adorno made the most sustained analysis himself and which has had 
a history of further analysis extending to the present day.87  In this piece, the pre-formed 
typology of sonata form is put into tension with Berg’s motivic and harmonic processes 
(of developing variation of the smallest motivic cells and of transitional harmonic 
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material derived from the themes/motives themselves). While there is a ‘scaffold’ of a 
formal type present, Berg’s use of this scaffold is dialectical, breaking it down so as to 
reveal that the old formal order can no longer support the new musical materials, which 
do not simply support the articulation of the form (e.g., with first and second themes, 
tonal areas etc.) but blur its divisions and create ambiguity between sections and 
functions as a response to the demands of the new materials themselves. Sonata form is 
present and recognisable, but only as a disfigured traditional form, one that is 
disintegrating yet being held together by the sonic logic of the new configurations now 
available.  Berg’s handling of form challenges the ‘concept’ of sonata form and the idea 
that its structures are “perfected within themselves which might be exhibited for all time 
in museums of opera or concert.”88 
1.3.c Mediated social critique 
It is in the dialectic between what is pre-formed and what is re-formed that Adorno 
finds the mediated social critique that music can perform. Radical new music does not 
paint a musical picture of social relations programmatically. Rather, to make a 
contemporary analogy, it can be likened to the way hand-made local goods produced 
from recycled materials and environmentally conscious processes—through their very 
materials and social relations of production—provide a critique of a society obsessed 
with low-quality, low-cost goods that is happy to ignore both the social and 
environmental exploitation necessary for their production.  The form of the goods 
themselves (their materials and shape) makes an immanent critique because of the 
concealed (or perhaps today no longer so concealed) relations of their production. This 
is essentially the Marxist materialist argument that Adorno turned to the service of 
cultural critique.89 In other words, musical material is also material that has been 
‘formed’ by the rationality of its time and the ‘form’ it takes is either critical or 
affirming of that rationality. Paddison says that according to Adorno: “Authentic 
autonomous works function as a critique of the instrumental rationality of the outside 
world, although they are mediated by that same rationality through the logicality of their 
form.”90  Below I will look at some of the difficulties that Paddison in particular 
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identifies with the question of mediation, or the linking of inner musical structure and 
outer social reality, in Adorno’s aesthetic theory. But to return for the moment to Berg’s 
Op.1, the disintegration of sonata form—Enlightenment reason’s most emblematic of 
musical forms—was seen by Adorno as homologous to the disintegration of social 
relations and bourgeois rationality that characterized twentieth-century modernism. The 
thinking that produced sonata form was being challenged. And it is the particular way 
that this experience is reproduced in Berg’s handling of the old and the new that gives 
it, for Adorno, its critical quality. For example, Horton discusses Adorno’s analysis of 
the significance of Berg’s treatment of the ending of the piece, contrasting it with a 
composition historically situated at the beginning of this process of disintegration, 
namely Beethoven’s ‘Tempest’ Sonata: 
In Berg’s Op.1, the embedding of antinomies has progressed to a point of almost 
inconceivable density. (…) The ultimate sense that no overarching synthesis can draw 
all of these conflicts into a higher unity—in brief, the work’s negative-dialectical 
posture—is basic to its expressive trajectory, and it is this above all that locates it as 
one historical end-point to the manner of composition introduced in the first 
movement of Beethoven’s ‘Tempest.’ Unlike Beethoven, however, Berg supplies no 
finale that might take up his movement’s dualities and resolve them; the Sonata’s 
manifold teleologies are simply left hanging with its closing chord. This is Adorno’s 
fractured totality in nuce: resolution persists here as an aspiration with no prospect of 
fulfilment.91 
In other words, in Berg’s Op.1 the fragmentation of musical material is not falsely 
unified or made to cohere, thereby concealing its true state, but instead is left in a semi-
coherent state of confusion with a question mark hanging over its future. The workings 
of this material dialectic are found back in the dialectic of social relations at that point 
in history. Unlike the way the aspiration of the bourgeoisie masked social reality (e.g. 
the claim that social change is undertaken for the freedom of its citizens), Berg’s music 
critically demonstrates the lack of possibility of its attainment. 
 
In his essay, Horton attempts “to add more analytical flesh to Adorno’s philosophy” by 
re-examining some canonical studies in the analytical literature, including analyses of 
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Berg’s Sonata Op.1 by Adorno, by Schmalfeldt and by Paddison but also analyses of 
Beethoven’s “Tempest” Sonata by Dahlhaus and by Schmalfeldt. He further offers his 
own dialectical reading of large-scale formal processes in Bruckner’s Symphony 
No.5.92 These analyses are outstanding examples of dialectical interpretations of form 
and content in pieces that each work quite differently with their materials and that 
furthermore can be interpreted as making quite different types of mediated social 
critique. Beethoven’s “Tempest,” for example, thwarts the expectation that theme and 
harmony support formal function. Instead, motivic development is initiated at the very 
start of the piece and drives the whole formal idea of the movement, dialectically 
struggling with its sonata form frame and ultimately failing to fulfil the historical 
convention of a synthesising recapitulation. In Horton’s words: “The mediation of a 
social dialectic is tangible: the failure to contain the music’s subjectivity [its motivic 
development] within sonata conventions parallels the failure to generate social and 
political order from rational individuality.”93 
 
According to Horton, Bruckner’s Symphony No.5 comes to a different conclusion. 
Horton’s analysis offers an interpretation of continuity and discontinuity (Horton refers 
to parataxis and hypotaxis) across the large-scale sonata form designs of the paired First 
movement and Finale movement. A dialectical interplay of theme and “topical” 
elements (such as march, chorale, dance, processional) works to contradict the sonata 
form of both movements in a variety of ways. Unlike the Beethoven example, 
Bruchner’s Finale resolves the problem of its oppositional material definitively: the 
struggle between secular and sacred musical material is concluded in favour of a 
Christian world view as the secular march theme “is drawn into the service” of a final 
chorale.94 That a religious conclusion still had validity at the time of Bruchner’s Fifth 
Symphony serves to highlight the inauthenticity that such a conclusion would have in a 
twentieth-century context. 
 
Horton argues that these analyses exemplify the Adornian notion that a composition 
consists of a musical problem to be worked out and critically responded to in the 
process of the composition. Each resolution posits a different type of social critique 
mediated through its materials. The notion that a musical composition involves the 
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working out of a problem in its compositional unfolding recalls Carter’s idea of a “field 
of operations” that he said he exposed at the beginning of a composition and from 
which the rest of the composition drew its impetus.95 I will argue that Carter’s 
appropriation of ritornello form presents a compositional problem to which the musical 
content is itself a solution. However, the musical terms of reference relevant for a 
discussion of Carter’s music are very different those in Horton’s examples. Horton’s 
essay highlights the significance that thematic-motivic material played in Adorno’s 
conception of musical content and form and at the same time the inadequacy of 
thematic-motivic material as a way of approaching music of the second half of the 
twentieth century. This point made by Julian Johnson when he notes that “[t]he primary 
status of harmonic-motivic working in Adorno’s theory reflects, of course, a 
fundamentally classical view. It is one, moreover, that restricts Adorno to categories 
derived from tonal practice which makes problematic his approach to music that works 
by quite different principles.”96 As such, Horton’s chapter impresses the need for 
analysis of post-1945 music to work with different categories of material and their 
dialectical disposition if it is to show dialectical processes and mediated social critique 
at work in this music. 
1.3.d Post World War II music 
Perhaps most challenging for any attempt to apply an Adornian concept of analysis to 
music after the Second Viennese School is the fact that Adorno’s concepts were 
developed in response to that music and that period of musical innovation.  As Johnson 
says, Adorno’s “definition of the category [new music] is fundamentally informed by 
his understanding of a particular body of work—early modernism in general and the 
Second Viennese School in particular. In music, the criteria of newness appears to be 
given, above all, by the period of free atonality prior to the adoption of the twelve-tone 
method.”97  The workings of Adorno’s ‘form’ seem best fitted to that transitional music 
(such as Berg’s Op.1) that was in the process of overtly challenging and breaking down 
its nineteenth-century musical inheritance of form-content relationships. Johnson points 
out that Adorno had nothing to say about music written after the early 1960s and “the 
relatively small amount of writing on post-war music is confined to his experience of 
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the Darmstadt composers of the 1950s.”98 Is it possible to take anything from an 
Adornian concept of form as mediated social critique that can shed light on an analysis 
of music since the 1960s and an analysis of a “postmodern” or indeed “post-
postmodern” society?   
 
This line of questioning has been pursued by a number of musicologists, particularly 
those arguing for the need for a new response to a persistent—albeit materially and 
historically transformed—aesthetic modernism, one with ongoing radical potential and 
in opposition to the relativism of the postmodern aesthetic. This secondary literature is 
of great significance for my present study as it critically reinterprets and contextualizes 
central strands of Adorno’s thought on new music both within the much more recent 
musical landscape and within recent music scholarship. It provides a research basis on 
which to build my interpretation of Carter’s musical aesthetic through an Adornian lens 
in the chapters that follow. The scholarship I will look at first is primarily musicological 
in nature, addressing music composition conceptually rather than technically. In the 
section that follows, I discuss studies that take on Adorno’s legacy in relation to 
empirical music analysis. 
 
In an extremely insightful and wide-ranging essay, “In Memory of a Receding 
Dialectic: The Political Relevance of Autonomy and Formalism in Modernist Musical 
Aesthetics,” Martin Scherzinger criticizes a postmodern attitude that claims “art cannot 
be an agent for social change or resistance after all” and asks “how do we forge a new 
link between culture and politics that is adequate to our times?”99 One of Scherzinger’s 
aims is to illustrate, following Adorno, that the space opened up by the critical praxis of 
modernist music (immanently through its formal and autonomous nature) is needed 
even more urgently today where “the oppressive moment in late-capitalist society 
largely depends on a complex mechanism of internalized psychic subjection.” He 
argues that the postmodern aesthetic was largely reactionary and instead of breaking 
down oppositions such as high/low, autonomous/commodified, global/local, 
totality/fragment, it in fact fetishized the second term at the expense of a dialectical 
engagement with the contradictions of modernism. In today’s socio-political reality, 
those contradictions flourish in many forms and make the questioning of ideology 
through autonomous cultural practice pressing. To resist the ever-transforming niche 
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markets of the late-capitalist culture industry requires a “formalism taken to its limits,” 
Scherzinger argues, as a way of opening up our consciousness to what is so pervasively 
excluded: “its obstinate focus on the radically insulated particular would flush out those 
unacknowledged beliefs and secrets that we are habitually in on.”100 Scherzinger points 
out that Adorno claimed music analysis has an important role to play in putting into 
words that which is mediated by such radical music.101  
 
An essay that nicely complements Scherzinger’s chapter with contemporary musical 
examples is Paddison’s “Postmodernism and the Survival of the Avant-Garde.” 
Paddison takes the Western rock music of Frank Zappa and the Western art music of 
Brian Ferneyhough to illustrate that despite a current prevailing postmodern aesthetic 
that rejects both history and subjectivity, there are still possibilities for pursuing 
ideological critique through radical commodified musical material (Zappa) as well as 
through radical autonomous musical material (Ferneyhough).102 Like Scherzinger, 
Paddison considers that Adorno’s concept of mediation retains pressing relevance today 
in relation to any interpretation of cultural phenomena. This is because no matter how 
the meaning, structure and function of music is construed, any musical activity is 
always a human activity and thus cannot escape its social situatedness, or in Paddison’s 
words “the extent to which society inheres historically within musical structures and 
musical material, and—importantly—the extent to which music itself, whether intended 
or not, engages with its socio-historical content in musical terms, and does so with 
greater or lesser degrees of reflexivity at a structural level.”103 He considers this 
reflexivity as a characteristic of “advanced critical music” regardless of the specific 
socio-historical conditions of its creation. Paddison critically widens Adorno’s musical 
reference points, arguing that there need be no restriction on musical style or musical 
culture since all musics, including for example jazz, pop and any form of non-Western 
music, exist within particular social conditions and are therefore capable of critical 
reflection upon those conditions. In particular what is significant about this essay for my 
discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 is the way Paddison offers an example of how 
Ferneyhough’s articulation of a personal musical aesthetic that is radically late-modern 
can be conceptually linked to aspects of Adorno’s philosophy of new music of an earlier 
era. Paddison’s work gives validity to the approach I take in Part 1 of the present study, 
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in which I draw parallels between Adorno’s and Carter’s conceptions of authentic 
musical composition as immanent social critique. 
 
In a more sympathetic reading of postmodernism, Alastair Williams tackles affinities 
and contrasts in the musical thinking of Adorno and Wolfgang Rihm in relation to 
subjectivity.104 Rihm’s inclusion of late-romantic gestures used with minimal re-
forming, seemingly in a post-modernist aesthetic stance of ‘anything is up for grabs 
now,’ appears in stark opposition to Adorno’s criteria for musical truth. However, 
Williams (with the help of Rihm’s own written reflection on his work) argues that it is 
precisely Rihm’s subjective handling of musical form that allows these gestures to 
acquire new contexts of meaning.  The music that surrounds these gestures—how the 
moments unfold into such music and away from it again—gives them an expressive 
value quite different from the period in which they originated. This is in contrast to 
Scherzinger’s critique of quotation pieces such as John Zorn’s Forbidden Fruit which 
“announce their references plainly, without irony, without any trope of distorted 
misreading.”105 In Rihm’s music, Williams argues, the subjective element lies in the 
formal possibilities that Rihm explores and that reshape the experience of the past to 
become an expression of the present-in-relation-to-the-past. In other words, the meaning 
of romantic gestures is not ‘fixed’ in time but is able to shift with this new handling. 
Williams also argues that Rihm’s multiple versions of a number of his own pieces 
similarly challenge the idea of form as static, instead creating forms that “point beyond 
the boundaries of the self-contained whole.”106 According to Williams, this openness of 
form alludes to Adorno’s musique informelle where the musical moment is free to move 
in response to its internal needs without being constrained by the dictates of pre-
conceived form. Williams’s study is informative because, despite obvious divergences 
between Adorno and Rihm, Williams is able to make an Adornian perspective shed 
light on Rihm’s music in imaginative ways by engaging with Rihm’s writings on music. 
This approach forms an important model of interpretation for my own study of Carter’s 
writings in Chapters 2 and 3: the gaps or partial congruence between Carter and Adorno 
do not discredit observations about their sharing of mutual ground. It is even possible to 
glean parallels between Rihm’s and Carter’s thinking—despite their obvious 
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differences—in notions such as openness of form, the critical engagement with 
historical materials and even a positive reconsideration of musical subjectivity (which I 
address in detail at the end of Chapter 3).  
 
In an equally probing essay, Julian Johnson questions the relevance of Adorno’s 
aesthetic theory to music of the second half of the twentieth century by re-posing the 
question of the relationship between “new music and new music theory.”107 What might 
music theory want to tell us about new music? Johnson’s conclusion is that is the only 
analytical pursuit valid today is to reveal the “utopian content” of new music since 
Adorno, a conclusion that has important significance for the study of Carter’s late 
music. By taking up themes in Adorno’s “Vers une musique informelle” in particular, 
Johnson rethinks the restrictive function and possibility Adorno assigned to the 
categories of repetition and temporality, texture and sonority, and plenitude and silence, 
arguing in the process that much ‘recent’ music retains both a critical as well as utopian 
impulse through its dialectical handling of these materials as content. Johnson cites 
among others the music of Berio, Ligeti, Boulez, Birtwistle, and Feldman. As we saw 
above, Adorno’s focus lay very much with the dialectical treatment of thematic and 
tonal-atonal relations, something that lost its significance in the innovations post-1945. 
Johnson argues that Adorno was not able to adequately theorize this shift before his 
death although he left hints of rethinking the nature of these musical materials in his late 
writing and these ‘hints’ motivate Johnson’s study. In Chapter 3, I discuss this essay 
extensively and adopt the categories that Johnson proposes as a model for thinking 
about and analysing Carter’s late music.  
1.3.e Adorno and technical analysis 
The work outlined above exemplifies some of the cutting-edge of Adornian scholarship 
in musicology in that it aims at rethinking and renewing elements of Adorno’s aesthetic 
theory in order to respond to the context of the newer music which it examines. 
However, there is another question that needs to be examined in relation to Adorno’s 
legacy and that is its usefulness and possibility for analysis known as formalist, 
technical, or empirical.  
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Adorno’s own position on the role of technical analysis was somewhat contradictory.108 
While Adorno insisted that technical analysis had to be the starting point of any 
analysis, in itself it was too narrow and restrictive in what it looked at and alone could 
not access the enigmatic, “riddle-character” of art/music. According to Paddison, 
Adorno “accuses technical analysis of a narrowness of focus which excludes that which 
is left over after analysis—what he calls the remainder, the “surplus” (Rest)—as 
irrational, because not susceptible to its methods.”109 Technical analysis as “mere note-
counting” cannot provide a complete “interpretive understanding” of a work. Paddison 
contextualizes Adorno’s response to empirical analysis and positivism within the period 
post Second World War when empirical data collection had all but taken over 
sociological research in the United States to the detriment of a more speculative Critical 
Theory. Adorno’s requirement for immanent analysis of music was the combination of 
musical data with “social reflection.”  
 
In an extensive essay titled “Immanent Critique or Musical Stocktaking? Adorno and 
the Problem of Musical Analysis,” Paddison unpacks precisely some of the difficulties 
with respect to the combining of empirical analysis and philosophical and sociological 
analysis in Adorno’s own writing.  He articulates the problem of analysis in Adorno’s 
theory as that of mediation; in other words, connecting the inner workings of the 
musical composition with the outer workings of social relations (a question already 
raised above). As mentioned, Adorno placed conceptually a high priority on technical 
analysis but he saw it only as useful if undertaken in tandem with socio-historical 
interpretation. There exists, however, no one-to-one correspondence between these 
inner and outer relationships. How, then, to make connections between the two?  
Examples such as the break-down of tonality and its related musical forms that we saw 
in Berg’s Op.1 seem more self-evident, perhaps because of the ubiquity of sonata form 
in the previous era and the relative proximity of that transitional music to its historical 
precedents. But how can this problem of mediation be solved to enable applicability of 
“immanent analysis” beyond that limited historical context?  
 
Paddison goes in pursuit of a methodology for Adorno’s “immanent analysis.” The crux 
of Paddison’s interpretation of Adorno here is that the musical materials of an authentic 
modernist work mediate their own critique immanently:  
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The extent that the structure of the individual work is a critical reflection upon the 
historically preformed material (which is not the same for all historical periods), the 
work may be considered to “contain its own analysis,” to use Adorno’s own phrase. 
… it is this self-contained analysis [performed by the composition] that needs to be 
revealed by the process of immanent technical analysis [performed by the music 
analyst/theorist].”110   
In other words, it is for the analyst to answer how are the ‘universal’ pre-formed 
historical musical materials (such as formal schemes, tonality, rhythmic systems, etc.) 
are particularized, re-interpreted, given new functions in the composition, organized in a 
way that they perform a critical reflection upon those materials. What is the nature of 
the dialectical interaction between what is given and how it is shaped anew? Paddison 
concludes that “[t]he work is seen as authentic to the degree that its structure is the 
outcome of this inner dialectic.”111 Thus, instead of looking for social meaning through 
analogy, the organisation of the musical materials themselves contains the sedimented 
socio-historical content “mediated through [the work’s] form”.112 
 
To provide a more concrete model of how to go about such an analysis, Paddison argues 
“it is necessary to be able to envisage the direction of Adorno’s thinking here at a 
theoretical level” because of Adorno’s lack of specific examples. Paddison define a 
model of “a dialectical theory of form” following Adorno’s concept of “second 
reflection.” To begin with, Paddison outlines what might constitute a ‘first’ reflection in 
the analytical process as follows: 
A first level of reflection would be one where material is uncovered, a content is 
analyzed, relations are identified, a factual account of the structure can be given. I 
suggest that the aim of such an analysis is to establish the technical consistency 
(Stimmigkeit) of a work, its correspondence to its dominating idea as unity of form and 
content (Form/Inhalt).113 
The process of “first reflection” as articulated here touches on some problems for 
analysis. The aim of establishing “technical consistency … as unity of form and 
content”  is central to Adorno’s theory and distinct from the idea of organic unity, as we 
have already seen in the discussion of the form-content dialectic. Adorno’s concept of 
Stimmigkeit Paddison defines as “the full realization in the structure of the work of its 
                                                
110 Ibid., 225. 
111 Ibid., 224. 
112 Ibid., 223. 
113 Ibid., 222. 
  39 
motivating ‘idea’ or concept” which additionally must include the composer’s response 
to the “historical demands of the material.”114 These ideas are tied up with a 
constellation of concepts in Adorno’s theory, including that the idea of each work is in 
fact centred on the working out of a “problem” that is both material and historical (as 
seen in the Berg and Beethoven examples above).115  However, as it is articulated in the 
quote above, “a factual account of the structure” can easily be mistaken for the notion 
that a purely formalist (objective) analysis is possible, something that today’s self-
reflective music analyst has already been taught is illusion.116  
 
Some of the difficulty is resolved in Adorno’s “second reflection” which Paddison 
outlines as involving a number of different types of engagements with the work and 
with the analysis of the “first reflection”: 
 A level of second reflection involves both critique and interpretation, not only in 
terms of the inner relations of the closed world of the musical work revealed through 
immanent analysis, which is an aspect on “first reflection,” but in terms of the 
relations between the work and its social and historical context—a context which also 
constitutes, if I understand Adorno correctly, the work’s structure, as socially and 
historically mediated content (Gehalt).117 
Thus, a “second reflection” requires that both the analysis of the ‘first reflection’ as well 
as the socio-historical context of the materials are critically re-interpreted. This does not 
resolve the problem of what constitutes “empirical data collection” in relation to music 
analysis, which, as we will revisit below, became/remains a site of contention in the 
music discipline. Equally, how to uncover what is historically sedimented meaning 
within the materials remains unanswered and subject to the same contentions as the 
analysing of material relations themselves. Despite Paddison’s model remaining 
somewhat abstract for practising analysts, “first reflection” and “second reflection” 
actually provide a very useful breakdown of a possible way of proceeding with 
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immanent analysis. In fact I structure this current study around a two-part reflection, 
Part 2 being a “formal analysis” and Part 3 being a “second reflection” that engages in 
particular with Paddison’s theory of mediation which he outlines in a complimentary 
essay “Music and Social Relations: Towards a Theory of Mediation” and which I 
discuss at the start of Chapter 7: A critical interpretation of Boston and ASKO 
concertos. 
 
A good example of some of the problems for analysis which are higlighted by Paddison 
can be found in a special issue of 19th-Century Music which presented four analytical 
responses to Adorno’s “Schubert” essay and one commentary on these responses from 
Kofi Agawu.118  The analytical essays are extremely interesting in themselves, engaging 
specifically with Adorno’s hearing and interpretation of Schubert but also with 
Schubert’s music in various ways. What is of most value to my present study is 
Agawu’s response. Agawu reflects on the attempts in the other four essays to provide 
concrete analytical examples to Adorno’s “verbal-poetic” insights into what constitutes 
Schubert’s unique musical style. Most interesting is his claim that “[a]nalysts who seek 
to domesticate Adorno’s thought by aligning the more or less explicit methodology of 
canonical analytical techniques with the implied methodology of his peculiar 
philosophical or poetic formulations are always rewarded with a deficit.”119 And yet, he 
argues, Adorno’s insights should at the same time not be ignored by analysts because in 
fact they are so strongly supported by the music itself, thereby acknowledging what he 
calls a “double impossibility” in approaching empirical analysis through Adornian 
thought.  Agawu seems to lead us to a dead-end, but in fact what he does is urge the 
analyst to suspend certainty and retain the provisional, the speculative, the poetic in 
writing about analytical observations (as Adorno did) because it gives access to 
imaginative understanding that falls outside the “technical baggage” carried by 
conventional analysis (as Adorno also argued). What we can take away from his 
critique is that the inherent conflict between empirical analysis and the speculative 
philosophical mode of analysis that Adorno practised ought not be resolved into one 
another but rather “[i]n order to begin to make good on Adorno’s legacy, music analysis 
must be willing to take nothing for granted …”120  
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While on the one hand this conclusion puts into question Paddison’s notion of an 
analytical first reflection providing a “factual account of the structure,” on the other 
hand it points to a way in which the analytical insights can become fruitfully contingent 
on imaginative rethinking about that which lies outside the music, of sociocultural 
contradictions not only of the music but of the analytical method. Frederic Jameson 
writes “the dialectic proceeds by standing outside a specific thought ... in order to show 
that the alleged conclusions in fact harbour the workings of unstable categorical 
oppositions.”121 This speaks to Agawu’s call to retain the provisional within the 
empirical. Adorno himself rejected any a priori  method that can be applied to the 
analysis of music that will get to “the fact” of it:  
… methods cannot be separated from the subject and treated as something ready-made 
and external, but must be produced in the course of a process of interaction with their 
subject. … Hegel understood dialectics not as a particular philosophical standpoint, 
but as the sustained attempt to follow the movement of the object under discussion 
and to help it find expression.122 
This “attempt to follow the movement of the object under discussion” is an important 
notion that I take up in a different guise in Chapter 4: Analytical prelude where I outline 
in detail methodological considerations for my analysis of Carter’s Boston and ASKO 
concertos.   
1.3.f Music theory’s critical self-examination 
Adorno wrote: “It is just as urgent for music theory to reflect on its own procedures as it 
is for music itself.”123 The question of how to engage with the musical text “itself” has 
by now had a significant history since Adorno. The decades around the turn of the 
twenty-first century were ones of intense self-interrogation for the discipline of music 
theory (and analysis), partially in response to criticism from the “new musicology” that 
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music analysis lacked “context,” partially motivated by music theorists’ own interests in 
epistemologies informing the humanities more broadly and cultural studies in particular.  
Agawu’s summing up of the situation in 1997 in “Analysing Music under the New 
Musicological Regime” provides an overview of the parallels between musicology’s 
adventures with post-modernist lines of inquiry and music analysis’s melding of 
formalist inquiry with the questioning of its own foundational assumptions.124 In fact, 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries produced a large number of notable 
publications addressing the question of what is possible for music analysis given our 
current state of knowledge. Many of these refer to Adorno, recognising his pioneering 
theorising of the mediated nature of musical material and the dialectic of musical 
structure and social meaning. In “Analysis in Context,” Jim Samson says: “The 
recognition that music’s ‘project of autonomy’ was historically produced and contingent 
brooks little dissension today. Well before the New Musicology, it was a central plank 
of Adorno’s aesthetics, and his commentary in the respect remains persuasive.”125  
Similarly, in his introduction to Music/Ideology: resisting the aesthetic, Adam Krims 
notes that “Adorno’s attempt at a solution to the problem of close reading [of musical 
structure] anticipates many of the current critiques of music theory.”126  In this debate, 
theorists contesting the claim that formalist readings of music lacked value often 
harnessed Adorno’s aesthetic theory. But equally, voices emerged that highlighted the 
need to critically rethink Adornian aesthetics in a new era and for a new style of 
music.127 Then, of course, there have been the myriad other influences on music 
analysis from feminist theory, theories of sexuality, race, ethnicity and other strands of 
philosophical thought such as those of Badiou, Deleuze and Arendt to mention only a 
few.128 While a clearly defined, cohesive shape for a ‘critical music theory’ might not 
have emerged, certainly as far as undergoing a process of critical reflection in the 
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discipline of music theory and analysis, there are few stones that have been left 
unturned at this stage.129  
 
Where does all this leave us as far as infusing the “note-by-note analysis,” as Agawu 
calls it, with a dialectical interpretation? 130  In other words, how to (as Jameson 
suggests) “stand outside of” any chosen conceptual framework for technical analysis 
and reflect on assumptions underlying the framework (what does not fit within it, what 
is not accommodated by its concepts and categories), while advancing at the same time 
a socio-historical reflection on both music and method?131 In what follows, I discuss 
scholarship that is exemplary in the way it engages with this pivotal question of linking 
text with context. 
 
Agawu suggests that one way to unhinge empirical certainty is by a willingness “to 
stage ongoing enactments and re-enactments of the musical work” rather than to claim 
or refer to a “definitive analysis.” Outstanding examples of the engagement with this 
notion of re-enactment are Scherzinger’s readings of Schoenberg and Webern against 
Adorno’s own analyses. Scherzinger takes Adorno head on by revising his “disparaging 
reading of Schoenberg’s twelve-tone music” to demonstrate that a dialectic of pre-
formed and re-formed materials can still be read in this music.132 In brief, Adorno 
objects that a twelve-tone row pre-determines the compositional material to an 
unacceptable level and eliminates the possibility of a dialectical handling of pitch 
relations. However, rather than a dialectic between tonal and atonal tendencies as in 
Schoenberg’s transitional music (or the music of Berg), Scherzinger positions the 
dialectic in the opposition between the organisational strictures of the system (i.e. order 
within a row) and the structures that can be subjectively determined (e.g. motivic 
connections, hexachordal ordering, incongruent phrase boundaries).  Schoenberg’s 
subjective handling of the row also elevates pitch organisation to a significance 
unknown in the tonal world of pitch-class equivalent function and thus, Scherzinger 
claims, through the manner of disposition of the row,  “the dialectical interplay [of the 
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row and its realisation] functions critically.”133 By “standing outside of” Adorno’s own 
dialectic, Scherzinger has been able to re-interpret the function of Schoenberg’s pre-
compositional pitch material and “re-enact” the workings of the music in a more critical 
way. 
 
Similarly, the historical distance denied Adorno has afforded Scherzinger the possibility 
of fruitfully re-interpreting social context as manifest within the musical materials of 
Webern’s symmetrical structures, arguing them to be progressive in terms of “a radical 
critique of gender hierarchy.” 134  Similar to Adorno’s objection to Schoenberg’s 
twelve-tone music, Adorno’s critique of  symmetrical inversion in Webern’s music 
hinged on the loss of a dialectic between compositional material and subjective 
expression. But unlike the way Scherzinger is able to demonstrate subjectivity in 
Schoenberg’s use of the rows, the structures in Webern’s symmetrically inverted row 
forms are so utterly pre-determined that they pose a genuine challenge. Adorno claimed 
that in these compositions the composer was completely superfluous to the shaping of 
any of the music’s motivic unity. In re-evaluating Adorno’s claims, Scherzinger pursues 
the deeper social meaning of symmetrical inversion in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in an extensive consideration of the parallel rhetoric around 
inversion and gender in tonal music theory and other fields of thought, most 
significantly in sexology. Scherzinger argues that in his inversional structures, Webern 
in fact creates a musical space free of a dualistic gender identity determined by the 
dominant rationality by resolving that duality into symmetry, which simultaneously and 
equally contains both genders as a “third gender.” He shows that this particular 
transitional moment in history provided Webern the opportunity to engage with gender 
in this dialectical material manner before public discourse on and scientific inquiry into 
inversion turned to a discourse of pathologized homosexuality. Sherzinger locates the 
dialectic in Webern’s symmetrically inverted music between “the closed musical work 
… and the social world in which it circulates” rather than solely as a dialectic of 
musical materials and musical form. Scherzinger’s essay is an outstanding example of 
the rethinking of Adorno’s categories of dialectic through critically investigating the 
social context in which the concepts central to this music where born while at the same 
time remaining loyal to the pursuit of formal analysis. 
 
                                                
133 Ibid., 86. 
134 “Anton Webern and the Concept of Symmetrical Inversion: A Reconsideration on the Terrain of 
Gender,” repercussions 6, no. 2 (Fall 1997). See particularly insightful comments on ‘methodology’ p.88. 
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Another exceptional essay that resonates with Agawu’s call to retain the poetic and the 
speculative within formal analytical writing is Martin Brody’s “‘Where to Act, How to 
Move’: Unruly Action in Late Wolpe.”  Brody’s aim is to demonstrate the way the 
“abstraction” of Wolpe’s late music retains an engagement with the social despite its 
formalism. Hereby, he contests the claim that Wolpe moved from a politicized 
composer in his youth to a mature composer with a disengaged and insulated modernist 
aesthetic. Harnessing (via Jameson’s observations) the formalism of Adorno’s writing 
as a way to model “the complex modalities of political thinking,” Brody models in his 
own writing the way that Wolpe’s music enacts social interaction critically. He analyses 
“the urgent, comedic exchange of identity and non-identity” between the materials of 
the ensemble in the opening to Wolpe’s Piece for Two Instrumental Units by using a 
richly poetic narrative that references the materials in their specificity, without 
generalizing theoretically beyond what is necessary to show the “subtle affinities and 
incongruences” between the musical objects. Brody argues that in the form and the 
exchange of musical objects, the piece displays a “dialectical awareness.” But even 
more suggestive of a social critique is the way Wolpe imbues his material with a kind of 
autonomous agency, and this resonates remarkably with Carter.  Brody takes Wolpe’s 
String Quartet 1969 as an example and borrows Arendt’s conception of freedom and 
control in social action. The actions of the opening material, Brody shows, model a 
community of engaged individuals in pluralistic, simultaneous and non-authoritarian 
exchange. In other words, the musical content determines its form through its individual 
and collective actions and while this content might originate in a degree of 
predetermined (controlled) organisation, the unfolding of the musical action breaks out 
of its initial structured “confinement” to respond instead freely to the “community of 
activity.”135 Brody offer not only a way “to hear the composer’s musical forms as 
modelling critical subjectivity and social engagement” but indeed he offers a verbal-
poetic analytical model for accessing this mediation.  
 
A final example of exceptional scholarship that aims to link the music to a broader 
critical context is John Roeder’s essay “‘The matter of human cooperation’ in Carter’s 
mature style.” Roeder’s analysis pursues a similar goal to Brody’s in that it shows how 
the “moment-to-moment interactions” of Carter’s musical gestures mediate in particular 
“cooperation,” but also “familiarly human conflict” and other types of “responsiveness” 
                                                
135 Brody, “‘Where to Act, How to Move’,” 213-14. 
 46 
with a framework of minimally predetermined materials.136 Roeder is particularly 
interested in balancing the notion of opposition and conflict in Carter’s music with the 
equally significant notion of cooperation, and while Roeder does not engage with any 
explicit philosophical models, his focus on the presence of both terms in Carter’s music 
suggests a dialectical awareness. The context in which Roeder situates his analyses is 
the commentary by Carter himself on the importance of “the matter of human 
cooperation with its many aspects of feeling and thought” in his music. Like Brody, 
Roeder weaves a narrative of musical agents that respond with self-determined actions 
to each other from one moment to the next in Carter’s Esprit Rude/Esprit Doux for flute 
and clarinet, Riconoscenza for solo violin and String Quartet No.5. Roeder shows how 
these interactions also determine the process of large-scale formal unfolding. This 
model of analytical writing dramatizes the instruments metaphorically while keeping 
the drama within the confines of the musical form—in other words, without extending 
the purely musical to a “representation of social cooperation.” Roeder’s analyses 
illustrate that the “cooperation” in Carter’s music lies in “the formal exigencies of 
absolute music” which can be seen as homologous to social actions.137  
 
The work surveyed here has significance for the analyses in this study, not because I 
adopt any one specific methodology in my analytical interpretations but rather because 
these studies model a mode of engaging with a musical object that allows the outside in 
without losing the self-containedness of the object. They model a dialectical thinking 
about music and its social other, and about music and its analysis, which shape my own 
engagement with Carter’s aesthetics and his music. In the first part of this thesis I will 
put Adorno and Carter side by side in an attempt to gain a specific understanding of 
how Carter saw his music as a “picture of society,” as a way of dealing with “the whole 
conception of human nature,” as a “more significant human message,” in a similar way 
to Williams connecting Adorno and Rhim, Paddison connecting Adorno and 
Ferneyhough or Johnson connecting Adorno with various post-1945 composers. 
Drawing on Adornian concepts assists me in bringing to the fore a position on new 
music underpinned by a dialectical philosophical aesthetics that was not only shared by 
Carter and Adorno but was also representative of a modernist Zeitgeist in new music. In 
                                                
136 Roeder, “‘The matter of human cooperation’ in Carter’s Mature Style,” 111. Compare with Brody, 
“‘Where to Act, How to Move’,” 214 and 19-20. 
137 Roeder, “‘The matter of human cooperation’ in Carter’s Mature Style,” 137. For different approach to 
the interpretation of opposition within a solo piece see Joshua Mailman, "An Imagined Drama of 
Competitive Opposition in Carter's Scrivo in Vento, with Notes on Narrative, Symmetry, Quantitive Flux 
and Heraclitus," Music Analysis 28, no. 2-3 (2009), 373-422. 
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the second part of the thesis, I will present two analyses that develop their own ways of 
drawing out the immanent dialectic of form and content that I argue is to be found there, 
and in this task the work of Scherzinger, Brody, Roeder and Agawu have been of 
particular importance to me. In the third part of the thesis, I widen the context and take a 
second look at the analyses, bringing in narratives that attempt to access a level of 
mediated social critique performed by the music, formally and historically. The work 
that has been of particular significance in this part of my study has been that of 
Paddison along with Brody and DeNora. 
1.4 Aims of this thesis 
This study consists of two areas of investigation— Part 1: Carter, Form and Dialectical 
Opposition which traces dialectical thinking in Carter’s compositional aesthetic; and 
Part 2: Two Formal Analyses which offers a reading of form in two examples of 
Carter’s late music. These two parts can be conceived as two separate investigations 
with different methodological approaches: the first a hermeneutic approach, searching 
from within Carter’s written texts ways of interpreting the author’s stated aesthetic; the 
second brings together philosophical understanding and analytical method with the aim 
of interpreting Carter’s music, independent of author intent. To a certain extent, these 
investigations are carried out separately, responding to the above caution about 
attempting to meld formal and speculative methods.  However, the investigation of 
Carter’s aesthetic is heavily reliant on my analytical knowledge of Carter’s music and 
equally my approach to the two formal analyses draws its shape from my understanding 
of a body of “critical” music theory literature which I have just discussed and to which I 
add in Chapter 4: Analytical prelude. Ultimately my investigation is shaped by the way 
in which the two approaches intersect and inform each other. This intersection is 
explored explicitly in Part 3: Second Reflection. In this section, I revisit the analytical 
work, reflecting critically on my technical findings of Part 2 and drawing on insights 
into Carter’s aesthetic gained in Part 1.  
 
To be more specific, in Part 1 of this study (Chapters 2 and 3) my aim is to make a case 
for the connection between some (but certainly not all) concepts central to Carter’s 
musical aesthetic and the milieu of dialectical thought—with Adorno as its main 
proponent—that undergirded the notion of modern music in the first two-thirds of the 
twentieth century. In Chapter 2, the writings of Carter’s which I discuss come 
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principally from the period of his earliest published reviews in the 1930s up to the last 
substantial writings of the 1970s.  While not seeking direct influence, I do draw 
parallels between Adornian aesthetics and Carter’s way of articulating his thoughts on 
new music’s place within the history of a Western art music tradition, on temporality in 
new music, on new music’s relationship to its listener, and on the specific ways that the 
relationship between new musical materials and form carries a responsibility to be true 
to the social reality in which they are conceived.  In Chapter 3, I extend the 
investigation into the question of the social ‘content’ of Carter’s music.  I examine the 
way in which Carter himself framed the connection between his music and society, and 
in particular his claim for a critical and utopian side to his musical ‘message.’  In this 
chapter I especially aim to show how Carter maintained the central tenets of a modernist 
as well as personal musical aesthetic while at the same time responding with musical 
means to the changing socio-political landscape in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first century. 
 
In Part 2, I present formal analyses of two of Carter’s late compositions that display 
with particular clarity a dialectical engagement with historical form and postmodern, or 
rather perhaps ‘late-modern,’ content. Carter’s use of ritornello form in the Boston 
Concerto and the ASKO Concerto demonstrates an explicit engagement with an 
historical form that embodies ideas of repetition, return, and formal clarity—
characteristics associated with a postmodern aesthetic and directly opposed to the 
qualities of musical material previously associated with Carter’s mature compositions.  I 
argue, however, that far from being a postmodern ‘turn,’ this formal frame exemplifies 
Carter’s critical engagement with history: by placing the demands of the repetitious 
form and the demands of the constantly varying materials into tension, the music both 
questions the historical meaning of ritornello form and plays with postmodern 
expectations of repetition and return. The analyses are technical, drawing on a post-
tonal analytical ‘tool bag,’ without aiming to demonstrate unity per se but leaving room 
for the presence of contradiction. 
 
In Part 3, I embark on a second reflection on the work I have undertaken in Part 1 and 
Part 2. Chapter 7 presents a reading of these two pieces informed by notions important 
to Carter’s aesthetic that were considered in Part 1 including musical time, musical 
memory, utopian ‘message’ and the engagement with music history. The oppositions in 
the music are examined through a lens of dialectical relationships stemming from the 
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materials themselves and from the historical nature of the ritornello form.  The critique 
is extended outwards from the music to the sphere of production, where the dialectic of 
the autonomy character and the commodity character of the materials are shown to be 
social mediated through the institutions of music, the processes of music dissemination 
and the “situatedness” of the composer.138 The composer’s working with the musical 
materials, rather than being a neutral creative endeavour, is instead also shown to be 
mediated by the social. Finally, in the concluding Chapter 8, I extend the critique a little 
further, tying together strands of the preceding chapters but at the same time opening up 
again the distance between Adorno’s thought and that of Carter’s which I have tried to 
bring closer together in the first part of the thesis. This gesture of opening up at the end 
rather than concluding tries to suggest that the ideas presented here are not fixed, while 
at the same time showing that they have all the same usefully facilitated the possibility 
of a new direction in examining Carter’s music and musical thought.  
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Chapter 2 
Tracing the dialectical in Carter’s compositional aesthetic 
 
“Although constantly preoccupied with musical dialectic, composers have often felt 
[the] need of preventing it from becoming a meaningless routine, and have searched in 
many directions for new freshness.” – Elliott Carter 
Elliott Carter: A Centennial Portrait in Letters and Documents, p.164 
 
“…the dialectical synthesis of the contributing sub-continuities and characters is 
irreducible to any one of these or to any “sum” of their qualities” – Elliott Carter 
Flawed Words and Stubborn Sounds, p.99 
2.1 Introduction 
In the search for a broader interpretive framework for Elliott Carter’s music, one might 
reasonably look to Carter’s own discourse on his music and on contemporary music 
more generally. Carter has been an important figure among a number of intellectually 
engaged composers of the twentieth century. While he did not produce treatises or 
analytical works, like Schoenberg’s Fundamentals of Musical Composition or Theory of 
Harmony, nor publish a specific manifesto on his compositional aesthetic, like Boulez’s 
Orientations and On Music Today, or Cage’s A Year From Monday, Carter can 
nonetheless be compared to these other composers in his extra-compositional 
engagement with his audiences on the philosophical, social and aesthetic dimensions of 
music.139 These engagements have taken the form of articles, reviews of music and 
other art forms, extended program notes on his own music, published lectures and 
interviews, and as the subject of a major documentary film. In addition to Carter's 
published writings, there exists a large range of insightful archival material in the form 
of written drafts of talks, beginnings of articles and a composition booklet as well as 
recordings of various types. Carter scholarship is beginning to pay closer attention to 
these materials.140 Scholarly interest was sparked in particular since Meyer and 
                                                
139 The Flawed Words and Stubborn Sounds interview with Allen Edwards published in 1971 comes 
closest to Carter’s personal manifesto.  
140 See for example, Schmidt, “Emanzipation des musicalischen Diskurses. Die Skizzen zu Elliott Carters 
zweitem Streichquartett und seine theoretischen Arbeiten in den späten 50er Jahren,” 209-48; Schmidt, 
“‘I try to write music that will appeal to an intelligent listener’s ear.’ On Elliott Carter’s string quartets,” 
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Shreffler exposed the extent and significance of Carter's archive at the Paul Sacher 
Stiftung in their publication to celebrate Carter's centennial year.141 
 
 
Carter’s writing presents a point of view informed especially by his own experience as a 
composer living through the greater part of the twentieth century and beyond. Jonathan 
Bernard observes this feature of Carter’s writing in his introduction to Elliott Carter: 
Collected essays and lectures: “Carter’s life as a composer, it is fair to say, has provided 
him, as a writer, with a point of departure: he often seems to feel impelled, in the 
medium of prose, to generalize upon his own experience.”142 His writings, spanning the 
number of decades that they do, also represent aspects of the history of particular 
moments and movements during the twentieth century which intersected with stages of 
Carter’s musical and personal experience and development. However, this history is 
more than just a backdrop to Carter’s musical endeavours. Carter’s long intellectual 
engagement with questions of new music extend to its relationship to history as well as 
to the present, in particular how music fitted into the social and the political, how it 
related to notions of nationalism and internationalism and to ideas from other art forms, 
and not least what new music’s relationship was to its performance, its audience and the 
techniques of its creation. Carter very deliberately thought about many facets of music 
and did so in ways that attempted to deepen an understanding of the complexities and 
problems of music of the time.  Informing his own experience was also his extensive 
reading of American and British, as well as French, German and Italian literature and of 
certain Western philosophers.  Carter’s desire to articulate his insights into the 
complexities of music in the twentieth century made him one of the more significant 
music intellectuals of our age.143 
 
For Carter, it was not until 1964 while in Berlin on a Ford Foundation Scholarship, that 
he became familiar with Adorno’s writings. In an insightful interview in 1995 with the 
                                                                                                                                          
168-89; the recording in the Betty Freeman collection transcribed in Jake Johnson, “Elliott Carter in Los 
Angeles, January 12, 1994,” Elliott Carter Studies Online 1 (2016), 
http://studies.elliottcarter.org/volume01/04Johnson/04Johnson.html; Carter’s Minnesota Lectures 
transcribed in the forthcoming issue of Elliott Carter Studies Online 3 (2018); and Guberman’s extensive 
consideration of archival material at the Paul Sacher Stiftung in “Composing Freedom: Elliott Carter’s 
‘Self-Reinvention’ and the Early Cold War.” See also the preface to Elliott Carter Studies, ed. Marguerite 
Boland and John Link (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ix-xi. 
141 Meyer and Shreffler, Elliott Carter: A Centennial Portrait in Letters and Documents. 
142 Jonathan Bernard, “Introduction: Essayist Despite Himself,” Elliott Carter: collected essays and 
lectures, 1937-1995 (New York: University of Rochester Press, 1997), vii. 
143 Bernard assesses of the value of Carter’s essays as “among the very best of their kind.” Ibid., viii-ix. 
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then German PhD student Annette van Dyck-Hemming, Carter said that it was during 
this time that he read everything he could of Adorno’s in German and later also 
acquired Italian versions of Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy and In Search of Wagner, 
which he claimed were easier for him to understand than the German texts. However, in 
this same interview Carter distances himself completely from Adorno and Adornian 
ideas as well as the German Idealist tradition more generally: 
Annette van Dyck (AvD): When and how did you come to know Adorno esp. Adornos 
[sic] writings? 
Elliott Carter (EC): I didn’t really... You understand that I read that magazine ‘Die 
Reihe’ in the old days and I read about Adorno but I didn’t come to know anything 
about Adorno until living in Berlin in 1964 ... 
I mean I have a great many almost all of—while I was in Berlin then I became very 
interested and I bought all of his books that were published at that time in German but 
I must add, I find it very very difficult to read. All the way through there are very 
remarkable things. Actually, I have translations of the book on Wagner and Mahler in 
Italian and I can read that much better... So I find the total concept of his music ... I 
don’t understand ... I’m not very sympathetic to it because of one thing: we haven’t 
been through a political situation in this country that is like that in Germany and I also 
find that the whole idea, the dialectic that comes from Hegelianism is something I 
don’t really understand very well. I’m not philosophically trained in it, it disturbed 
me. I find it very hard to understand any of the German: Husserl and Heidegger, I find 
both of them very hard to understand, Wittgenstein. So these all... I mean I haven’t 
made a grade up to learn; I just hadn’t have [sic] the time to train myself to understand 
these things.144 
Twenty years earlier, in correspondence with Bayan Northcott in 1974, Carter gives a 
brief but more balanced assessment of his opinion of Adorno’s work: 
I met Adorno once when we were on a German speaking panel about neue Musik in 
Berlin - he delivered in interminable Hegelian German for what seemed forever and, 
since I could hardly understand anything that he said (we were in public, at the 
Akademie der Kunst) [xx] I had to respond in English and admit it - much to the 
                                                
144 Annette van Dyck-Hemming, “Diskurse zur ‘Musik Elliott Carters.’ Versuch einer Dekonstruktiven 
Hermeneutik ‘Moderner Musik’” (PhD. diss., Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn, 
2002), 226-30. Remarkably, while Carter claims a certain ignorance of German philosophy, he 
nonetheless had read or had ventured to read texts by many of its central figures as James Wierzbicki has 
noted in Elliott Carter, 59. 
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amusement of the audience.145 
I have suffered my way with what help I could get from a dictionary through the 
German of his ‘Philosophie der neuen Musik’ and am glad that finally it has appeared 
in English - It is depressing, - and it shows its age badly, I think. I shall write more 
when I have studied it out.  I like his book on Mahler and especially his short essay[s] 
- like the one on Parsifal! Which are not such hard going. […] At least music 
accumulated some intelligence, if only philosophical, with him.146 
It is interesting to speculate why Carter later distanced himself so strongly from Adorno 
and from German philosophical thinking more generally. It is possible that by the 1980s 
and 1990s so much more had been written about the philosophy of modernist music that 
Carter no longer felt in a position to say anything about such ideas with confidence 
(reflected to some extent in his comment above that “I haven’t made a grade up to learn; 
I just haven’t had the time to train myself to understand these things”). By this stage his 
age was also advancing and he was less inclined to be distracted away from composing 
by other interests. In the 1950s and 1960s, by contrast, these ideas were only just 
arousing interest, certainly in the Anglo-Saxon musical landscape, and were a vibrant 
and vital part of new musical thinking.147 It could have been that at that time Carter’s 
obvious facility in approaching philosophical texts gave him the confidence to reference 
them in his own writings and lectures with a sense of authority.148   
 
Nevertheless, as far as Adorno’s writings were concerned, Carter had at the time clearly 
been interested enough in Adorno’s ideas to “suffer through” a reading in German, as 
well as undertake a thorough study in English, of Philosophy of New Music. In fact, the 
English translation had only just appeared the year prior to his letter to Northcott.149  
Carter had found things he liked in Adorno’s later writings and he also had respect for 
the “intelligence” that Adorno had brought to the subject of modern music. Thus, while 
                                                
145 This anecdote is also in the interview with van Dyck-Hemming, “Diskurze zur ‘Musik Elliott 
Carters’,” 226. 
146 Letter from Elliott Carter to Bayan Northcott, Elliott Carter Collection, Paul Sacher Stiftung, March 
15, 1974. 
147 See George Gelles, “An Interview with Elliott Carter,” Academy 2, no. 1 (July 1979). Here Carter talks 
about his earliest thinking about the importance of the connection between music and philosophy while 
teaching at St. John’s College, quoted in Eisenlohr, Komponieren als Entscheidungsprozess, 231-2. On 
Carter’s years at St. John’s and the value of music within a liberal arts curriculum, see Hollis Thoms, 
“Rolling His Jolly Tub: Composer Elliott Carter, St. John’s College Tutor, 1940-1942,” The St. John’s 
Review 53, no. 2 (Spring 2012). 
148 For a detailed discussion of many of these texts see Jonathan Bernard, “Elliott Carter and the Modern 
Meaning of Time,” Musical Quarterly 79 (1995). See also Wierzbicki, Elliott Carter, on Carter’s 
philosophial interests. 
149 The first English translation was published in 1973, so Carter had acquired a copy of it soon after it 
became available. Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, trans. Anne G. Mitchell and 
Wesley V. Blomster (New York: Seabury Press, 1973). 
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many of Adorno’s ideas were problematic for Carter (as they were for most composers, 
particularly in earlier writings such as Philosophy of New Music and later in the 
challenges Adorno brought to the Darmstadt school),150 Carter had nonetheless studied 
them and was even grateful for their articulation. Echoes of Adornian thought are 
certainly evident in Carter’s writings and public statements, including some direct 
references and citations, which I will discuss below. 
 
To be clear, Carter never subscribed to Adorno’s theory of modern music and any 
shared aesthetic might be put down to a modernist Zeitgeist, or as discussed in Chapter 
1, the influence of an ‘Adornian’ era.  Other influences would have certainly 
contributed. For example, Carter knew Schoenberg’s Fundamentals of Musical 
Composition and Theory of Harmony, and the essays in Style and Idea,151 texts 
brimming with dialectical thought as Michael Cherlin illustrates.152 Another émigré to 
move to Carter’s side of the United States was Stefan Wolpe. Carter was friendly with 
Wolpe and knew his music and writings well.153 Wolpe’s explicit left-Hegelian 
influence would also not have been lost on Carter.154 Regardless of influence, however, 
there are concepts that reappear through Carter’s writings which show a dialectical 
thinking about composition. These concepts are important for understanding the 
foundations of Carter’s compositional aesthetic and they can be fruitfully brought into 
contact with and illuminated through Adornian notions of the dialectic of new music.  
This task is the subject of the current chapter.  
 
One of the themes that recurs throughout Carter’s writing on music is what he referred 
to as the “human side of things”: broadly, his aim to manifest musically his 
                                                
150 See for example Gianmario Borio, “Dire cela, sans savoir quoi: the question of meaning in Adorno and 
in the musical avant-garde “ in Apparitions: New Perspectives on Adorno and Twentieth Century Music, 
ed. Bertold Hoeckner (New York and London: Francis and Taylor, 2006); and Edwards, “Convergences 
and Discord in the Correspondence Between Ligeti and Adorno.” 
151 See for example references in Elliott Carter, “Expressionism and American Music (1965/72),” in 
Elliott Carter: collected essays and lectures, 1937-1995 ed. Jonathan W. Bernard (New York: University 
of Rochester Press, 1997), 75-76. 
152 Cherlin, “Dialectical Opposition in Schoenberg’s Music and Thought.” 
153 Carter invited Wolpe to talk at Dartington Summer School, see Carter, “In Memoriam Stefan Wolpe 
(1972).” Both composers would have also read each other’s writings; for example, Carter’s “Shop Talk 
by and American Composer” and Wolpe’s “Thinking Twice” were both published in Barney Childs and 
Ernie S. Schwartz, eds. Contemporary Composers on Contemporary Music (New York: Da Capo Press, 
1967). 
154 For more on Wolpe’s compositional aesthetic and philosophy see Brody, “‘Where to Act, How to 
Move’”; Greenbaum, “Stefan Wolpe’s Dialectical Logic: A Look at the ‘Second Piece for Violin 
Alone’”; and “Debussy, Wolpe and Dialectical Form,” Contemporary Music Review 27, no. 2-3 (2008): 
with reference to Carter on p. 350. See also Brigid Cohen, Stefan Wolpe and the Avant-Garde Diaspora 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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understanding of human experience and, crucially, his idealized vision of people 
relating to each other.155 Carter articulates this social vision as one of people co-existing 
peacefully despite difference, where unavoidable opposition (opposition that is in fact 
necessary to maintain individual difference) leads not to the kind of devastating 
conflicts of the twentieth century, but to a new kind of pluralistic human activity 
characterized by ultimate cooperation. The construction and treatment of musical 
conflict and opposition in Carter’s compositions can be read as his exploration of the 
possibilities of such a social vision articulated through music. In a 1988 interview 
Carter said: “I see music as a metaphor for how society should behave, honoring the 
individual, but working together for a common goal.”156 The conviction that purely 
musical processes are capable of embodying a critical social vision connects strongly 
with Adorno. Carter frequently referred to the dialectical relationship of individual and 
society in statements about the message he wanted to convey through his music. In 
interview with Andrew Ford, Carter summarizes in the simplest terms how this 
relationship plays a role in his musical composition: 
I never think of my pieces in the abstract. Very early in the piece the general 
typecasting of the various instruments or groups of instruments becomes something 
that is, to me, a means of expression of a certain specific idea, like a human idea: the 
idea of groups of people in society; individuals and their relationships to each other.  
My music has been very concerned with the presentation of individual characters and 
their interrelations.157 
Toward the end of Frank Scheffer’s 90 minute long documentary, in a shot taken in the 
early 2000s, Carter elaborates on the importance of an awareness of the social 
component to his music: 
In previous times there was a dominant group of society that explained just how 
everybody ought to act and now this has become much freer.  As a result people have 
to ma ... every individual has to make a choice about how we will cooperate and how 
we will fit into any particular situation that is produced by a group of people.  And this 
is very important in my work – the idea of having all the ... I’ve tried to give, in a 
string quartet for instance, the idea that each player is an individual that he has his 
                                                
155 See Scheffer, “Elliott Carter: A Labyrinth of Time,” 6’41”. See also for example Benjamin Boretz, 
“Conversation with Elliott Carter “ Perspectives of New Music 8, no. 2 (Spring-Summer 1970): 14. 
156 Mark Swed, “The Difficulties And Rewards Of being Difficult,” New York Times 27 November 1988. 
157 Andrew Ford, Composer to Composer: conversations about contemporary music (St. Leonards, NSW, 
Australia: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, 1993), 6. 
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own way of thinking, his own way of expression and music, but he also has a way of 
behaving in relation to the other people that are playing with him.158 
Over the many years of Carter making such statements, their complexity, specific 
emphasis and choice of wording changed, reflecting both Carter’s professional 
development and his ageing, but also the changing socio-political climate to which he 
was responding. Nevertheless, the underlying proposition that his music is an abstracted 
message about the individual in relation to the group, about the struggle or conflict of 
the expressive self in relation to the social whole, remained primary in Carter’s 
compositional aesthetic.159  
 
How this aesthetic is realized in Carter’s composition will be explored in the rest of this 
chapter through a number of topics. The first is the nature of the relationship of musical 
innovation to the musical past. For Carter the communicative act of a piece of music 
comes about only through an acknowledgement and a reshaping of the historical nature 
of its musical materials—not by way of novelty for its own sake, nor by evading the 
influence of inherited musical history, problematic as it might be, but by grappling with 
it.  In the same way that it is impossible to say something new about human interaction 
itself by beginning with a “clean slate,” so it is impossible to say anything musically 
new without a dialectical engagement with a musical tradition. Carter’s views on this 
topic and the points of connection they make with Adornian thought, I will examine 
next in section 2.2: Music history and “dialectical method.” 
 
The second topic in tracing the dialectical in Carter’s compositions involves the 
connection between form and temporality in new music.  To compose a music where, in 
Carter’s words, “individuals” can “fit it” while also having “his own way of thinking, 
his own expression and music” requires special consideration of the way music can be 
articulated in time.160  That innovation with musical time became Carter’s main 
preoccupation has become somewhat of a cliché today but in the context of the post-
1945 new music debates Carter was engaged with problems that were pressing for a 
                                                
158 Scheffer, “Elliott Carter: A Labyrinth of Time,” 52’03”. 
159 See for example the comments Carter makes to cellist Alisa Weilerstein about the Cello Concerto in 
the last interview that he gives before his death: “I love the beginning of this, you’re playing away and 
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1stGn4NA-tU). Accessed 24 September, 2016. 
160 “Elliott Carter: A Labyrinth of Time.” 52’03”.   
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generation of composers. Some historical context for Carter’s interest in the temporal in 
music is worth briefly revisiting. In the wake of the disintegration of tonality and its 
associated temporal formal structures, new music’s search for solutions to the 
interlinked problems posed by musical form and temporality was felt as urgent.161 
Carter famously said “Any technical or esthetic consideration of music really must start 
with the matter of time.”162  The centrality of the “time problem” in music was also 
identified by Adorno. In one of his later essays, “Vers une musique informelle,” Adorno 
writes: 
 In traditional listening the music unfolds from the parts to the whole, in tune with the 
flow of time itself.  This flow—that is to say, the parallel between the temporal 
succession of musical events and the pure flow of time itself—has become 
problematical and presents itself within the work as a task to be thought through and 
mastered.”163  
But the question of temporality in the arts had already become pressing more than half a 
century earlier, permeating most artistic endeavours around the turn of the twentieth 
century.  Adorno had located the breakdown of the linkage between the language-like 
nature of tonality and its temporal structuring through formal schemas in its embryotic 
stage as far back as Beethoven.164 The crisis unravelled fully for Adorno after 1910 
when the moment of Schoenberg’s free atonal music dissolved into the strictures of 12-
tone music.  Having grown up in the ferment of these ideas it is little wonder that they 
found such strong expression in Carter’s own musical concerns.  
 
As Bernard shows in “Elliott Carter and the Modern Meaning of Time,” early twentieth-
century modernist thinking about temporality in the arts generally was defining for 
Carter’s creative maturity.165 It included the Marxist film director Sergi Eisenstein’s 
dialectical theory of film at which I take a closer look below. Furthermore, James 
Wierzbicki points out that, in addition to the large range of artistic influences during his 
                                                
161 See in particular Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music, 264; and Witkin, Adorno on Music, esp. 
209-10. Relevant here are also Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music, 149-58 and 79-80; and Witkin, 
Adorno on Music, 180-82 and also 83-84. 
162 Edwards, Flawed Words, 90. 
163 Adorno, “Vers une musique informelle,” 271. 
164 Ibid. See comments on this in Alastair Williams, “New Music, Late Style: Adorno’s ‘Form in the New 
Music’,” Music Analysis 27/ii-iii (2008): 196-97. 
165 Bernard, “Elliott Carter and the Modern Meaning of Time.” Bernard’s focus is on Carter’s most 
frequently self-declared influences during the early years of his musical education and career up to 1944 
and those that specifically relate to questions of time/form in the arts: American philosopher Alfred North 
Whitehead, French writers Marcel Proust, Charles Koechlin, Gisele Brelet, and Pierre Suvchinsky (expat-
Russian), Russian-born choreographer George Ballantine, and Russian cinematographer Sergi Eisenstein. 
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early years, Carter cites significant philosophers in his writings about temporality and 
form, among them Hegel: 166 
… Carter, in his various efforts to explain his new “temporal thought,” also deals with 
ideas about time as expressed by serious thinkers who range chronologically from 
Greek antiquity (Plato and Pythagoras, explicitly, but by implication also Aristoxenus) 
through the heyday of music’s “common practice period” (Hegel, explicitly, but by 
implication also Kant and Hanslick) to the time of his own writings; the more or less 
contemporaneous thinkers he cites include Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, Martin 
Heidegger, and Susanne K. Langer.167 
Carter’s ideas on musical temporality and form were clearly shaped by a range of extra-
musical influences. Musical influences were of course of no less significance, especially 
those Carter gained through personal contact.168 Shreffler traces the early influences on 
Carter of the American ultramodernists of the 1920s and 30s and their experiments with 
temporal ideas in music: Cowell’s tempo modulations, Seeger’s dissonant counterpoint, 
Crawford’s rhythmic forms, Ives’s polyrhythmic layering.169 By contrast, Dörte 
Schmidt considers significant European sources in Carter’s development, surmising 
how “the public presence of the émigrés in American musical life of the post-war years” 
might have influenced Carter.170 Schmidt paints a picture of a vibrant European-
influenced performance culture that would have surrounded Carter living on America’s 
east coast, and especially the performance practice of the Kolisch Quartet. She 
considers Carter’s polyvocal and formal experiments in his string quartets and his 
dramaturgy of musical voices having to do with a (democratic) social ideal, as 
paralleling ideas of Schoenberg’s circle.171 
 
The treatment of musical time and its implications for formal innovation were directly 
connected to how Carter conceived of the treatment of conflict and opposition in his 
                                                
166 In Carter, “Time Lecture.”; and “Music and the Time Screen (1976).” 
167 Wierzbicki, Elliott Carter, 59. 
168 See for example Guberman, “Composing Freedom: Elliott Carter’s ‘Self-Reinvention’ and the Early 
Cold War.”; Anne C. Shreffler, “Elliott Carter and his America,” Sonus 14, no. 2 (1994); and Felix Meyer 
and Anne C. Shreffler, ed., Elliott Carter: A Centennial Portrait in Letters and Documents (Woodbridge: 
The Boydell Press, 2008). 
169 Anne C. Shreffler, “Elliott Carter and His America,” Sonus 14, no. 2 (1994) 
170 Schmidt, “‘I try to write music that will appeal to an intelligent listener’s ear.’ On Elliott Carter’s 
string quartets,” 168-89, quote on 173. 
171 Schmidt cites important premières (of Schoenberg, Bartók and Berg) given by the Kolisch Quartet and 
the Juilliard Quartet, influenced by the Kolisch, as well as Rudolph Kolisch’s lecture “Democratic 
Principles of Ensemble Playing” given at Black Mountain College in 1944 and Dika Newlin’s Bruckner, 
Mahler, Schoenberg (1947) and René Leibowitz’s Schoenberg and his School (1949). 
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music. In other words, musical temporality and form lay at the foundation of expressing 
Carter’s “human message.” Put another way, the dialectic between the expressive needs 
of Carter’s individual musical strands (that are deliberately conceived in opposition to 
each other) and the overall collective musical expression must find a formal unfolding 
in time that does justice to each in order to compose a truthful message about how 
collective and individual relationships exist and can be reconceived fruitfully. Points of 
contact between Adorno’s aesthetic theory and these notions in Carter’s composition are 
discussed in the remained of the chapter, section 2.3: Musical form and “time 
continuity;” section 2.4: The dialectic of musical motion: “human” and “inhuman” 
experiences of time; section 2.5: Musical form and Adorno’s Subject-Object dialectic; 
and finally section 2.6: Carter’s dialectic of expression and construction.  
2.2 Music History and “dialectical method” 
It is certainly possible to read aspects of dialectical thinking into Carter’s musical 
techniques and writings, even without the explicit use of terms such as “dialectic” or 
“dialectical.” However, even this language, while rare, is not altogether absent from 
Carter’s texts.  Most notable is a lecture Carter delivered in 1961 at the Tokyo “East-
West Music Encounter” festival.172 The thread running through Carter’s presentation to 
the festival’s (presumably largely Eastern) audience is that the successful continuation 
of the Western art music tradition is due to its “dialectical” nature.  The title of the 
talk—”Extending the Classical Syntax”—highlights how Carter wished to emphasize 
the historical continuity of modern Western art music with the earlier Western classical 
tradition, connecting, by implication, his own musical thinking to ‘masterworks’ of the 
past. Much of the presentation could be read as a statement of Carter’s own 
compositional intent and personal musical interests.173 
 
The listener-composer relationship is crucial to Carter’s concept of “the dialectical 
method of Western art music” that he refers to in the talk. It is the communication that 
                                                
172 This conference was organized by Nicolas Nabokov who was director of the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom, see Meyer and Shreffler, Elliott Carter: A Centennial Portrait in Letters and Documents, 163. 
For more on Carter’s involvement with Nabokov during the cold war era see Martin Brody, “Cold War 
Genius: Music and Cultural Diplomacy at the American Academy in Rome,” in Crosscurrents: American 
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composers in tradition contrasting them with the experimentation by young European composers that 
involved “[a] definite break with the past on every level.” Carter, “The Milieu of the American Composer 
(1962),” 216.  
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occurs between composer and listener that is at the heart of the method. He introduces 
the idea with the following paragraph: 
For the most striking characteristic of Western art music is that it makes appeal to a 
special aspect of the listener’s intelligence and memory. The composer assumes that 
the listener will carry out a creative task analogous to his [own], that is, to the act of 
composition proper – that he will organize notes into groups and these groups in turn 
into larger units, that he will perceive the relationship of these building blocks to one 
another and apprehend the similarities and differences that exist in diverse elements 
or, indeed, in various placings or occurrences of the same element.174 
The listener is given a task almost analogous to the composer’s in the (re-)creation of 
musical relationships through “intelligent” listening. Carter points to the kinds of 
musical relationships and musical awareness a listener should perceive in this method, 
which include listening temporally both forward and backwards (i.e., “… organize notes 
into groups and these groups in turn into larger units”; “apprehend the similarities and 
differences … in various placings … of the same element”). Such a listening strategy 
has similarities to the “structural listening” that Adorno demands of his listeners. 
Adorno’s “expert listener” must listen “structurally” in order to grasp the how each 
present musical moment stands in a dialectical relationship with past and future 
moments, all of which occur within a temporal process of ‘becoming’ that makes up the 
totality of the composition (more on this below).175 Carter concludes that this way of 
composing and listening: 
… is the dialectical method of Western art music. It is by using this method that it is 
able to express such a variety of interrelated thoughts and feelings and give a 
remarkable experience of living time.176 
Here Carter emphasizes that a dialectical approach to music results in the expression of 
“thoughts and feelings” as well as of the “experience of living time,” expressions he 
often used to describe his own compositional aesthetic and aims.  Yet, in the same talk 
Carter claims that “[n]o other art has striven so persistently for a self-contained dialectic 
and is therefore so untranslatable”; that in Western masterworks, “the musical argument 
was a self-sufficient thing, developed within the music itself, on its own terms.”177  
There is an apparent contradiction between the “self-sufficiency” of the music and the 
                                                
174 “Extending the Classical Syntax,” 164. 
175 See Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music., 208-213 esp. 210. 
176 Carter, “Extending the Classical Syntax,” 164. 
177 Ibid. 
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musical expression that reaches outside the music to the human: to thought, feeling and 
temporal experience. It is in fact the dialectic between the two that is the crux of 
Western music’s success, according to Carter.  
 
While this “self-sufficiency” underpins the nature of Western art music, in Carter’s 
opinion some composers in recent times have nevertheless failed to successfully 
extended the boundaries of the Western musical language and instead have “dislocat[ed] 
the musical dialectic by imposing on it programs derived from non-musical experience 
and non-musical thought.”178 In other words, Carter claims here that some Western 
music has moved from being materially “self-sufficient” to relying on extra-musical 
content to its detriment. He goes on to critique composers of ‘program music’ (without 
naming names) where in essence the program makes up for the lack of musical 
invention. He claims that “In the long run it is only works of a preponderantly 
dialectical interest that continue to be heard—those whose concern is mainly 
programmatic fade very soon.”179 His examples of twentieth-century composers who 
were successful in discovering “new methods of musical dialectic” include the music 
that he refers to in many of his writings as influential on his own thinking: “the later 
Debussy etudes and sonatas, the pre-12-tone Schoenberg, and some early Bartók and 
Stravinsky works.”180 
 
As noted, there is an interesting contradiction in these statements: for Carter, music 
expresses “thoughts and feelings,” in other words subject experience, and yet it must 
remain entirely musically “self-contained” and refrain from superimposing non-musical 
meaning.  Here the point of contact with Adornian thinking seems quite clear: as 
discussed in Chapter 1, the musical work must, according to Adorno, be understood on 
its own terms —analysed in terms of its musical material and their relations. However, 
the immanent dialectic of the musical materials is made evident in the extent to which 
these materials, and their relationships within a musical form, address the dialectic of 
the self-expressive individual and the social totality but “self-sufficiently,” without 
recourse to programmatic elements—in other words, mediated through the musical 
materials themselves.181  To revisit briefly the discussion in Chapter 1, I would like to 
quote Cherlin’s very clear summary of the broad concepts underlying Adorno’s 
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181 See for example Max Paddison, “Review: Aesthetic Theory by Theodor W. Adorno,” Music Analysis 
6/iii (1987): 364. 
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immanent musical dialectics. Cherlin, following Paddison, identifies two manifestations 
of this dialectic: 
… one emphasizes the dialectic between “preformed” musical materials and the 
creative vision of the composer, and the other emphasizes an immanent critique of 
societal values within the composition. In the first formulation, the composer inherits 
musical material from the work of those who have preceded him or her within the 
tradition. Such musical material has taken on what seems to be “a life of its own.” It 
has specific tendencies and implications for its own expansion. Musical meaning 
exists a priori, and the composer must resist this meaning if new meaning is to 
emerge. The musical composition becomes the place where the composer both obeys 
and dialectically opposes those demands. Aspects of the same dialectic take on social 
significance as we realize that the composer is a socially mediated subject, and that the 
material as well is historically and culturally mediated. The material, a 
social/historical construct, has become a “second nature”. The composer’s dialectic 
with that material forms an immanent critique of society.182 [italics mine] 
The “first formulation” in the above quote could be considered the basic premise of 
Carter’s Tokyo talk: “Extending the boundaries of the musical language” involves the 
composer’s struggle with pre-existing materials and how to make them “fresh, new, 
different, irreplaceable,”183 without inventing random systems that abandon their 
connection to the history of music (seen in Carter’s dislike of ‘total serialism’ or of 
‘chance music,’ a stance shared with Adorno as I will discuss below). In the Tokyo talk, 
the main examples of composers grappling with the sedimentation of musical history 
which Carter discusses are the extension of the triad and the development of musical 
material originating from a single idea: 
To the triad, two superimposed thirds, was added still another third to make a seventh 
chord. And with the seventh once accepted, one could continue the process by creating 
and establishing the ninth, and the eleventh and the thirteenth. In analogy with this 
stacking of thirds, Schoenberg and Scriabin could base some of their harmonic theory 
and practice on pile-ups of fourths. Likewise, Wagner with methodical logic 
elaborated an entire work, Tristan and Isolde, out of a consideration of the uses of one 
single chord.184 
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In these examples, Carter suggests that the composers have responded to the demands 
of the musical material dialectically by taking historically sedimented material (e.g. the 
triad) and extending it in ways that were not possible in previous contexts: e.g. the triad 
loses its harmonic function when extended by additional thirds; or, the interval of a 
fourth is extended to create a chordal harmony which in a diatonic system lacks 
functionality; or, as in the example of the Tristan chord, tonal themes and harmonic 
plans give way to musical form that is generated principally by its chord structure.185 
Carter cites other examples of the “method of developing ideas from one single musical 
feature:” 
To mention a few, The Rite of Spring deals among other things with patterns of 
irregular scansion, the Webern Bagatelles deal with the intervals of the seventh and 
the ninth, and the third of the Schoenberg Five Pieces for Orchestra deals with 
sonority. This kind of freshening consists essentially of an internal operation 
performed upon the language itself.186 [italics mine] 
In these Stravinsky, Webern and Schoenberg examples the same generating idea applies 
to the musical parameters of rhythm, interval and sonority. Carter clarifies that this kind 
of invention in new music results from “an internal operation performed on the 
language itself.”  Carter’s “internal operation” performs in Adornian terms an 
“immanent critique,” a critical response that is mediated by the musical materials rather 
than one superimposed by an extra-musical program.187  By musically reworking the 
historically handed-down materials, their inherited meaning is reframed, thereby 
creating the possibility of an “intelligent” listener questioning the ‘fixedness’ or ‘stasis’ 
not just of music, but of how other aspects of society are organized.188 
 
                                                
185 In his conversation with Boretz, Carter includes his own composing as a further extension of the same 
idea: “This use of a unifying chordal sound is found in music of many periods. It is most obvious in 
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society and serves as a locus for structural critique,” in Shreffler, “‘Music Left and Right’: A Tale of Two 
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The imperative for this critique to be immanent comes through in Carter’s Tokyo talk in 
his argument against program music.  Carter strongly suggests a responsibility on the 
part of the composer not to “deceive” the listener by trying to woo them with easily 
“verbalized” music.  He is highly critical of music that is primarily of “entertainment 
value”: 
It is interesting to point out also the appeal that program music has always had for 
non-musical persons. Sometimes the public is deceived into believing those factors 
that can be verbalized are the essentials of the music. It is obvious to the musically 
experienced that this is not so.189 
 Any kind of “program” must be expressed immanently using musical means, and not 
rely on words to substitute for a musical message.190 Musical styles and methods that do 
not engage a “musical dialectic” fail to engage musically with social critique and fail to 
create a kind of truthful music. 
 
The idea that art must express its message through its unique medium, not through 
simplistic analogy or verbal program, had already been an important aesthetic notion for 
Carter that he expressed publicly as far back as his first published writings of 1937-38 
in Modern Music, in particular in relation to dance performance. In his 1938 article 
“With the Dancers,” Carter attacks a group of modern dancers for their overtly 
programmatic presentation of social critique along with a lack of structure to their 
“intense emotional strain.” While it seems Carter was not without sympathy for the 
message of social critique that the dancers hoped to convey, he took great issue with its 
method of delivery: 
Doubtless the dancers believe (and with some justice) that modern life is disintegrated 
and frustrated. But there have been works—and there are going to be more—that 
show this strongly and clearly without being so technically submerged by their 
message that they are weak and ineffective: Berg’s Wozzeck, Weill and Balanchine’s 
Seven Deadly Sins, and Blitzstein’s Cradle Will Rock.  What the dancers want to say 
about society may be significant and valuable. It should be said as strongly and with 
as much conviction as possible in order for the idea itself not to succumb to the very 
forces they criticize. Moreover, their message is not delivered on stage, but via their 
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program notes … The theme of revolt against bourgeois society (and I suspect against 
any form of society) is a recurrent one with artists. But surely the direction should be 
not toward that of emotional, chaotic conflicts as these dancers seem to maintain but 
toward greater physical, intellectual, and emotional discipline; that is the only road to 
liberation from the society they loathe.191  
To “succumb to the very forces they criticize” may refer to using artistic means that 
evoke strong sensational responses that lack a sense of rational thought, or that simplify 
the presentation of a complex scenario—means that could also be associated with 
propaganda and methods of manipulating mass social behaviour.  Carter contrasts the 
approach of this group of modern dancers with Uday Shankar’s choreography, his 
“discipline,” his “highly developed technic and a thorough muscular control:”  
And what he does has to do with the body and its parts from eye to toe. The modern 
dancer’s body [by contrast] is always used monotonously as a whole, and the lack of 
disciplined gesture, hence concentration of meaning, dissipates the message.192 
In other words, the ‘materials’ of dance—the physical body, its gesture, its control and 
the structuring of its motion—need to be the message carrier, not an explicit theatrical 
program. In his earlier article “More About Balanchine, 1937,” it is “the interrelations 
of the people on stage” that Carter praises about Balanchine’s ballets, the “lyric and 
poetic vein” in his choreography and the way he “worked out flow in dancing.” Again 
Carter contrasts this successful approach with the failure of what he calls “modern 
dance”: 
Modern dance generally shows us individuals in the throes of self-indulgent emotions, 
who by their apparent disregard of the looker-on, seem to move within a ritual like 
that of the church. Groups of individuals also take part in these ritual dances without 
contact, apparently swayed by a simultaneously experienced emotion. The 
relationships are not human and emotional; they might exist between schools of small 
fish. Sometimes we see satirical situations such as the genius-hero being tortured at 
the hands of a fantastic society conjured up for the occasion without any social 
validity.193 
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Carter takes issue with the simplistic, over-dramatized approach to movement and to 
social message that fail to take into account the intelligence of the “looker-on” (the 
equivalent of the “intelligent” listener in music).  By using the metaphors of “the 
church” and “schools of small fish” Carter evokes images of an undifferentiated, 
unthinking mass conjured up by the movements of the dancers, a caricatured portrayal 
of real human interactions which, by contrast, involve a much more dialectical 
relationship between the individual and the group.  
 
The kind of social message that Carter criticizes in modern dance as well as in program 
music is explicitly verbal or theatrical. But in his Tokyo talk Carter speaks also of 
“another type of program music, one whose program is of a scientific, arithmetical 
nature.” Meyer and Shreffler identify this as Carter’s “veiled critique of mid-1950s 
European serialism.”194 At the conclusion to his talk, Carter states: 
Our interest leads us to avoid the cynicism and contempt [of] some music so 
perilously close to the practical joke. In avoiding the distracting temptation of 
sensationalism for its own tedious sake, we are seeking new kinds of musical thought 
patterns, new formulations of ideas, and new methods of continuity that make use of 
the special faculty of musical understanding that has been developed so extensively by 
Western art music already.195 
Carter’s mention of “sensationalism” and “the practical joke” may equally be in 
reference to ‘chance’ music, but in either case, the composer who neglects the historical 
nature of musical materials and fails to grapple dialectically with music history is 
avoiding their responsibility to engage critically with musical means.196 In his earlier 
essay “A Further Step (1958),” Carter praises Stravinsky’s Agon and Canticum Sacrum 
and Copland’s Piano Fantasy as compositions “which reveal a living and meaningful 
sensitivity to the mutual interaction of detail and whole and to differences of qualities 
and styles based on a thorough reworking of inherited musical language”197 [italics 
mine]. It is noteworthy that in this quote Carter identifies two features of new music that 
are for him critical to its success: a “mutual interaction of detail and whole” and a 
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“reworking of inherited musical materials.” Carter argues that neither requirement is 
fulfilled by a “scientific, arithmetic” approach nor a “programmatic” approach.  
 
In Carter’s critique of serialism (and chance music) we find clear parallels with 
Adorno.198  Adorno famously attacks “twelve-tone composers” in his lecture “The 
Ageing of the New Music” delivered at Darmstadt in 1955 and later published in Das 
Monat (May 1955).199 Like Carter’s criticism in his Tokyo Talk of composers who 
think that “merely mapping out the technical devices constitutes a justification and 
sufficient defense of a composition,”200 Adorno targets the pretence of technical 
complexity which obscures the lack of musical meaning: 
Judgment is passed over innumerable contemporary twelve-tone compositions by the 
fact that in them relatively simple musical occurrences stand in a relatively simple 
musical interrelation, the establishment of which by no means demanded serial 
technique in the first place. Such technique becomes what in mathematics is called the 
convergence of an equation, a simple error.201 
In 1961, the same year that Carter gave his Tokyo address, Adorno gave another 
Darmstadt lecture, “Vers une musique informelle”, which took on board criticisms 
from the Darmstadt community towards Adorno’s rather scathing assessment in “The 
Ageing of the New Music.” Many felt Adorno had been too dismissive of the attempts 
by composers to create music not reliant on traditional musical forms.202 While Adorno 
largely maintains an uncompromising position towards serialism, in “Verse une 
musique informelle” his criticism comes across more humorously: 
Musicians are usual truants from maths classes; it would be a terrible fate for them to 
end up in the hands of the maths teacher after all. The speculative artist above all 
ought to cling to the vestiges of common sense which would remind him that music is 
not necessarily more advanced just because he has failed to comprehend it. It may 
indeed be so primitive and uninspired that he failed to consider it an option in the first 
place. This explains why the products of laborious mindlessness are sometimes not 
seen through at the outset. Because the musical material is intelligent in itself, it 
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inspires the belief that mind must be at work, where in reality only the abdication of 
mind is being celebrated.203 
It is interesting to compare Adorno’s critique with Carter’s assessment of new music 
performed on the “festival circuit” in Europe in 1962, the year following his Tokyo talk, 
and published as “Letter from Europe” in Perspectives of New Music in 1963.  To get a 
sense of the extent that Carter’s ideas parallel Adorno’s I have included a lengthy quote. 
In it, Carter criticizes—in less veiled terms than in Tokyo—serial and aleatoric music 
out of the Darmstadt School (again without mentioning names): 
Like the old avant-garde, the neo-avant-garde has a very great preoccupation with the 
physical materials of music … The presentation of these in time concentrates at 
present on producing varied or kaleidoscopic alternations such as are inevitably 
achieved by either total serialization or the use of aleatoric devices. There seems to be 
very little concern with the perception of these sounds, their possibilities of 
intellectual interrelation by the listener, and, therefore, their possibilities of 
communication on a high level. Most of the time the possibility of communication is 
denied, or, if admitted, kept on the primitive level of any music that has only a 
sensuous effect. The most talented works, by very definition, communicate, apparently 
almost unintentionally, while a greater part of the others consist in an auditorily 
random display of unpredictable groupings of sound, rather violently opposed in pitch, 
speed, intensity, and color. … Yet many of these have considerable interest, and since 
they are approached from such an untraditional point of view have an important effect 
on esthetic and philosophical ideas about music; perhaps they could even become 
useful if given direction by equally “advanced” concepts arising from an awareness of 
the listener’s psychology. But without these, even in the most stimulating sound 
combinations, there is usually a stultifying intellectual poverty that no amount of 
arithmetic patterning will overcome; for either such a pattern can be heard by the 
listener, in which case it is usually far too simple to be of any interest, or it cannot, in 
which case an impression of pointless confusion results. For the most part, the 
Darmstadt music seems to waver between these two extremes—this is, when it is 
heard in large amounts—for there is no denying that on first impression some of the 
works are quite striking.204 [italics mine] 
Carter is somewhat more hopeful for the potential of some of this music than Adorno is. 
However, as far as describing the criteria for an genuine communicative musical 
experience, they resemble each other. Like Adorno who seeks, but fails to find, an 
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intelligent communication or “mind,” Carter looks for “possibilities of intellectual 
interrelations by the listener” and finds them mostly lacking. Both label music that does 
not communicate in this way as “primitive” and both warn against the seduction of 
novelty which Adorno says is “sometimes not seen through at the outset” and of which 
Carter says “there is no denying that on first impression some of the works are quite 
striking.”  What is shared is the critique of a perceived lack of communication, lack of 
musical sense-making, by composers resorting to systems—or the opposite, chance—to 
take over from their own subjective expression.  This also involves a denial rather than 
a critical engagement with the historically inherited meaning of musical materials.  
Serialism (or ‘total serialism”),205 as critiqued here by Adorno and Carter, is considered 
to be a kind of mindless application of mathematical ‘formulae’ and the systemization 
of expression, rendering it ultimately expressionless. The “aleatoric devices” that Carter 
notes above are simply the flip side of total organisation.206 The apparent absence of the 
composer’s subjective involvement with the music’s materials troubled Carter as it did 
Adorno. To leave the outcome of musical expression to chance or to a preordained 
system was to give over one’s subjective responsibility to an external force, something 
that was artistically but also morally suspect. I will return to the philosophical 
significance of this below in Section 2.5 Musical form and Adorno’s Subject-Object 
dialectic. 
 
To recapitulate, the “dialectical method” of Western music and its “true” extension in 
modern times, as Carter summarized in his Tokyo lecture, involves reshaping the 
inherited (socio-musical) meaning of musical materials and form into something new 
that takes account of a “living experience” of time, of “feelings and thoughts” and of a 
dynamic relationship of part and whole. It must communicate to its listener not through 
pure and immediate sensuousness but by engaging the mind, and not through words or 
program but by way of music alone. How did these ideas take shape in Carter’s writings 
about musical form in his own music? 
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2.3  Musical form and “time continuity” 
In the 1971 interview with Allen Edwards, Flawed Words and Stubborn Sounds, 
Edwards asks Carter: “It has been remarked that you are today one of the only advanced 
composers who really thinks of music in a contrapuntal way. Is this way of thinking 
specifically related to your feelings about time-continuity and musical form?” [italics 
mine]. Edward’s question elicits the following response from Carter: 
While it’s obvious that the constant and over-all phenomenon of music is one in which 
every “moment” is in the process of coming from some previous moment and leading 
to some future moment - only thus contributing to what is happening in the present - it 
seems to me that this process can have a number of simultaneous dimensions such 
that, for example, the moment, as it occurs, may consist of a number of 
simultaneously evolving event patterns or sub-continuities of more or less radically 
different musical character, which interract with each other to produce the “total” 
continuity and character-effect (which, as the dialectical synthesis of the contributing 
sub-continuities and characters is irreducible to any one of these or to any “sum” of 
their qualities). It seems to me that this is very much the way we think all the time and 
that the feeling of experience is always the synthesis of our awareness of half-a-dozen 
simultaneous different feelings and perceptions interracting [sic.] together, with now 
one and now another coming into the main focus while the others continue, more or 
less in the background, to influence it and give it the intellectual and affective 
meaning it has.207 
These two very dense sentences encapsulate a number of important, interrelated ideas. 
Firstly, it is noteworthy that, at the end of the quote, Carter draws his preceding 
technical explanation back to his conviction that (as we have seen above) music can 
“show” something about not only the make-up of an external society but also of an 
internal psychology: about “the way we think all the time” and about “the feeling of 
experience.”  Once again, Carter emphasizes the importance of taking the “human” 
experience as a starting point for shaping musical material.  Secondly, in this paragraph 
Carter makes an analogy between the psychological experience of time and what he 
calls “the simultaneous dimension” of music—in other words, the uniquely musical way 
in which sounds are combined into counterpoint. The plurality of the musical 
counterpoint mirrors the plurality of thought. Carter elaborately describes the individual 
musical lines that make up such counterpoint as “simultaneously evolving event 
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patterns or sub-continuities of more or less radically different musical character.” This 
is deliberate on his part as he is wanting to move away completely from any association 
with traditional musical voices. By referring to the “total” effect as a “dialectical 
synthesis,” Carter squarely places his musical layers in opposition to each other, in 
contrast to tonal music which is thematically, rhythmically and harmonically far more 
integrated than the layers in Carter’s own music.  The “simultaneous dimension” in 
Carter’s music is “irreducible” and thereby presents a space for expressing the idea of 
multiple self-contained thought processes flowing at the same time. 
 
Jonathan Bernard puts “the language of ‘dialectical synthesis’” of the passage quoted 
above down to the influence of Sergei Eisenstein’s Marxist/Hegelian philosophy of 
film.208  In a section of his article “Elliott Carter and the Modern Meaning of Time,” 
Bernard explores in some depth aspects of Eisenstein’s montage techniques, 
convincingly highlighting parallels with Carter’s own descriptions of his compositional 
techniques and his concept of form. It is worth revisiting some of these parallels. For 
example, central for Eisenstein was the idea that “art is always conflict.”209 The 
connection of art to social conflict and to a Hegelian dialectical ontology is given 
artistic expression in Eisenstein’s montage process.  His list of montage techniques 
were to be used successively, bringing each technique into conflict with the next, such 
that each “collision resulted in a higher unity.”210 Eisenstein’s idea of “dynamism” 
animated the collisions of his montage, providing the impetus for continual change that 
gave the film its overall form.  Of the overall direction or progress of a film, Eisenstein 
said that the motion of montage should be 
 through a simultaneous advance of a multiple series of lines, each maintaining an 
independent compositional course and each contributing to the total compositional 
course of the sequence … The general course of the montage was an uninterrupted 
interweaving of these diverse themes into one unified movement. Each montage-piece 
had a double responsibility—to build the total line as well as to continue the 
movement within each of the contributory themes …Montage is actually a large, 
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developing thematic movement, progressing through a continuing diagram of 
individual splices.211 
The similarity of Eisenstein’s language to that of Carter’s in the quote above is indeed 
striking, and it is even more so in the following quote where Carter elaborates on the 
“progressive” nature of his music as he continues his response to Edwards: 
What began to interest me was the possibility of a texture in which, say, massive 
vertical sounds would be entirely composed of simultaneous elements having a direct 
and individual horizontal relation to the whole progress or history of the piece—that 
is, simultaneous elements, each of which has its own way of leading from the previous 
moment to the following one, maintaining its identity as part of one of a number of 
distinct, simultaneously evolving, contributory thought-processes or musical 
characters … the principle idea is a sort of generalized program concerned with one 
aspect of the formal structure, whereby the trajectory of the whole piece, its 
progression or rise and fall of tension in time, from its beginning to its end, is 
produced by the interaction of the contributory elements. The coordination of these 
contrasting layer of music then forms an integral part of the musical discourse of the 
work and give it its small and large formal evolution. (The form I seek is Coleridge’s 
“form as proceeding,” and I try to avoid “shape as superinduced.” For the latter, as he 
says, “is either the death or the imprisonment of the thing; the former is its self-
witnessing and self-effected sphere of agency.”)212 [italics mine] 
The conceptualization of formal unfolding that Carter presents here is virtually identical 
to the way Eisenstein expresses his idea of the motion in montage. Carter elaborates on 
the make-up of his simultaneous dimension, adding important emphasis on how the 
individualized musical characters have a “double responsibility” (to borrow Eisenstein’s 
term): to their own evolving identity and to the trajectory of the whole piece.213 Time-
continuity—or “the way everything … happens as and when it does in relation to 
everything else”214—is crucial Carter says, “precisely in works that seem to depend on 
‘discontinuity’ for their character.”215  Carter expresses this view strongly in Flawed 
Words and Stubborn Sounds: 
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I take exactly the opposite stand from those composers of every stripe who don’t 
believe the order of presentation is important in music and who don’t appear to 
recognize that this order influences and in fact confers the meaning and effect that a 
given set of musical events comes to posses …216 
The irreversibility of time is a given for Carter, and while time can be elastic in music, 
the effect of sequence cannot be avoided. This view was certainly shared by Adorno.217 
The distinction between “shape as superinduced” and “form as proceeding” that Carter 
refers to above speaks not only to the modernist rejection of classical formal models 
that imposed structure on the material, but also to this specific understanding of time-
continuity that Carter wishes to capture in his music, something he frequently referred 
to as “flow.”  In an interview with Boretz around the same time as the Edwards 
interview, Carter said:  
Composers had been very routine about what goes on in any given instant of music—
simultaneously, I mean—usually they settled for harmonic effects that emphasize 
certain qualities of the theme, or contrapuntal ones that repeat fragments of the main 
theme in order, so to speak, to cook the chicken in chicken broth, to intensify its 
particular character. I was interested, by contrast, in flow, in the contribution of the 
past to the present and the effect of predicted futures on it, in dealing with the process 
of an emerging present.218 
The idea of “flow” sits at the very foundation of dialectical thought: in both Heraclitian 
and Hegelian/Marxist dialectic the fundamental state of the material world and human 
thought is one of constant conflict, change and flux, the subject as becoming rather than 
being. 219  Carter’s writings and interviews are full of references to the significance of 
“flow” in his compositions.220 Its relationship to the “dialectical synthesis of the 
contributing sub-continuities and characters” in Carter’s music hinges on the concept of 
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the “emerging present,” a concept associated with process philosophy. In this 
understanding, the present is not “pointillistic”221 and cannot be grasped as a static 
moment but rather is conceived as continuous, incorporating both the past, which has 
just come from being the present, and the future which is about to become the present; 
in Carter’s words, “the ‘now’ of any given point to me is only as significant as how it 
came to be ‘now’ and what happens afterwards.”222   
 
To summarize, Carter’s idea of flow is manifest by way of a music that contains a 
plurality of musical motion, collectively defining the trajectory of a composition but 
without abandoning the relationship of each musical strand to its own past and future 
unfolding, in other words a dialectical interaction. Interestingly (and perhaps 
provocatively), Boretz questions whether Carter’s simultaneous dimension to 
polyphony might really be a “new category of textural relations” to which Carter offers 
the following comment: 
My musical attitude did not arise from a desire to compose a certain kind of music 
“original” or otherwise. Rather it came directly from my own human experience and 
thoughts about it, corroborated by St. Augustine, A. N. Whitehead (especially in 
Process and Reality), Eliot, Williams, Proust, Joyce, Broch and others. I have been in 
search of a music that would embody the human experience of process and its 
transcendence.223 
While Carter does not explore what he means by the suggestive reference to 
“transcendence,” it is hard not to hear Hegelian overtones. The rich web of the 
influences Carter cites here is certainly connected by a shared pre-occupation with 
temporality, memory, and human process.  Bernard examines in detail the influence of 
Whitehead on Carter, as well as the influence of Proust.224 I do not wish to retrace 
Bernard’s extensive coverage of these specific influences. However, I would like to 
draw links between Carter’s conception of how the musical moment is constituted, its 
relationship to “human experience,” and Adorno’s notion of the centrality of time for a 
musical work’s truth content. For both Carter and Adorno, the nature of temporality was 
determining not only for the individual psychological experience but for the human 
social dynamic. I will attempt to flesh out these ideas in what follows. 
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2.4 The dialectic of musical motion: “human” and “inhuman” experiences of time  
The notions of time flow and social progress are tied together in a comment Carter 
makes in Scheffer’s film: 
I’m very much concerned throughout all of my life to avoid the idea of mechanical 
repetition because it seemed to me that we were being deluged by advertising and by 
propaganda.  This is something that I have tried specifically to fight - what we want is 
a kind of growth, a kind of development, a kind of liveliness and not just a kind of 
prison in which everything is made mechanical and inhuman. And so my music has 
always tried to reflect the human side of things, human in the sense that we are, like 
Montaigne says, constantly changing - “l’homme ondoyant et divers” is what 
Montaigne said, and this is what I try to capture.225 
In this interpretation of the experience of time, “mechanical repetition” or stasis is the 
negation of flow, of (lived) temporal experience, of progress, of becoming, indeed of 
humanity, all of which are for Carter the primary expressive priorities of his music (note 
his use of the word “fight,” reflecting the strength of conviction this concept held for 
him). Furthermore, for Carter mechanical repetition brings into music something all too 
expected and predictable, promoting a passivity of listening antithetical to true 
expressive communication. Its social manifestation can be found in advertising and in 
propaganda that promotes a kind of programmed mass responses which halts individual 
thinking and critical reflection, and hold both the individual and the collective in a state 
of stasis.226  Both Carter’s and Adorno’s critique of listening is relevant here because, as 
noted above, the listener is the idealized receptor of musical communication and needs 
to keep an active, critical listening capacity despite the “deluge” of false communication 
that surrounds them. Conversely, it is the composer’s responsibility to communicate 
something worthy of deep listening, which for Carter involves this sense of the human 
in a state of constant change. The social interactive dynamic is played out between 
composer and listener mediated by the music.  
 
Carter’s criticism of mechanical repetition has definite parallels with Adorno’s 
diagnosis of the features of repetitive music that facilitate capitalist production and 
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marketability but also repressive social organisation.227 While Carter’s claim that 
mechanical repetition in music is the sonic equivalent of advertising and propaganda 
certainly expresses a critique of these consumerist and brainwashing activities, during 
the 1980s in particular Carter also levelled stronger public criticism at the morality of 
repetition in minimalist styles of music and in neo-romanticism. In one interview Carter 
cites Adorno’s “regression of listening” and, like Adorno, targets the effects of 
repetitive music that mimic negative influences on the development of a “human” 
society—not only advertising, consumerism, passive engagement, conformism, and 
state propaganda but, at its extreme, fascism.228  In interviews over the last decade of his 
life, Carter maintained this position toward repetition, particularly as it is manifest in 
Minimalism in the arts.229  Eisenlohr points out that Carter’s views originally stemmed 
not from a reaction to the rise of a post-modern aesthetic per se but rather from Carter’s 
long-developed stance towards the relationship between composer and listener. Already 
in 1938, when Carter himself was still composing in an American neo-classic style, he 
had articulated his criticism of the passive listener.  His article “Orchestras and 
Audiences; Winter, 1938” in Modern Music opens boldly with: 
There are two ways of listening to music.  The most popular is for the listener to give 
himself up to an evening of reminiscence or revery after having checked his 
conscious, critical self at the door with his hat.230 
 The second “more objective … kind of listener … is eager for new ideas and new 
feelings.” It is the composer’s responsibility to communicate to this “intelligent 
listener,” who in turn is responsible for actively listening to grasp this message: 
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He follows it attentively for he know that it is a living message to him from another 
living man, a serious thought or experience worth considering, one that will help him 
to understand the people about him. To him, dead, worn-out formulas or non-
communicative styles are anathema. Serious composers and musicians have always 
aimed at this listener and he in turn has shown that he could take his listener’s share of 
the responsibility by keeping his mind actively fixed on the music he was hearing.231 
Composer and listener engage in a “true” social exchange through their postures 
towards their tasks of composing and listening respectively.  In his reviews of new 
music in the 1930s and 1940s Carter always commented unfavourably on excessive 
repetition of musical ideas and musical forms that relied on classical or romantic 
models.232 As already noted, Carter’s “two ways of listening” recall Adorno’s 
“structural listening” and “regressive listening” but Carter’s early views seem also to 
echo the writings of Schoenberg, whose ideal listener must have “an alert and well-
trained mind” and who is offended by the musical equivalent of “baby talk.”233   
 
Carter’s formulation of his ideal listener as the target of his musical communication has 
received attention in the scholarly and popular literature partially because Carter himself 
continuously raised this topic in interviews. Dörte Schmidt and Henning Eisenlohr 
delve into this aspect of Carter’s aesthetic in detail. I wish to extend the discussion a 
little further, and suggest that it is not simply that the ideal listener was important to 
Carter because of his desire for communication but because of a broader social vision 
that Carter himself felt almost morally obliged to engage with musically. Arnold 
Whittall sees this as an ethical stance to which Carter holds.234 And in my reading it 
connects to what Tia DeNora says of Adorno’s insistence on “the handling of musical 
materials [being] nothing short of moral praxis.”235 The expression of this moral praxis 
for both Carter and Adorno hinged on the understanding of how music temporality 
embodies the social.  
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Witkin remarks that for Adorno “[temporality] is inseparable from his notion of what is 
‘social’ and what is ‘creative’” and thus “[a] music that is truly social (and, therefore, 
socially true), in Adorno’s analysis, is one in which the elements manifest sociality and 
temporality in their relations with each other.”236  Social relations resulting from mass 
responses put a halt to “the emergent character of the present.”237 Time in a sense 
becomes petrified in false social relations: 
In Adorno’s analysis, so long as individuals act freely and spontaneously and enter 
into real dialectical relations with others, there will be temporality and an historical 
dimension to action. Any system of relations in which the individual is totally 
subsumed by the collectivity, and his or her relations with others mechanically 
determined, is a de-sociated and atemporal reality, a structure from which all change 
and development have been expunged.238 
What is so significant for Adorno, as it is for Carter, is the interaction of past, present 
and future musical elements that set musical time in motion analogous to the way 
individuals change and progress through genuine (free) interactions with other 
individuals and thus set social progress in motion.239 Witkin explores in detail the 
sociological basis for Adorno’s temporal model of interaction between individuals in his 
chapter “Taking a critical line for a walk” in Adorno on Music.240 It is instructive that 
Witkin connects Adorno’s view of social interaction and temporality with George 
Herbert Mead’s philosophy. Alfred North Whitehead was an admirer of Mead’s and as 
already noted Carter was influenced by Whitehead’s Process and Reality, having 
studied it as a student at Harvard where Whitehead was a faculty member.241 While 
exploration of this connection is outside the scope of this study, it is worth at least 
noting that elements of Hegel’s, Whitehead’s and Mead’s philosophies regarding 
‘process’ and ‘emergence’ can be found to connect on different levels with Adorno’s 
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addressed this in Marguerite Boland, “The All-Trichord Hexachord: compositional strategies in Elliott 
Carter’s Con Leggerezza and Gra” (M.A. diss., LaTrobe University, Melbourne, 1999), 10-14. 
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philosophy and Carter’s aesthetics.  Time and again, Carter places his musical ideas in 
opposition to mechanical expression and to social and political activity that “expunges” 
the temporal, instead stressing the ever-changing (and thus ever-progressing) nature of 
the ‘participants’ or ‘layers’ in his compositions.  Carter is very clear in his discussions 
of repetition and form during the 1960s and 1970s: his musical forms contain no 
repeats. In a discussion of his Third Quartet (1971) with Charles Rosen, for example, 
Carter says: 
What may be interesting about the form is that none of the material ever repeats 
literally, and this is characteristic of many of my pieces ever since the First Quartet.  
They never actually repeat the same theme, but they are always improvizing [sic] on a 
basic piece of material that holds together all the various things that are being played.  
There will sometimes be repetitions of certain speeds and textures that dominate 
different sections ... but the form is not a form in which there is literal repetition, only 
a constant repetition of a general principle. ... Maybe you can find one chord that is 
the same from beginning to end, but the main thing is the sense of constant growth and 
change.242 
Carter’s constantly changing, growing and differentiated musical characters maintain 
their basic identity, while the “musical discourse” (i.e., the progressive unfolding of 
form in time) is “produced by the interaction of the contributory elements” [italics 
mine].  In this way, the musical materials themselves model the notion that (ideal) 
human experience comes about through true subjective interaction, in which the 
exchange changes all participating individuals in a way that has consequences for the 
future.  
 
Once again, this kind of treatment of musical material finds a parallel in the interaction 
between creator (composer) and receptor (listener) in Carter’s thought.  In his “Time 
Lecture” of 1965, Carter links the composer’s treatment of the temporal aspect of music 
(here referred to as “the manner of dealing with time and memory”) with the listener’s 
experience of the social world. As in the above quote from Scheffer’s film, forms of 
mass communication provide the example of undesirable experience that genuine 
musical expression must avoid.243 The listener is presented as a recipient whose 
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capacity for memory and complex experience of time should always be addressed by 
the composer. Carter concludes his lecture as follows:  
… the manner of dealing with time and memory has become very obvious, almost 
primitive. Things continue for a while in a more or less uniform way and then switch 
to another, contrasting stretch of similar concept. This is actually a denial of memory 
and time, which corresponds to the treatment of these we receive as readers of 
newspapers and advertisements, as targets of almost any kind of public 
communication which reduces everything to superficiality and ultimately to loss of 
identity.244 
Memory is critical to “lived” temporal experience but also to the constitution of the 
subject, its “identity.” Music is capable of referencing and playing with memory and 
time in complex ways.  However, Carter sees a diminishing use of this capacity in the 
New Music. That Carter connects the “denial of memory and time” in musical form 
with “public communication which reduces everything to superficiality and ultimately 
to loss of identity” relates directly to what Williams notes is Adorno’s aspiration for 
new musical form: 
 Adorno hopes for a form of music in which particular moments are not subsumed by 
the overall structure; and it is well known that for him this vision relates to a larger 
concern with the ways in which all-purpose patterns of thinking crush the spontaneity 
of the moment.245 
The “spontaneity of the moment” is where true human interaction capable of growth 
occurs and for this to happen time cannot be rigidly structured into “all-purpose patterns 
of thinking.” Carter also captures this sense of “spontaneity of the moment” in his 
contrasting of the “primitive’ organisation of time with his own musical treatment of 
part and whole: 
In my own music, I am keenly aware of the ways in which some of these concepts of 
time can affect even small details and make them able to participate in larger 
constructions. For it is the large continuity and conception of progress which 
determines the choice of all the materials in my recent work—any given moment, for 
the most part, is a bridge from a previous one to a succeeding one and contains both 
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the elements of unexpectedness as well as intelligible relations to the past and 
anticipation of the future, not always fulfilled in the way anticipated.246 
Again the relationship of part to whole is presented here as a dialectic where the choice 
of materials are in service of the large continuity while simultaneously never ceasing to 
relate to their own flow. The final phrase “… anticipation of the future, not always 
fulfilled in the way anticipated” is laden with significance, because by allowing the 
spontaneous individual moment to determine the future, the form of the piece 
accommodates its individual constituents rather than superimposing a pre-determined 
shape on their inherent expressive trajectories.  As we saw in Chapter 1, the dialectical 
handling of part and whole was where Adorno located music’s immanent social 
critique.  The relationship of the pre-formed material with sedimented historical 
meaning and the re-forming of material in a way that the particular is not subsumed or 
violated by the whole—in other words, the relationship of the objective and the 
subjective in music—must be a dialectical one for the music to contain any truth 
content.247  While the concept of Subject-Object relations in Adorno’s philosophy of 
music is not straightforward,248 it is worth at least sketching some of the elements in a 
way that connections to Carter’s thought can be made. 
2.5 Musical form and Adorno’s Subject-Object dialectic 
Roughly, for Adorno traditional formal means of organising music’s materials (‘given 
forms’) constituted the objective content of music—the content that musically 
embedded the external world—even if this content was in fact not really objective, but 
only seemingly objective by becoming “second nature.”  In “Form in the New Music,” 
Adorno analyses the modern day situation by first revisiting the past. Of the objective 
nature of formal schemes he writes: 
To be sure, the traditional forms, the schemes, are more than just schemes. Music 
possesses no contents borrowed directly from the external world. In exchange, 
contents have become embedded in the traditional forms. Thus the rondo evokes a 
spiritualised form of the round dance, with its distinction between couplet and refrain. 
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To grasp it as a form always meant sensing this form, moulding oneself to it, varying 
it. The contrasts between tutti and solo hidden in the rondo, between the individual 
and the totality, were made dynamic with the concerto and became essential for the 
decisive form of the modern age, the sonata.249 
Through their historical use and transformation, traditional forms had become 
‘objective’ schemes with which to structure musical content; however, they in fact 
originated in social practice which had now become sedimented within the structure. On 
the other hand, ‘subjective’ musical content consisted of musical innovations (of the 
composer) through the way motives, themes and harmonies negotiated this (relatively 
fixed) formal objectivity. The way subject and object mediated each other was critical 
to the success of the music. Adorno continues: 
However, even if the traditional musical forms were also content, thanks to their 
implicit meaning, and if every musical content made itself heard uniquely in them or 
their modifications, then this shows that even in traditional music, form and content, 
and especially what is known as expression, were profoundly mediated by each other. 
The rank of a work of music was determined by the level of profundity at which this 
meditation took place, by the degree to which the forms were justified by their specific 
and spontaneous contents (instead of being merely adopted in a superficial way) and, 
conversely, by the depth at which the unique musical event adapted itself to the forms 
in which it manifest itself.  This intersection, this conciliatory resolution of the tension 
between form and content, was the lifeblood of the Viennese Classicism, of Haydn, 
Mozart, Beethoven.250 
Gradually as tonality—the integration of melody and harmony (and of course rhythm, 
although Adorno does not mention it)—broke apart over the course of the nineteenth 
century, so formal organisation that dictated and depended on harmonic function lost its 
raison d’être.  In other words, the subjective and the objective were no longer able to 
sustain the mediated relationship that held the universal (form) and the particular 
(content) in aesthetic tension.251  For Adorno, the New Music needed to retain a 
dialectical relationship between subjective musical content and objective musical form: 
despite the disintegration of material and the necessary dissolution of traditional forms, 
subject and object must continue to mediate each other. This imperative can be 
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understood in the context of Adorno’s inherited Hegelian notion of mediation.252 Witkin 
explains: 
 True subjectivity for Adorno is always an historically constituted subjectivity. It is a 
subjectivity in which subject and object, individual and society, mediate one another, 
constitute one another; there is no realm of pure subjectivity which is ‘in-itself’ and 
distinct and different from its objects; subject and object tango together in history but 
not without a struggle for hegemony, not without one or other appearing, sometimes, 
to get the upper hand - more subjectification, more objectification, etc.253  
Subjectivity is defined against objectivity, dialectically. In this way Subject cannot be 
subsumed by Object but retains its autonomy to varying degrees. Witkin continues: 
In the very process of actively mediating (and being mediated by) its objects - in being 
historical - the subject continuously realises its own non-identity which, for Adorno, is 
the ground of its becoming, its freedom, autonomy and spiritual integrity. The more 
that the subject seeks to de-sociate itself, to empty itself, the less does it possess within 
itself the wherewithal to resist the total domination of the ‘external’ - that is, the 
domination of the collectivity - and the more it gives itself over to the latter in an act 
of self-immolation.254 
This philosophical understanding of the mutual immanence of Subject and Object—this 
‘dance’ that the subject does in retaining its identity while recognising it is 
simultaneously constituted by (and constitutes) ‘external’ reality—lies at the core of 
Adorno’s analysis of New Music. As we saw above, integral serialism and aleatoricism 
are two sides of the same coin according to Adorno (via Ligeti) because both relinquish 
the subjective hand of the composer to a pre-determined scheme or to randomness 
respectively. Their claim to objectivity by removing the subject from the equation of 
form-creation is false according to Adorno, because there is no such thing as a pure 
form of either. Both the subjective and the objective must be expressed in musical terms 
that are true to their relationship at any particular point in history. Paddison explains: 
The relations of Subject and Object takes place within the work itself. It is, in 
Adorno’s view, necessarily an antagonistic relationship today, characterized by the 
conflicting demands for unity of form (as Subject) in the face of the need to remain 
true to a disintegrating material (as Object). That is to say, the ‘form’ of the integrated 
work, to be ‘authentic’ (that is, true to the demands of the material), must now 
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incorporate its apparent opposite - disintegration, fragmentation, chaos, along the lines 
of his ideal of ‘une musique informelle.’255 
As the experience of the subject in the modern world becomes more fragmentary and 
elements of life more dissociated, the musical content needs to be true to this reality. 
But the ideal relationship between subject and object must also not be forgotten, and it 
is the form that must suggest an idealized integration that does not oppress the 
subjective materials.  Adorno’s ideal, Williams writes, is 
 a music that would be dependent neither on traditional forms nor on technical 
systems; instead, like the pieces deriving form Schoenberg’s free atonal period, the 
music he foresees would create its own form from its own immanent needs … More 
specifically, Adorno envisages what he calls “a third way between the jungle of 
Erwartung, on the one hand, and the tectonics of Die glückliche Hand, on the 
other.”256 
The subjectivism of the expressionist Erwartung and the objectivism of the serial Die 
glückliche Hand represent the two extremes to which a dialectical third ideal would 
become Adorno’s true ‘new music.’  The necessity for music to maintain this dialectical 
relationship points back to Adorno’s sociological and philosophical critique of 
Enlightenment reason, and the role of music as reason’s dialectical partner, as we have 
seen in Chapter 1. Witkin elaborates on this connection as follows: 
When Adorno lines up his champions of truth in music against the enemies of that 
truth, it is on the basis of that same dark choice between a music that, he claims, truly 
reflects the human condition—a music that is the result of an historically constituted 
and mediated social praxis, a music which refuses identity and resists oppression—
and a music which seeks to escape from entanglements, to lay claim to an unmediated 
realm of pure musical experience and which, whether it retreats into inwardness or 
escapes into outwardness, is a music which collaborates with oppression. In a world in 
which the spiritual, sensuous and expressive life of the subject is so threatened—and 
with it, all true sociality—the serious artist assumes a special significance. A ‘re-
valuing’ of experience under the conditions of barbarism, a re-sociation of life, 
becomes the special province of the artist in the modern world.257 
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In other words, the artist is faced with a choice that is not a stylistic, musical choice but 
a moral one. The treatment of the objective and the subjective in musical expression is a 
statement about the human condition that cannot be escaped. Adorno’s rejection of 
chance and serial music is on the basis of its of “inward retreat,” since the composer 
ultimately avoids the question of the dialectic of subject and object by letting systems 
pre-determine the form.  Typical of his negative stance, Adorno was cautious in 
identifying any of the compositions of the decades immediately following the Second 
World War as having achieved his ideal (more on this in Chapter 3).258 Carter’s 
insistence of the treatment of musical time as an expression of human experience speaks 
directly to this moral aspect of composition. It finds direct expression in Carter’s 
compositional preoccupation with the balancing of the objective and subjective through 
the simultaneous individual layers that are conceived as individuals responsive to the 
total interaction and trajectory of the piece, as we saw above. In the next section, I 
connect this balancing of subject/object with Carter’s ideas of expression and 
construction, and chaos and order, especially important to his middle period music. 
2.6  Carter’s dialectic of expression and construction 
We have already noted a parallel between Adorno’s and Carter’s assessment of serial 
and aleatoric music.  Carter does not talk in Adornian terms about a Subject-Object 
dialectic in the relationship of musical content and form. However, what is revealing is 
Carter’s analysis of ‘new’ music from the early part of the twentieth century in his 1965 
essay “Expressionism and American Music.”259  As Meyer and Shreffler explain, Carter 
initially wrote on this topic in 1964 for the Convegno Internazionale di Studio 
sull’Expressionismo, organized by Roman Vlad during Florence’s annual music 
festival.260 On this occasion Carter gave a lecture titled “On the Borders of 
Expressionism.”  A “completely reworded and much longer” version of this talk was 
published in Perspectives of New Music in 1965 as “Expressionism and American 
Music,” stimulated by exchanges that Carter had with Benjamin Boretz (then editor of 
the journal Perspectives of New Music).261 Carter writes to Boretz that the participants 
in the conference 
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all received a book-sized (printed) bibliography of Espressionismo, Caos e geometia, 
by P. Chiarini, with quotes from all the important texts and their dates of printing—
and summaries. This is most helpful, for now I shall try and relate the American 
school more precisely, ideologically, with the middle European, Italian, French, and 
English currents of the time.”262 
In Carter’s published article he contextualizes musical experimentation in the United 
States during the first few decades of the twentieth century in the light of parallel 
musical innovation and musical thought during what Carter calls German 
Expressionism (but he also mentions schools of French and Russian music). 
Referencing a wide range of literature of the day on “expressionism” (no doubt aided by 
the above mentioned bibliography), Carter draws parallels between the American 
ultramoderns such as Ives, Varèse, Cowell, Ruggles (and others), and principally the 
Second Viennese School.  What is interesting is the way Carter brings into focus the 
two opposing tendencies of the expressionist attitude: one subjective, driven by “the 
primeval, immediate expression of basic human emotion” (or Urshrei) and the other 
taking an objective starting point in “constructivism.” 263  He engages with the historical 
debates around subjective and objective expression in music, citing Rufer, Kandinsky 
and Schoenberg as well as Ives on the primacy of the Subject in expressionist music. 
But he insightfully prefaces his discussion with the observation that Ives misquotes 
Hegel in support of his claim that music must be an expression “that comes from 
somewhere near the soul.” Carter writes: 
The basic point of agreement [between ultramodernist composers] is Hegel’s 
statement (quoted in part by Ives) that “The universal need for expression in art lies, 
therefore, in man’s rational impulse to exalt the inner and outer world into a spiritual 
consciousness for himself, as an object in which he recognizes his own self.” This 
statement as quoted by Ives omits the words “and outer” and the last phrase “as an 
object …”. Both of these omissions are very significant, for they reveal how close 
Ives’s thinking was to that of the expressionists, for whom the inner world was of 
prime importance, and for whom art was not an object but a means of embodying his 
own spiritual vision …264 
In pointing out Ives’s omissions in his quoting of Hegel, Carter is drawing attention to 
the dialectical nature of the “inner and outer world” basic to Hegel’s philosophy and to 
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how Ives’s omission negates this basic dialectic. Carter quotes Italian literary critique 
Ladislao Mittner who argues that the opposing tendencies of the subjective and 
objective, which Mittner terms “chaos and geometry,” also contain the potential to turn 
into their opposites “since geometry can deform and even disintegrate, while the “cry” 
can turn into an ecstatic shout of jubilation which invokes or creates a new world, an 
ideal world …”265 Further evidence of Carter’s sensitivity to the dialectical nature of 
expressionism can be found in the fact that Carter uses the same ultramodernist 
composers to exemplify both expressionist and constructivist techniques present in 
American music of that period. Carter identifies compositions by Ives, Rudhyar and 
Ruggles for both “expressionistic intensity”  as well as  “‘geometrical’ schemata,” 
pointing to Carter’s perception that despite their “expressionist” ideology these 
composers nonetheless wrestled with the dialectical nature of musical materials.  This 
essay is evidence that Carter was clearly comfortable navigating his way around the 
philosophical foundations of the aesthetic debates concerning musical form and content, 
subjective expression and objective construction.  
 
Significantly, it was also precisely at this time that Carter’s own compositional work 
was steeped in similar ideas. The pieces of the 1960s (the Second String Quartet (1959), 
Double Concerto (1961), Piano Concerto (1965) and Concerto for Orchestra (1969)) are 
discussed in precisely these terms by Schiff in his first edition of The Music of Elliott 
Carter.266  Of Carter’s compositional approach in general during this time, Schiff notes 
the tug-of-war between construction found in Carter’s exploration of flexible systems of 
large-scale organisation and his need for expressing the fragmented nature of the 
modern subjective experience: 
The expressive contrast of order and chaos was achieved through extensions of 
techniques Carter had developed in the early 1950s, but whereas the surface of the 
music became more fragmented, its underlying language became far more rigorous.267 
In particular, Schiff’s discussion of the Piano Concerto delves deeply into the ideas and 
techniques of objective and subjective synthesis for which Carter was aiming, 
contrasting Carter’s dialectical approach with “the Darmstadt school” and “his 
European contemporaries” whose predominant interest, according to Schiff, lay in “total 
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serialization and aleatory composition.”268 Summing up the influences on the Piano 
Concerto, Schiff says: 
The work thus transforms the architectonic group-opposition of the baroque concerto 
grosso and the metaphorical ‘heroics’ of the romantic concerto into a new conception. 
It can also be seen as a synthesis of the lyrical drama of the Second Quartet and the 
geometric choreography of the Double Concerto, with the concertino’s lyricism and 
the orchestra’s geometry placed on a collision course.269 
The piece Carter composed after the Piano Concerto was his Concerto for Orchestra, a 
particularly clear example of the synthesis of “geometic” and “expressive” means. 
Schiff writes poetically about the direction in which Carter took this dialectic: 
The Piano Concerto is a tragic vision whose prophetic darkness recalls the late 
paintings of Mark Rothko. Carter, however, was able to take his art beyond despair. 
He transcended the anxious battleground of the Piano Concerto through a leap of 
‘negative capability’. He identified with his opposite. The storm that threatened to 
obliterate the soloist in the Piano Concerto itself became the swirling, cyclonic texture 
of the Concerto for Orchestra. Carter now viewed destruction and innovation as 
inseparable …270 
Schiff’s analyses are penetrating but Carter himself was the source of many of these 
ideas, especially in Flawed Words and Stubborn Sounds, an interview that was 
conducted during and just after the years in which Carter composed the Concerto for 
Orchestra. In that interview, Carter speaks about ideas of “flow,” “simultaneous multi-
layered continuity” and “highlighting” of polyphonic layers in the Concerto for 
Orchestra with particular reference to Mahler and Ives. Citing discussions by both 
Adorno and Bauer-Lechner on Mahler’s polyphony, Carter recounts Mahler’s 
observation of “true polyphony” resulting spontaneously from “hearing festive sounds, 
bands, and a men’s’ chorus coming from different directions” in a town and how 
Mahler connected this experience to childhood memories. Carter links Mahler’s account 
to Ives’s description of similar experiences which Ives captured most directly in his 
Central Park in the Dark but which were important for much of his music.271 While 
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Carter always rejected the superimposition of unrelated musics,272 these sonic images 
described by Mahler and Ives do provide Carter with an clear analogy for how his 
musical layering aimed to enact the true interaction of individuals within a society. At 
the same time, in order to achieve the spontaneity of that interaction with the materials 
of musical composition, Carter required constructive techniques to achieve the 
coordination necessary for the individual layers to be “picked out of a welter of things 
and contemplated while the welter continues to press in on them, and gives them, 
dialectically, a special new meaning.”273 By not having any particular content dominate, 
and by having the interaction of the participating layers be the motivating force for the 
formal organisation of the piece, Carter achieves the expression of a democratic ideal. 
The constructive element in the music has to do with the ordering of time, a large scale 
polyrhythm that fixes the points of emergence of events to a time grid.274 This aspect of 
the composition provides the external force that exerts pressure on the free expression 
of the instrumental layers but also provides the objective integration necessary for the 
meaningful interaction of subjective layers to occur.  The Concerto for Orchestra 
provides an especially clear example of this dialect in Carter’s mature music but the 
same kind of reading can be made of many pieces from the 1960s onward.  Even the 
late music retains the important dialectic of construction and expression regardless of a 
change in expressive means, as I will explore in the coming chapters. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Throughout Carter’s writings of the 1950s, 60s and 70s, the themes of expression and 
construction, time continuity and form, part/whole relations, new music’s relationship to 
its historical material and to its social situation and, importantly, the expression of 
human experience through purely musical means are constantly present. By following 
Carter’s thought processes as articulated in his writings over a number of decades, we 
find the development of ideas that culminated in his most substantial aesthetic statement 
in Flawed Words and Stubborn Sounds, and upon which he expanded during the 1970s 
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in a several important essays.275  A number of tropes reappear in Carter’s writings that 
illustrate his constant reclaiming of a critical space for music through its content and its 
means. Music must aim to communicate a “living message,” “feeling and thought,” “the 
feeling of experience.” The way it realizes this communication is by through the motion 
of music that must involve an “experience of living time,” a “constant change and 
growth,” “no literal repetition,” musical “flow,” “the now in relation to the past and the 
future.”  The demands Carter places on musical composition arrive finally at a series of 
contradictions that present themselves dialectically. The music must be sensuous, yet 
require thought and attention; it must not be programmatic, yet it must communicate a 
“message;” it must involve constant change and motion, yet have recognisable 
character; it must be new and surprising, yet rely on memory of previous events for its 
effect; it must not be systematic, yet rest on a firm organisational frame. These 
contradictions create the tensions and struggles within the material that propel the 
evolving form of a piece to its (often inconclusive) ending.  
 
As I have explored in this chapter, these aspects of Carter’s musical aesthetic finds 
points of contact with Adorno’s theory of new music. In particular there is a strong 
congruence with Adorno’s claim for the necessary mediated nature of social critique 
and the imperative to engage with the historical nature of musical materials 
dialectically. Furthermore, Carter’s and Adorno’s categories of listening and their 
requirements of an active listener demonstrate a similar view of new music’s need for 
reciprocity from its audience to truly communicate. But it is perhaps Adorno’s 
conception of the Subject-Object dialectic as mediated by musical temporality and 
form-content interaction that sheds the greatest light on Carter’s compositional 
aesthetic. With the aid of Adorno’s theory we can understand Carter’s thought on the 
treatment of the organisation of musical time as the dialectical interaction of 
objective/constructive form and subjective/expressive content which provides the 
musical material means for immanent social critique. 
 
Expressed in more concrete musical terms, musical form in Carter’s aesthetic must arise 
dialectically out of a constant interaction of opposing parts that through their conflict 
and cooperation discontinuously propel the moment onwards. The drama and form of 
the music must be generated entirely from within the musical material without the 
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superimposition of program or system or recourse to musical formulations with 
established meaning.  Meaning therefore must be mediated and not experienced directly 
from the music.276 The act of composition must be a communicative act about the social 
while remaining entirely within the realm of the musical—a modernist challenge, 
certainly, and in this Carter is at one with Adorno.  Arnold Whittall sums up Carter’s 
challenge to himself, and to his audience, as follows: 
To be alive to the creation and recognition of patterns as they evolve, without 
shunning complexity yet at the same time acknowledging the need to match human 
experience and feeling: this might seem like a dangerously ambitious, if not utopian 
aim. But it represents the ethical core of Carter’s motivation as a composer …277 
Whittall’s interpretation of Carter’s compositional aesthetic as “ethical” supports the 
understanding that for Carter, like Adorno, autonomous music does not escape the hand 
of man: the composer’s musical choices cannot be viewed as a pure expression of the 
soul, as Ives would have it, but instead must be seen as laden with social import and 
laced with moral significance. If Whittall reads Carter’s compositional aims as utopian, 
then the latent “message” contained in his compositions can be read as equally, if not 
more, utopian.  Despite the requirement that the music itself not be programmatic, the 
utopian quality of this musical “message” is nonetheless “verbalized” by Carter in his 
own commentary on his pieces and on how he sees the relationship of his music to 
society as much as it is by others attempting to explain his music. In the next chapter I 
will examine some of these verbalisations that focus on the socio-political and utopian 
content of Carter’s music.  
  
                                                
276 The question of literary sub-text as mediating musical meaning in Carter’s compositions is addressed 
by Henning Eisenlohr in a lot of detail in Eisenlohr, Komponieren als Entscheidungsprozess, 261-80. 
277 Whittall, “The search for order: Carter’s Symphonia and late-modern thematicism,” 62. 
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Chapter 3 
“a more significant human message”:  
Carter’s compositions as utopian vision 
 
“Sound for its own sake is of very limited interest to me. Human beings, I think, come 
to expect more from music than entertaining patterns of tone-colors. Mine uses a large 
variety of these but, I hope, always to transcend the medium of sound completely and 
present a more significant human message.”  
Elliott Carter: A Centennial Portrait in Letters and Documents, p.216 
3.1 “a picture of society” 
Utopian visions of human existence are characteristic of aesthetic modernism, its desire 
to resist what is and to imagine what-is-not but might yet come to be—an alternative 
that improves on human existence as it is and has been experienced. While the utopian 
vision in modernist instrumental music must be immanent and mediated, this has in no 
way precluded extra-musical ideas being projected verbally on to the artistic objects, by 
the artists themselves (as Carter and other composers have done in explanations of their 
music) or by others trying to understand.  Later in his life, Carter spoke candidly of the 
social aspiration he connected with his music: 
I think my own music is a picture of society as I hoped it would be, I hope it will be – 
that is, there are a lot of individuals dealing with each other, sensitive to each other, 
and cooperating and yet not losing their own individuality and this is what I hope a 
state and a society will be everywhere.  It’s hard to believe that it can be achieved 
within this entire century but we hope something like this will happen.278 
If, on the one hand, this statement appears perhaps to give a simplistic or naive vision 
what might be socially possible, on the other hand it can be read as a plain language 
version of what Adorno writes in one of his very last essays “On Subject and Object”: 
In its proper place, even epistemologically, the relationship of subject and object 
would lie in a peace achieved between human beings as well as between them and 
                                                
278 Scheffer, “Elliott Carter: A Labyrinth of Time,” 3’25”. 
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their Other. Peace is the state of differentiation without domination, with the 
differentiated participating in each other.279 
Carter’s “cooperating and yet not losing their own identity” and Adorno’s 
“differentiated participating in each other” get to the same basic notion of a utopian 
marriage of individual and society. Not infrequently, however, interpretations of 
Carter’s metaphors of individuals and society in his music miss the utopian intent and 
instead see them as hailing a Western democratic individualism. In his interview with 
Heinz Holliger in 1970s Carter said: 
You see, we humans live in a society and we are only individuals in so far as we 
contribute something to the society. This interests me a lot, this political, this social 
theme, the question of the influence of individuals on other individuals, on society.  
The piano concerto deals with this in some way, how the individual stands in relation 
to the Mass, I wrote it in Berlin in a time when these relationships appeared to be 
rather sinister.280 
While the first part of this quote speaks of individuals and society in general terms, the 
last sentence about the Piano Concerto being influenced by the situation in Berlin 
during the Cold War opens up the possibility of interpreting Carter’s comments as 
specifically anti-communist.281 Such statements were perfect for the cultural 
propaganda machine of the West during the Cold War and Carter’s Piano Concerto, as 
Gubermann reveals, was harnessed by the US government in an effort to involve Carter 
in diplomatic cultural exchanges/propaganda.282   
 
For the Fourth String Quartet, Carter again uses this analogy, specifically referring to a 
“democratic attitude”: 
A preoccupation with giving each member of the performing group its own musical 
identity characterizes my Quartet No.4; thus mirroring the democratic attitude in 
                                                
279 Theodor W. Adorno, “On Subject and Object,” in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords 
(Columbia University Press, 2005), 247. 
280 Quoted in Eisenlohr, Komponieren als Entscheidungsprozess, 235. “Sehen Sie, wir Menschen leben in 
einer Gesellschaft, wir sind nur Individuen insofern, als wir etwas zur Gesellschaft beitragen. Das 
beschäftigt mich sehr, diese politische, diese soziale Thematik, die Frage der Beziehung des Individuums 
zu den anderen Individuen, der Gesellschaft. Das Klavierkonzert etwa handelt davon, wie das Individuum 
sich zur Masse verhält, das habe ich in Berlin geschrieben zu einer Zeit, als die Verhältnisse ziemlich 
finster waren” in Heinz Holliger, “Abseits des Mainstreams: Gespräch mit Elliott Carter,” Neue Zeitung 
für Musik 3 (1991): 7. Translation mine. 
281 See below at Section 3.2 for Carter’s comments on communism after the War. 
282 Guberman, “Composing Freedom: Elliott Carter’s ‘Self-Reinvention’ and the Early Cold War,” 207-8. 
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which each member of society maintains his or her own identity while cooperating in 
a common effort - a concept that dominates all my recent works.283 
Such statements have easily led to what I consider to be a misinterpretation, or a co-
opting, of Carter’s utopian imagining in order to lay claim to an American hero, 
particularly in the popular press. Even those writers who identify a utopian element to 
Carter’s metaphors of individual and society still frequently portray his “musical 
message” as positive support for a real politics, rather than the hope for alternative 
possibilities, not only nowhere yet achieved, but not yet fully imagined (by Carter or 
others).284 For example, while Anthony Chueng makes a concise summary of the 
utopian aspects of Carter’s social vision, he then proceeds to take the metaphors of 
conflict and cooperation in Carter’s Double Concerto and superimpose imagery of the 
then recent American election (2012) on them, including the tropes of “freedom” and 
“civilization” associated with democratic liberalism: 
… Carter created an image of an ideal society that thrives on cooperation in spite of 
disagreement, of progress and evolution based on mutual relationships (in his music, 
metric modulation and rhythmic transformation). Political and societal allegory is 
deeply embedded in his art, and confronting his work in this fashion is the most 
meaningful way of getting to its core… Maybe the buzz of last week’s Presidential 
election hasn’t yet fully subsided, but my mind has been transfixed by the symbolism 
here. The ultimate bipartisanship in the face of seemingly irreconcilable roles is what 
makes the Double Concerto work, its clashes amplified by the “controversies” and its 
profile made whole by its “conversations.” This is a rhetoric in which polyphony 
stands for freedom within highly civilized bounds.”285 
 
In another example in the Boston Globe, Matthew Guerrieri spins a narrative that has 
Carter’s founding aesthetic appropriating no less than the principles of America’s 
“Founding Fathers”:  
                                                
283 Elliott Carter, “Program note to String Quartet No. 4,” in Elliott Carter: The String Quartets 
(Associated Music Publishers; Boosey and Hawkes, 1986), ix-x Quoted in Eisenlohr, Komponieren als 
Entscheidungsprozess, 238. 
284 Shreffler’s insightful discussion of two models for the musical treatment of political messages in 
twentieth century “progressive” music. There are many affinities between “Nono’s vision of a future 
utopia” (p.86) without explicit expression, and Carter’s “musical message.” Shreffler, “‘Music Left and 
Right’: A Tale of Two Histories of Progressive Music.” 
285 Anthony Cheung, “Controversies and Conversations: an Appreciation of Elliott Carter,”  News 
Features (Elliott Carter (1908-2012): Two Appreciations) (November 12, 2012), 
http://aarome.org/news/features/elliott-carter-1908-2012-two-appreciations. 
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In his own way, Carter’s music was very much American: implicitly and explicitly, 
fascinated by the possibilities and hazards of democracy, by the promise and peril of 
yoking disparate voices into something resembling a union. ... As a composer, Carter’s 
vision of America resembled nothing so much as that of the Founding Fathers.  The 
early Americans, after all, were dedicated to self-determination, but forever nervous 
about the gray area between individual opinion and collective policy. In the Federalist 
Papers, James Madison worried over “the violence of faction” … Carter made that 
concern musically his own: Faction and unity would become the latitude and 
longitude of his musical map.286 
Displacing the motivation for Carter’s preoccupation with conflict and cooperation in 
his music to an historical period two centuries earlier, Guerrieri is able to make Carter 
into a cultural crusader for “American democracy.” His article concludes with: 
The challenge of his music—demanding an uncommon engagement from the listener, 
exercising the ability to comprehend multiple, divergent layers of discourse—parallels 
the challenge of democracy. Intricate but unsettled, fixed but fluid, the music evokes 
the paradox of the experiment that those early Americans set in motion, an experiment 
still in process, an ideal still being chased. Elliott Carter wrote anthems for a country 
forever in the making.287 
The “ideal still being chased” has been fixed by Guerrieri back with the Founding 
Father and that ideal is assumed to be understood and shared by Carter in the same way. 
However, Carter’s ideal does not correspond with a democratic ideology and Carter is 
careful in all his public statements to remain vague about any suggestion that any of his 
music is politically motivated. While Guerrieri captures the sense of “becoming” that is 
so important to Carter’s concept of musical form, what he ignores is Carter’s critical 
intent, his resistance to a positive image of capitalist consumer democracy. Guerrieri’s 
is not an uncommon interpretation of Carter’s metaphors for his music, and it is also 
one that Carter possibly seized on himself to make a point about his music that might be 
easily grasped by the less critically inclined of the concert-going public.288 These 
interpretations are problematic as they promote a congruence between current actual 
politics and Carter’s generalized, idealized notion of social conflict and cooperation. 
                                                
286 Matthew Guerrieri, “The American Music of Elliott Carter: the composer’s “difficult” music captured 
the spirit of the Founding Fathers,” Boston Globe 11 November 2012. 
287 Ibid. 
288 See for example this comment reported to have come from Cellist Fred Sherry: “In his comments Mr. 
Sherry shared another Carter story. When asked in an interview about his artistic credo, Carter, who did 
not like talking about such things, suggested that his music was like an ideal of American democracy, 
with ‘dissenting independent voices creating harmony.’” Anthony Tommasini, “The Honoree Would’ve 
Felt at Home: Elliott Carter Memorial at Le Poisson Rouge,” New York Times 15 January 2013. 
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They uncritically reduce current political processes and systems to an idealized version 
of the reality of capitalist democracy (in the actual political present as well as 
historically). They claim Carter’s aesthetic to be its musical manifestation: a 
glorification of things as they are, or aim to be, rather than a utopian alternative that 
shows up the darkness in the current social order and its aspirations (war, exploitation, 
commodification of all aspects of life, and so forth). 
 
Henning Eisenlohr is much closer to the aesthetic truth of Carter’s “musical message” in 
his discussion of the utopian character of Carter’s conception of ‘democracy’: 
According to all previous findings relating to [Carter’s] critique of the existing 
consumer society and the passivity of the masses, it is clear that the instrumental 
metaphors of his work are not a glorification of the existing democracy, but rather a 
utopian alternative of a possible democratic society, that can nevertheless only be 
conceived as the result of an attitude of resistance towards consumer society.  Elliott 
Carter’s musical utopia comes into being not against but rather through an aesthetic of 
resistance. … If at the base for Carter there is a critique and inclusion of an 
undesirable reality entirely distinguished from the Ideal, then in the end he hopes for a 
positive Utopia (in the sense of Charles Koechlin’s lighthouse pointing to the future) 
“a glimpse of another America” that is only truly understandable when conceived in 
tandem with its critical origin. Utopia is not escape from the world, but critique of the 
existing relationships.289 
Thus, Eisenlohr claims that far from championing the individualist democratic hopes 
and desires of the Founding Fathers or of any actual political realisation of a democracy 
today—or claiming that their goals will lead us to a utopia sonically manifest in his 
music—Carter’s metaphors for his music point to what is not achieved and not 
acknowledged in the current organisation of individuals in society.  This is also evident 
in the quote at the beginning of this chapter when Carter expresses a far from certain 
                                                
289 “Nach allen bisherigen Erkenntnissen bezüglich der Kritik an der bestehenden Konsumgesellschaft 
und der Passivität der Massen ist klar, dass die instrumentale Metaphorik seiner Werke kein Lobpreis der 
bestehenden Demokratie ist, sondern ein utopischer Gegenentwurf einer möglichen demokratischen 
Gesellschaft, der aber eben nur denkbar erscheint als Ergebnis einer Verweigerungshaltung gegenüber der 
Konsumgesellschaft. Die musikalische Utopie Elliott Carters ist nicht gegen, sondern durch die Ästhetik 
des Widerstandes enstanden. Ihre besondere Betonung in Spätwerk entspricht der Beobachtung an dem 
Briefentwurf an Paul Henry Lang. Steht am Anfang bei Carter die Kritik und Einbeziehung der slechten, 
vom Ideal gänzlichen unterschiedenen Wirklichkeit, so gelangt er letztlich (im Sinne von Charles 
Koechlins in die Zukunft weisenden Leuchtturm) zu einer positiven Utopie, “a glimpse of another 
America”, die aber nur wirklich verstehbar ist, wenn ihr kritischer Ursprung mitbedacht wird. Utopie ist 
nicht Weltflucht, sondern Kritik an den bestehenden Verhältnissen.” Eisenlohr, Komponieren als 
Entscheidungsprozess, 239. Translation mine. 
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conviction of attaining his ideal: “It is hard to believe that something like this will be 
achieved in this entire century but we hope something like this will happen.”  I will 
explore further the idea of the utopian in Carter’s music in relation to Adorno and 
Jameson below in section 3.3 Lightness and Darkness: reworking the dialectic of 
material and form. In particular, I will consider how Carter’s later music from the 1980s 
onwards might be expressing a similar utopian vision as the middle-period music 
despite a recognisable shift in Carter’s compositional approach toward a lighter, more 
transparent, sound world, accompanied by the question of whether Carter was 
compromising hereby on what he expected of the listener.  However, I will take a 
circuitous route towards answering these question and begin with section 3.2 Glance at 
the socio-political connection in Carter’s compositional oeuvre. As with any utopian 
vision, the underpinnings of Carter’s musical message stemmed from a critique of the 
actual social and political world in which Carter lived and worked. Therefore, a very 
brief overview of the intersection between the way Carter frames his compositional 
concerns and the socio-political climate a various points in a particularly turbulent 
century will provide some important context against which Carter’s late compositions of 
the following century can be contrasted. This period of Carter’s music and 
compositional approach has been well-examined in the established literature and what I 
offer here is an interpretive slant on some of that literature. 
3.2 Glance at the socio-political connections in Carter’s compositional oeuvre 
An abstracted connection of music to politics existed from the beginning of Carter’s 
professional career. In conversation with Enzo Restagno in 1989 (Carter was almost 80 
and it was the year of the fall of the Berlin Wall), Carter told Restagno: 
When I was a young man, in my college days, I looked all over for political ideals.  
For a while I think I was even a Trotskyite, and I was always very much interested in 
the Soviet Union. I remember the disappointment caused by Stalin’s purges, but even 
that didn’t turn me into an anti-Communist.290 
Carter’s reflection on this pre-war period when international socialism was of great 
interest to American artists and intellectuals resonates with Martin Brody’s account of 
                                                
290 Restagno, Elliott Carter: In Converstaion with Enzo Restagno for Settembre Musica 1989, 35. 
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Milton Babbitt’s political experiences in New York in the 1930s and 1940s.291 While 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it would certainly be of great value to pursue an 
investigation into Carter’s intellectual engagement with American cultural-political 
thinking of this era. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the influence of Alfred North 
Whitehead on Carter was lasting and the interconnection between his philosophy and 
other cultural-political thinkers of that period on the US East Coast such as John 
Dewey, George Herbert Mead, and Clement Greenberg would broaden out the 
perspective on the ferment of ideas which surrounded Carter at this time.292 But even if 
the young Carter was swept up in the more overtly political interests that dominated 
cultural debate during this time, he always insisted on the distance between his 
abstracted music politics and real politics.293 This is exemplified in his interview with 
van Dyck-Hemming in 1995 (Carter was 86). In his response to the question of whether 
the McCarthy era politics affected his composing, Carter said: 
… I’ve never been politically ... except in this early period I was never really 
concerned with politics in the large scale. But of course all my pieces are in the sense 
of a political meaning and that is the idea of cooperating - music is a way of making 
people cooperate.294 
This claim is consistent with what Guberman finds in his thorough investigation of how 
Carter was politically engaged during the post-war and 1960s Cold War period “not 
only in his compositions … but in his actions.”  This engagement was not passive but it 
was for the most part indirect: always in the service of his music and never clearly 
aligned with any political movement as such.295 In keeping with a modernist position, 
Carter’s political meaning lay in his musical means. 
                                                
291 Brody examines the political importance of Art for Art’s sake in Trotsky’s as well as in Greenberg’s 
writings and for Babbitt and the post-war ‘serious’ composers in America. Brody, “‘Music for the 
Masses’: Milton Babbitt’s Cold War Music Theory.” 
292 Bernard, “Elliott Carter and the Modern Meaning of Time,” 649. Whitehead and Dewey were admirers 
of Mead (see George Cronk, “George Herbert Mead (1863-1931),” in Internet Encyclopeadia of 
Philosophy: a peer-reviewed academic resource.) Dewey was at Harvard with Walter Piston who also 
taught Carter (see Nicholas E. Tawa, From Psalm to Symphony:A History of Music in New England 
(Boston: Northeastern Univeristy Press, 2001), esp. 308.) 
293 Guberman explores Carter's claim that the world extraneous to music had no place in his compositions 
in relation to the cold-war political climate in “Composing Freedom: Elliott Carter’s ‘Self-Reinvention’ 
and the Early Cold War.” 
294 Dyck-Hemming, “Diskurze zur ‘Musik Elliott Carters’,” 227. 
295 Guberman makes a case for Carter being opportunistic in his response to government and non-
government benefactors of his music in the “Conclusion” to “Composing Freedom: Elliott Carter’s ‘Self-
Reinvention’ and the Early Cold War,” 219-23. Exceptions to this position were Carter’s outspokenness 
about wages, rights and subsidies for composers and new music groups and the difficulty of making a 
living in this field; and also his contribution to the effort to release Isang Yun (e.g., Meyer and Shreffler, 
Elliott Carter: A Centennial Portrait in Letters and Documents, 10-11 and 194-5.) 
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At the same time, as the musical means became more abstracted, more autonomous, 
Carter’s verbal explanations of the connection between his music and a social message 
became more explicit. Eisenlohr makes a penetrating analysis of the socio-political 
motivations in Carter’s music, discussing the connections Carter makes between his 
music and political meaning from as early as his 1938 choral composition To Music 
through the neoclassic pieces The Defense of Corinth (1941), Holiday Overture (1944) 
and The Minotaur (1947) with their less obscured war-time content, to his post-war shift 
from neoclassicism to his atonal idiom and concomitant musical autonomy. Eisenlohr 
identifies 1958 as the year that Carter starts explicitly to articulate his music as “a 
utopian alternative” to the post-war consumer society. For example, Carter describes his 
music in a letter to Paul Henry Lang (1958) as: 
a glimpse of another America not occupied with conspicuous waste, with ‘killing 
time’, but occupied with the values of adventure, liveliness, beauty, tradition and the 
rest that are presupposed but forgotten in the world we face. In music we try to make 
time live …296 
Here Carter identifies a utopia that has been repressed, “presupposed but forgotten.” 
However, it is a memory to which music still has access and the qualities of which he 
aims for particularly in relation to the treatment of time in his own music. This 
comment comes at the time of Carter composing the Second String Quartet, the piece to 
usher in what is commonly regarded as Carter’s mature music, consisting of the large 
works of opposition.   
 
The message of Carter’s mature music takes on another layer of political meaning when 
he begins to articulate it not only as the humanising of a stultifying consumer culture 
but as a response to the dark psychological states associated with the horrors of the 
Second World War: 
Well, as one lived through those changing times during and after the Second World 
War, it became obvious that there was a permanent extravagant part of people’s 
experience and actions that had to be faced. We don’t want to run around like wild 
people and hurt each other at every turn but one [sic] the other hand we do have that 
wild side and it has to be fitted into a socially effective situation if we are going to live 
together and profit by it. It seems to me that this could be part of the message of my 
                                                
296 Quoted in Eisenlohr, Komponieren als Entscheidungsprozess, 236. 
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music. It could be seen as a way of trying to deal with this irrational, rather 
extravagant and violent side of ourselves.297 [italics mine] 
Carter’s message as articulated here places the dark reality of recent history in 
dialectical opposition to his utopian social vision. As Eisenlohr emphasizes, the 
“irrational, rather extravagant and violent side of ourselves” is in Carter’s view not 
fixed or invariable, and it is precisely this “wild side” that Carter hopes can be 
transformed by imagining alternatives—not through its denial or suppression but 
through recognition and accommodation.298 The influence of Freud’s irrational 
unconscious (that had played a role in early modernism) reappeared after World War II 
and Carter acknowledges this influence directly in Flawed Words and Stubborn 
Sounds.299 In his essay “The European Roots of American Music,” Carter frames the 
neoclassic/atonal polarityin terms of a French/German stylistic opposition,300  once 
again claiming an influence of Freud: 
… The French ability for characterization, at first so useful to us, has become now less 
valuable than the German concern for inner psychological states and the search for an 
organic order in them—paralleling, perhaps, the paths opened by Freud and Jung 
earlier this century.301 
The concern with “inner psychological states” and the darkness of human nature that 
Carter wished to “deal with in a less oblique and resigned way” is found in various 
guises throughout the works of opposition of the 1960s and 1970s, or as Schiff termed 
them, the works of the “divided ensemble.”302  These pieces include the String Quartet 
No.2 (1959), the Double Concerto (1961), the Piano Concerto (1964), the Concerto for 
Orchestra (1969), the String Quartet No.3 (1971), the Duo for Violin and Piano (1973), 
the Brass quintet (1974), and the Symphony of three orchestras (1976).303 For Schiff, 
the darkness in Carter’s music of this period manifests itself as “black comedy”: 
                                                
297 Carter, “Elliott Carter in conversation with Robert Johnston, Michael Century, Robert Rosen, and Don 
Stein (1984),” 253. 
298 Eisenlohr, Komponieren als Entscheidungsprozess, 233. 
299 Edwards, Flawed Words, 61. 
300 For more on the use of the Stravinsky-Schoenberg debate in cold war politics and Carter’s comments 
see Guberman, “Composing Freedom: Elliott Carter’s ‘Self-Reinvention’ and the Early Cold War,” esp. 
20-46. 
301 Carter, “The European Roots of American Music,” in Elliott Carter: collected essays and lectures, 
1937-1995, 68. 
302 Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter, 26. Also Link, “Elliott Carter’s Late Music,” 34. 
303 The music from about 1980 onwards displays a shift towards a perceived ‘lightness’ which I discuss 
below. 
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The confidence and expansiveness of the earlier pieces [First Quartet and Variations 
for Orchestra] gives way to a mood of anxiety—not the angst of expressionism, but 
the ironic despair of black comedy.304 
The musical means that Carter developed to express this sense of darkness hinged on 
the idea of a tenuous balance between order and disorder. Of his rhythmic procedures, 
Carter said: 
It’s kind of terrifying in a way—you see, I always deal with things that have a very 
strong dramatic meaning to myself, and the conflict of chaos and order is particularly 
significant because it seems to be at the root of so many of the things important to 
us.305 
 As Carter explains here, the technical detail of his rhythmic procedures finds greater 
meaning in “so many of the things important to us” in the world outside of music. The 
questions of order and chaos in musical composition become immanent questions of 
society and history. Schiff identifies this mediation of the social and musical, 
commenting on Carter’s realisation that the order necessary for artistic creation conflicts 
with the need to express the experience of disorder in contemporary life as well as the 
need to deny modes of expression that mimic totalitarian order: 
Random chaos undermines meaning; and yet disorder may be a necessary rebellion 
against tyrannical order, an assertion of freedom in a world totally dedicated to 
making all experiences predictable.306 
As Schiff suggests, Carter’s struggle with how dialectically to handle order and disorder 
(that is, structure and flow, or the objective and the subjective) in the compositional 
techniques he developed during this time shows Carter’s preoccupation with the 
handling of musical materials as a way of expressing both a critical and a utopian social 
vision.  These pieces are dialectical in their darkness and lightness; not at all an 
affirmation of democracy as we know it, but crucially an attempt to work with the 
musical materials in a way that most authentically communicated Carter’s “significant 
human message” that human relations might be arranged differently. Recall that Schiff, 
for example, talks of the Piano Concerto as “a tragic vision whose prophetic darkness” 
Carter was nonetheless able to take “beyond despair,” claiming that “Carter now viewed 
                                                
304 Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter, 193. 
305 Edwards, Flawed Words, 114. 
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destruction and innovation as inseparable, and sources of imaginative creation.”307 As 
the message must remain entirely immanent to the music, the technical musical means 
for achieving this dialectical critique—the way of handling the musical materials in 
relation to their musical form, as we saw in Chapter 2—were at the crux of Carter’s 
innovations. The Piano Concerto, as the drama of “the discovery of identity,” is a 
musical discovery with an immanent social message, as Schiff notes: 
The [Piano] Concerto is not a representation of the search for identity, but a specific 
enactment of that search, in which terms, issues and processes of self-discovery are 
themselves transformed. Formally, it is Carter’s freest conception; expressively, it is 
his most intense.”308 
 
If the dialectic of chaos and structure had taken on contrary implications in the modern 
era as Schiff argues, then, to summarize the dilemma Schiff identifies but now in 
Adorno’s words: “… the question of form which faces composers today must be: Is 
disintegration possible as a result of integration.”309  This question underpinned Carter’s 
explorations of form (as we saw in Chapter 2) from his mature period onward.310 And 
even as Carter moved into his late period where the oppositional character of his music 
began to be modified, the conflict between the need for an integrated formal musical 
structure and the need to express a disintegrating social reality remained central.311 In 
1986, Carter articulates this dilemma very clearly in a letter where he turns down the 
possibility of a commission for a choral piece.312 In the letter he concludes: 
                                                
307 Ibid., 241. 
308 Ibid., 228. 
309 Adorno, “Form in the New Music. Translated by Rodney Livingstone,” 208. Paddison elaborates on 
Adorno’s articulation of this dilemma as follows: “how is it possible to compose autonomous, integrated 
and consistent musical works in the face of, on the one hand, the disintegration of musical material and on 
the other hand, the degeneration of music to ideology as a result of its commodification?” Paddison, 
Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music., 260 
310 Whether the manner in which Carter responded to this question bears any resemblance to Adorno’s 
ideal is another matter. But as we will see below, Julian Johnson (in “‘The Elliptical Geometry of 
Utopia’: New Music Since Adorno.”) redefines Adorno’s category of  ‘New Music’ to better 
accommodate techniques by composers since Adorno whose music can be read as fulfilling the critical 
function of art. 
311 See Link, “Elliott Carter’s Late Music.” See also the discussion of opposition in Carter’s opera in Guy 
Capuzzo, Elliott Carter’s What Next?: Communication, Cooperation, and Separation (Rochester, NY: 
University of Rochester Press, 2012), 18-19. 
312 The question of choral writing and “social cohesiveness” for Carter is explored in depth in 
Guberman’s dissertation “Composing Freedom: Elliott Carter’s ‘Self-Reinvention’ and the Early Cold 
War,” 5-12. Also Daniel Guberman, “Elliott Carter’s Cold War Abandonment of the Chorus,” Mitteilung 
der Paul Sacher Stiftung 25 (April, 2012). 
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…to me, now, choral music represents a social cohesiveness and agreement about 
worthy goals – which I no longer see in the world we live in, except on very 
superficial matters – public relations and consumer goods and as I have no desire to 
write an advertising cantata (as Milhaud did for a paper company) … Being one of a 
crowd and expressing this in choral music is, now, I think, alien to me, writing a work 
that ‘deconstructs’ a choral as I have instrumental ensembles and still be within the 
range of American choral potentials would be to solve an arduous time-consuming 
puzzle …313 
For Carter to consider undertaking such a project, the musical means must be able to 
mediate a critique of “being one of a crowd,” of “social cohesiveness,” of “consumer 
goods.” The “more significant human message” or the utopian imagining must be part 
of the creative endeavour.  However, the techniques of composing for choir that Carter 
could envisage at that time would not enable such a mediation. We see here what 
Whittall refers to as Carter’s “ethical core” at work.314  And we may also find a parallel 
in Adorno’s formulation of the moral significance of handling musical materials, which 
is interpreted here by Horton in somewhat bleak terms: 
In all, Adorno offers us a stark choice: if music pursues a notion of community, then it 
embraces a lie of collectivity that tends towards totalitarianism or submission to the 
culture industry; if music honours the material’s immanent tendency, then it forever 
condemns the composer to isolation.315 
Horton’s “stark choice” captures the extremes of Adorno’s assessment of the moral 
situation of new music.  The quote highlights a parallel with Carter’s thinking on 
composing for choir at that time and furthermore brings to mind the critiques of Carter’s 
music in the 1980s by John Rockwell and Samuel Lipman that Schiff cites in his second 
edition of The Music of Elliott Carter. Rockwell “attacked Carter’s music for its 
distance from the American mainstream of popular culture” and Lipman claimed that “I 
have no doubt at all that whatever the fate of Carter’s mature work may be, composition 
cannot go further in the direction he has adumbrated and remain what can be recognized 
as music.”316  Schiff concludes that “[w]ith the rise of minimalism and neo-
                                                
313 Elliott Carter to Ann Santen, March 1986, Elliott Carter Collection, Paul Sacher Stiftung. Quoted in 
“Composing Freedom: Elliott Carter’s ‘Self-Reinvention’ and the Early Cold War,” 9. Guberman 
interprets Carter’s statement about “social cohesiveness” differently, as embodying “one-worldsim” 
ideology prevalent in post-1945 America (pp.10-19). 
314 Quoted at the end of Chapter 2. Whittall, “The search for order: Carter’s Symphonia and late-modern 
thematicism,” 62. 
315 Horton, “Dialectics and music analysis,” 119. 
316 Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter, 28. 
  105 
Romanticism, American music was returning to the models of Copland and Barber; 
Carter, for all his honors, became an increasingly isolated figure.”317 The 
correspondence of this image with the fate Adorno predicted for new music is 
striking.318 Nevertheless, neither the music nor the social remained frozen in the 
concerns of the post-war period: the historical moment of post-war modernism shifted 
to address new questions of musical relevance in a transforming society. Adorno was no 
longer alive to witness how his predictions would play out. Carter however still had a 
lengthy compositional career ahead of him and the new challenges to new music 
became increasingly relevant to his own compositional choices. In the next section I 
will discuss the shape of some of those changes and examine Carter’s later music 
drawing on theoretical notions of a number of scholars concerned with the ongoing 
critical potential of art music. 
 3.3 Lightness and Darkness: reworking the dialectic of material and form 
The implications of the conflict between order/structure/totalitarianism and 
disorder/chaos/freedom that dominated musical innovation in the two decades following 
the Second World War were given a new challenge in the late 1960s by the arrival of a 
post-modernist attitude in the musical arts.319 Carter was far from deaf to this changed 
aesthetic environment and the music-philosophical questions it brought with it.  In 
Carter’s musical style from the 1980s onwards, many commentators found that the 
darkness of the 1960s and 1970s was brought into opposition with a newfound 
“lightness” and arguably a greater emphasis on cooperation than on conflict.320   
 
The theme of opposing lightness and darkness in Carter’s music is found in much 
secondary literature. It characterizes Schiff’s first 1983 edition of The Music Of Elliott 
Carter. However, it is not until the music written after Night Fantasies (1980)—the last 
piece discussed in Schiff’s first book—that commentators begin to characterize many of 
Carter’s new pieces firstly by a lightness or transparency and only then noting pieces or 
movements of pieces that present a balancing darkness—in other words, there appeared 
                                                
317 Ibid. 
318 See also Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music, 98. 
319 See David and Kenneth Gloag Beard, Musicology: The Key Concepts (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 142. 
320 See for example John Link, “Elliott Carter’s ‘Late Music’?,” Tempo 62, no. 246 (October, 2008): 7; 
Roeder, “‘The matter of human cooperation’ in Carter’s Mature Style.”; and Schiff, The Music of Elliott 
Carter, 29-30. 
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to many listeners to be “a change of emphasis,” as Whittall puts it in relation to the 
Oboe Concerto, in enough of Carter’s music to make it a noticeable feature.321 This 
change is picked up by Wierzbicki in the final chapter and in the “Epilogue” to his 
book, where he summarizes observations by Bernard, Caltobianco, Link, Meyer and 
Shreffler, Schiff, and Whittall on the qualities of “lucidity,” “clarity,” “transparency” 
and “lightness” in recent Carter compositions.322  
 
But what significance does this observation of a new lightness have for understanding 
Carter’s “musical message,” his “picture of society as … I hope it will be,” his utopian 
imagining? It is clear from statements later in his life that for Carter there existed no 
fundamental change to his conception of what his music was aiming to communicate.323  
However, we do find, even in the language Carter uses to talk about his music, that 
there is a change of emphasis. For example, in 1971 at the height of his compositional 
maturity, we saw that Carter emphasized the message of conflict: “I always deal with 
things that have a very strong dramatic meaning to myself, and the conflict of chaos and 
order is particularly significant because it seems to be at the root of so many of the 
things important to us.”324 By contrast, towards the end of his life on his 100th birthday, 
Carter was asked what he wanted people to take away from hearing his music, and 
without hesitation he said “Happiness!”325 It remains for us then to question if the goal 
of expressing the conflict of chaos and order need be at odds with the goal of expressing 
happiness. Does one necessarily retain a critical space and the other necessarily become 
a capitulation to ideology? Certainly Whittall has claimed that “the special features of 
Carter’s late style need not be seen as contradicting all that had gone before…”326 On a 
number of occasions, Whittall has noted the potential contradiction between the 
“exhilaration, even joy” experienced by listeners to Carter’s late music and the “sense 
of alienation, of endemic melancholia” that once was almost obliged to accompany 
modernist music.327 According to Whittall this sense of necessary melancholia arose “as 
composers contemplate the professional and personal challenges which arise as they 
                                                
321 Arnold Whittall, “Review of Oboe Concerto by Elliott Carter,” Music & Letters 73, no. 2 (May, 1992). 
322 Wierzbicki, Elliott Carter, 97-100. 
323 This is evident in the way Carter speaks about his music in Scheffer’s film “Elliott Carter: A Labyrinth 
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324 Edwards, Flawed Words, 114. 
325 Link, “Elliott Carter’s Late Music,” 34. 
326 Arnold Whittall, “The search for order: Carter’s Symphonia and late-modern thematicism,” 71. 
327 Ibid., 72; see also “Twentieth-Century Music in Retrospect: Fulfilment or Betrayal?,” 20; and “‘A play 
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attempt to live and work within communities that have little understanding of and even 
less time for their activities.”328 This is the Adornian alienated composer-subject par 
excellence, mediating social struggle through their struggle with musical materials. 
Whittall concludes that “Carter would seem to conform only if it can be accepted that 
such alienation need not invariably find expression in songs of sorrow and despair.” 
While Whittall acknowledges the darkness in a piece such as Adagio Tenebroso, he 
agrees with David Schiff that the “sorrowful spirit” of this music is best heard in 
context, as the second movement of Symphonia, the orchestral triptych that ultimately 
ends in some of Carter’s most exhilaratingly light music, evoking instead of sorrow, a 
transcendent spirit.329 
 
There are risks in using the poles of metaphorical musical lightness and darkness to 
characterize periods of Carter’s compositional output, let alone the history of musical 
modernism as a whole: darkness too easily becomes locked into representing all that is 
the negative, critical, disintegrating; while lightness is too easily associated with 
frivolity, indifference, or a veneer of existence. Italo Calvino, in his “Lightness” lecture 
in Memos for a New Millennium, delves into the nuances of the characterisation of 
‘lightness’ and its ‘Other’ and I will expand upon Calvino’s important influence on 
Carter in this matter below. But it is also important to note that despite the shift in 
musical means in Carter’s late music, this shift is in no way comparable to Carter’s 
move three decades prior from a neo-classic harmonic and formal language to an atonal, 
polyvocal idiom. In fact, it would be widely agreed that the late music owes everything 
to Carter’s experimenting with musical means in his large compositions of opposition 
and darkness. The musical means from the “mature” period also underpin the later 
music; the long-range polyrhythms—a feature of the 1980s compositions330—are a 
further development of Carter’s rhythmic practice since the Second String Quartet; 
Carter’s late harmonic practice can be seen as a refinement and narrowing of his 
harmonic language made possible because of the expansive pitch set vocabulary he had 
developed and composed with in earlier pieces.   
 
Many reasons have been sought for the move to, or perhaps it is better to say the 
inclusion of, greater lightness in Carter’s late practice.  One of the most perceptive 
                                                
328 “The search for order: Carter’s Symphonia and late-modern thematicism,” 72. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Link, “Long Range Polyrhythms in Elliott Carter’s Recent Music.” 
 108 
insights come from John Link’s analysis of Carter’s return to vocal writing in the mid 
1970s. Link argues that Carter’s rediscovered interest in vocal writing prompted the 
development of what Link calls a “lyric perspective.”331  He demonstrates how the new-
found clarity of a single singing voice within the “polyvocal” instrumental texture of 
Carter’s songs also made its way into much of Carter’s instrumental music of the 1980s 
and onwards. Link further argues that practicalities, such as orchestral rehearsal time, 
changes in institutional expectations and Carter’s need to speed up his rate of 
composing, all contributed to the musical innovations characteristic of Carter’s late 
style. Following Link, Whittall and others,332 I propose to understand Carter’s subtle yet 
significant shift in sound world as partially linked to changing social and musical 
climate of the late 20 century. However, I also wish to develop a philosophical 
framework that can provide insight into how Carter’s change of attitude towards the 
musical means in his later music might be seen not as resigning from his earlier utopian 
imagining and critical impulse—despite its supposed greater accessibility—but rather as 
continuing his fundamental belief that music must be responsive to its time, its social 
reality, and its own history, all of which are constantly changing.333 These changes in 
Carter’s music may well be interpreted through the work of a number of scholars who 
have been considering how music since Adorno may be heard to respond to Adorno’s 
claims for the possibilities of new music but now at the changed historical moment of 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In what follows I wish to engage in 
particular with the work of Julian Johnson. 
 
In his outstanding article “The Elliptical Geometry of Utopia: New Music since 
Adorno,” Johnson reconsiders Adorno’s notion of darkness and lightness in art. It is the 
desire to break out of the fixity of the characterisations of aesthetic darkness and 
lightness that seems to motivate Johnson’s lines of investigation in this essay, 
particularly since he identifies this very same desire in a category of new music from 
the end of the twentieth century. Johnson’s work provides a context within which to 
examine features commonly occurring in Carter’s late practice, such as his use of more 
transparent textures; of repetition; of reduced harmonic and rhythmic complexity; of 
both sectional formal models and formal ‘open-endedness;’ and even of ‘flexible’ 
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333 See John Link, “Sense and Sensibility: Music on Stage in What Next?,” Chicago Review 58, no. 3/4 
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boundaries of a piece though self-referencing and the loose grouping of pieces;334 as 
well as other elements that contribute to the quality of lightness, such as the use of 
fragments, lyricism, and ironic humour.335 
 
Taking a broad starting point, Johnson addresses music theorists (and perhaps 
composers) with the challenging claim that the “only valid justification for new music 
today lies in its unique utopian content. The only valid justification for music theory lies 
in its capacity to bring that content into the realm of reflective thought.”336  In response 
to his own ambitious but astute claim, Johnson goes in search of this “unique utopian 
content” in the “compositional practices and materials” of music written since Adorno.  
He wishes to define a category of new music which maintains a critical and utopian 
purpose without conforming to Adorno’s “aesthetics of blackness.”337 It is music that 
escapes “the falsities exhibited by the products of the culture industry” while at the 
same time avoiding “Adorno’s negative construction of the fate of modern music.”338 
 
Adorno insisted that “art had to assimilate itself into the darkness of contemporary 
society” but it was its very doing so that was “its measure of remaining true to the idea 
of the utopian.”339 In other words, the emphasis on darkness provided the trigger to 
question the prevailing false bright image of social cohesion and subjective choice 
projected by capitalist consumer culture, and to propose (utopian) alternatives. How this 
idea finds expression in music might be understood more concretely by way of a literary 
example. Fredric Jameson developed the notion of the literary utopia being not “a mode 
of representation”, but rather a “kind of praxis.”340 The utopian in the novel is not what 
the Utopia is—the nature or even the presence of an image of an alternative society. 
Jameson says: “… utopias are non-fictional, even though they are also non-existent.” 
341Rather, the utopian is the work that the novel does in making us “unthink” or 
                                                
334 For example Esprit Rude/Esprit Doux and Esprit Rude/Esprit Doux II which can be played together or 
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“neutralize” our conditioned thinking about current society and future possibilities.342 
This is also termed the utopian impulse of art.343 The utopian impulse does not present a 
fully-conceived Utopia as a workable alternative to present-day society; rather it forces 
us to confront our assumptions about our own lived reality, our expectations for a 
Utopia, and the contradictions in our own thoughts about the present.  In the same 
sense, Adorno’s “necessary blackness” of new music stems from the requirement that 
music not “slide into an ideological affirmation of things as they are.”344 Instead, the 
blackness provides a means of breaking through conditioned thought/listening patterns. 
The utopian is not so much a quality that new music should have, but rather the utopian 
reveals itself negatively by showing up the dark reality that is not otherwise 
visible/audible and yet which is in need of uncovering and rethinking: a prompt to make 
us recognize the undesirable and imagine what might be possible instead.  
 
As we have already seen in Chapter 2, according to Adorno, musical materials which 
were too immediate and too formulaic resulted in experiences which denied music’s 
temporality. Such music was able to induce a sense of passivity in the listener and 
thereby capitulated to ideology.  The treatment of repetition and sonority in new music 
falls for Adorno into this category of ideology, as Johnson explains: 
The status of repetition and sonority in Adornian theory is of course bound up with a 
larger constellation of ideas. The refusal of genuine temporal progression, marked by 
musical repetition, is seen as a fundamental denial of the nature of the subject. The 
focus on sonority for its own sake denotes a regression into immediacy, which a truly 
dialectical music would avoid. These ideas meet in Adorno’s category of myth—a 
term by which he denotes the target of all genuinely critical culture, and all genuine 
cultural critique. Myth is above all the proposition of Being over Becoming, of 
undialectical immediacy, of a completion of reconciliation that can only be understood 
as pure ideology. The historical nature of mankind and thus of culture, requires that 
artworks must always be mediated, dialectical, and incomplete in themselves if they 
are to avoid being merely tools of such an ideology.345 
As legitimate as Adorno’s claims about the avoidance of ideology in music are to 
Johnson, Adorno’s categorisation of repetition and sonority as too immediate to be used 
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critically Johnson sees as a “blind spot” in Adorno’s theorizing of new music.  Johnson 
critically teases out the connection between sonority, repetition and utopia in Adornian 
aesthetics, and criticizes Adorno’s locating of the communicative content exclusively in 
the motivic/thematic material rather than including the possibility that other elements 
might be able to function critically and communicatively in non-motivic music.346 In 
other words, the categories of sonority and repetition are far from fixed in the way 
Adorno seems to theorize them, and instead what they are able to signify has been 
transformed in new music since the 1960s.347 While Adorno seemed to be re-thinking 
these elements of his aesthetic theory towards the end of his life, he had not gone so far 
as to reclaim a critical potential for sonority or repetition, or to rework these categories 
dialectically in a way that Johnson claims the music of composers such as Fernyhough, 
Ligeti, Boulez, Berio, Nono, Birtwistle, Feldman, Xenakis, Lutoslawski and even 
Varèse and Debussy have done.  All the same, in seeking qualities of the new music 
since Adorno that display this critical yet utopian aesthetic, Johnson takes his cues from 
the “distinctly utopian character” of Adorno’s own later writings, and particularly his 
idea of a musique informelle. Notable within these later writings are Adorno’s modified 
assessment of the role of repetition, his mention of “the quality of inexhaustibility” he 
finds in Berg’s music and of the dialectical use of sonority. All these areas bear on the 
quality of the lightness in Carter’s late music. In the following sections I will outline 
Johnson’s understanding of the role of repetition, “inexhaustibility” of material and 
sonority in new music since Adorno and examine how these notions help to understand 
Carter’s later music as both utopian and critical, in other words how Carter maintained 
his strong compositional aesthetic developed throughout the post-war period but now 
expressed with altered musical means. 
3.3.a – Repetition  
Adorno’s critique of repetition was forcefully levelled at Stravinsky in Philosophy of 
New Music. Adorno later certainly recognized the undialectical treatment he had given 
Stravinsky in that work, and in later writings he refined his theorising of repetition, 
examining the necessity for a dialectical handling of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ in 
music, and the subtle manner in which materials could articulate these categories.348  
                                                
346 Recall the discussion in Chapter 1, pp. 35-36. 
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Adorno nonetheless maintained that certain kinds of repetition were no longer tenable in 
music. Identical repetition, which constituted the reprise of material in historical formal 
models such as the recapitulation of sonata form, was no longer possible (recall 
discussion in Chapter 2). 349 Such a recapitulation was the result of functional tonal 
forms in which the repetition participated in the creation and diffusion of tension that 
defined the flow of time. Without that productive tension, identical repetition resulted in 
stasis or the denial of time flow, as did attempts at total differentiation, where rapid 
constant change had the effect of constant sameness.350  Johnson analyses how Adorno 
refines his thinking on repetition by way of Stravinsky and Beckett in Adorno’s 1962 
essay “Stravinsky: a dialectical portrait,” as well as in his posthumous Aesthetic 
Theory.351  While not reneging on his earlier assessment of the dead-end nature of 
repetition in Stravinsky’s music, Johnson shows that Adorno now allows for another 
possibility: Adorno suggests that the opposition of static-dynamic has come to be 
replaced by the “spurious infinity of … reprise” such as found in the repetitions in 
Beckett’s plays. The flow of time in Beckett’s work (and in instances of Stravinsky’s 
music) is being constituted by an unending series of sameness that nevertheless contains 
difference rather than pure invariance (identical repeats).  Johnson quotes Adorno from 
Aesthetic Theory: 
Repetition in authentic new artwork is not always an accommodation to the archaic 
compulsion toward repetition. Many artworks indict this compulsion and thereby take 
the part of what Karl Heinz Haag has called the unrepeatable; Beckett’s Play, with the 
spurious infinity of its reprise, presents the most accomplished example. … 
Enciphered in modern art is the postulate of an art that no longer conforms to the 
disjunction of the static and dynamic. Beckett, indifferent to the ruling cliché of 
development, views his task as that of moving in an infinitely small space toward what 
is effectively a dimensionless point. This aesthetic principle of construction, as the 
principle of Il faut continuer, goes beyond stasis; and it goes beyond the dynamic in 
that it is at the same time a principle of treading water and, as such, a confession of the 
uselessness of the dynamic.352 
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While in the pre-war period new music’s “dynamism”353 challenged the static 
oppression of temporal flow, mid-century new music was quickly loosing an objective 
goal for its dynamic motion.354 Instead of Adorno’s earlier prediction of complete 
disintegration, the idea emerges that music (like society, like history) just keeps on 
going ad infinitum, feeling its way to the next point instead of moving to a prescribed 
conclusion. The subjective expressive impulse, instead of being killed off altogether by 
an ever-greater alienation, now finds a way to accommodate living with that alienation 
(à la Beckett).  The never-ending but varied reprise provides a means of going from 
moment to moment, with the musical structuring (form) responding to the momentary 
need (material)—indeed Adorno’s ideal of a musique informelle.  This new attitude 
toward musical time is late-modern: in the changed historical moment of late-
capitalism, the notion of progress itself becomes in need of challenge. Johnson sees the 
later music of Boulez and of Feldman as well as Ligeti’s music as embodying this 
notion of musical time that challenges the idea of progress while not being merely 
static. 
 
Carter’s response to repetition and the changing experience of temporality toward the 
end of the twentieth century has taken a number of forms.  For Carter, minimalism in 
music remained a denial of lived temporal experience, “mechanical and inhuman,” a 
repression of human expressivity, “a kind of death;” this position he held right to the 
end of his life, as we saw Chapter 2. Temporal flow remained essential to musical 
expression for Carter. However, like Adorno, Carter recognized a different way in 
which such flow could manifest itself and that the negation of repetition no longer 
retained the critical force it once had. The continuation of music, its never-ending 
onwardness, its repetition, that Adorno points to by way of Beckett’s Il faut continuer, 
is recognisable in a number of late compositions in which Carter employs his ‘long 
line,’ an extended musical line that weaves its way through large stretches of a 
composition, morphing and adapting itself constantly. While this technique had its roots 
in Carter’s ‘Boulanger’ education, and can certainly be found in earlier compositions 
(the Variations for Orchestra and the First String Quartet are good examples), it is 
something Carter retained as an expressive resource and arguably foregrounded in 
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recent compositions more explicitly that in the middle period music.355 Clear instances 
of Carter’s ‘long line’ can be found for example in Triple Duo (1983), Pentode (1985), 
Violin Concerto (1990), Adagio tenebrosa (1994) but also much later pieces such as 
Caténaires for solo piano (2006) and Interventions for piano and orchestra (2007).356 
Perhaps the most evocative example is Carter’s character of Rose in his opera What 
Next? (1999).  Rose sings a continuous wordless melodic line from the beginning of the 
opera till the end. Librettist Paul Griffith writes: “‘the whole thing will be, for her, a 
performance, in which she tries out various parts—in vocalise except when she has to 
take part in the verbal drama. ‘And the meaning of this’, Elliott says, ‘is that it’s like 
music: nobody knows what it means, but it goes on and on without stopping.’”357 Here 
Carter seems to be in agreement with his modernist fellow-travellers about the 
unfaltering continuation of musical expression regardless of the direction of history’s 
progress. His comment that “nobody knows what it [music] means” can be given a 
double layer of meaning if related to the opening of Adorno’s essay “Vers une musique 
informelle” which quotes Beckett: “Dire cela, sans savoir quoi.” The meaning of the 
Beckett quote is elaborated on in Adorno’s final sentence of his essay: “The aim of 
every artistic utopia today is to make things in ignorance of what they are.”358 Adorno 
(through Beckett) articulates an artistic aspiration that is freedom from the known, from 
control by externally imposed structures. The process towards achieving this aspiration 
is, on the other hand, a dialectical one between freedom and control. This resonates 
greatly with Carter’s compositional processes: Link points out that “Rose’s ability to 
spin out beautifully formed and continuously varying lines with great virtuosity is 
unhampered by her limited intervallic repertory, which is both the smallest and the most 
rigorously adhered to in the opera. Her entire vocal part is written using only four 
intervals ….”359  Carter lets the music go “on and on” with a repetitiousness of intervals 
but without an imposed formal scheme or goal for Rose’s singing.  In using the interval 
as the unit of repetition Carter avoids literal reprise as well as motive repetition which 
maintains a fluidity to variation that nonetheless has a recognisable sonic identity. 
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357 Paul Griffith, “What Next?—A Journal,” in Elliott Carter:What Next?/Asko Concerto (ECM New 
Series 1817, 2003, compact disc), 33. 
358 Adorno, “Vers une musique informelle.” Quoted in Johnson, “‘The Elliptical Geometry of Utopia’: 
New Music Since Adorno,” 75. 
359 Link, “Sense and Sensibility: Music on Stage in What Next?,” 214. Link also reads irony and comedy 
in Rose’s part (pp. 213-4). Whittall similarly sees a comic side particularly to Rose’s ending, in Whittall, 
“‘A play of pure forces’? Elliott Carter’s opera in context,” 5. 
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Related to the shaping of Rose’s minimal material into a continuous flow is what 
Whittall identifies as  “late-modern thematicism” in Carter’s late music.360 According to 
Whittall, this late-modern thematicism incorporates repetition as a response to the 
“cultural situation” of the late twentieth century: 
What brings particular power and strength to Carter’s own later music is the way he 
uses small-scale repetitions of rhythmic patterns and lyrical ideas to provide a core of 
stability which the rest of the music challenges, plays with, but never entirely escapes. 
And this seems to be his way of working out a response to the cultural situation which 
he defined with unusual sarcasm, even bitterness, in a discussion in Banff in 1984.361 
The cultural situation Whittall is referring to is that of the “post-modern” shift in 
musical expression as found in stylistic imitation of Romantic music and in minimalist 
styles. Carter forcefully rejects these two choices. Whittall argues that Carter responds 
with a new thematicism that sits in the gap between the traditional theme and the post-
tonal theme: not a theme in the tonal sense, and not quite a ‘classical’ post-tonal theme 
in that there is no varied repetition by way of canonical transformations, augmentations, 
diminutions or other tricks that maintain the essential intervallic relationships in the 
theme. Instead Carter’s late-modern thematicism can be exemplified by his use of a set 
type, such as the ubiquitous all-trichord hexachord. Such a set appears as a prominent 
melodic element—what Whittall terms a “recognisable object” in the music—without 
there ever being a literally repeated or systematically transformed theme.  Whittall’s 
coining of Scheinthemen to identify this kind of apparent but not actual recurring theme 
is an important analytical tool in Carter’s late work, and I will explore instances of 
Scheinthemen in the analytical chapters.362 At work is a dialectic of sameness and 
difference contained within each reference that also plays with the workings of memory.  
The listener, in a sense, can recognize the reprise of something, or the experience of 
hearing something that might have gone before, but the reprise is different enough that 
the similarity is not easily grasped with confidence. In this way the ‘thematic’ material 
avoids participating in defining a formal structure. Instead it leaves the listener 
                                                
360 “The search for order: Carter’s Symphonia and late-modern thematicism.” 
361 “Review of Elliott Carter: A Centennial Celebration; and Elliott Carter: A Centennial Portrait in 
Letters and Documents,” 726. In the Banff discussion Carter attacks minimalism as amoral, see Carter, 
“Elliott Carter in conversation with Robert Johnston, Michael Century, Robert Rosen, and Don Stein 
(1984),” 253. 
362 Whittall, “The search for order: Carter’s Symphonia and late-modern thematicism,” 66. Jeff Nichols 
convincingly demonstrates something similar in the much earlier Variations for Orchestra (1955) in Jeff 
Nichols, “Mistaken Identities in Carter’s Variations for Orchestra,”  Elliott Carter Studies Online 1 
(2016), http://studies.elliottcarter.org/volume01/05Nichols/05Nichols.html. 
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questioning their memory and expectation, or perhaps conversely questioning the 
music’s progression and relatedness. The analyses of the Boston and the ASKO 
concertos will provide concrete examples of how Carter achieves this play with memory 
and recognition. 
 
Link notes that “since the 1980s, Carter’s avoidance of repetition has given way to an 
approach that might be called “reduce, reuse, recycle,” cleverly using a metaphor that 
connects Carter’s music to the social movement for ecological sustainability which has 
characterized the modern world since the 1980s.363 Carter’s “re-using” notably includes 
materials that previously would have been considered uniquely defining of an individual 
composition: background polyrhythms, harmonic collections and forms. Noubel 
interprets this approach to repetition by way of the metaphor of a “deforming prism” 
that allows us to perceive within the familiar sound world of Carter’s “Ultima Practica” 
minutely changed details. Noubel claims this “connects [Carter] with certain Baroque 
composers’ ability to draw on materials and musical ideas already exploited in order to 
create something new without yielding to facility or renouncing any of their deeper 
artistic aspirations.”364  In relation to Three Illusions, this changed attitude to repetition 
can be likened, according to Noubel, to Carter mixing “up the cards of his single pack, 
displaying a range of combinations always surprising despite the remarkable economy 
of means.”365 Again, this kind of reprise plays with listener memory across the piece’s 
unfolding as well as across the boundaries of different compositions, making the 
‘coming back’ to something familiar in a different context a surprising experience.  
These ‘repetitions’—that also extend beyond the individual work and create a thread 
through groups of pieces366—link to the idea of ‘inexhaustibility’ as we’ll see next.  
3.3.b – “the quality of inexhaustibility” 
The specific kind of treatment of repetition found in Carter’s late music speaks to 
another quality that Johnson finds in this body of utopian, post-war, post-Adorno music. 
This is, Johnson tells us, what Adorno identified in Berg’s music as “the quality of 
inexhaustibility, of a profusion of ideas which constantly regenerates itself and flows in 
                                                
363 Link, “Elliott Carter’s Late Music,” 41. 
364 Max Noubel, “Three Illusions … and maybe a fourth: a hermeneutic approach to Carter’s recent 
music,” 254. 
365 Ibid. 
366 Such repetition is found in textural ideas and even melodic lines shared by the Boston and ASKO 
concertos. 
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superabundance.”367 The idea behind “inexhaustibility” for Adorno stems from his 
musique informelle where the material is not artificially or forcefully closed off by an 
externally imposed system, structure or program that determines the form of the music, 
but rather that the musical ideas can go where they need to, shaped both subjectively by 
the composer (and the composer’s ear), but also by the immanent needs of the material 
itself—the idea that the composer can themselves be surprised where the material has 
lead them. Carter also speaks of this notion of the material having its own voice, and 
that he must respond to it regardless of any compositional scaffolding that he may have 
constructed.368 The authority of the composer is reduced as the material itself 
inexhaustibly generates its continuation.  Johnson names the orchestral music of Berio, 
Ligeti, Boulez, and Birtwistle as imbued with this quality of inexhaustibility, illustrating 
in most detail with the example of the third movement of Berio’s Sinfonia. Johnson sees 
the piling up of musical material on top of the frame of the Mahler Scherzo in Sinfonia 
not as leading to chaos but rather to one manifestation of the proliferation of musical 
voices: the layering causes a breaking up of the Mahler frame which ends in a “plurality 
of musical voices that undermines the notion of any central, unified authorial voice.”  
These very notions of a plurality of voices, the lack of an imposed central voice and the 
delicate balance between “chaos” and “a sensible … collective entirety” lie of course at 
the foundation of Carter’s compositional practice.369  Carter’s songs illustrate this 
powerfully in the way the lyrical singing voice is woven into a polyvocal texture and 
need not be the central focus of the music.370 
 
What Adorno calls “Berg’s plenitude” does not mean “superfluous padding” but rather 
in Berg’s music a way of generating simultaneous individual voices that remain distinct 
but interrelated: “The more, and the more compulsively, simultaneous events are 
presented, the more they strive to expand. “371 The expansion requires a regeneration of 
                                                
367Johnson, “‘The Elliptical Geometry of Utopia’: New Music Since Adorno,” 78; quoting Adorno, 
“Berg’s Discoveries in Compositional Technique,” 195. Johnson says that Adorno had Stockhausen’s 
Gruppen in mind when he noted something of this quality in “the most recent experiments in music for 
multiple orchestras,” and from today’s distance the affinities between Carter’s orchestral music of the 
1960s and Gruppen seem greater than their distinctions.  See Schiff’s analyses of these comparisons in 
the first edition of Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter, 195; and again but differently in the  second 
edition, The Music of Elliott Carter, 26 and 235-6. 
368 See for example Elliott Carter, Harmony Book, ed. Nicholas Hopkins and John F. Link (New York: 
Carl Fisher, 2002), 33-34. See also Boretz, “Conversation with Elliott Carter “ 9. 
369 See Wierzbicki, Elliott Carter, 64. 
370 See for example Brenda Ravenscroft, “Layers of meaning: expression and design in Carter’s songs,” in 
Elliott Carter Studies, ed. Marguerite Boland and John Link (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012); and Capuzzo, Elliott Carter’s What Next?: Communication, Cooperation, and Separation. 
371 Adorno, “Berg’s Discoveries in Compositional Technique,” 194. 
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ideas already presented so that the music ends up “in reality economic in the extreme 
and, paradoxically, simple.”372 In Carter’s late style we find within the plurality of 
voices an economy of means, mentioned above, in the recurrence of formal features, 
textural ‘types’, polyrhythms and Scheinthemen. These features illustrate the idea of 
“inexhaustibility” and “regeneration” in that Carter finds endless ways to make this 
material speak in a particular and unique manner in each composition.  
 
Unlike Boulez or Rihm, Carter does not reuse or recycle compositions as such. 
However, Carter did start adding to existing pieces, starting with Three Occassions and 
continuing with chamber pieces such as Esprit Rude/Esprit Doux (and Esprit 
Rude/Esprit Doux II), the Retracings, Figments, Tre Duetti, but also the orchestral 
triptichs, Three Illusions and Symphonia: Sum Fluxae Pretiam Spei, the movements of 
which were conceived and commissioned separately (and can be performed separately). 
Thus the forms of these pieces gain a degree of flexibility, being able to be played alone 
or surrounded by and integrated with the member pieces. Another element of 
“inexhaustibility” and “regeneration” can be found in Carter’s harmonic resources.  The 
All Trichord Hexachord, the All Interval Tetrachords and the groups of Twelve Tone 
Chords became the pitch material of all his late compositions, and their combinations, 
diminutions and augmentation have been an unending fountain of source sounds out of 
which Carter has woven the most complex as well as the simplest textures.  They give 
the late music both a definable Carterian sound and an abundant richness of variation 
that can be called “exorbitant plenitude.”373 Rhythmically, the polyrhythmic basis to the 
layering of musical voices also serves as an example, especially of “regeneration.” 
Carter’s rhythmic techniques provided him with a means of organising “chaos” that 
became gradually more structured until it was manifest as ‘long-range’ polyrhythms. 
Then these ‘long-range’ structures were fractured again in the later music, leaving 
fragments of polyrhythms almost like a mirage of what were in previous compositions 
very real determining constraints. That Carter’s rhythmic means facilitated this 
fracturing without falling apart suggests the quality of “regeneration.” 
                                                
372 Ibid., 193. 
373 Johnson, “‘The Elliptical Geometry of Utopia’: New Music Since Adorno,” 73; quoting Adorno, 
“Berg’s Discovery in Compositional Technique,” 194.  
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3.3.c – Sonority 
The problem of the immediacy of sound for its own sake was one that Carter shared—to 
some extent—with Adorno. Recall from Chapter 2 Carter’s Letter from Europe, written 
in 1962, in which Carter considers music with “only a sensuous effect” to be too 
“primitive”: “[m]ost of the time the possibility of communication is denied, or, if 
admitted, kept on the primitive level of any music that has only a sensuous effect.”374 It 
is as if being distracted by sound prevented one from thinking. Carter expressed almost 
a mistrust of unmediated sonority, when in 1973 he articulated the significance of the 
communicative act of his music as almost opposing its musical content, in this quote we 
have encountered before: 
Sound for its own sake is of very limited interest to me. Human beings, I think, come 
to expect more from music than entertaining patterns of tone-colors. Mine uses a large 
variety of these but, I hope, always to transcend the medium of sound completely and 
present a more significant human message.375 
Carter expresses the desire for his music to contain “patterns of tone-colors” not for 
aural entertainment, but for a greater purpose, one that “transcends” the sonorous and 
sensual experience of music to speak of a more urgent concern to his fellow human 
beings than music itself.376 The dialectical tension in Carter’s formulation can be drawn 
out by comparison to Johnson’s observation that “Hegelian theory suggests that art as a 
material, sensuous medium is superseded by the spiritual activity of pure thought. The 
thinking which art provokes is higher than its own materiality.”377  The same dialectic 
of the sensuous and the intellectual nature of music is found back in Adorno’s writing. 
As noted above, for Adorno the sonorous nature of music (e.g. timbre, tone-colour, 
orchestration, harmonic colour) was too unmediated to be of use in a critical sense.  
Sonority, for Adorno, must always be in the service of something more “meaningful;” 
that is, a musical syntax expressed in thematic-harmonic interrelations—the locus, for 
Adorno, of the musical idea. Adorno was critical to the point of dismissing post-war 
                                                
374 Carter, “Letter from Europe (1963),” 220. See also “Sound and Silence in Time,” 132. Here Carter 
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375 “Elliott Carter, Interview with Stuart Lieberman (1973).”; quoted in Eisenlohr, Komponieren als 
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376 See here Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music, 150 on Hegel, Adorno and the function of art as 
‘truth’ over beauty, pleasure or usefulness. 
377 Johnson, “‘The Elliptical Geometry of Utopia’: New Music Since Adorno,” 83. 
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music’s focus on tone-colour (in orchestration and electronic music especially) as a 
fetishization of sonority devoid of critical potential in itself: 
… in works which count [sonority] is never an end in itself, but instead is both 
functional in the context of the work and also provides an element of fermentation. 
Schoenberg always stressed that sonority [Klang] was a means to achieve the adequate 
representation of the musical idea.378 
This appears to resonate on some level with Carter’s contrasting of patterns which are 
there for mere entertainment with patterns which carry the music beyond itself to 
promote a thinking which was of greater significance than the experience of the music 
alone, a criticism which Carter incidentally made of much music, even pre-1945.  
Despite Carter’s suspicion of the vacuous use of sonority, Carter did not share with 
Adorno the notion that only the motivic could be the bearer of meaning. In his 1968 
interview with Benjamin Boretz, Carter states this position clearly: 
A tone-color, a chord, or a texture can play just as substantial a role in the musical 
process as a theme is said to have in previous music. (I would claim, of course, that 
insistence on the primacy of theme in older music is one of the falsifications music 
theorists and critics have handed down to us.)379 
According to Carter, the importance of theme was overemphasised in relation to most 
music and  just not limited to modern music. Certainly Carter saw the unique sonority 
and tone-colour inherent to the musical instruments as important material with which to 
compose (and not just something overlaid on the so-called real musical idea). He says: 
The instrumentation and its location on stage are a fundamental part of the work, 
giving one level of continuity that can be moulded, among many others, not unlike 
that once associated with theme and development. 380  
The unique sound qualities of individual instruments furnished many of the expressive 
ideas of the majority of Carter’s music, both chamber and orchestral, starting from the 
beginning of his atonal style.  However, Carter too required that sonority be at least 
working in tandem with other material and not for purely sensuous effect but for a clear 
expressive purpose: 
                                                
378 Ibid., 79-81. 
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As I have said, I feel very strongly that the instrumental makeup of my music has to 
be part of the concept of the music itself, not only the source of its material, of its 
structure, but most important, has to be justified by the expressive vision or character 
of the entire work. The instrumentation, along with all the other aspects of the work, 
must seem to come from some expressive need.381 
 As we can see, Carter already early on had a complex notion of the possibilities of 
tone-colour for new music, and Johnson certainly finds this to be the case in a range of 
other post-war composers. Johnson argues that “foregrounding timbral concerns in no 
way results in a lessening of syntactical sophistication” and that there exists a 
“thoroughly dialectical tension in postwar music between sonority and its rational 
manipulation.”382 He goes on to say that “postwar music is full of works that produce 
themselves out of the incongruence of highly rational formal processes and the sonic 
material which they shape.”383  He cites among others Messiaen, Ligeti and Boulez but 
of course Carter belongs equally in their company.384 In both the Boston and ASKO 
concertos we see examples of sonority used as principle syntactical idea. In these pieces 
timbre is working almost thematically and has its own trajectory and subjective 
demands, interacting dialectically with musical line and chord to affect a formal 
transformation over each piece’s unfolding. The distinctive timbres of the ritornello 
sections do engulf the listener in the sensuousness of the sonority. However, on each 
reprise, the onward motion of constituent elements (rhythm, interval, pitch, 
Scheinthemen) connect timbre with the formal flow of the piece beyond pure sound 
effect. 
 
Interestingly, Carter once commented about his sensuous, very fast, continuous single-
line piece for piano, Catenaries, that it was a rather showy piece, that lots of people 
seemed to like it, and that therefore maybe he shouldn’t have written it.385 The piece is 
in fact very entertaining to experience because of the speed at which the performer has 
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382 Johnson, “‘The Elliptical Geometry of Utopia’: New Music Since Adorno,” 80. 
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384 For example, Carter articulates this very idea about the relationship between pitch and timbre in his 
Piano Concerto in Boretz, “Conversation with Elliott Carter “ 7. 
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to make the continuous unbroken texture flow. It is, as Carter said “very unlike anything 
I ever wrote before or since.”386  It was perhaps the piece’s undialectical nature that 
gave him the moment of doubt.  But the fact that he did write this piece and clearly 
enjoyed it, exemplifies the shift in emphasis from a darkness and a density of layering 
to instances of lightness and transparency. It also opens up the possibility that the 
ideological need not always be found in the same places it used to be. Utopia may need 
to be painted in lighter shades so as not to loose its critical potential in the present 
moment in history. 
3.3.d – The utopian in shades of light 
For Adorno, blackness in modern art was a metaphor for the non-identical, for 
“recollection of the possible in opposition to the actual that suppresses it.”387  Johnson 
and others show that this conception of darkness and the utopian is in fact coupled to an 
historical moment.388 In the spirit of critical thinking that sprung out of this moment, it 
is appropriate to reconsider the material manifestations of the artistic/musical critique of 
ideology under more recent historical conditions. Scherzinger makes this point very 
clearly in his examples of the historical use of the musical and the visual: 
 … the kind of dialectical montage found in the work of Sergei Eisenstein or John 
Heartfield can be found in every television advertisement, Hollywood movie, fashion 
magazine, and store window today. The same kind of argument can be made about the 
music, once radically experimental, that is deployed for visual effects in mainstream 
film and television. Relatedly, MTV’s average pop video is practically a showcase of 
early twentieth-century avant-garde visual techniques.389 
Scherzinger points out that for Adorno nothing was immune to instrumentalisation and 
that “[t]his is why the modernist critique of unchecked reason remains relevant today, 
even if new historical conditions have dated many of its specific themes.” Today 
“systems of oppression have changed” to become more psychological. The political or 
commercial co-opting of the means of expressing resistance and individual diversity is a 
mode of instrumentalisation particularly characteristic of late-capitalism and 
                                                
386 “Elliott Carter discusses 100th birthday celebrations at Southbank Centre,”  (Filmed Oct 26, 2008. 
Posted Dec 8, 2008. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bp95zFUPEj0). Accessed 15 Sept, 2017.   
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particularly difficult to counter, Scherzinger notes, “in the tilted social playing-field of 
global modernity.”390  
 
Can we consider Carter’s lightness within the context of this changed historical 
moment? The words that have become associated with the lightness of Carter’s late 
music —play, humour and irony, inwardness, fragment, effervescence, lyricism—may 
suggest a lessening of difficulty, a degree of accessibility, that would imply a less 
critical stance, even a capitulation to an ideology where art is entertainment and utopia 
no longer contains a space for the “irrational, rather extravagant and violent side of 
ourselves.”391  But nothing could be further from the truth about Carter’s late music. 
 
The idea of “lightness” seemed to have made its appearance in the discourse on Carter’s 
music by way of Italo Calvino’s lecture entitled “Lightness” from his Harvard lectures 
Six Memos for the Next Millennium.392 Carter told Bernard that he “read through 
[Calvino’s Harvard Norton Lectures in the original Italian] with fascination and found I 
agreed with many of his ideas.”393 Carter associated the text with the Oboe Concerto 
(1987) and according to Schiff: 
Throughout the work the oboe is in the spirit of lightness—mercurial, playful, 
thoughtful, and precise—while the orchestra is the bearer of heaviness: somber, 
agitated, and anxious. Carter has pointed out the following text from Calvino which he 
discovered after the work was composed, but which he feels expresses its spirit: ‘Were 
I to choose an auspicious image for the new millennium I would choose that one: the 
sudden agile leap of the poet-philosopher who raises himself above the weight of the 
world, showing that with all his gravity he has the secret of lightness, and that what 
many consider to be the vitality of the times—noisy, aggressive, revving, and 
roaring—belongs to the realm of death, like a cemetery for old cars.’394 
                                                
390 Ibid., 91. 
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Stein (1984),” 255. 
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Later Carter titled his 1990 trio for clarinet, violin and cello, Con Leggerezza Pensosa, 
after a phrase from this part of Calvino’s text: 
Above all I hope to have shown that there is such a thing as a lightness of 
thoughtfulness, just as we all know that there is a lightness of frivolity. In fact, 
thoughtful lightness can make frivolity seem dull and heavy.395 [italics mine] 
The reversal that Calvino uses in these two quotes makes thoughtfulness light and 
frivolity heavy. It suggests that there is a particular quality of lightness which can be 
critical: reflection that refuses to get bogged down but can climb above the noise and 
the fake laughter to reach to a truth that frivolity (or “the vitality of the times”) blacks 
out. 
 
There is more in Calvino’s lecture on “Lightness” that suggests how we might think 
about the transformation of means that created Carter’s own musical lightness. 
Calvino’s literary references are extremely rich, soaring through the history of Western 
thought with the very lightness he seeks to illustrate. In his opening alone, he takes us 
via Medusa’s petrifying stare that turns all to “heavy” stone and Perseus’s victory over 
Medusa thanks to his “winged sandals” and “the very lightest of things, the wind and 
the clouds,” to Eugenio Montale’s lightness of fragility (images of the snail and its trail; 
of crushed mica) placed in relief against terrifying blackness and heaviness (“Lucifer 
with pitch-black wings”). Importantly, Calvino asks and answers: 
But how can we hope to save ourselves in that which is most fragile? Montale’s poem 
is a profession of faith in the persistence of what seems most fated to perish, in the 
moral values invested in the most tenuous traces: “il tenue bagliore stronfinato/ laggiù 
non era quello d’un fiamminfero” (the thin glimmer striking down there/ wasn’t that 
of a match.)396  
And it is also this image of “what seems most fated to perish,” of the fleeting, the 
effervescent, the transitory, and the transformative, that we find especially in Carter’s 
music of the 1990s and early 2000s.  It is particularly evident in images from poems 
Carter sets or associates with these pieces of music.  Carter’s astonishing late orchestral 
achievement Symphonia: Sum Fluxae Pretiam Spei is associated with seventeenth-
century poet Richard Cranshaw’s poem “Bulla,” Latin for bubble. The bubble is of 
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course a transient, fragile and light thing and Schiff observes the connection between 
the image of the bubble and Calvino’s lightness:  
In the seventeenth century the bubble often appeared in pictures as a child’s plaything 
emblematic of life’s brevity. In Cranshaw’s poem, however, the bubble seems to be an 
emblem of art; the bubble is a transient mirror of human existence. In the lines Carter 
cites, Cranshaw’s bubble, ‘the flower of the air,’ takes a view of art very similar to 
Calvino’s idea of ‘thoughtful lightness’ …397 
The subtitle Sum Fluxae Pretiam Spei (“I am the prize of flowing hope”) suggests the 
intangible nature of true human achievement and Schiff characterizes the first two 
movements of the Symphony as a struggle of life versus death, to which the third 
movement offers a kind of dialectical outcome suggested by Cranshaw’s ‘bulla’: “The 
three works [each movement was written as a separate piece] are similar in their 
materials but strikingly contrasted in effect. Partita is explosive; Adagio tenebroso, 
darkly meditative; Allegro scorrevole does not resolve the life-against-death contrast of 
the two earlier movements; moving up in register, it celebrates its own gaudy lightness 
…”398  The title of Carter’s solo flute piece Scrivo in Vento (“written in the wind”) is 
take from a line of a Sonnet by fourteenth century French poet Petrarch, and also 
belongs to this imagery, as do the stanzas of the Rilke poem that Carter associates with 
Trilogy for oboe and harp, the very last lines of which read “And music, ever new, 
builds out of the most tremulous stones her divinely/ consecrated house in unexploitable 
space.”399   
 
Carter sets many poems in his music composed in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. It would be overgeneralising to say that all this music is concerned with this 
same imagery of fleetingness and effervescence, although the theme does persist in 
various guises, often mingled with themes of love and ageing.400 It is poignantly 
illustrated in A Sunbeam’s Architecture, one of Carter’s last settings of poetry, this time 
by e.e.cummings. The title is taken from the line “–who’ll solve the depths of horror to 
defend/a sunbeam’s architecture with his life” and reverberates the idea of Calvino’s 
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http://studies.elliottcarter.org/volume02/04Meyer/04Meyer.html. 
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lightness championing life in the face of suffocating heaviness (“horror”).401 Most of the 
poems Carter selected for this collection concern love and death in some way. The sixth 
and final song Somewhere speaks of the fragility of a lover. In the second last stanza, 
fragility is both eternal and powerful: “nothing which we are to perceive in this world 
equals/the power of your intense fragility: whose texture/compels me with the colour of 
its countries,/rendering death and forever with each breathing”.402  
 
By moving away from Carter’s earlier cathartic images of the conflict of order and 
disorder to this type of symbolic imagery of lightness, the darkness associated with 
Adorno’s negative dialectics (which leads to the total disintegration and radical self-
destruction of art) is transformed not into a positive utopia but rather into a utopia of 
survival: a persistence of the most perishable, the most fragile, the most denied. The 
authoritarian, the brutal, “unchecked reason”—what Calvino evokes when he says 
“Whenever humanity seems condemned to heaviness”—is made problematic by the 
persistence of that which is crushed by its weight. In an age where the pursuit of 
acquiring happiness is capitalism’s most powerful psychological tool, the reverence and 
contemplation of the happiness inexplicably found in the temporary, the effervescent, 
the fragile, the meaningless, represents a resistance to that commodification.403 A vivid 
example of this kind of happiness is found in Wallace Steven’s tiny poem Life Is Motion 
that Carter sets in his song cycle The American Sublime: “In Oklahoma,/Bonnie and 
Josie,/Dressed in calico,/Danced around a stump./They cried,/ 
“Ohoyaho,/Ohoo”…/Celebrating the marriage/Of flesh and air.”404  
 
The two late pieces I have selected to analyse here, Boston Concerto (2002) and ASKO 
Concerto (2000), project the utopian not through textual association but through the 
way they mediate materials and form. Their respective materials are in different ways 
examples of Carter’s late treatment of lightness, repetition, sonority, and plenitude. 
                                                
401 Calvino, Six Memos for the Next Millennium, 6. 
402 e. e. cummings, “somewhere.” Accessed 1 June, 2017,  
https://hellopoetry.com/poem/75803/somewhere-i-have-never-travelled-gladly-beyond/. 
403 As an aside, it does seem to me that this artistic resistance and critique must be ever-changing in 
material form, as the commodities catch up so quickly to all that we believe unable to be commodified. 
Think of commodification of the natural sonic environment: mobile phone apps that respond with 
soothing ‘morning’ sounds to your wake-up patterns, or those that give you the aural experience of a 
rainstorm from beginning to end; however unlike the real thing you can of course ‘plug out’ of the 
recordings at will. The moment in which “lightness of thoughtfulness” is a critique of the “vitality of the 
times” is also the moment in which that lightness becomes open to being co-opted. See discussion in 
Scherzinger, “In Memory of a Receding Dialectic,” 90-91. 
404 Wallace Stevens, “Life is Motion.” Accessed 1 June, 2017, https://www.poetrynook.com/poem/life-
motion. 
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They engage critically with the historical ritornello form, a form that is premised on 
continual reprise.  The treatment of musical materials these pieces, I argue, displays a 
dialectical interplay of opposites that generate the tensions and progression across the 
formal layers of each piece. I will begin by contextualising the ritornello form of these 
pieces more generally within Carter’s oeuvre before presenting a detailed analysis of 
each piece in Part 2: Two Formal Analyses with a critical reflection on the analyses in 
Chapter 7: A critical interpretation of Boston and Asko concertos. 
3.4 Boston and ASKO concertos: the dialectic of ritornello form 
As I touched on in Chapter 1.3.b: Form-content dialectic, Carter’s 1956 essay “A 
Further Step” articulates his idea of an “emancipated musical discourse”—of form as 
self-originating and developing out of a process of constantly changing moments.405 On 
the surface at least, the ideas that underpinned much of Carter’s mature music seem to 
be at odds with the appearance of ritornello form in a number of his later works, 
including the ASKO Concerto and Boston Concerto.406  Not only is ritornello form an 
archetype that fits Carter’s definition of “pre-established pattern” to be avoided in truly 
new music, it is also a form to which the continual return of previously heard material is 
intrinsic—it contains a kind of “self-evident continuity” contrary to Carter’s ideal of an 
“emancipated musical discourse.”  But in view of the elements of lightness that 
contribute to Carter’s late style and with an appreciation of Carter’s rethinking of the 
meaning and manipulation of musical repetition that accompany this late period, the 
appearance of a traditional repetitive formal structure might come as less of a surprise. 
Furthermore, while the appearance of ritornello form in Carter’s music could never have 
been predicted, two established aspects of his formal approach make it less incongruous 
with his overall compositional aesthetic than one might initially suspect.  Firstly, in 
contrast to many post-war composers, Carter has on more than one occasion constructed 
his complex and novel formal processes in a delicate shadow of more traditional formal 
schemes, as for example David Schiff points out in relation to the Double Concerto 
(1961) and the Fourth String Quartet (1986).407  This is of course in line with Carter’s 
concern for engaging with the historical nature of musical material (traditional forms 
included) that we saw in Chapter 2.  Secondly, Carter’s interest in the Baroque principle 
                                                
405 Carter, “A Further Step (1958).”  
406 And also in the Cello Concerto (2000) and the Clarinet Concerto (1996). 
407 On the Double Concerto, see Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter, 245; on the Fourth Quartet, see ibid., 
86. 
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of ensemble contrasts —fundamental to ritornello form—goes back a long time, 
particularly in his concerto writing, perhaps precisely because of its in-built dialectical 
possibilities in relation to orchestration and sonority. The Double Concerto was the first 
to employ soloists each accompanied by their own contrasting concertino.  This 
principle was later realized in various ways in the Piano Concerto (1965), Oboe 
Concerto (1986), and Clarinet Concerto (1996).  It isn’t until the Clarinet concerto, 
however, that the idea of a regular alternation of tutti and sub-sections of the ensemble 
appears as a formal device.  In the Clarinet Concerto, the tutti function more as 
transitional passages rather than full-blown formal sections, although they do recur 
between each of the solo sections, hinting at what is to come in later pieces.  In the 
ASKO and Boston concertos, Carter married the Baroque principle of ensemble 
contrasts with the formal ritornello patterning.  
 
While it is striking how easily the form of these two concertos can be grasped on first 
listening, Carter certainly reworks the ritornello form critically. Traditionally, the 
ritornellos in the Baroque concerto grosso were an important structural means of 
stabilizing tonal regions, reinforcing themes and providing coherence to the (still novel) 
virtuosic escapades of the instrumental solos.408  However, in the ASKO and Boston 
concertos the ritornellos get their identity not from any traditional thematic return or 
harmonic stability but from the memorable tutti textures. The sonority of these textures 
themselves carry an important part of the musical conceit of the pieces, and are a 
manifestation of the transformed role of sonority as a communicative element in its own 
right.  In the Boston Concerto, the pizzicato/staccato texture is so unusual and striking 
that Charles Rosen’s observation about the solo classical concerto—”[t]he most 
important fact about concerto form is that the audience waits for the soloist to enter, and 
when he stops playing they wait for him to begin”409—could be applied here in reverse: 
when the tutti gives way to the soloists, we wait for the tutti to return.  This surprisingly 
light yet energetic orchestral sound creates an effect of shimmering movement with its 
frequent repetition of short single pitches and pitch intervals in individual instruments.  
The allusion to the rain in the lines of the William Carlos Williams’ poem 
accompanying the concerto is inescapable, and the listener is undoubtedly expected to 
make the association (more on the poem in Chapter 5).  The dialectical tension of the 
                                                
408 Michael Talbot, “The Italian Concerto in the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Century,” in 
Cambridge Companion to the Concerto, ed. Simon P. Keefe (Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 
2005), 45; also Simon and Jehoash Hirsberg McVeigh, The Italian Solo Concerto 1700-1760: Rhetorical 
Strategies and Style History (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2004), 29. 
409 Charles Rosen, The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), 196. 
  129 
falling rain image realized by the pizzicato orchestral texture lies in a repetitiveness that 
appears static but that is nonetheless created by way of continual movement.  As we will 
see, in both Williams’s rain and Carter’s ritornellos the dialectic of stasis and movement 
are ultimately shaped so as to affect a transformation although, as I argue, not a 
synthesis.  By contrast, the ASKO ritornellos’ loud sustained tutti chords, spread across 
a consistently wide registral space, appear as static monolithic objects periodically 
interposed between the flowing counterpoint of the smaller concertino sections. While 
Carter has not identified any poetic or textual association with the ASKO Concerto, the 
orchestral sonority and static rhythmic treatment of the tutti chords are reminiscent of 
Varèse’s chord masses and what Jonathan Bernard has termed Varèse’s “frozen music,” 
particularly in Intégrales.410 But as we will see, in the ASKO Concerto too the stasis as 
well as the repetition are transformed over the unfolding of the piece. These are not 
pieces that Carter could have written in the 1960s, when the self-evidence of the form 
and the repetitive structure would have grated with an avant-garde aesthetic.  Yet the 
treatment of repetition here is decidedly late-modernist, engaging with the temporal 
experience of both ‘flow’ and of ‘infinite reprise,’ bringing the ideas of development 
and of repetition into dialectical tension through the large-scale formal structures of the 
pieces. Here Carter’s use of pitch repetition is unlike the deliberate symbolic critique of 
temporal stasis at the end of A Symphony of Three Orchestras, where Carter seems to be 
implying, through the latent program of the piece, that minimalist repetition represents a 
kind of death.411 Instead, these pieces might be heard as an ironic commentary on 
repetition: it is quite surprising to discover the myriad of ways in which Carter creates 
the effect of repetition when in fact very little is actually being repeated and there are 
certainly no literal repeats.  The unavoidable ease with which the ear makes connections 
between similar sounds means that only very little need stay exactly the same in order 
for the listener to associate sonic events, thus allowing for the “constant growth and 
change” in musical content that Carter prizes so highly, without losing the effect of a 
ritornello. 
 
Carter’s “constant growth and change” is not a Schoenbergian developing variation, 
since there is no gradual transformation of material from one shape to the next. Nor are 
                                                
410 Jonathan Bernard, “Varèse’s Space, Varèse’s Time,” in Edgard Varèse: Composer, Sound Sculptor, 
Visionary, ed. Felix Meyer and Heidi Zimmermann (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2006). 
411 Kerner, “Creators on Creating: Elliott Carter.”; cited in Dyck-Hemming, “Diskurze zur ‘Musik Elliott 
Carters’,” 156. See Noubel’s interpretation of the static repetition in this passage in Noubel, Elliott Carter 
ou le temps fertile, 181-85. Thanks to John Link for bringing this to my attention. 
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Carter’s “very vivid moments” completely block-like in a Stravinskyian sense; instead 
there is a flow and elasticity to the motion from texture to texture.412  Carter himself 
refers to the influence of late Debussy on this aspect of his formal thinking.413  
Debussy’s non-systematic and discontinuous presentation of distinct musical ideas is 
more akin to a stream-of-consciousness approach to musical time, neither 
developmental nor consisting of a collage or moment-form approach.414 Indeed, the 
“constant change and growth” of Carter’s forms and his belief that “music should be 
continuously surprising, [but] it should be so in a sense that whatever happens should 
continue an already-perceived ongoing process or pattern”415 resonates with Richard 
Parks’ discussion of “kinetic form” in Debussy’s music: “Kinetic form arises from the 
organization of discontinuities and imparts the sense of motion that is such an important 
aspect of musical experience. ... Kinetic form derives coherence from a consistent 
pattern of change of a particular type416 ...”  On closer inspection, Carter’s particular 
“re-forming” of ritornello form in the ASKO and Boston concertos reveals in each case a 
struggle between the cyclical drive of the ritornello form and the kinetic drive of the 
materials: the pattern of change is one that unfolds linearly but discontinuously within 
the “infinite reprise” of the ritornello sections. In each piece, there is a clear division of 
basic musical content between the ritornellos and the contrasting concertino sections 
with which they alternate. While the ritornello sections emphasize whole ensemble 
playing and the vertical pitch dimension by way of vertically ordered twelve-tone 
chords prolonged in various ways, the concertinos—each very different from the 
other—unfurl long contrapuntal melodies that emphasize the movement and interplay of 
lines over time.  Line and chord are in a sense treated as distinct musical entities and 
partitioned between ritornello and concertino sections giving them contrasting 
characters not dissimilar to the way Carter partitions interval repertoires, speeds and 
                                                
412 Schiff outlines many such “combinatorial” forms in Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter.  See also 
Bernard’s analysis in “Poem as Non-Verbal Text: Elliott Carter’s Concerto for Orchestra and Saint-John 
Perse’s Winds,” in Analytical Strategies and Musical Interpretations, ed. Craig Ayrey and Mark Everist 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996); and John Link on “linking” textures in “Elliott Carter’s 
Late Music,” 46-49. 
413 Edwards, Flawed Words, 98. 
414 Carter sees himself as having developed this aspect of Debussy’s music further in his own music. See 
Carter, “The Three Late Sonatas of Debussy (1959/94),” 251-52. Greenbaum also notes a connection 
between Carter’s and Debussy’s “dialectical” approach to form in Greenbaum, “Debussy, Wolpe and 
Dialectical Form,” 350. For more on form in Debussy’s music see Richard S. Parks, The Music of Claude 
Debussy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); and Marianne Wheeldon, “Interpreting 
Discontinuity in the Late Works of Debussy,” Current Musicology 77 (2004). 
415 Edwards, Flawed Words, 87-88. 
416 Parks, The Music of Claude Debussy, 233. My thanks to John McCaughey for making me aware of 
this reference. 
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“behaviour patterns” between simultaneous musical characters in many other 
compositions. 
 
However, if this characterisation of sections holds true for the ASKO and Boston 
concerto in a general sense, it is also precisely the chord-line distinction that begins to 
blur and change over the course of both pieces, and this process, as we shall see, 
provides a subtle yet powerful overarching linear continuity, or kinetic drive, which is 
overlaid onto the cyclic ritornello form.  As we will see in Part 2, this reading posits a 
more complex and ambiguous formal design to the ASKO and Boston concertos than the 
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Chapter 4 
Analytical Prelude 
4.1 Circle of analyses—some analytical considerations 
In this part of the thesis, I present a technical analysis of each of the Boston and ASKO 
concertos.  What I do not do in these analyses is engage with the material as mediated 
social critique, wanting to keep a distance between technical and critical interpretation 
at first. I reserve the critical interpretation for Part 3: Second Reflection. In this sense, 
Part 2 is a “first reflection” that looks at the pieces without social or historical 
interpretation but nonetheless with a critical reflection on analytical methodology. The 
analyses are not full pitch analyses (although I do analyse some pitch relations). They 
are not attempts to account empirically for structural coherence or unity on a 
background level (although I do suggest that large-scale processes unfold which give 
the pieces coherence). Nor are they comprehensive analyses in the sense of trying to 
capture the whole experience of the music through technical means. In this sense I heed 
Agawu’s warning discussed in Chapter 1 about retaining the provisional and the 
speculative in the analytical process in an attempt to access, or at least not to ignore, 
what Adorno considers the “surplus” left after technical analysis, and what other have 
described as that aspect of the music that lies “just out of our reach” or with which we 
play “catch-as-catch-can.”417  
 
While my analyses have remained firmly rooted in the musical object, its materials, and 
their relationships, I have nevertheless tried to gain a critical understanding of the 
systems of interpretation and narrative that we project onto the material findings.  To be 
more precise: in one simple sense, the polyrhythmic background structure of Carter’s 
Fourth Quartet (for example) is there as a fact, as much as the opening twelve-tone 
chord of the Boston Concerto or the ASKO Concerto is there, without doubt. However, 
it is the architectures of meaning that we build as we try to define these object and as we 
look further into the piece trying to describe the significance that chord or rhythm has 
                                                
417 Agawu, “What Adorno Makes Possible for Music Analysis.” Quotes from Paddison, “Immanent 
Critique or Musical Stocktaking?,” 217; and Marion C. Guck, “Analytical Fictions,” in Music/Ideology: 
resisting the aesthetic, ed. Adam Krims (Amsterdam: G+B Arts International, 1998), 172. See also Edgar, 
“Adorno and Musical Analysis,” 448. 
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for the experience of the music which are of interest to me. As Agawu states 
“[d]escription is never neutral, innocent or objective. For Adorno, the site of description 
becomes the site of provocation.”418 This is very powerfully illustrated by Suzanne 
Cusick in her “Feminist theory, music theory, and the mind/body problem,” where she 
convincingly shows that it is possible to construct almost any sort of narrative one likes 
about a musical experience to different effect.419 Cusick models, in her search for the 
source of the gender encoding that she experiences in Fanny Hensel’s Trio in D minor, 
op.11, that the challenge of analysis is to find an approach that captures the truest sense 
of the listener’s experience. Cusick demonstrates that this challenge becomes 
complicated by the social situatedness of the analyst themselves, and requires constant 
reflection on the modes of knowledge that are being sought or produced. What we are 
left with, I propose, is a group of analyses that stand in a dynamic relationship to each 
other producing different types of understanding.  
 
My analytical approach in this study makes use of a range of narratives and post-tonal 
analytical tools responding to the kind of musical process I am attempting to bring to 
light in my analysis. This approach acknowledges Adorno’s notion that “the sustained 
attempt to follow the movement of the object under discussion and to help it find 
expression” involves using methods fitting for that object.420 To try and specify in more 
detail how I approach the question of analytical methodology, I would like to make use 
of the metaphor of a circle of analyses and I would like to categorise three nodal points 
on this analytical circle—descriptive, interpretive, and critical—although without 
closing off the circle to understandings that sit in the interstices between the ones I’ve 
chosen to represent, nor to others understanding which oppose these.421 
 
Within the process of descriptive analysis I include a representation of the listening 
experience that arises through a reading, or in this case a close reading, of the musical 
object (score and performance). Both David Temperley and Mark DeBellis, in their 
respective explorations of the purpose and nature of music analysis, have made a 
distinction between an analysis that seeks to make a representation of what a listener 
                                                
418 Agawu, “What Adorno Makes Possible for Music Analysis,” 53. 
419 Suzanne G. Cusick, “Feminist theory, music theory, and the mind/body problem,” in Music/Ideology: 
resisting the aesthetic, ed. Adam Krims (Amsterdam: G+B Arts International, 1998). 
420 Adorno, Sound Figures, 145. See discussion in Chapter 1.3.e. and also Wilson’s discusses of Adorno 
and analytical methodology in “An Aesthetics of Past-Present Relations,” 23-24. 
421 See Jim Samson’s wonderfully clear articulation of the notion of “categories”, their limits and 
“permeability” in his opening paragraph to “Analysis in Context,” 35. 
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can hear or perceive in a piece of music, and an analysis that seeks to add information to 
enhance or change the hearing of a piece of music.422 Temperley labels the former 
“descriptive” and the latter “suggestive.”  Both Temperly and DeBellis argue that the 
two are mutually exclusive. My use of the term descriptive differs to some extent. By 
descriptive I mean a description of musical materials and their relationships informed by 
my pre-analytical hearing but not exclusive to it. I believe that my (pre-analytical) 
hearing of the two Carter pieces analysed here forms the base on which I have built new 
or other ways of hearing the piece while consulting the score.423 In other words, I started 
with a representation of my listening experience —an experience that came prior to the 
analysis; then, I added to that experience, by way of my close reading of material 
features of the musical text aided by the score.   
 
I further added to that experience by re-interpreting my material findings through other 
intellectual understandings—in this case, music aesthetics and philosophy, feminist 
musicology, and historical insights into musical modernism.424 These bodies of 
knowledge have helped me make sense of the musical findings beyond the experience 
of the individual piece. This process falls within what I’ve called interpretive analysis. 
 
Within the process of interpretive analysis I include the knowledge we bring to bear on 
the creating of a narrative that helps to make sense of the material features that we have 
isolated in the initial process of descriptive analysis.  To explore what “creating a 
narrative” might mean, I turn to feminist influenced scholars, starting again with 
Cusick’s illuminating essay mentioned above.   
 
                                                
422 According to Temperley “… the objective of doing theory and analysis is to find and present new 
ways of hearing pieces [“suggestive” approach], not to describe the way people hear pieces already 
[“descriptive” approach].” David Temperley, “The Question of Purpose in Music Theory: Description, 
Suggestion, and Explanation,” Current Musicology 66 (Spring, 1999): 70. Compare with DeBellis: “In 
particular, what I am interested in are cases in which the analysis is said to capture a way of hearing that 
was enjoyed prior to the production of, or encounter with, the analysis (a hearing which the analysis then 
articulates). To be sure, musical analysis commonly has other functions, such as that of suggesting new 
ways of hearing and thereby changing the ways we hear, or so it is usually asserted.” Mark DeBellis, 
“The Paradox of Musical Analysis,” Journal of Music Theory 43, no. 1 (Spring, 1999): 84. 
423 Both authors would consider this to be “suggestive” analysis. While it is important to Temperley’s and 
DeBellis’s logical reasoning that these are mutually exclusive processes, in practice I’m not sure that the 
lines are so clearly drawn between an analysis that describes what “everyone” hears and that which 
“adds” to that hearing, for reasons explored in the next two categories that I define. In other words, I’m 
not convinced there is an empirical basis for the division. 
424 See for example Agawu’s discussion in relation to Adorno’s analysis: “…there are different kinds of 
musical knowledge, and ... these are constituted in a complex variety of ways.” “Analyzing Music under 
the New Musicological Regime,” 298. 
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Cusick begins with a hearing of Fanny Hensel’s Trio in D minor, op.11, and briefly 
outlines analytical strategies she could drawn upon to help her explain “where this 
work’s gender subtext (and real drama) lay.”425 She first imagines “a historical 
argument exploring analogies” between instrumental roles in the piece and gender roles 
of the period. Moving on to find a strategy that would help explain more about the role 
of gender in the formal tension of the piece, Cusick considers but rejects the fruitfulness 
of a thematic reading of “sonata form as gendered discourse” (from feminist 
musicologists Marcia Citron and Susan McClary) as well as a “pitch syntax” narrative, 
as these aspects of the piece did not seem particularly remarkable and thus not likely to 
be the locus of the subtext.  She then engages positively with the ideas of gender 
metaphors being performed in all types of discourse acts (from historian Joan Scott) as 
well as gender itself being a performance (from philosopher Judith Butler), and arrives 
at the idea of an analysis that “considered the movement’s tonal, thematic, and 
relational scripts in tandem … from the situation of the piano’s role” leading to “a 
narrative that moved me in just the way and just the places that the music moves me.”426  
However, Cusick also ultimately rejects this line of investigation too: while it provides 
an explanation for her intuitions about gender in the piece, it excludes the physical 
bodily act of performance that motivated her in the first place to take up such a line of 
investigation.427 Her final proposal is a speculation on the possible form of a feminist 
analysis of the piece which takes the body (performance) rather than the mind (score) as 
its starting point. What is so important in this essay is that through the process of her 
search, Cusick demonstrates that the facts of the piece do not need to change with each 
analytical strategy; rather it is the types of knowledge used in the interpretation that give 
access to different understandings of the experience of these musical fact. In other 
words, the narrative of the musical experience need not be singular. 
 
Marion Guck’s “Analytical fictions” touches on a related aspect of “narrative” namely 
the language itself. Guck argues that “language conveying a personal involvement with 
musical works pervades, indeed shapes, even the most technically oriented musical 
prose.”  In it she illustrates how specific grammatical use of “technical, conventional, 
and novel language” tells a “story of involvement” about the analyst.428  The analyst’s 
                                                
425 Cusick, “Feminist theory, music theory, and the mind/body problem,” 42. 
426 Ibid., 44. 
427 Cusick goes on to outline how the denial of features of bodily performance in music also restricts 
access to an understanding of gender metaphors in music. She also outlines questions to ask if wanting to 
develop a mind/body approach to music theory. 
428 Guck, “Analytical Fictions,” 172. 
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use of even commonplace ways of expressing analytical ideas about music can in fact 
attribute agency variably to the music, to words, to the analyst, the listener, and the 
composer. The resultant “fictional narrative” invites the reader into this world created 
by the analyst, to be convinced by the story that presumably tells us something new and 
worthwhile about the musical experience.  Importantly, Guck shows: 
 that we can create many kinds of portrayals of involvement with musical works, 
which themselves are depicted as many different kinds of entities—some of them 
human representations, some not. More importantly, it is clear that there is no one, 
right story. Different individuals engage pieces in different ways; they therefore find 
different language congenial to that engagement.429  
Guck acknowledges the cultural element determining some of this difference, and we 
also can trace a link back to Cusick to indicate that gender, race and other contextual 
factors obviously play into language choice. Furthermore, Guck observes that analysts 
do not necessarily hold to one vocabulary to tell a single narrative fiction about the 
music, rather as analysts we swap and change vocabularies and stories to find the one 
that best represents “our sense of the music before us, secure that these shifting stories 
will be understood by our community of readers.”430 The reason Guck gives for this 
need to roam about linguistically when writing about music is that: 
Language more readily expresses what is concrete than what is immaterial. Shifts in 
musical vocabulary recognize that for all our erudition, evident in analytical texts, the 
musical work lies not under our finger, but just out of our reach. Our language about 
music is rightly secondhand, after the fact—and catch-as-catch-can. As such, it 
reflects what the interaction with music is like.431 
It is interesting to reflect on this comment in relation to Adorno’s analytical prose, 
which in fact uses language in such a way as to try to access precisely that sense of 
understanding that escapes us, not through greater precision in rational language but 
through greater poetic language. Guck, by contrast, calls for analysts to be more explicit 
about their own stories of involvement: 
I think that the practice of analysis would be improved if stories of involvement were 
less often subliminal, more often … explicitly stated, because music analysts are not 
simply communicating the musical facts by way of a neutral, transparent language. 
                                                
429 Ibid. 
430 Ibid., 173. 
431 Ibid., 172. 
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We choose words, and thereby shape texts in particular ways in order to persuade our 
readers or listeners … to adopt our way of looking at things.432 
Guck’s call for linguistic transparency and Adorno’s attempt to make language speak 
beyond the rational exemplify the tension within the difficult marriage of empirical and 
speculative analysis.  
 
An outstanding example of analytical interpretation that holds firmly to empirical 
analysis while offering much in the way of speculative interpretation through the lens of 
gender is Ellie Hisama’s book Gendering Musical Modernism.433  What is particularly 
exemplary about Hisama’s work is the way she achieves great clarity in her prose about 
what are “technical” observations and what is a “narrative” interpretation of those 
observations, convincing us in the process of both her analytical arguments and her own 
story of “involvement” with the music. The essays range across a number of pieces by 
Ruth Crawford, Marion Bauer and Miriam Gideon. Hisama uses different strategies to 
present “analyses that are inflected by historical and social context.”434 Informing all her 
analyses is biographical information gained from various sources about the situation of 
these women as women and as women who composed within the social reality of their 
historical period. Importantly, this information motivates Hisama’s choice of analytical 
tools for her close readings, and specifically her particular “attention to various aspects 
of contour” as an apt way to access the gendered structures she hears in the music.435 
The narratives that she weaves about the relationships of musical voices, melodies, 
arrangements of the two hands of the piano player, and part arrangements all tell a story 
about how the musical materials are organised in ways that can be read as 
“intentionlessly” reflecting gender concerns facing these three women.436  Hisama’s 
analyses model a way of allowing the music to remain “self-contained” while 
simultanenously locating within itself the traces of the social and it is in this process that 
Hisama’s analyses also flow over into my category of critical analysis. 
 
To summarize so far, my category of interpretive analysis can be understood as a 
process of translating the musical experience from an internal mental experience to one 
that can be shared with others through the “situated knowledge” that we choose to 
                                                
432 Ibid., 174. 
433 Ellie M. Hisama, Gendering Music Modernism: the music of Ruth Crawford, Marion Bauer, and 
Miriam Gideon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
434 Ibid., 9. 
435 Ibid., 8. 
436 Ibid., 10. 
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engage as metaphor for our musical knowledge of the piece, gained in turn from 
listening as well as from identifying material features (from the score) salient to that 
listening.  Descriptive analysis as a prior step helps select the concrete material features 
of the music for interpretation.437 However, in my own experience there is a movement 
back and forth between these two processes, and as such I don’t conceive of them as 
fully discrete steps but rotatable categories on the analytical circle.  Similarly, as already 
indicated, interpretive analysis flows over into the process of critical analysis. 
 
My category of critical analysis constitutes a reflection on method, materials and 
subjects. In this present study, critical analysis is reserved in its fullest for Part 3. It is 
here that the foregoing descriptive, interpretive analysis is reconsidered in the light of 
the notion of mediation—how musical content might mediate the social in the 
organisation of the materials themselves. The work of Martin Scherzinger and of Martin 
Brody discussed in Chapter 1 represent some of the finest examples of critical analysis 
in the way that they engage with existing stories of the music (by Schoenberg and 
Webern and by Wolpe respectively) and re-tell them through the dialectical lens of 
mediated social content, imbuing the music with a critical potential that other accounts 
have denied.438 
 
In Chapter 7: A critical interpretation of the Boston and ASKO concertos I present a 
“second reflection” along the lines that Paddison describes in his essay “Music and 
Social Relations: Towards a Theory of Mediation.” Here Paddison theorizes about 
musical mediation of the social on three levels: the level of a dialectic between musical 
form and content, between historical materials and their social context, and between 
music as autonomous artefact and as commodity.439 It is important to note however, that 
in its use of metaphor these notions of mediation are equally “interpretive” in the sense 
of my second category on the analytical circle. The over-aching metaphor in this case is 
one of dialectical relationships which may also be seen as a “story of involvement” 
                                                
437 The relationship between my descriptive and interpretive categories is captured by Samson in the 
following observation about the changing direction of analysis over the latter part of the twentieth 
century: “Analytical insights increasingly took their place within a much larger ‘implicative complex,’ 
where the selection, emphasis, and grouping of particular musical features would be determined not just 
by music-theoretic criteria but by the extent of their isomorphic correspondence to other controlling 
metaphors.” Samson, “Analysis in Context,” 50.  
438Scherzinger, “In Memory of a Receding Dialectic.” Scherzinger, “Anton Webern and the Concept of 
Symmetrical Inversion: A Reconsideration on the Terrain of Gender.” Brody, “‘Where to Act, How to 
Move’.” 
439 Paddison, “Music and Social Relations: Towards a Theory of Mediation.” 
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according to Guck, or simply as replacing a metaphor of unity (that was so strongly 
critiqued by the New Musicology) with a metaphor of dialectic. It is with such an 
awareness that Horton qualifies the dialectical analyses in his study with the following 
observation: 
Dialectical thought is in the first instance conceptual; whether we regard it as logical 
or critical, the idea that the world necessarily responds to antinomic characterization is 
at base an observation about its conceptual structure. However, the application of this 
idea in musical analysis inevitably proceeds by metaphor or analogy, because musical 
material has no capacity to embody concepts as immanent properties.440 
The distinction between musical material and the concepts we use to describe them is of 
course valid.  However, while the sounds themselves may be concept-less, musical 
“content” in Adornian terms is more than just the sounds. As I understand it, musical 
“content” includes the conception of how materials are organized with all the historical 
and social implications that that carries, and as such the link between concept and 
organised sound may be plausibly sought in a metaphor of dialectical rationality. 
Following Cusick and Guck, the narrative constructed around dialectical relationships in 
this study enables a story of involvement with the music that aims to get most faithfully 
at the listening experience of the analyst, myself in this case. Crucially however, it is 
not the only story possible. And in that sense, the category of critical analysis aims to 
reflect on the constructed narratives of the descriptive, interpretive analysis and on its 
own dialectical interpretation in an attempt to identify what these interpretations 
exclude in order to make their points.  
 
The analytical chapters on the Boston and AKSO concertos in Part 2, then, are informed 
most heavily by the categories of descriptive and interpretive analysis. They are 
descriptive in that they try to capture the mental representation of a hearing (mine in this 
case) informed by my particular way of interpreting connections and dis-connections 
between sections of the unfolding form. I support my descriptions and interpretations 
with examples from the score which are aimed at showing features present in the 
structure (purposeful organisation) of musical elements (pitch, rhythmic, timbral, 
textural, orchestral). But not all observations are supported with concrete examples, 
especially some of the more generalized ideas of how I propose to hear the dynamics of 
form-in-motion, since these to a large extent need to be experienced in the real-time 
                                                
440 Horton, “Dialectics and music analysis,” 140. 
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unfolding of the music, and poetic description seems to me the most suggestive way of 
translating this temporal aural experience. I do not sustain any specific metaphor, but 
my language will draw on a range of commonly encountered metaphors for music; for 
example, the idea that musical materials “transform,” that they move in “shapes” (e.g., 
“arch-shaped trajectory”), that they “stand in opposition” to each other, or that musical 
instruments, through their musical material, interact “dramatically” (e.g., they are jolted 
out of a dream, they keep to themselves, they have an exchange or a dialogue). 
 
I had the good fortune of having available to me another interpretation of the Boston 
Concerto by Alan Theisen, who completed his dissertation on this piece in 2010.441 It 
became available to me in 2013.  While my own analytical work was well complete by 
this stage (I had already published on the Boston Concerto by this time), I have 
benefitted from Theisen’s work in numerous ways.442  Firstly, that Theisen included 
pitch analyses of a large number of passages in the music has freed me up from 
reproducing this material in my dissertation.  The pitch analyses I include here are of 
passages not included in Theisen’s work, except in a few circumstances: on occasions 
where I use the analysis to support an argument that differs from Theisen; and of 
sections where I would like to enhance the analysis with Carter’s own sketch material. 
Secondly, it is rare to share with another scholar such a detailed encounter of a large 
orchestral work and be able to read such a complete response to the same material. 
Theisen’s analytical methodology follows Lawrence Ferrara’s “Ten Step” model for 
analysis that incorporates “multiple analytical tactics”443 and is underpinned by the 
concept of “form-through-time” phenomenology that Judy Lochhead theorises.444 This 
model includes a detailed listening journal which is fascinating in that Theisen’s 
listening consistently points to parallels with my own listening, highlighting as 
noteworthy and salient many of the same moments in the music.  This congruence of 
our listening (which might have been otherwise) suggests to me something about the 
music itself: while subjective listening experiences are all that we have as complete 
experiences, the music ‘itself’ does offer something concrete out of which those 
subjective experiences take shape. 
                                                
441 Alan Theisen, “A Multifaceted Approach to Analyzing Form in Elliott Carter’s Boston Concerto” 
(PhD diss., The Florida State University, 2010). 
442 Marguerite Boland, “Ritornello form in Carter’s Boston and ASKO concertos,” in Elliott Carter 
Studies, ed. Marguerite Boland and John Link (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
443 Theisen, “A Multifaceted Approach to Analyzing Form in Elliott Carter’s Boston Concerto,” 9. 
444 See Judy Lochhead, “Joan Tower’s Wings and Breakfast Rhythms I and II: Some Thoughts on Form 
and Repetition,” Perspectives of New Music 30, no. 1 (1992). 
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Where my reading differs from Theisen’s is in the interpretation of the experience of 
form. Theisen’s focus is on the elements and their internal shaping that make up the 
experience of musical progress across each individual movement (i.e., each ritornello 
and concertino). Theisen says: “In particular, this dissertation will focus on how larger 
formal units are opened, closed, and attain climax.”445 In my case, I aim to capture 
something of how the motion from start to finish of the piece might be experienced, 
through the awareness of multiple unfolding strands and their mutual influence that 
gives the progression of the piece a greater complexity than might be evident from a 
focus on sectional listening. This aim also applies to my analysis of ASKO Concerto. I 
know of no other published analysis of this piece. 
 
                                                
445 Theisen, “A Multifaceted Approach to Analyzing Form in Elliott Carter’s Boston Concerto,” ix. 
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Chapter 5 
Boston Concerto - Analysis 
5.1 Boston Concerto overview—text and texture, sonority and form 
The Boston Concerto (2002) is in essence Carter’s second concerto for orchestra. His 
Concerto for Orchestra (1969) pre-dates the Boston Concerto by 33 years.446 The two 
concertos are a good illustration of the contrast between Carter’s middle and late 
styles.447 In terms of form, the Concerto for Orchestra is hard to grasp in comparison to 
the clarity of form articulated by the Boston Concerto.  The Concerto for Orchestra has 
a continuous form made up of four simultaneous timbral layers that are also defined by 
register (mid, mid-high, mid-low, low). Solos and different timbral colours of the layers 
come to the foreground and recede again into a dense textural fabric.448 Associated with 
each layer (Carter called them ‘movements’) are characteristic types of gestures in 
which the rhythmic profile is an important defining element.449 The gestures between 
the instruments within each layer are also polyvocal like the layers themselves which 
are constantly interacting. All this layering forms a highly charged battleground of 
chaos and order, where one layer at a time predominates in a section of the music but is 
also forced to respond to interruptions from other layers that refuse to lie completely 
dormant while a single layer tries to hold ground. Schiff says “Form now grows out of 
the contrapuntal interplay of movements, so that simultaneity becomes a formal as well 
as a polyphonic principle.”450 The form is determined quite evidently by the unfolding 
interactions of the musical content. It takes quite a lot of familiarity with the Concerto 
for Orchestra to orient to any given point in the music without the score (and it helps 
significantly to know the order in which the timbral groups appear as the predominant 
                                                
446 Boston Concerto is dedicated to Carter’s wife Helen and written as a ‘thank-you’ piece for the Boston 
Symphony Orchestra. See Meyer and Shreffler, Elliott Carter: A Centennial Portrait in Letters and 
Documents, 323. 
447 On Carter’s changed approach to composing for orchestra in his late period, see Link, “Elliott Carter’s 
‘Late Music’?,” 2-3. 
448 In fact, the “simultaneity” of layers is coordinated by a large-scale four-layer polyrhythm that provides 
an underlying structure to the potential moments at which different layers can surface. Klaas Coloumbier 
shows the degree to which Carter keeps to this grid and where he deviates for musical purposes. 
Coulembier, “Analyzing simultaneous time layers in selected compositions by Elliott Carter and Claus-
Steffen Manhkopf,” 21-92. 
449 See Bernard, “Poem as Non-Verbal Text.”; also Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter, 243-57. 
450 Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter, 242. 
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layer). By contrast, listening to the Boston Concerto it does not take long to hear 
identifying features that provide a quick orientation to which point the music is up to, 
even without much familiarity with the piece. Change events happen clearly in 
succession due to the sectionalized ritornello form and the strong textural distinction 
between sections. The visual metaphor of ‘splicing’ from one scene to the next, that 
Carter used to describe some of his middle period music, is in fact more obviously 
applicable to the Boston Concerto’s ritornello form than it is to the Concerto for 
Orchestra’s ‘simultaneous’ form. 
 
The contrast between the two orchestral concertos extends to the literary references 
associated with each.  The Concerto for Orchestra has as a literary model St. John 
Perse’s epic poem Winds that “describes winds blowing over the American plains 
destroying old dried-up forms and sweeping in the new.”451 The theme of the poem is 
itself one that belongs to that time in Carter’s career when addressing ‘the new’ in an 
almost cataclysmic manner was of great importance. Bernard has shown many parallels 
between the “cosmic character” of the poem and the “grand scale” on which Carter’s 
music is conceived, particularly with respect to the density of ideas and the complexity 
of formal conception.452 By contrast, the lighter and more transparent Boston Concerto 
suggests parallels with the intimacy of William Carlos Williams’ poem Rain, the 
opening lines of which are quoted in the score. Again, the theme of this poem reflects 
Carter’s late period preoccupation with subjects which are more personal and more 
transient. In the poem Rain, the outside is where the rain (“the spring wash/of your 
love”) falls freely, cleansing and transforming everything it touches. It is juxtaposed 
with the inside where “the priceless dry/rooms” hide material riches, secrets and desires 
(“all the whorishness of our delight”).  From inside, the rain can only be heard and seen 
but the touch of its “drips” and “drops” which by their very nature will “bathe 
every/open/object of the world” and transform it, are kept at a protective distance.453    
 
The sonority of the tutti ritornello sections in the Boston Concerto immediately evoke 
an association with the sound of rain described in the poem. This is achieved not only 
by the expressive indication of Allegro staccatissimo—the pizzicato and strummed 
playing technique of the strings and the many fast repeated notes in the rest of the 
                                                
451 Ibid. 
452 Bernard, “Poem as Non-Verbal Text,” 180. 
453 William Carlos Williams, Asphodel, that Greeny Flower & Other Love Poems (New Directions 
Publishing Corporation, 1994). Also at http://www.zverina.com/bestbooks/poem-online-rain.htm 
(accessed  October 5, 2016) 
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orchestra—but also by the ebb and flow of the density of the dripping, spitting, raining 
texture that is suggestive of the unevenness of rainfall. The ritornellos, then, can be 
visualized as the outside space of the poem where the rain falls. The contrasting sections 
are the concertinos which evoke the more emotionally intense and closed inner spaces. 
The concertinos involve leaner, more focussed textures with heightened instrumental 
dialogues between subsections of the orchestra. Table 5.1 gives an outline of the formal 
sections by orchestration, expressive character and tempo. 
 
 
Table 5.1 — Formal sections of the Boston Concerto 
 
Formally, the concertinos can be heard as a series of tableaux, each enacting a self-
contained scene that forms a part of a gradually unfolding drama. This idea is nicely 
captured by John Link: 
 ... in the concert hall the schematic plan is perhaps less noticeable than the gradual 
intensification of feeling in the soli.  Stravinskian cool gives way to witty comedy in 
the winds, while in the strings, impassioned arco displaces the pizzicato raindrops of 
Section mm. Orchestration Expressive marking Tempo
Ritornello 1 1 tutti (full) Allegro staccatissimo ! = 90
Concertino 1   29 flutes/clarinets Lento, teneramente
h   = 54
Ritornello 2 74
tutti (no fl/cl in 1st half)
                (no pf/hrp/vibs) Tempo primo ! = 90
Concertino 2   91 piano/harp/vibs Meno mosso ! = 72
Ritornello 3 119
tutti (no pf/hrp/vib)
               (no basses) Tempo primo ! = 90
Concertino 3       141 violas/basses Meno mosso ! = 60
Ritornello 4 164 tutti (no brass) Tempo primo ! = 90
Concertino 4      190 brass Lento, sostenuto
h   = 36
Ritornello 5 221 tutti (strings only) Tempo primo ! = 90
Concertino 5     244
oboes/English
horn/bassoon Píu mosso ! = 120
Ritornello 6 281 tutti (no strings) Tempo primo ! = 90
Concertino 6   305 violins/cellos Maestoso – molto espr. !  = 72
Ritornello 7
344-
358 tutti (full) Tempo primo ! = 90
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the tutti, and the progression from basses and violas to cellos and violins gives the 
piece as a whole a sense of gradual brightening.454   
The effect of gradual brightening comes also from the registral motion across a 
succession of sections which I will examine below.  Accompanying the concertinos are 
bursts of staccatissimo chords from other sections of the orchestra which (to continue 
the textual association) may be visualized as the sound of the rain penetrating the “dry 
rooms” that “hear the wash of the/rain” but are not touched by it. 
 
In one obvious way then, the form of the piece is defined by the alternation of the 
returning Allegro staccatissimo ritornello sections and the varied concertino sections. In 
a number of ways, however, the obviousness of this form is thwarted. Although the 
ritornellos continually return to the “rain” texture (pizzicato/staccato articulation, 
rhythmic layering of beat subdivisions of 6 and 3 against 4 at a tempo of MM=90), the 
returns are never static and there are certainly no literal repetitions of any sort. Each 
ritornello in fact presents a very different kind of “rain” sonority as the instrumentation 
of the tutti is constantly changing. The ritornellos—which Carter first labelled 
“interlude” but later “tutti” in his sketches—are in fact only true tutti in the opening and 
closing ritornellos.455 In the remaining ritornellos, the lower sounding instruments are 
generally excluded (except in the occasional full tutti chord) which helps to keep the 
sound light. The piano only makes an appearance in Ritornello 6. Furthermore, each set 
of concertino instruments is withheld from either the preceding or following ritornello 
(or sometimes from both, as for Concertinos 2 and 4; refer to Table 5.1). The linking of 
the concertinos and ritornellos through the subtraction of instrument groups gives each 
section a very defined position in the chain of unfolding events despite the 
discontinuous effect that such an alternation creates. This in turn contributes to the idea 
of “moment to moment” unfolding of form that Carter emphasized during his middle 
period, rather than a static or mechanical application of a formal template. Unlike the 
ritornellos, the sound world of each concertino is unique and clearly defined by its 
instrumental family. Nevertheless, not all concertinos are entirely dissimilar in their 
sonority. The double reeds of Concertino 5 are a more active realisation of the 
meandering, interlocked counterpoint of the flutes and clarinets of Concertino 1. The 
                                                
454 Link, “Elliott Carter’s ‘Late Music’?,” 2-3. Others have also noted a dramatic trajectory across the 
concertinos, for example Rodney Lister, “Boston, Symphony Hall: Harbison’s ‘Requiem’ and Carter’s 
‘Boston Concerto’,” Tempo 62, no. 225: 38. 
455 Sketches for the Boston Concerto are held at the Paul Sacher Stiftung, Basel, Switzerland. All sketch 
material referred to in this chapter was viewed with the kind permission and generous financial support of 
the Paul Sacher Stiftung. 
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expressive two-part counterpoint of violas and basses in Concertino 3 finds a 
companion in the more intensely lyrical polyphony of violins I, violins II and cellos in 
Concertino 6. 
 
Coupled to the association of outside “rain” with the ritornellos and inside “dialogue” 
with the concertinos is not only the distinctive sonority of each strand but also a basic 
distinction between the musical material of each: the concertinos weave a polyphony of 
instrumental lines drawn from smaller groups of instruments, while the hallmark of the 
ritornellos is the fast reiterated and oscillating notes that form chords of varying 
densities across most of the orchestra. Thus, the spatial and the temporal are set in 
opposition to each other and distinguished by sonority in various ways. The opposition, 
however, is not fixed because the division of materials is not maintained hard and fast: 
melodic textures and chordal textures interpenetrate each other over the duration of the 
piece. Example 5.1 is a graphic representation of the transformation that takes place in 
the ritornello strand, from the distinctly chordal Ritornello 1 to a single 
Klangfarbenmelodie with accompaniment in the central Ritornello 4, returning to a 
chordal texture in Ritornello 7 that is similar to, yet more static than, Ritornello 1. 
 
 
Example 5.1 — Textural transformation across the Boston Concerto ritornello strand 
 
In the concertino strand the opposite occurs at the centre of the piece: the lines of the 
first concertinos become spatialized in Concertino 4 with the brass section playing a 
very slowly moving chorale which gives the effect of a gradually unfolding series of 
chords.456 The registral space of the concertino strand descends as it moves towards this 
central concertino and then fans out widely in the second half of the piece. Example 
                                                
456 Theisen makes a fine analysis of this movement, see Theisen, “A Multifaceted Approach to Analyzing 
Form in Elliott Carter’s Boston Concerto,” 95-101. 





5.2. captures the drop in energy and rhythmic activity at the centre of the concertino 
strand that lifts upward again with the registral expansion, represented by the inverted 
arch shape. 
 
Example 5.2 – Dramatic energy across the Boston Concerto concertino strand 
 
The design has some suggestive parallels to Williams’ poem. Without implying 
compositional intent or fixed textual correspondence, the textural transformation that 
happens over the unfolding of Boston Concerto is not in discord with the broad 
trajectory of the poem, which moves from the clearly defined ‘inside’ and ‘outside,’ to 
the messier and wilder movements of rainy and watery transformations, back to a clear 
delineation of the worldly and unworldly represented by the rain and love respectively. 
Like these opposition in the poem, ritornello and concertino materials are set up in 
opposition to each other. But also like the form of the poem, the clearly chordal “rain” 
texture of the opening and closing ritornellos frames a transformation of both ritornello 
and concertino textures that complicate the clarity of the ritornello form and ultimately 
shape the piece’s large scale design.  
 
A dialectic is at work between stasis and motion on the larger formal level which has its 
origins in the materials themselves. In the first two ritornellos, the stretches of single 
fixed-register chords are harmonically static but rhythmically activated, expressing this 
dialectic of movement and stasis in a very immediate way. Furthermore, a melodic 
‘path’ is frequently traced through the static chords. In other words, fragments of the 
registrally fixed chord are melodically activated. In this way, chord and line are shown 
to each contain their opposite. These elements of the musical material translate to the 
formal design, or put differently, to the way in which the textural transformation across 
C.1 C.2 C.3 C.4 C.5 C.6
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the ritornello strand is effected. Ritornello 1 starts with a chordal texture and very 
gradually introduces melodic fragments. On each return to the ritornello section, the 
relationship between chordal and linear material changes, until the central ritornello is 
dominated by a single Klangfarbenmelodie. In the ritornellos of the second half of the 
piece, the relationship between chord and line changes again, until the return of a clear 
chordal texture in the final ritornello. In section 5.2 that follows, I will examine the 
details of how this transformation occurs. In section 5.3, I will turn to the concertino 
strand to examine the processes at work in its trajectory. In the final section of the 
chapter I look at how the two strands interrelate and how other processes of linking and 
memory recall contribute to the continuity of the form. 
5.2 Ritornellos: the “rain” texture and its transformation 
Ritornello 1 
The discussion of the first ritornello will be the lengthiest as it is here that the 
oppositional premise of line and chord is established. It is this narrative of opposition 
that I will develop in examining the unfolding of the ritornello strand across the whole 
piece. In Ritornello 1, I will examine two significant stretches of music that are clearly 
heard as distinct sonic events: the first is a passage that runs from the extended static 
moment of the opening chord to the next static chord of 9 measures later; the second is a 
passage where distinct melodic fragments are introduced for the first time (mm. 14-18) 
into a strongly chordal texture. Both passages consist of clearly delineated linear and 
chordal material that are nonetheless intertwined by their pitch and interval content as 
well as their expressive gestures or timbral qualities (such as articulation or 
instrumentation). Of interest is how the materials are kept both in opposition and 
connected, in other words the way in which their identies are bound up with each other. 
 
One of Carter’s most striking orchestral openings is the first chord of the Boston 
Concerto. The sketches reveal that this opening was actually added towards the end of 
writing the piece.457 Initially, Carter began the piece not with the declamatory down-
                                                
457 This opening was only added after many of the tutti sections had been composed, as evidenced from a 
renumbering of measures during the composition of the piece. Boston Concerto folder, Elliott Carter 
Collection, Paul Sacher Foundation. Leaving the beginning until the end is not an uncommon practice for 
Carter; see for example the sketch study of the opening of “Anaphora” from A Mirror on which to Dwell 
in Denis Vermaelen, “Elliott Carter’s sketches: spiritual exercises and craftsmanship,” in A Handbook to 
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beat chord of the final score but with a sweeping up-beat string gesture similar to the 
final score’s mm. 3.3-3.4. The first two and a half measures were added later and they 
lead beautifully into the sweeping gesture that follows as if they had always been there. 
The added opening is a single chord in which pitch pairs are reiterated: a single, 
rhythmically activated, fixed register, twelve-tone chord presenting a dialectic of 
rhythmic motion and harmonic stasis as the piece’s opening statement. By contrast, the 
sweeping string gesture (along with a reply from woodwinds that follows a beat later) 
which Carter had initially sketched for the piece consists of one of the most 
harmonically dense passages in Ritornello 1. 
 
 
Example 5.3a — Boston Concerto, opening chord, mm. 1-3  
 
Example 5.3a shows a reduction of the opening two and a half measures. The forte 
attack on the down beat of the score’s m. 1 consists of strummed quadruple stops in the 
strings, accompanied by guiro and lingering wood chimes, and with fast staccato 
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sextuplets in flutes and clarinets oscillating on a major second.  The upper hexachord of 
this fixed-register Twelve Tone Chord (TTC) is an All-Trichord Hexachord (ATH). On 
beat two of m. 1, the violins reiterate pizzicato pitch pairs in a fragmented 4 against 3 
rhythm from this upper hexachord: A4/Bb4 and E3/F#3. These four pitches introduce 
one of the two All-Interval Tetrachords (AITs), 4-Z15 [0146] or in Carter’s 
nomenclature, Tetrachord 18. The lower strings join in from m. 2.3 adding Eb4/D4 to 
complete an ATH. They also fill out the bottom end of the TTC by adding in the literal 
complement of the ATH. The lowest analytical staff in Example 5.3a shows these 
sets.458  
 
The measures that follow this static opening chord present a series of melodic gestures, 
densely harmonized and punctuated by brief reiterated chords, each event lasting no 
more than one or two beats. Example 5.3b gives a schematic overview of the first six 
measures of the piece. 
  
 
Example 5.3b – Boston Concerto, Ritornello 1 schematic overview, mm. 1-6  
 
Here we can see that in the midst of the dense activity the TTC of m. 1 provides a 
consistent harmonic reference point throughout the passage. The opening TTC is firstly 
linked by an ATH formed in the violins to the following sweeping arco string gesture. 
The ATH shares pitches A4, Eb4 and D4 with the opening TTC while all the pitches are 
found in the first few notes of the sweeping string guesture that follows.  This sweeping 
gesture (with which Carter had initially opened the piece) involves the whole string 
                                                
458 ATHs and AITs are indicated using Carter’s set class numbering. Transposition levels indicated on 
examples refer to transpositions of the prime form of the set class. A full table of conversion between 
































































section and arrives two and a half beats later on a tremolo TTC in the strings. The two 
contiguous hexachords of the tremolo TTC at m. 42 are hexachords 35/36, just like the 
opening TTC (see Example 5.3c). In fact they are the same 35/36 hexachordal pc sets 
only realised vertically in pitch space with a slight variation: the lowest note in each 
hexachord has been flipped up two octaves making both the highest and lowest notes 
different from the opening TTC. Flowing out of the tremolo chord, woodwind and brass 
each play a 5-note subset of this chord in a gesture that will become characteristic of the 
ritornello sections: single reiterated chord tones, one in each instrument, played as fast 
sextuplet semiquavers or semiquavers, or sometimes both rhythms combined. 
Woodwinds play a pentad 27 while brass play a pentad 21. An illustration of the level of 
detailed attention that Carter gives to his pitch material is seen in the very last of these 
staccato reiterations: the pitches in the second clarinet and bass clarinet move to B3 and 
C3 respectively (forming a pentad 35) for one semiquaver sextuplet only so as to 
include the last two pitches of the TTC from which the two pentads are extracted. These 
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These pentad reiterations are followed by another sweeping gesture that answers the 
foregoing string sweep. This time it is played by woodwinds (see Example 5.3b, 
‘flutes, clarinets sweeping response’). The woodwind gesture is similarly harmonically 
dense: a series of vertical pentads change every sextuplet semiquaver and are 
underpinned by semiquaver pizzicato strings also playing pentads (see Example 5.3d). 
Again the gesture lasts only two beats. The same pentads (21, 27 and 35) that initiated 
the gesture at m. 4.3 reappear at the end to frame the passage: pentads 35 and 27 close 
the woodwind phrase while pentad 21 closes the string phrase. The chords are circled in 
Example 5.3d. Thus we can see how the TTC harmony which opened the piece is a 
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Example 5.3e – Boston Concerto, Ritornello 1 accelerating line with string ATH chains, mm. 5.3-6.3 
 
Dovetailing the end of the sweeping woodwind gesture is a new, slower melodic line in 
rhythmic unison between two oboes, two bassoons and xylophone (refer to Example 
5.3b, ‘oboes, bsns, xylo accelerating phrase’). This line again forms vertical pentads 
that are all supersets of the two ATHs. The line is underpinned by pizzicato strings 
weaving an interlocking web of trichords that pair into ATHs (the passage is detailed in 
Example 5.3e). The line lasts five beats and presents an accelerating rhythm that ends 
in a strummed string chord like the opening chord of m. 1. This time, however, the 
strummed chord is an ATH at T3I instead of a full TTC. This T3I ATH becomes the 
new static harmony that lasts until m. 9.  
 
In summary, the opening 6 measures are framed by two strummed string chords, a TTC 
and a ATH, which present bookending moments of harmonic stasis across the orchestra 
(refer back to the schematic overview of Example 5.3b). The music that happens in 
between this frame rushes by in a flash. Nonetheless, the whole is underpinned by the 
return to the opening TTC and the clear gestures connecting these returns are easily 
registered by the ear: a whirlwind of dense sweeping gestures that are punctuated by 
tiny moments of staccato chord reiterations. Despite their fleeting quality, Carter 
orchestrates these gestures in great detail.  Many of the pentads are supersets of the two 
AITs or subsets of the ATH. The ATH itself is carefully partitioned into trichordal 





























˙˙# ˙˙b ˙˙b ˙˙
˙ ˙ ˙# ˙#
interlocking trichords forming ATHs




˙˙# ˙˙# ˙˙# ˙˙#




˙˙# ˙˙## ˙˙bb ˙˙n













  157 
either [0137] or [0146] can be found in the Harmony Book on pages 81-82 (“Chapter 3. 
Synthesis I, 1+4=5”), and pentad and trichord subsets of the ATH on page 241 
(“Chapter 11. Analysis III, 6=5+1/4+2/3+3”). This was clearly a useful resource for 
shaping the rapid progression of chords. These harmonically dense gestures also have 
clear melodic profiles and a definite sense of motion which contrasts with the measures 
of static chords. They present an opposing musical idea to the framing repeated-note 
chords of measure 1 and measure 6 which spread themselves out in a rain-like sonic 
image of orchestral colours and that do not move anywhere except ‘on the spot.’ In this 
way chord and line are simultaneously presented at the start of the piece. Carter has 
integrated their individual identities into a fluid gesture without subsuming either. 
 
Ritornello 1 continues through what are perhaps most accurately termed harmonic 
fields, of which the pitch content is primarily fixed-register TTCs or ATHs.459 Some of 
the TTC are All-Interval, others are not. Pitches are also held in common between one 
vertically ordered TTC or ATH and the next. These common pitches smooth the shift 
between harmonic fields. Throughout Ritornello 1, spatially ordered chords are shaped 
into a variety of gestures and mostly rhythmically activated over one to three measures, 
often partitioning AITs or ATHs from the fixed pitch aggregate. The ‘tropes’ set up in 
the first few measures of the piece, such as the tremolo chords, reiterated staccato 




                                                
459 Theisen makes a reduction of the first ritornello. This reduction does not show all the twelve-tone 
harmonic fields but does include TTCs that occur at a number of significant gestural moments in this 
section. See Theisen, “A Multifaceted Approach to Analyzing Form in Elliott Carter’s Boston Concerto,” 
58. 
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While Ritornello 1 as a whole is defined by orchestral chords, the opposing idea of 
melodic line is dramatically brought to the foreground in a pivotal moment in mm. 14-
15 (see Example 5.4).  In mm. 13-14, a hiatus in the rhythmic activity is effected by 
three temlando chords: the first is tremolo flutes with held brass, the second and third 
are two string tremolos (shown in Example 5.4). A single muted trumpet line projects 
out of the last tremolo chord.460 The trumpet’s climbing contour and repeated final 
tenuto notes (A5) leave a kind of ‘bugle-call’ impression. A response comes 
immediately in the form of a short but sustained dolce chorale-like phrase between 
oboes, English horn and three horns (see mm. 15-16 in Example 5.4).  As the pizzicato 
strings start up again, the horns play a harmonized continuation of the trumpet call over 
the top of the now returned “rain” motive (m. 17). Then a further response comes from 
the first trumpet (m. 18) which picks up the first horn’s first three pitches, repeating 
them to faster note values and extending the phrase with a final leap before the “rain” 
texture takes over again.  Thus, this momentary event consistes of four melodic 
fragments: 1. trumpet melody, 2. reeds/horns choral, 3. harmonized horns, 4. final 
trumpet response. These fragments are numbered in boxes on Example 5.4. 
 
The trumpet’s bugle call melody is the first clear, independent melodic phrase of the 
piece. Nonetheless, it remains fully embedded in its harmonic surrounds, as do the 
melodic fragments that follow it. The trumpet’s pitches at mm. 14-15 are a linear repeat 
of the preceding tremolo string chord, T8 ATH. In addition, this T8 ATH forms part of 
a fixed-register TTC that accumulates all its pitches by the end of the trumpet melody 
(see analytical staff in Example 5.4). It includes the T3I ATH string chord that 
accompanies the trumpet melody and the T5 ATH that is formed between double reeds 
and horn in fragment 2. Furthmore, the next ATH at T0 in fragment 2 is a linking chord 
with 5 of its pitches shared with the preceding TTC and 4 with the following TTC.461 
Thus, while melody is brought into focus, momentarily halting the chordal activity, the 
materials from which the melody is shaped comes directly from the chords 
themselves—in other words, latent melodic content is drawn out of the chords. Pitch 
and interval content further connect the trumpet’s melody to response fragments 3 and 4 
that follow. All three gestures have a high presence of interval class 5 and of open 
sounding harmonies, such as [027] and [037] in the trumpet melody, [048]s in the horn 
                                                
460 This passage is also discussed with emphasis on the major/minor qualities of the trichords in ibid., 62-
4. 
461 Linking will be discussed more below. See also Boland, “‘Linking’ and ‘Morphing’: Harmonic Flow 
in Elliott Carter’s Con Leggerezza Pensosa.” 
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harmonies and [025]s in the following trumpet harmonies (compare mm. 14-15 and 
mm.17-18 in Example 5.4).  
 
Example 5.4 — Boston Concerto, Ritornello 1 melodic fragments in the brass, mm. 14-18 
 
 
Ritornello 1 has set up the elements that will constitute the transformation that occurs 
across the ritornello strand: vertical chordal sonorities transform into horizontal melodic 
lines and shift back again. The process is a subtle one that underlies the dominant “rain” 
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Ritornello 2 continues the transformation of the strand to a more linear texture by 
introducing more extended melodic fragments passed between the instruments. The 
overall texture and harmonic material of the second ritornello is rather similar to the 
first, although more lightly orchestrated. The lead-in to this ritornello is an arch-shaped 
marimba line that descends before climbing up again to meet the pizzicato violins (mm. 
72-74, see from m.74 in Example 5.5). The marimba melody starts fortissimo 
announcing itself assertively at the end of the Concerto 1’s soft meandering woodwind 
soundscape. The marimba decrescendos to pianissimo when pizzicato first violins take 
over the line. The music shifts to short melodic phrases that are passed between 
different instruments: first from the violins back to the marimba, and then on to the 
oboes and the English horn (mm. 72-79). Like the trumpet call in Ritornello 1, these 
fragments are predominantly linear ATHs but with greater harmonic independence now, 
as only the second marimba fragment is drawn from the surrounding harmonies, namely 
the ATH preceding it and the AIT that following it (m. 76). 
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The melodic fragments leads to a longer line that is indicated in the score as a marimba 
“solo” in mm. 79-82 (see Example 5.6). Unlike the trumpet solo in Ritornello 1, the 
marimba plays an extended rapid solo and the melody itself maintains features of the 
“rain” texture, mostly made up of repetitions and oscillations of notes rather than a 
strong melodic contour like the earlier trumpet solo.  However, like the trumpet solo of 
Ritornello 1, the pitches of the marimba solo are now also drawn out of the harmonies 
of its string accompaniment.   
 
Example 5.6 – Boston Concerto, Ritornello 2 marimba solo, mm. 78-82 
The marimba solo ends with repeated C#5s which dovetail to a gesture by four muted 
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The horns introduce the rhythmic activation of a static chord for the first time in Rit. 2. 
And while this gesture is answered by a final melodic cascade in the woodwinds (not 
shown here), the remaining seven measures of Rit. 2 return to texturally activated 
twelve-tone chords in the manner of Rit. 1, thereby pausing any further development of 
the linear texture till later ritornellos. Thus, with the marimba solo’s definite linear 
statement the chordal character of the ritornello strand is disrupted but does not yet 
transform to a fully linear texture. 
Ritornello 3 
Ritornello 3 brings to the transformation of the ritornello strand another element: rather 
than continuing the extension of melodic fragments, in Ritornello 3 a much more 
stratified texture emerges consisting of greater independent layering. The coordinating 
TTCs that spanned the full orchestra now virtually disappear. The pitch reiterations and 
oscillations of the previous ritornellos have all but gone and have been replaced by 
varied note successions. The fragmented rhythms and the voice-crossings make it 
impossible to discern clear melodic lines within these layers. In other words, it is not so  
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much a contrapuntal texture as a pointillistic “rain” texture of greater pitch density (see 
Example 5.7).  Especially the clarinets present an erratic display of fragments, failing to 
manage more than a dyad or two in succession although with the occasional return of 
the wave-like sweeping gestures from the first ritornello (refer for example to m. 124-6 
in the score).  It is as if independent melodic lines are trying to consolidate but are not 
quite able to take their full form.  
 
The strings generally do complete aggregates linearly while also coordinating together 
on fleeting vertical ATHs and combining AITs into octatonic collections in a number of 
passages.462 However, overall Ritornello 3 lacks the clear harmonies of the TTCs and 
the ATHs that unified the whole orchestral sound in the previous two ritornellos. Within 
this dense textural terrain, the brass are the only group to provide a cohesive layer. 
Initially the brass play reiterated notes of the “rain” motive (refer for example to mm. 
123-124 in the score). However, they then turn to playing short, loud burst of AIT and 
ATH chords (or subsets of these) at irregular intervals in the manner of the 
accompanying chords that can be found throughout the concertinos (see end of m. 134 
in Example 5.7). This textural element of the brass appears here for the first time and 
reappears in a number of later ritornellos.   
Ritornello 4 
After the independent layering of Ritornello 3, Ritornello 4 makes a complete 
transformation away from a chordal texture, bringing in a single line that drives the 
motion of this central ritornello forward. This is the mid-point of the ritornello strand 
and also the central section of the piece as a whole. Ritornello 4 presents a continuous 
melodic line that weaves its way through the whole ritornello and provides a clarity to 
the movement that contrasts with the much more chaotic texture of the proceeding 
ritornello. 
 
The line is divided between primarily piccolo, xylophone and pizzicato first violins, as 
indicated by the Hauptstimme brackets in the score. It is constructed from ATH and AIT 
collections. The melody maintains the rhythmic values of the “rain” texture—beats are 
divided into sixteenths against sextuplet sixteenths—making for a very fast, intense 
                                                
462 For octatonic moments, see the strings in mm. 124-125 and mm. 135-136. 
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melodic line with the high register of the piccolo and xylophone dominating.  Example 
5.8a reproduces a section of the Klangfarbenmelodie. The line is fragmented by the 
rhythmic and timbral changes as it is passed between instruments; however the ATH 
and AITs (along with various subsets) link the line together harmonically.  The first 
piccolo is frequently doubled in rhythmic unison by second piccolo and likewise the 
first and second violins. The harmonies between these doubled lines also form 
predominantly AITs and occasionally ATHs.  
 
 
 Example 5.8a — Boston Concerto, Ritornello 4 Klangfarbenmelodie, mm. 167-172 
 
The accompaniment to the Klangfarbenmelodie is quite stratified. The layers consists of 
unpitched percussion (wood blocks, temple blocks, cow bell, snare drum); upper strings 
(joined by the lower strings in the last few measures); reed instruments; and a gentle 
sprinkle of single harp notes. Like the main melodic line, these other layers follow their 
own linear pathways while retaining the pizzicato/staccato character of the “rain” 
texture.  A significant change in Ritornello 4 is that along with the lack of TTC 
harmonic fields, the pitch reiterations have now also gone. This makes the overall 
texture far more linear.  In place of the pitch reiterations we now find a web of 
predominantly AIT harmonies (with ATHs also appearing, similar to the 
Klangfarbenmelodie itself). This give a specific colour to the harmonic landscape 
despite the lack of single coordinating chordal harmonies across the whole orchestra. In 
addition, emphasis is placed on the vertical pitch classes (pics) 6, 3 and 9 throughout the 
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Example 5.8b). The violins in rhythmic unison form chains of AITs with intervals 
between their pitches forming mostly pics 6, 3 and 9, while the oboe and English horn 
do likewise in their own independent gestures (not shown in example). This manner of 
set and interval distribution continues throughout Ritornello 4.  
 
Example 5.8b – Boston Concerto, Ritornello 4 ic 3, 6, 9 and AIT chains, mm. 167-169  
 
From about half way, a chordal element is added. Reeds and strings begin now to 
coordinate on single attacks of AITs or ATHs (see Example 5.8c). The chords are short 
and barely distinguishable amidst the rush of activity. However, each chord is 
accompanied by sharp percussion attack and these percussion accents are in fact the 
more prominent part of the listening experience than the AIT or ATH harmonies. The 
chords occur on a rhythmic grid of 5 semiquavers with attacks appearing unevenly at 
first but towards the end the strings on their own do articulate a 5-semiquaver pulse with 
reeds joining in every second or third attack. As can be seen in Example 5.8c, the 
dynamics swell from pp to f and return to pp before crescendoing again. Along with the 
racing Klangfarbenmelodie, these attacks have the effect of propelling the music 
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The last few attacks reach ff  just before the xylophone melody makes a final ascent to a 
decrescendo. The melody accumulates all the pitches of the total chromatic collection, 
reaching the last high C8 at a dynamic of pianissimo as the rest of the orchestra falls 
silent (see Example 5.8d).  This final line is accompanied by a last low piano chord 
held in the bassoons and contra bassoon just as the rest of the orchestra peters out. The 
chord is given colour and attack by doubling it with pizzicato basses. This subtle yet 
dramatic moment creates an important connection with the following Concertino 4, as 
we will see in Section 5.4.a below. 
 
 
Example 5.8d — Boston Concerto, Ritornello 4 ending, mm. 188-189 
 
The xylophone’s last melodic line softly floats away with an upward drift dissolving the 
driving linear motion of the ritornello strand. Ritornello 5 and Ritornello 6 each in their 
own way reintroduce the reiterated notes and chords of the “rain” texture, finally 






‰ ≈ Rœn> ‰ Œ ‰ œb> œb œ œn








œb œ œb> œb œn œn œ# œ#

















‰œ œ œ# >
≈Œ
‰.
















































































œ œ œ# >‰
. ≈
















œ œ œ# #>
Œ


















































































































































































Ritornello 5 (strings only with some supporting percussion) and Ritornello 6 (largely 
without strings) are a mixture of chordal repetition and melodic gestures, and are also 
possibly the two most contrasting ritornello sections. The orchestration of Ritornello 5 
with strings only gives it a distinctive sonority. The texture is a mixture of melodic 
fragments and static chord repetitions similar to the opening ritornello but without the 
additional orchestral colour. 
 
Concertino 4 leads into Ritornello 5 with an important gesture in the piano. The piano 
plays a motivic figure that, as we will see below in Section 5.4.b, is not only significant 
in this ritornello but also has a role to play in linking different moments throught the 
piece. It is particuarly interesting that this motive consists of a reiterated note—a 
gesture emblematic of the notion of continual reprise. In m. 220 the piano plays a 
leaping quintuplet figure that settles on an insistent repetition of Ab4 to a pulse of 2 
eighteenth-note quintuplets (see Example 5.9a). This is a measure of tempo modulation 
where the quarter-note quintuplet becomes the new quarter-note beat (at MM.90). The 
repeated Ab4 establishes the new pulse. Immediately following in m. 221 the cellos 
enter with their own repeated note, A3, to a pulse of 3 sixteenth notes. The remaining 
string sections follow suit, each on their own note and to their own pulse stream. 
Together the reiterated string pitches from a ATH collection at T2 (see analytical staff 
in Example 5.9a). These brief few measures lead to a passage of strummed chords, also 
ATHs. Across the passage from m. 221 to m. 225 all ATH chords played belong to a 
single fixed register TTC, which is finally heard in its complete from at the end of m. 
224. The idea of this passage, where individual pitches accumulate in a strummed TTC 
is a kind of retrograde of the first measures of Ritornello 1 where first the strummed 
TTC gave rise to the individually reiterated pitches.  
 
 
Example 5.9a — Boston Concerto, Ritornello 5, repeated-note motif, mm. 219-224 
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In this passage, however, the pitch reiterations are single notes not dyads, and this gives 
the moment its own unique sonority. What’s more, the same motivic idea reappears 
later in the ritornello. In mm. 231-233 the basses are heard projecting a repeated high 
D5 to a pulse of 4 triplet eighth notes duration (see Example 5.9b). The first three 
attacks are to near silence from the rest of the orchestra which makes the motif stand out 
clearly. A variation of this motivic idea appears a final time at the transition from 
Ritornello 5 to following concertino (mm. 242-243, see Example 5.9b). Descending 
rhythmic unison lines between the flutes and violas are set to a regular pulse of 2 triplet 
eighth notes duration. Together the two lines form a T1I ATH. The top line is a [0137] 
(AIT 23) with the first two pitches reiterated. The lower line is a [037] also with the first 
two pitches reiterated. While this gesture is not a line of single pitch repetitions, the feel 
of a momentary regular pulse with a few pitch reiterations is enough to recall the motif 
from the start of the ritornello. Thus, the whole of Ritornello 5 is framed by the motive 
idea of pulsation and reiteration. As we will see below, this motivic idea also permeates 
the piece in other places.  
 
 
Example 5.9b — Boston Concerto, Ritornello 5 return of repeated-note motive, mm. 231-233 and 
mm. 239-240 
 
Even where this motif is absent, the ritornello as a whole contains strongly projected 
pulse streams fragments and the texture is quite linear at moments. However, strummed 
chords and ATH harmonies lead Ritornello 5 back to a final static TTC played across 
most sections of the orchestra. These last measures contain sonorities that have laid 
dormant during Ritornellos 3 and 4, including fast staccato reiterated notes and flutter-
tongue tremolo chords and strummed strings. The sound world of the ritornello strand 
appears to be moving back to a coordinated chordal texture similar to that of Ritornello 
1. 
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Ritornello 6 
Contrary to expectation, however, Ritornello 6 takes a turn away from the narrative of 
the piece that I’ve been constructing: that the ritornello strand traces an arch-like 
trajectory following a pattern of transformation from chordal to linear and back to 
chordal texture. While the “rain” character certainly dominates Ritornello 6, the chordal 
texture does not return here in a way that the end of Ritornello 5 would suggest.  
Instead, Ritornello 6 focuses on a dialogue between the woodwind section and the brass 
section. Significantly, Ritornello 6 follows Concertino 5 where the woodwinds have just 
engaged in a lyrical exchange to the gentle background of the occasional string 
harmonic and sparsely spaced pizzicato chords. Ritornello 6 responds to Concertino 5 
with a heightened energy level. The woodwinds exchange in a dense counterpoint of 
twisting and fragmented phrases at high speed, although with no clear sense of a single 
melodic line.  
 
Example 5.10 — Boston Concerto, Ritornello 6 brass chords, mm. 289-291 
The brass have briefer response type phrases with fast attacks of chord reiterations 
punctuated by percussive wood, drums, piano and harp (the strings fall largely silent 
after the first 8 measures). Brass chords alternate between single repeated staccato 
ATH/AIT chords and staccato chords that form a rapid succession of ATHs giving the 
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in every gesture of Ritornello 6.463 However, the overall texture is not coordinated by 
clear TTCs, making this ritornello less chordal than the previous one.  Ritornello 6 leans 
towards a more erratic and high-energy version of Ritornello 3 where the clarinets and 
the brass had very similar roles. The overall texture, then, is a mixture of chord and line 
fragments within a predominantly “rain” sound where the brass chords and sweeping 
woodwind melodies gestures are equally prominent. The push and pull of the different 
elements makes for a highly dynamic sonic landscape.  
 
Ritornello 7 
The return to a full orchestral tutti texture comes with Ritornello 7. In its clarity, 
Ritornello 7 recalls the “liquid clearness” of the rain referred to in Williams’ poem that 
“perfectly” traces the forms of nature. In fact, Ritornello 7 intensifies and compresses 
the chordal texture heard in Ritornello 1 by doing away with any varied gestures, 
melodic lines or fragments and by having the entire orchestra reiterate gentle patters and 
sprinkles of single notes across four TTCs. These chords gradually fade out over a 
sequence of ATHs and finally end with the strings playing a single pizzicato B3 
(suggesting perhaps a reference to the piece’s title). The effect is like the petering out of 
raindrops at the end of a rain shower.  However, even in this most repetitive section, the 
sound is not one of mere stasis, but rather one of subtle change and movement of pitch 
and harmony.  Carter achieves this effect by using a sequence of chord transformations 
that produce a number of pitch and interval “reflections” from the first to the last chord. 
On a sketch page for the final ritornello (reproduced on staff (i) in Example 5.11 with 
my annotations below), Carter notates four TTCs in a sequence that also show common 
tones between the first three chords (asterisked below in the example).464  The four 
chords are vertical realizations of a single All-Interval (AI) row class of the QI-type,465 
built from two chromatic hexachords.  The transformational relationship between the 
rows is given at (iii) in Example 5.11 and the chord progression across the final 
                                                
463 Theisen makes some insightful analytical points about the pitch material in this ritornello in “A 
Multifaceted Approach to Analyzing Form in Elliott Carter’s Boston Concerto,” 95-101. 
464 In the sketch, chord IV is notated a few staves down the page and includes an additional C7 that is part 
of chord III rather than chord IV.  The 8ve signs shown in brackets are not included in the sketch but from 
the score and sketches are clearly intended.  In chord III, Carter’s accidental omission of a ledger line 
means the notated B#1 should instead be G#1 as in the score (and notated here in brackets). 
465 In QI-type rows “the interval-class sequences of their two hexachords are identical, projected as 
complementary intervals.” Tiina Koivisto, “Syntactical Space and Registral Spacing in Elliott Carter’s 
Rememberance,” Perspectives of New Music 42, no. 2 (Summer, 2004): 159. On the Q-operation, see 
Robert and Daniel Starr Morris, “The Structure of All-Interval Series,” Journal of Music Theory 18, no. 2 
(Fall, 1975). 
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ritornello is shown on the analytical staff (ii).  As the example shows, firstly the interval 
order from low to high of chord I is reversed in chord II, while the boundary pitches F1 
and B6 are maintained.  Chord III then changes boundary pitches to C#1 and D7 and 
inverts all of chord II’s intervals; however, the pcs of its adjacent chromatic hexachords 




Example 5.11 — Boston Concerto, Ritornello 7 analysis of TTC structure  
Finally, chord IV reverses chord III’s interval ordering while maintaining boundary 
pitches C#1 and D7, mirroring the relationship of chord I and II.  The end result of this 
transformational sequence is that the pcs of chord I’s two hexachords swap registral 
positions in chord IV while each hexachord maintains their interval ordering (shown on 
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chord I    <  t 1 9 5 8 6 2 e 3 7 4 >  
chord II   < 4 7 3 e 2 6 8 5 9 1 t >  
(ii)
    row A = {5, 3, 4, 1, 6, 2} {8, t, 9, 0, 7, e} realized as chord I
RT4I(A) = {5, 9, 4, 7, 6, 8} {2, t, 3, 0, 1, e}                   chord II
 RT9(A) = {8, 4, 9, 6, 7, 5} {e, 3, t, 1, 0, 2}                   chord III
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chord IV  < 2 e 3 7 4 6 t 1 9 5 8 >








chord I chord IV
hexachords swap positions
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common tones and interval structure, they nonetheless facilitate a subtle transition from 
chord I to chord VI, creating a sense of motion that breaks up what would otherwise be 
static repetition.  
 
Ritornello 7 creates a sense of ending to the piece. However, it is not a convincing 
closing off. There is something about the way the music fades out, the way it dissolves, 
rather than firmly concludes, that leaves a question mark over the sense of finality that a 
clear ending gesture might otherwise achieve.  Others have noted this feature of Carter’s 
music more generally.466  In Chapter 7, I will explore one way in which the lack of a 
sense of finality has an effect on the experience of the musical form. However, within 
the narrative I have been telling here, the return to a clear “rain” texture in Ritornello 7 
does create the matching side of a formal frame that was opened in Ritornello 1. The 
transformation of the “rain” texture in between this frame, from chordal to melodic and 
back to chordal texture, creates a dynamic process of change. This in turn lends an arch-
shaped trajectory to the otherwise cyclic ritornello form.  The fact that the ritornellos 
sections are explicitly not points of stability but rather following a forward motion 
(albeit an interruped one) exemplifies the important re-interpretation of ritornello form 
that Carter has made in the Boston Concerto. 
5.3 The “drama” of the concertinos 
The concertinos are the dialectical partner of the ritornellos in that they contain all that 
is excluded from the ritornellos: extended lyrical lines, small instrument groups, 
strongly expressive phrases, counterpoint, dialogue; as well as long sustained notes, and 
near motionlessness. As far as sonority is concerned, the instrumental families keep to 
themselves in that each concertino consists of only one family: 1) woodwind 
(flutes/clarinets), 2) keyboard (vibes, piano, harp), 3) low strings (violas, basses), 4) 
brass choir, 5) double reeds (oboes, English horn, bassoons), 6) high strings (violins, 
cellos).467   These groupings contribute to the homogeneous sonority of the concertinos 
and contrast sharply with the ritornello sections.  Like the ritornellos, however, the 
concertinos also contain elements of their opposite. The most obvious element is the 
bursts of pizzicato and staccato chords (or rhythmically activated staccato figures) that 
accompany every concertino. However, there is also a transformation of line to chord 
                                                
466 See Guy Capuzzo, “Texture and Process in Four Carter Works with Quiet Endings,”  Elliott Carter 
Studies Online 3 (forthcoming), http://studies.elliottcarter.org/. 
467 Unlike many other compositions, Carter does not give the percussion family a section. 
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across the concertino strand that is not unlike the ritornello strand but reversed so that 
melodic lines transform into chords at the mid point and return to an intensified 
polyphony for the last sections. This feature as well as the progressive changes in 
expressive quality and registral space give the concertino strand its own trajectory 
across the piece. I will approach the analysis of this strand by way of broad description 
rather than through detailed score analysis in order to maintain a narrative flow to my 
interpretation of the musical “drama.”468 Alan Theisen has undertaken important work 
on the pitch analysis of these sections.469 
Concertinos 1, 2 and 3 
In the first half of the piece, the concertino strand begins relatively high with the slow, 
gentle meandering of flute and clarinet trios in Concertino 1 and moves to the equally 
slow sustain of the attacking pitched percussion instruments in Concertino 2. 
Concertinos 1 and 2 are quite homogeneous—gentle and rhythmically consistent in their 
slowly unfolding of gestures. They form a perfect contrast to the rhythmically active 
and varied “rain” texture of Ritornellos 1 and 2, making the alternation of ritornello and 
concertino sections in the first half of the piece clearly demarcated.  
 
In Concertino 3, a new expressiveness is introduced with the low strings.  The 
composite melodies that the woodwinds and the keyboards unfurled predominantly 
together now give way to a lush, continuous counterpoint in the violas and basses in 
which two lines take it in turns to recede and advance within the dialogue. The basses 
and violas speak very complementary languages as if advancing the same argument or 
telling the same story, mostly leaving space for each other to speak although there are 
moments of greater polyphony where both lines take off on their own course 
simultaneously (see for example mm. 157-159). The deep resonance of the basses and 
their relatively fast leaping around the lower register lend a dramatic and somewhat 
urgent edge to the music in Concertino 3. 
                                                
468 On different ways of providing an account of ‘unity’ in a composition, see Fred Maus, “Concepts of 
Musical Unity,” in Rethinking Music, ed. Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 172 including fn.4. 
469 Theisen, “A Multifaceted Approach to Analyzing Form in Elliott Carter’s Boston Concerto.”  
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Concertinos 4, 5 and 6 
Concertino 4 presents a complete contrast to the preceding concertinos: a brass chorale 
across the entire eleven voices of the brass section. The voices are grouped into mostly 
two, sometimes three, rhythmic layers and move as if in slow motion. The result is a 
texture that sounds much more chordal than it does melodic or contrapuntal. This 
concertino marks the still point of the whole piece and its darkest colour.  Till this point 
the spatial motion of the concertino strand has been descending (see above Example 
5.2). While the horns and trumpets in Concertino 4 certainly do play up high in their 
tessitura (especially in the second half of the movement), the quality of the section is 
kept dark, with the relatively low register of the chords with an emphasis on the low end 
of the tuba and trombone.  Central ‘still points’ are a feature of many of Carter’s 
compositions, from his music of the 1950s right through to his late music. In his first 
book, Schiff names such designs “inverted arch form” and describes them as follows: 
Carter’s music often reverses the arching formal curve heard in both Wagnerian and 
Bartokian music. Instead of building to a climax and then receding, his music will 
begin at a moment of great intensity, as if it were ‘tuning in’ on musical activity that 
had already begun. The music will gradually slow to a central still point, and then 
revive, gaining in energy until it reaches or surpasses the opening moment. Such a 
parabolic form obviously reverses the cumulative construction found in most other 
music.470 
In Carter’s later music, some very clear examples are Symphonia with its central Adagio 
tenebroso; the slow, still central section of the Clarinet Quintet; and a similar middle 
movement in the Clarinet Concerto.  While the still points slow down the musical 
motion, not all still points in Carter’s music are ‘dark.’ Esprit Rude/Esprit Doux has a 
very light (and high) still point that is more like a floating daydream. And the tiny 
central song “Una Colomba” in the song cycle Tempo e Tempi has a similar quality of 
reverie and other-worldliness.   
 
Concertinos 5 and 6 that follow the still point of the Boston Concerto revive the energy 
levels of the piece but each in a very different way. In Concertino 5, the double reeds 
(oboes with English horn and bassoons) talk to each other in much lighter and higher 
tones. They have a gentle exchange, often waiting for each other to speak at the start but 
getting more entwined as the discussion goes on. The lines themselves are much less 
                                                
470 Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter, 48. 
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sustained than those of their woodwinds relations in Concertino 1 and the faster 
rhythmic values throughout make them lighter on their feet and give this concertino an 
energetic lift after the slow brass section.  Concertino 6, on the other hand, brings a 
sweeping but intense energy to the music and fully restores the linear texture to the 
concertino strand. 
 
Concertino 6 is marked “Maestoso—molto espressivo” in the violins and cellos, and 
projects a romantic and wistful character. This impassioned trio between violins I, 
violins II and cellos has the longest continuous lines of any of the concertino. The 
registral space continues to climb upward, the cellos playing in their high register a lot 
of the time. The large intervals moving in long arches also contribute to the 
expressiveness of the movement. This concertino is 40 measures long and has a 
dramatic climatic rise that begins after its mid point at m. 325. After initially building 
up energy towards m. 325, the motion halts when the first violins initiate a series of five 
accented held A5s set within a field of shifting sustained pitches  (Example 5.12a).  
The A5 moves from violins I (m. 325) to violins II (m. 326) to cellos (m. 327) and back 
again to violins II (m. 329) and violins I (m. 330).  
 
Example 5.12a – Boston Concerto, Concertino 6 repeated-note passage, mm. 325-330 
Out of this relative stasis emerges a counterpoint of three faster string lines. These lines 
leap dramatically toward the final climatic fortissimo held notes that are the last 
intensely expressive statement of the piece (mm. 342-344).  It is only in retrospect, 
however, that this last passage seems to signal a kind of ending. Bayan Northcott, in his 
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At the close of this episode, one expects a culminating full orchestral climax, only to 
hear the rain music sputter away to nothing. Retrospectively, one realizes the 
transcendental string episode was the climax.471 
Many of the sections in the piece end with dynamic swells or intensification of 
expression and this string concertino passage fits easily within that pattern. The string 
climax is therefore noticeable but not in a particularly exceptional way—the music at 
this point could just as easily continue on with its ritornello-concertino alternating 
pattern. To my ear, it is really the way in which the final tutti “rain” chord leaps in at the 
upbeat to m. 345 that suggests that the piece is approaching closure. All other motion 
between sections has involved some kind of transitional or linking passage. Here, 
however, the ritornello “rain” suddenly appears as if out of nowhere, or perhaps as if it 
had always been there but just out of our sonic reach. 
 
Despite its suddenness, this moment has been gently prepared in the preceding few 
measures: after fifteen measures of hearing no other instruments at all but the violins 
and cellos, this string reverie is arrested by two forte staccatissimo bursts from the 
orchestra (brass, piano and violas) at mm. 339 and 340 (see Example 5.12b). Three 
measures later, during the last of the string trio’s sustained chord, brass with bassoons 
punch out repeated forte chords that end with a single fortissimo triplet eighth note 
chord (beat 4 of m. 344). The fortissimo attack is instantly followed by a piano attack 
on the next triplet of the beat and leads into the full orchestral “rain” texture (beat 1, m. 
345). It is this tiny moment of juxtaposition between the end of the string trio, the loud 
brass reiterations and the sudden, instant presence of the soft “rain” that creates a 
dramatic moment signalling something that only after the fact we can hear perhaps as 
closure, perhaps as transformation, perhaps as renewal.  Line and chord are contrasted 
in the most vivid way at this moment and this clarity suggests both a coming-full-circle 
but also, like with all circles, the possibility of beginning again. To my ear, this is one of 
the most arresting moments of the piece. 
                                                
471 Bayan Northcott, “Boston Concerto (2002),” (Liner notes for The Music of Elliott Carter Volume 7. 
Bridge Records 9184, 2005, compact disc, September 2005). 
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 Example 5.12b —Boston Concerto, Concertino 6 to Ritornello 7 passage, mm. 339-345 
 
Overall, the ‘gradual brightening’ that John Link has noted (mentioned above), has at 
least in part been shaped by a long-range registral motion of the concertino strand, 
defined in large part by the range of the instrumental group of each section.  In 
Concertino 1, the registral focus is up high in the trios of flutes and clarinets. In 
Concertino 2 the registral focus shifts downwards to the mid-range of the vibraphone, 
harp and piano but with dramatic single notes or widely spaced chords as high as C#7 
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‘lower’ strings (violas and basses) drop the higher end of the registral span of the 
orchestra (violas reaching a climactic C#6 only once in m. 158), but at the same time 
the basses in particular are playing in their upper register most of the time, giving a 
slightly strained brightness to the registral shift downwards. In Concertino 4, the focus 
moves to the darkest and lowest sonorities of the trombones and tuba (which underpin 
many of the chords with the notes E1 and F#1). While the trumpets do swell upwards 
(as high as Bb5 at one point, m. 211-212), these swell are climatic points, not the 
trumpet’s predominant register which sits around the forth octave and below. Following 
the central Concertino 4, the motion heads upward again in register and in lightness of 
character through the double reeds of Concertino 5 (reaching as high as G6, m. 251) and 




5.4 Form and continuity 
The independent discontinuous trajectories of the ritornello and concertino strands 
discussed above are of course not experienced in isolation as they are presented here. I 
argue that the long-range trajectories of each individual strand do form an important 
part of the musical experience, one that we might only become aware of after multiple 
listenings. However, the continuity from one movement to the next, from ritornello to 
concertino, plays as much (or probably more) of a part in the experience of the 
unfolding form of the Boston Concerto. One example of local temporal flow across 
sectional boundaries is the tempo modulations that Carter composes between sections to 
facilitate the smooth tempo shifts away from and back to consistent quarter note=90MM 
of the ritornellos (see Table 5.1). The moment-to-moment continuity of the music 
affects the immediate experience of  “living time” and exemplifies the presence of a 
musical “flow” that can be traced across the fractured continuity of tutti and soli 
divisions.   
 
I will discuss what I consider to be two important aspects of the moment-to-moment 
continuity. The first is the way in which Carter creates transitions or “linking” at 
moments surrounding the switch between ritornello to concertino. “Linking” is a 
compositional technique that appears in much of Carter’s music regardless of stylistic 
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period and has been discussed in the literature especially in relation to pitch.472 
However, I extend it here to include timbre as well. The second aspect of moment-to-
moment continuity concerns a broader impression: what Carter called the “total” 
continuity effect. Here I interpret the changing degree of contrast between successive 
ritornello-to-concertino sections as important to how the flow across the trajectory of 
the whole piece is experienced. I will first give some examples of timbral and pitch 
“linking” across sections before turning to a description of the “total” formal effect. 
5.4.a “Linking” between movements 
Carter employs different kinds of “linking” strategies, such as using 
timbre/orchestration and rhythmic character to bridge more abrupt changes between 
sections.  The use of timbral elements as a simple sonic bridge is in once sense quite 
subtle since the large contrasting timbral effects between sections tend to grab attention 
while the small consistent elements are registered possibly less consciously, especially 
during the early listening experiences.  For example, the timbral element of the temple 
block as a bridge between the first ritornello and concertino (from m. 21 to m. 37) might 
go by almost unnoticed. However, without it, the sonic gap between the sections would 
be widened. The temple blocks appear first in m. 21 of Ritornello 1 and continue 
intermittently. They are joined by wood blocks in the last the “rain” chord of Ritornello 
1. Then temple and wood blocks come in again in Concertino 1 after the flutes begin in 
m. 29. They sound briefly in Concertino 1 a number of times until m. 37 before they 
disappear. Similarly, the marimba sneaks into Concertino 1 from m. 49, dotting the 
background with single soft chords that become more present with fortes in m. 64 and 
m. 67 ahead of the linking melodic line of mm. 72-74 that introduces the marimba’s 
prominent role in Ritornello 2 that follows (refer to Example 5.6 above). Concertino 3 
links to Ritornello 4 in a similar way: the flutes, piccolo and xylophone make their 
appearance towards the end of Concertino 3 with subtle sprinkles of notes (mm. 158-
166) ahead of their solo line that features in Ritornello 4.  Another example of timbral 
linking is the harp at the end of Concertino 2 moving into Ritornello 3 from mm. 116-
117 (see Example 5.13 below). Here the harp has a distinctive descending glissando 
                                                
472 I define this concept of linking in Boland, “‘Linking’ and ‘Morphing’: Harmonic Flow in Elliott 
Carter’s Con Leggerezza Pensosa.” For other analyses that draw on “linking” see Capuzzo, Elliott 
Carter’s What Next?: Communication, Cooperation, and Separation; and Brenda Ravenscroft, “An 
Adventure in Form: Elliott Carter’s “Like a Bulwark” (2009),”  Elliott Carter Studies Online 2 (2017), 
studies.elliottcarter.org/volume02/02Ravenscroft/02Ravenscroft.html. 
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that ends in an oscillating figure on a ATH, three notes in each hand.473 The repeated 
plucked notes give a sonic resemblance of the pizzicato strings associated with the 
“rain” texture, and indeed two measures later pizzicato string begin their gradual ‘drips 
and drops’ initiating Ritornello 3.  
 
Thus timbral linking aids the transitions between a number of successive movements: 
temple and wood blocks from Ritornello 1 to Concertino 1; marimba from Concertino 1 
to Ritornello 2; plucked strings from Concertino 2 to Ritornello 3; and a timbral cluster 
of flutes, piccolo and xylophone from Concertino 3 to Ritornello 4. As well as simple 
timbral linking Carter uses another strategy, namely pitch linking, to bridge some 
transitions. 
 
The harp glissando passage, as well as being a timbral link, is a good example of pitch 
linking. In the above passage, a chain of ATHs and TTCs connects Concertino 1 to 
Ritornello 2 (see Example 5.13). Two measures before the harps glissando, we find a 
number of ATHs formed between instruments that together make a fixed register TTC: 
T1 ATH between vibraphone and piano, T6 ATH in the harp and T6 ATH a second 
time between harp and piano. The last two pitches of the TTC are supplied by the piano 
in a widely spaced compound pitch interval 7 (F#5 and C#7 circled in m. 115).  The 
next aggregate is formed by a combination of the harp’s T0I ATH and the vibraphone’s 
appreggiated T7 ATH chord in m. 118. But these combined ATHs give only 10 pitches 
of the twelve-tone aggregate. The ‘missing’ pcs to complete a chromatic aggregate are 
once again F# and C#. The F# is actually heard paired with its lower interval 7 partner 
B, as the huge interval F#6-B1 in the piano at m.118. However, the F# and C# are also 
paired together, played pizzicato as F#4 in violin 1 and C#4 in violin 2 in the next string 
passage that begins Ritornello 3 (circled in m. 120). Through these two aggregate 
completing pcs the strings are linked to the TTC harmony of the preceding passage. 
Aggregate formation continues in the strings at the start of Ritornello 3. The six 
pizzicato pitches in the violins at m. 220 make a T8I ATH and violins and violas 
continue with the literal complement across mm. 220-221 to give another fixed pitch 
TTC. Thus aggregate completion with ATH partitons becomes a linking strategy at the 
boundary of these two sections. 
 
                                                
473 A special tuning for the harp is required to play this passage, see Theisen, “A Multifaceted Approach 
to Analyzing Form in Elliott Carter’s Boston Concerto,” 78-9. 
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Not only are ATH and TTC formations used as a linking strategy in this transitional 
passage but interval class also plays a role. As we’ve seen, twice the aggregate 
completing pcs were C# and F#, placing an emphasis on ic 5. Furthermore, just prior to 
the strings taking over, the piano plays a fortissimo two-note chord on its own, sounding 
another even more widely-spaced compound pitch interval 7 between B1 and F#6 (see 
m. 118 in Example 5.13). Interval class 5 is in fact the defining ic of the whole 
concertino, found especially prominently in the piano’s rapid gestures mm. 94-95 and 
mm. 98-101), and contributes to the open sound of this concertino.474 Looking more 
closely at the measures surrounding the linking harp glissando, we find ic 5 (as pitch 
intervals 5 and 7 and their compounds) dominating the sonic landscape in the 
vibraphone, piano and harp (see  Example 5.14). The notation in this example is a 
representation of the intervals only since these intervals occur in the music either as 
simultaneities or as registral extremes in a rhythmically active gesture. The next 
ritornello continues this ic 5 emphasis, albeit for a fleeting moment, in two of its first 
intervals: vertically with C#4-F#4 between first and second violins; and linearly with 
C4-G4 in first violins (m. 120). The linking between Concertino 2 and Ritornello 3 is 
thus a mixture of timbral, interval and pitch techniques, where aggregate completion 
crosses sectional boundaries provides a subtle background harmonic flow.  
 
 
Example 5.14 – Boston Concerto, ic 5 linking between Concertino 2 and Ritornello 3, mm. 114-120 
 
Timbre and pitch linking is also found at the dramatic shift from Ritornello 4’s high 
Klangfarbenmelodie in the piccolo and xylophone to Concertino 4’s dark brass chords. 
This is the point of the greatest transformation of materials in each strand: the chordal 
texture of the ritornellos has just become linear and the lines of the concertinos are 
about to become chords. The separation between the two strands at this moment is 
marked by almost two beats of complete silence, the only silence in the piece.  
Nevertheless, one small “linking” gesture bridges the gap almost unnoticeably. In m. 
                                                
474 Theisen also notes the ic5s and the C# in m.120 that completes the pc aggregate that starts in m.116. 
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189, the low woodwinds (bassoons and contrabassoon) play a soft low three-note chord 
which gives a fleeting sonic foretaste of the brass choral to follow. Cellos and basses 
punctuate the onset of this chord with a with a brief sixteenth-note pizzicato doubling of 
the chord notes, slightly disguising the woodwind timbre (see also discussion above at 
Example 5.8d).  This is a very understated moment beneath the fading, ascending 
xylophone line. The low double reeds are not brass instruments like in the concertino 
that will follow (this ritornello excludes brass all together). However, their sonority in 
the lower register is not dissimilar to a soft, low brass sound. The bassoon chord is a 
member of 3-5 [016] and links harmonically to the [016] that is played by the 
trombones and tuba two beats later at the start of Concertino 4. This brass [016] trichord 
forms a T5I ATH harmony with the horns who play the literal complement, a [048] 
trichord. This is a subtle moment where the ear makes a connection despite itself, half 
noticing the low woodwind chord because it is somewhat out of place in what has just 
preceded it, and noticing it again retrospectively a measure later because of its similarity 
to the sonic world that has just opened up.  
 
 
Example 5.15 – Boston Concerto, Ritornello 4 bassoon chord linking to Concertino 4 brass chord, 
mm. 189-190 
 
For the last example of pitch linking, I shall revisit the striking end of Concertino 6 and 
beginning of Ritornello 7 discussed above at Example 5.12b.  The motion between 
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harmonically the two movements are linked. The last string passage of Concertino 6 
ends on three sustained high notes in the first violins, second violins and cellos, 
followed by a descending three note line in the cello—a passage of six pitches (see 
score extract at Example 5.12b above and reduction at Example 5.16 below). The first 
orchestral chord of Ritornello 7 follows immediately on from this passage without a 
linking or transitional gesture such as those that we have seen throughout the piece. This 
Ritornello 7 chord is an All-Interval TTC and the six pitches of the final string gesture 
share the same registral placement as in this TTC. At the ‘collision’ point in m. 344, the 
forte and fortissimo brass and woodwind attacks similarly play ATHs that share 4 and 5 
pitches with the AI TTC that follows. Thus, by the time the “rain” of Ritornello 7 
quietly but suddenly showers down, its actual pitches have been circulating for a few 
measures ahead of it. This linking creates a smooth harmonic transition between an 
otherwise abrupt and dramatic shift in texture, timbre and dynamics. 
 
 
Example 5.16 – Boston Concerto, Concerto 6 to Ritornello 7 TTC linking, mm. 342-345 
 
5.4.b  “Total” continuity effect 
What Carter referred to as “the ‘total’ continuity effect” in his 1971 Flawed Words and 
Stubborn Sounds interview was specifically in relation to how simultaneously flowing 
strands in the music combined to make a single sonic image at any point in their 
individual trajectories.  For the Boston Concerto I would like to borrow this phrase to 
refer to the large scale continuity that is experienced as the piece moves between two 
textural stands. Thus, rather than the “total” continuity effect arising from the 
combining of simultaneous strands, I will examine a “total” continuity effect that comes 
about from alternating strands. While on the one hand the continuity is all too obvious 
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the piece is hard to grasp precisely because of its fragmentary continuity. The obvious 
experience of the piece’s continuity is that of an exposé of orchestral instrument 
families, each instrument group returning to the thematic tutti texture before the next 
group launches into its display, thereby weaving together two strands of continuity. This 
recalls the idea of “montage” that Carter borrowed from Eisenstein (discussed in 
Chapter 2). But, as Eisenstein advocated, the continuity of  montage must be 
deliberately construed. Carter’s sonic “montage” continuity has been carefully 
composed and lends a specific experience to its unfolding. To examine this aspect of the 
form, I will firstly revisit my narrative of the formal drama of the piece, this time 
threading together section by section an experience of the immediate flow of the music. 
Secondly, I will examine moments of connection the reach forward and backward 
across large stretches of the piece to show the subtle way that memory influences the 
experience of the total continuity effect. 
Continuity and flow 
The opening sound of the piece is captivating, delicate and intricate: the repetitions, the 
strummed strings, the pizzicato and staccato pitch reiterations. The texture is active yet 
clear, not muddied by overlapping activity. The sudden change to Concertino 1 with its 
harmonically similar but texturally and timbrally contrasting woodwinds is arresting. 
The woodwind music here remains meditative, slow and gentle throughout. The lines 
are clear and easily distinguished, not dense in their polyphony. When the first return 
comes with Ritornello 2, it is a textural leap back to rhythmic busy-ness, back to 
something familiar, yet changed. With the next shift to the plucked/struck keyboard 
strings of Concertino 2 begins the sense of a pattern: this is a new texture, a new timbre, 
but expressively it remains gentle and slow, clear and transparent. The arrival of 
Ritornello 3 continues the expectation of changed return, now to even greater activity, 
greater polyphony and less chordal material.  From Ritornello 1 to the end of Ritornello 
3 then, a pattern of alternation and gentle, gradual variation is set up—the premise of 
the piece is established.  
 
The first rather contrasting dramatic moment comes at the end of Ritornello 3 with a 
single sustained sff viola note (A4) that cuts in at the end of the orchestral tutti chord 
and is held for near 4 beats accompanied by orchestral silence (mm. 139-140). It is a 
real interruption compared to the linking and bridging that knitted together the 
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transitions between sections till this point. It momentarily halts the musical flow 
completely, like a call to attention that hushes a mass of voices. The bass and viola duo 
of basses and violas that follow in Concertino 3 is the most lyrical counterpoint to this 
moment, intensifying the dramatic expression of the concertino strand and registrally 
shifting the sonic space down.  
 
This shift down is then reversed by the following section, Ritornello 4.  In fact, as the 
piece reaches its mid point, the spatial and expressive contrast between the ritornello 
and concertino strands becomes more pronounced. In the central Ritornello 4, the 
registral space dramatically shifts up to the flighty heights of the piccolo and xylophone 
melody. Brass, low woodwinds and low strings are omitted from this ritornello 
altogether. The thematic rain texture now moves in high melodic lines within a soft, 
sparse sprinkling background. As the music becomes more intense, the line moves 
higher till it reaches its highest and softest note at its close (in the xylophone, m. 196). 
This dramatic fading away is followed by a brief moment of tutti silence.  The deep, 
glacial motion of the brass chorale of Concertino 4 that follows represents the greatest 
contrast between sections: the ppp C8 note of the xylophone is followed by a brass 
chord with lowest pitch E1 in the tuba.  In fact, the contrasts at the centre of the piece 
between Ritornello 4 and Concertino 4 are like mirror opposites: fast, light, high, short 
lines juxtapose slow, dark, low (and mid-low), long chordal sonority. As discussed 
above, the motion is completely slowed in the brass concertino, creating a midway still 
point in the overall form. Within this concertino there are swells and expressive 
movement, intensifying towards the end.475 Then another dramatic transition gesture 
from the piano (with its repeating Ab4, see Example 5.9a) leads back suddenly to the 
soft but sprightly pizzicato strings of rain texture of Ritornello 5. Thus, in the middle 
portion of the piece the strands have been most divergent and the moment-to-moment 
continuity the most fractured. 
 
The final third of the piece continues with a greater congruence between strands. 
Concertino 5’s meandering double reeds pick up some of the energy of the preceding 
Ritornello 5 while in turn moving quite seamlessly into the timbrally similar Ritornello 
6 where the entire woodwind section dominates the “rain” texture. It is if the strands are 
now attempting a rapprochement after their greatest moment of differentiation. But the 
attempt is not sustained: the expressive final string trio of Concertino 6 silences the 
                                                
475 Theisen’s analyses show this well, see ibid., 95-101. 
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entire orchestra for two blocks of 15 measures at a time (one tiny five-note 
contrabassoon gesture in m. 316 aside). It weaves its impassioned trio of lines towards a 
last climatic fortissimo chord which is in turn suddenly silenced by the piano burst of 
quiet, showering rain from Ritornello 7 which finally peters out to a single pitch, almost 
inaudible, as the piece’s last sound. 
Continuity and memory 
The narrative above attempts to map an experience of the musical flow from moment to 
moment. But what also becomes significant in the ‘total’ continuity effect is the subtle 
workings of memory.  Throughout this dramatic journey, along the ins and outs of 
strands of music, are scattered sonic ‘crumbs’ like the trail Hansel and Gretel leave to 
aid them in finding their way back home.  In Boston Concerto these sonic ‘crumbs’ 
seem to tease the memory as they neither lead back to anything concretely familiar nor 
are they substantial enough to function as easily graspable reference points. 
Nonetheless, they are noticeable, especially on repeated listening, and so do have an 
effect on how the piece can be experienced.  One simple example is the use of the wind 
chimes.  This distinctive sound is used once at the very opening of the piece.  It occurs 
only once again at the central section of the piece, in the transition from the end of the 
brass chorale into the following strings-only ritornello (m. 219). Like at the opening, 
here at the centre of the piece the wood chimes again initiate a gesture: the piano’s wide 
leaping notes that lead to its single repeated Ab4 (see Example 5.9a). The occurrence 
of the wood chimes at this point seems to suggest some connection with the opening 
measure, but nothing tangible eventuates.476 The string ritornello (Ritornello 5) that 
follows is of course a return to the ‘rain’ texture but this ‘rain’ is very different from the 
full orchestral ‘rain’ of the opening.  Despite these similarities, the wind chimes 
triggering a memory of the first sounds of the piece and with this triggering the 
suggestion of ‘starting anew’ makes its way into the listening experience on some level. 
The memory of the opening is strengthened by the recurrence of the strummed string 
chords that follow immediately after the wood chimes, a sonority that has been absent 
from the ritornellos since Ritornello 1. Nonetheless, the absence of the full orchestra 
makes Ritornello 5 quite distinct from the beginning of the piece. Another reference to 
the opening sounds of the piece occurs at the beginning of the final Ritornello 7 (m. 
344) where the guiro, which also accompanied the wood chimes in m.1, is given its 
                                                
476 Theisen calls this point a ‘reboot’ without referring to the wood chimes, ibid., 95. 
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second hearing.477 This long-range recalling of a timbral element from the opening of 
the piece at its conclusion contributes to the sense of cyclic completion, albeit in a very 
subtle, understated manner. This is of course in keeping with the fleeting nature of all 




EXAMPLE 5.17a – Boston Concerto, string harmonics in Concertino 1, mm. 59-61 
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Example 5.17b – Boston Concerto, string harmonics across concertino strand 
 
Another subtle, almost etherial, long-range triggering of memory occurs between the 
two woodwind concertinos, Concertino 1 with its trios of flutes and clarinets and 
Concertino 5 with the double reed family. The trigger is not found in the main music but 
rather in the accompaniment. In Concertino 1 (see m. 60 in Example 5.17a), the strings 
play two measures of a ppp muted arco chord that gently accompanies the flutes and 
clarinets. Despite its soft dynamic, the chord stands out in the sparse texture because of 
its harmonic contrast to the woodwind harmonies. These have been chains of ATHs 
partitioned into AITs all the way through this concertino. While the chord played by the 
strings is also an AIT ([0146]), three of the four pitch classes are different from the 
flutes and clarinets in these measures and more importantly the interval spacing is very 
contrasting.  The flutes and clarinets together are playing close positioned AITs, with 
the [0137] chords giving a particularly ‘triadic’ feel. Against this harmony, the widely 
spaced string chord with its framing pitch interval class 11 and central pitch interval 
class 9 gives a dissonant flavour. The chimerical quality of this string chord, appearing 
almost imperceptibly from nowhere to colour the sonic background, leaves an 
impression on the memory albeit a transitory one. 
 
This memory is triggered again most strongly in Concertino 5 but both Concertino 2 
and Concertino 3 also include a number of similar moments: Concertino 2 has three 
single muted, tasto sustained notes (m. 98 in the cellos, m. 101 and m. 111 in the 
violas); and Concertino 3 two muted chords (between cellos and second violins in m. 
145 and m. 155).  These notes and chords are far more deeply ‘disguised’ in the texture, 
but are not entirely inaudible.  By Concertino 5 the soft string element is brought to the 
surface: Concertino 5 already has a strong timbral parallel with Concertino 1, but it is 
further strengthened by the recall of the Concertino 1 string chord which is triggered by 
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piano and harp attacks) appearing five times throughout Concertino 5. This element in 
the texture is subtle, nothing like a thematic reference, but it carries with it the sense 
that this encounter is not altogether unfamiliar: it becomes a moment of indistinct 
memory recall, something ephemeral and hard to place, something we might call 
delicate and insubstantial.478 
More substantial in its presence but equally fleeting is the play on memory of a number 
of trumpet ‘motives.’ The trumpets and horns frequently play reiterated fast semiquaver 
sextuplets in the ritornellos and, like the strummed string chords, these brass figures are 
a general hallmark of the ‘rain’ texture.  There are, however, a number of places where 
a sense of memory recall jumps out of the texture more strongly than other moments 
because of the placement these motives in the musical flow, their dynamics or other 
distinguishing features. In m. 90 one such moment stands out. This is the last measure 
of Ritornello 2. The trumpets play a brief rising staccato gesture in triplet quavers, 
immediately triggering a memory (see m. 90, Example 5.18). In search of the moment 
of recall, we arrive back at Ritornello 1 where the trumpet ‘bugle call’ sounded the first 
melodic line of the piece (see m. 14-15, Example 5.18). Measure 90 gives us a 
fragment of that melody transposed down by ic4 and now in close harmonisation with 
its trumpet partners.   
 
Much further along in the piece, the first utterance by the trumpets in Ritornello 6 jolts 
the memory again: a quick succession of reiterated D5 and Eb5 notes (see m. 283 on 
lowest staff in Example 5.18). And again we find the reference back in Ritornello 1, 
this time at m. 8 where trumpet 1 has an extended staccato line of the same pitch 
reiterations, here at a slightly slower speed of semiquavers instead of sextuplet semi-
quavers. Both times the reiterations are broken by an ic 4, the ascending ic 4 in the first 
statement becomes two descending ic 4s in its later reiteration. At m. 8 the line is a 
realisation of T2 of [014] while at m. 283 the pitches are the same only with an E-
natural added, expanding the set to T2 of [0124]. Finally the trichord is expanded to T2 
ATH with the addition of two last pitches. These figures are not motives in the 
traditional sense but they do share sufficient pitch and interval similarities to trigger a 
                                                
478 Jeff Nichols identifies a similar experience with the Variations for Orchestra: “I suggest that the music 
here enacts a process of recognition, or rather of déjà vu – that is, the feeling of recognizing something 
whose precise identity remains inaccessible to the conscious mind.” Nichols, “Mistaken Identities in 
Carter’s Variations for Orchestra”. para.10. Nichols’s observation is far-reaching in that it locates 
Carter’s approach to playing with musical memory, and indeed the idea of ‘recognisable musical objects’ 
that Whittall identifies with a “late-modern thematicism” in Carter, at the very beginning of Carter’s 
mature period. 
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memory, even at such a temporal distance from each other. Such moments produce a 
feeling of familiarity that is nonetheless not entirely secure. 
 
 
Example 5.18 – Boston Concerto, motives in trumpets 
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Throughout Ritornello 6 the trumpets play similar figures.479 In the transition between 
Ritornello 6 and Concertino 6, the first trumpet’s linking gesture stands out strongly 
(see m. 305, fifth staff in Example 5.19). Its repeated A4s to a regular pulse briefly 
trigger a memory of an earlier moment in the piece that has already been discussed, 
namely the piano’s repeated Ab4 in m. 220 (see third staff in Example 5.19 and also 
above at Example 5.9a). As discussed earlier, this piano gesture of reiterated single 
notes within a regular pulse stream fans out forward into Ritornello 5, where it 
reappears as a regular reiterated D5 in the basses (see fourth staff in Example 5.19). 
However, as can be seen it also reaches further to the linking passage at the end of 
Ritornello 6. What for me is very interesting is that when I arrive at the piano’s Ab4, I 
find it hard to ignore the strong feeling that my memory is already being triggered. In 
other words, I have already heard something like this before. In other words, the piano 
motif is not new but is in fact already pointing backwards to a previous passage in the 
music. The timbral connection I seek is found back hidden away in Concertino 2 which 
features the piano, harp and vibraphone. Here a curious fleeting moment occurs when 
the piano repeats an accented B3 to a pulsing crotchet triplet (see Example 5.19 first 
staff, mm. 107-108). This B3 repetition stands out for its rhythmic regularity in an 
otherwise rhythmically irregular landscape as well as for the tenuto accents and the 
accented chord series in the piano that it initiates and by which it is engulfed. Again, the 
moment is over within seconds (crotchet triplets are moving at MM108). The 
connection to the later in m. 220 in the piano are not experienced as solid or definite in 
the way the appearance of a traditional thematic element might be. Nevertheless, a sense 
of familiarity, a questioning of memory (“ah, where do I know that from?”), occurs at 
the Ab4 piano gesture and to my ears the fleetingness of the moment does not need to 
detract from its ability to function as a reference.  
 
A similar prior momentary reference is heard at the start of Ritornello 3. The trumpets 
play a reiterated chord that recalls the later reiterations of the piano (see m. 124, second 
staff in Example 5.19). This phrase has an accelerating rhythm at the end but begins 
with an even pulse. The first trumpet’s high G5s stand out in this chord which is 
harmonized by the other two trumpets and accompanied by a repeated chord to a triplet 
rhythm in the three horns. The chords are almost cluster-like with the G5 projected 
above. While the moment is noticeable, it also vanishes again before much can be made 
                                                
479 See also the discussion in Theisen, “A Multifaceted Approach to Analyzing Form in Elliott Carter’s 
Boston Concerto,” 110-16. 
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of it. In retrospect, however, both these fleeting moments, in the piano (Concertino 2) 
and the trumpet (Ritornello 3), add up to the sense of familiarity that comes when the 
piano’s emphatic Ab4 appears later (at the start of Ritornello 5).  
 
 
Example 5.19 – Boston Concerto, repeated-note motif 
 
Further on, the trumpet’s A4s that link Ritornello 6 and Concertino 6 in m. 305 are no 
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can be given to it. As the music continues into Concertino 6, however, we find another 
group of the reiterations that is quite extended this time: from m. 326-340 the strings 
pass around an accented, sustained A5 (discussed above Example 5.12), slowed down 
and without definite pulse, as if in a half day-dream (see sixth staff in Example 5.19). 
The repetitions still the lyrical movement of the counterpoint in this extended passage 
and there is time to reflect on the pitch reiterations, even if the ephemeral nature of the 
previous moments make remembering any definite earlier references nearly impossible. 
To me, it is precisely the quality of the ephemeral that connects all these linking 
moments.480 
 
The examples discussed in this section are not the only moments that play with memory 
and that evoke a sense of indeterminate reference.481 However, from these examples we 
get a sense of the complexity of the flow of the sonic experience. Carter’s notion of 
“living experience of time” is not a uni-directional thing and the music itself is able to 
capture this multi-directionality: the experience of unfolding time in the Boston 
Concerto incorporates not only cyclic return, linear transformation, and composite 
unfolding of strands but also forward-and-backward consciousness of time through the 





In this analysis of the form of the Boston Concerto, I have presented a narrative of the 
way discontinuous trajectories of two distinct types of material (ritornello and 
concertino) proceed each through a process of transformation. In addition, I have read a 
moment-to-moment flow into the textural discontinuity by way of the notion of timbral 
and pitch linking. Furthermore, I have shown that disjunct moments of musical 
similarity provide a different kind of temporal experience: a telescoping together of 
temporally separated events that changes the flow from a purely unidirectional 
experience to one that can metaphorically move forward and backward in time. 
 
                                                
480 Without wanting to make too much of this possibly arbitrary collection of motivic “recall” moments, it 
is neverthelss interesting to observe that the pitches together from the set {G, Ab, A, B, D}, a member of 
the set class [0,1,2,4,7]. With the addition of the piano’s D# of m. 108, the set becomes an ATH. 
481 Others include, for example, chords at m. 12-13 and m. 294; and also sparse texture and rhythms at m. 
12, m. 20-23 and m. 86. 
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In my narrative, I have drawn on a number of metaphors. Some are associated with the 
piece’s accompanying poem, such as “inside drama” and “outside rain,” the 
psychological versus the physical, and idea of the transformed and the untouched.  
Others are metaphors of motion: directed linear motion in a melodic line, static motion 
in a repeated chord, the motion of transformation from line to chord and the reverse, as 
well as the forward and backward motion that memory evokes. 
 
By way of description and interpretation I have presented an experience of the Boston 
Concerto that tells the story of a ritornello form “reformed” by its musical content. In 
doing so I have attempted to illustrate the workings of a number of aesthetic principles 
of Carter’s including the notion of temporal flow, of “constant growth and change,” of a 
dialectic between content and form, and of the familiar that nevertheless remaining 
surprising. I have also attempted to demonstrate the way limited pitch class sets offer 
Carter a plentiful sound palette, and the way repetition is used ironically by way of 
semblance rather than literalness. 
 
In the analysis of the ASKO Concerto that follows, both differences and similarities 
between the two pieces will illustrate Carter’s responsiveness to the particular materials 
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Chapter 6 
ASKO Concerto - Analysis 
6.1 Overview of ASKO Concerto 
Carter’s ASKO Concerto (2000) for chamber ensemble was commissioned by the Dutch 
ASKO ensemble, a 16-member group consisting of five woodwinds, three brass, five 
strings, harp, piano and percussion.482 Carter completed this piece two years prior to the 
Boston Concerto and while following the same ritornello formal scheme, the AKSO 
Concerto has a very different expressive quality.483  The ASKO Concerto divides chord 
and line between ritornellos and concertinos like the Boston Concerto. However, the 
ritornellos of the ASKO Concerto consist mostly of loud and widely-spaced sustained 
tutti chords while the concertinos consist of duos or trios of instruments from different 
families in a continuous counterpoint of melodic lines. Each concertino has a unique 
expressive character and every instrument from the larger ensemble appears in only one 
concertino. Table 6.1 lays out the orchestration and pattern of alternation between 
ritornello and concertino material in the ASKO Concerto.  
 
The concertinos start out alternating between duos and trios but this pattern is broken at 
the end with a quintet followed by a bassoon solo.484  Continuing the comparison 
between the orchestration of the two concertos, it is worth noting that the quintet of the 
ASKO’s Concertino 5 (piccolo/xylophone/celeste/harp/violin2) resembles the Boston’s 
climactic central Ritornello 4 Klangfarbenmelodie that moves between piccolo, 
xylophone and pizzicato violins (with harp present in the texture).  Both textures are 
light and a little frantic and both divide a fast line between piccolo and xylophone. The 
ASKO Concerto concertinos include very short staccato or pizzicato chords by other 
instruments that are not part of the concertino grouping, something we also saw in the 
Boston Concerto.  In the Boston Concerto these chords were discussed with reference to 
                                                
482 Since 2008 the ASKO and Schönberg ensembles have merged into a group of larger forces, now called 
the Asko|Schönberg Ensemble. See http://www.askoschoenberg.nl/ 
483 Theisen suggests that the ASKO concerto “could be regarded as a chamber ‘trial-run’ of the Boston 
Concerto” in Theisen, “A Multifaceted Approach to Analyzing Form in Elliott Carter’s Boston 
Concerto,” 52. While I don’t share this view, there are certainly intertextual elements in both piece—see 
especially my discussion below on the trumpet melody. 
484 Carter later extracted the bassoon line and turned it into a free-standing piece for solo bassoon entitled 
Retracing (2002). 
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the rain of the William’s poem. However, it is significant to note that this idea was 
already present in the earlier ASKO Concerto, highlighting the tenuous link in Carter’s 
composition between text and music. 
 
 
Table 6.1 – ASKO Concerto, formal sections 
 
The returning tutti sections are the most obvious feature of the formal design in the 
ASKO Concerto, as they are in the Boston Concerto.  Similarly, the ASKO Concerto 
also has a sense of forward motion in addition to the cyclic organisation.  Furthermore, 
the opposition of the horizontal and the vertical are present in the linear and chordal 
textures of the concertino and ritornello strands respectively, as they are in the Boston 
Concerto. However unlike the Boston Concerto, there is no process of transformation 
from chord to line or vice versa within a strand.  Rather Carter achieves the effect of a 
large-scale trajectory in the ASKO by interleaving two additional formal processes, a 
spatial one that organizes the long, unfurling lines of the concertino strand and a 
temporal one that organizes the much more static chordal textures of the ritornello 
strand. The ritornellos, which consist of temporally static but registrally expansive 
chords, undergo a process of temporal shrinking, becoming shorter and shorter. The 
concertinos, which consist of lines in motion within relatively confined registral space, 
undergo a process of registral shift, moving upwards to an extreme height before 
dropping back to a low register. These processes give this particular instance of 
Section mm. Orchestration Expressive marking Tempo
Ritornello 1 1 tutti Quasi maestoso ! = 96
Concertino 1   20 trio- oboe/horn/viola Giocoso ! = 96
Ritornello 2 56 tutti Quasi maestoso ! = 96
Concertino 2   73 duo- clarinet/double bass Allegretto lyrico !  = 115+
Ritornello 3 112 tutti Quasi maestoso ! = 96
Concertino 3       125
trio-bass clarinet/ 
       trombone/cello Tranquillo !  = 60
Ritornello 4 162 tutti Agitato !  = 90
Concertino 4      169 duo-trumpet/violin1 con intensità
h   = 54
Ritornello 5 213 tutti Quasi maestoso
h   = 54
Concertino 5     221
quintet-piccolo/xylophone/
celeste/harp/violin2 Leggierissimo !  = 144
Ritornello 6 262 tutti ff – f ! = 144
Concertino 6   268 solo-bassoon con umóre !  = 96
Ritornello 7
292-
296 tutti ff – f ! = 96
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ritornello form its own unique temporal flow. It is helpful to see a graphic 
representation of the two strands unfolding over time, which can be found below at 
Example 6.7 in section 6.4 Two formal processes. 
 
In the analysis that follows, I will first examine the nature of the returning material in 
the ritornello strand with particular emphasis on Carter’s use of repetition: how a 
distinct identity is forged for the ritornello material that relies on a reprise of material in 
the sense of “going back over” or “re-covering” rather than literally “repeating.”  I will 
then turn to a close examination of the opening ritornello to show how important pitch 
and rhythmic features of the piece’s form are established at the beginning of the piece. 
Finally I will analyse more closely the way in which the two formal processes in the 
concertino and ritornello strands unfold and come together towards the end of the piece, 
drawing the differentiated strands into each other while nevertheless maintaining the 
chord-line and spatial-temporal oppositions.  
6.2 ‘Thematic’ material in the ritornello sections 
Throughout the ASKO’s ritornello sections, the tutti ensemble plays predominantly 
Quasi maestoso, forming a chordal texture of loud, sustained tutti gestures that might be 
mistaken for literal repetitions on first listening because of their similarity.485  None of 
the chords are in fact repetitions with one exception that we will encounter below.  
Nevertheless, the vast majority of the tutti chords are of the same type: “Link” chords, 
which are the subset of the All-Interval (AI) twelve-tone series which has the All-
Trichord Hexachord (ATH) as adjacent notes.486 While Carter does not give special 
attention to the ATH property of these “Link” chords, he does consistently highlight a 
five-note subset of the ATH, pentad 31 (5-19 [01367]).487  In a number of his pre-
compositional sketch pages, Carter singles out pentad 31 and pentad 36 (5-28 [02368]) 
together with their aggregate forming partners, septads 31 (7-19 [0123679]) and 36 (7-
28 [0135679]), as principle harmonies for the ASKO Concerto.488  Pentad 31 is a subset 
                                                
485 Even in the last two ritornellos, where the indication is not explicitly given in the score, the maestoso 
character is maintained. 
486 Carter, Harmony Book, 358-61. 
487 As in the previous chapter, after this initial reference I will refer to these set classes (as well as most 
other set classes) using Carter’s numbering. Transposition levels refer to transpositions of the prime form 
of the set class. For a full correspondence of Carter’s numbering with Forte’s, see ibid., 23-26.  
488 ASKO Concerto folder, Elliott Carter Collection, Paul Sacher Foundation. It should be noted that the 
pitches of these sets that are extracted from the AI chords are only very occasionally contiguous. In other 
words, they are not necessarily subsets of the adjacent-note ATHs found in these Link chords. 
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of the ATH and pentad 36 is a subset of the ATH complementary hexachord 36 (6-z43 
[012568]).  Both pentads 31 and 36 as well as septads 31 and 36 contain both All-
Interval Tetrachords (AIT 18 and 23) and are notably the only ones in their respective 
classes to do so.  
 
In a succinct sketch, transcribed in Example 6.1, Carter shows the shared AIT pitch 
class content for the two pentads and the two septads by adding single pitches and 
trichords respectively to the initial AIT collections (Carter labels the sets above the 
staff; the labels below are my addition). Thus, Carter focuses on a limited sonic field of 
specific five-note and seven-note set class collections, while his favoured ATH and 
AITs remain the foundational pitch language for the piece.  
 
 
Example 6.1 – ASKO Concerto, Carter’s sketch of pitch materials 
 
These pitch-class collections are made explicit in the orchestration of the first tutti 
chords of each ritornello (see Example 6.2). After each full tutti chord attack, a smaller 
group of instruments sustains one of these five- or seven-note subsets of the AI Twelve 
Tone Chord (TTC). Pitches are kept in fixed register thus maintaining a static harmonic 
field with changing instrumental colour. This is particularly clear at the opening of the 
piece where the same AI chord is reiterated three times. Furthermore, the opening 
gesture of each ritornello is orchestrated in the same way: the woodwind and string 
families are not blended but always used as alternating sonorities, creating a coloristic 
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 Example 6.2 – ASKO Concerto, opening TTCs across the ritornello strand 
 
Sonority is used thematically: there is no traditional thematic material but the common 
harmonic source and its rhythmic and timbral realisations function in a thematic way. 
The one exception to the non-repetition principle is the first chord of Ritornello 2 which 
is in fact identical in its vertical arrangement of pitches to the piece’s opening chord 
although the orchestration differs.  With this repetition Carter establishes the idea of 
“return” literally in the first two ritornellos, setting up a pattern from which he 
immediately diverges.  
 
The succession of AI TTCs in each ritornello is unique (see Example 6.3). However, 
the sonic congruence between them is strong and varied repetition across stretches of 
the piece can be observed: the chords across Ritornellos 3 and 4 (labelled  W, X, Y, Y’, 
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T10(W), X, T4I(Z), T8(Y)).489 Thus, the chord vocabulary is more limited than it might 
seem, strengthening the similarity of the timbral manifestation of the chords with 
harmonic similarity.  
 
 
Example 6.3 – ASKO Concerto, TTCs across all the ritronellos 
 
The idea of reprise that is not literal but rather quasi-thematic is manifest in another 
feature as well: a melodic line in the trumpet found in Ritornello 1, 2 and 3. In these 
first three ritornellos, the chords shown in Example 6.3 are connected by a counterpoint 
of melodic lines that use pitch material external to the chords.490 Each of these lines, 
doubled by various instruments, moves at its own speed articulated by regularly spaced 
note attacks and together they create a polyrhythmic counterpoint. The trumpet line 
(mostly doubled by the oboe) makes a particularly clear varied return.  Its line stands 
out each time because of the dynamics and timbre which project it out above the tutti 
texture. Furthermore emphasis is created by the line’s more active rhythm and the way 
it leads each time into the closing chords of the section. Example 6.4a shows the 
trumpet line in Ritornellos 1, 2 and 3.   
 
                                                
489 This means that the interval succession from high to low of a chord is maintained (or inverted) but the 
chord itself transposed. 
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Example 6.4a – ASKO Concerto, trumpet Scheinthemen in Ritornellos 1-3 
 
The phrases have a strong rhythmic congruence: attacks every 4 quintuplet eighth-notes 
at quarter note = 96, with faster single quintuplet eighths at the beginning or end of the 
phrase. They also share contour similarities (or inversions) and pitch boundaries: D4 is 
the lowest pitch in phrases one and two; A#5 the highest pitch of phrase two and three.  
Furthermore, the phrases string together a number of literal pitch motives. The second 
phrase begins with a compressed version of phrase one, bringing motives A and B from 
the start and end of the first phrase together at the beginning of phrase two, as A and B 
retrograded.  This second phrase is then extended, ending with motives C and D, which 
are picked up again at the beginning of phrase three, starting with motif D followed by 
motif C.  The motives connect the phrases, their particular arrangement creating a kind 
of long-distance continuity from one phrase to the next.  It is interesting to consider 
these melodic lines in relation to Arnold Whittall’s claim for a “late-modern 
thematicism” in Carter’s music. Whittall proposes the idea of Scheinthemen as a way of 
thinking about “musical material shaped into lines that suggest some kind of thematic 
identity” but which nonetheless eludes structural features of traditional thematicism.491 
In these trumpet lines the thematic “appearance” is strong. There is a kind of allusion of 
returning to something previously heard, but the reiterations lack the sort of 
relationships that facilitate the recognition of more obvious themes or motives (for 
                                                
491 Whittall, “The search for order: Carter’s Symphonia and late-modern thematicism,” 66. 
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example, transformation by canonical operators, or a Schoenbergian developing 
variation). This slightly illusive approach to theme is congruent with the thematic 
treatment of sonority in the chords at the opening of each ritornello. While avoiding 
literal repetition, the quasi-thematic trumpet lines as well as the opening ritornello 
chords make an aural link across sectional boundaries in a theme-like manner but it is a 
reprise—a going over the same material—rather than a repetition. These Scheinthemen 
also recall the examples of memory triggering that were identified in the Boston 
Concerto—the presence of something not immediately graspable but nonetheless 
something that niggles at the listener’s memory. 
 
 
Example 6.4b – Sheinthemen: trumpet lines in Boston Concerto m. 14 and ASKO Concerto m. 211 
Surprisingly, the Scheinthemen of the trumpet in the ASKO Concerto also trigger a 
memory from the Boston Concerto. Listening backwards and forwards between the 
ASKO and Boston concertos, a moment of recall is triggered, an intertextual reference: 
the idea of a bugle call, a call to attention. As we saw in the previous chapter, the 
Boston Concerto makes use of the trumpet to project the first real melodic fragment of 
the piece in Ritornello 1 (mm. 14-15).  Example 6.4b shows this trumpet solo. Below is 
shown the trumpet (doubled by violin 1 in the score) at the end of the ASKO’s 
Concertino 4 (mm. 211-212). The ASKO’s trumpet line ends with a near-transposition 
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of the Boston’s trumpet line. While not being related by true transposition, the three 
reiterated accented pitches (A5 and A#5 respectively) and the ascent that leads to them 
(both [014]s with the same interval contour) connect the two melodies in the manner of 
thematic likeness. As I discussed in Chapter 3.3.a: Repetition, this intertextual reference 
illustrates the notion of “shuffling of the deck of cards” (Noubel) or “reduce, reuse, 
recycle” (Link), where Carter’s material can find a re-contextualized place in more than 
one compositional setting.  
 
As we have seen, the ritornello strand creates its clear sonic identity by way of the 
theme-like treatment of both chords and lines. Before examining the formal trajectory of 
the piece, I will turn to a detailed analysis of the opening ritornello. It is here that we 
find many elements that support Carter’s famous claim that “[w]hether the composer is 
conscious of it or not, a field of operations with its principles of motion and of 
interaction is stated or suggested at the beginning of a work.”492 These first materials 
suggest and set up features, “patterns of action” and other types of processes that unfold 
over the rest of the piece. The opening ritornello introduces pitch material that becomes 
prominent throughout the other ritornellos and vertical and horizontal pitch relations 
that recur throughout, as well as the idea of accelerating pulse streams so important for 
the formal trajectory of the ritornello strand and the piece’s ending. 
 
6.3 Ritornello 1: “field of operations” 
The opposition of chord and line defines this opening ritornello: a single held chord, 
repeated three times, is followed by a polyrhythmic unfolding of melodic lines that lead 
to a second held chord. What follows is a detailed look at the materials that make up the 
melodic lines and their relationship to the framing chords.  
 
After the static reiterations of the piece’s opening AI chord (refer back to Example 6.2), 
the texture of Ritornello 1 is rhythmically activated by the successive entry of five 
melodic lines and one series of low chords, each moving at its own regular pulse rate 
(indicated to the left of each staff in Example 6.5). As the entries of the lines 
accumulate, the pulse rate of each new line increases compared to the previous one,  
                                                
492 Carter, “Shop Talk by an American Composer (1960),” 218. Recall the discussion in Chapter 1 about 
Adorno’s view that the unfolding of a composition is the working out of a problem. 
Example 6.5 — ASKO Concerto, Ritornello 1, mm. 1-17 
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beginning with 5 quavers between attacks, then 4 quavers, 5 triplet quavers, 4 quintuplet 
quavers, and finally 2 triplet quavers. This gives the entire passage the effect of 
accelerating towards the next static chord.493  This acceleration process sets up in 
miniature the formal process of the entire ritornello strand. The first ritornello can be 
heard as a more polyphonic and condensed version of the acceleration that leads into the 
final ritornello which is to be discussed below (at Example 6.10). This semblance 
between opening and closing ritornello creates something of a symmetrical frame to the 
piece. 
 
Harmonically, the counterpoint of lines in this passage slots together a limited set class 
vocabulary into a mosaic of tightly interlaced motifs. The quasi-thematic role of Pentad 
31 (so prominent in the AI chords of every ritornello) is first established here in these 
opening melodic lines.  As can be seen in the first measure of Example 6.5, the passage 
begins with a pentad 31 chord sustained in the strings, mimicking the opening sustained 
chords. As the polyrhythmic lines enter one by one, a new pentad 31 is introduced each 
time (indicated on the example with dashed lines, and given on the analytical staff 
below), ordered to unfold one of the AITs and in some cases an ATH (both indicated 
with solid lines).  In line one and two, the pentad 31s are embedded within chords. In 
the third and fourth lines, the clarinet/violins followed by the trumpet/oboe each open 
with a clear melodic statement of pentad 31.  The clarinet paces out its regular 5 triplet 
eighths, while the trumpet enters with a faster quintuplet flurry.  Their two pentads 
share four of their five pitches (indicated by open note heads on the analytical staff) and 
the sets are arranged to begin on the same pitch (E4).  Additionally, they share inverted 
interval contours (<- + + -> <+ - - +>) and have the same ascending intervals (<-3, +8, 
+6, -7> and <+6, -1, -2, +8> respectively). The thematic ‘allusion’ between the 
beginning of these two melodies is strong, the trumpet/oboe presenting a kind of 
compressed version of the clarinet/violins.  The quasi-thematic role of pentad 31 is 
further emphasized when the following bass clarinet/trombone line enters. Although this 
line does not literally state a pentad 31, it does trace a march-like ascent through all of 
the trumpet/oboe’s first six pitches two octaves below (filling in F and C on its way), 
and thus emphasizes the sonority common to the two previous entries. While these lines 
                                                
493 It is interesting to compare this technique with the ‘polyrhythmic canon’ technique in Carter’s Holiday 
Overture that Bernard discusses in Bernard, “The true significance of Elliott Carter’s early music,” 12-14. 
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do not develop or repeat a pentad 31 theme as such, they each present a different 
shaping of the same sonority, creating reprise without literal repetition. 
 
As already noted, the first clear melodic statement of pentad 31 appears in the 
clarinet/violins line (mm. 11-13). This melody is realised with the pc set {1, 3, 4, 9, t}.  
This pc set is not new to the passage.  As shown in staff (i) of Example 6.6, we hear 
this pc set sustained by brass, piano and harp as a subset of the second opening chord 
(mm. 5-6); the set reappears as dyads in the oboe/viola line (mm. 9-10); and as already 
mentioned, the trumpet/oboe’s pentad 31 (m. 13) shares with it four of its five pitches.  
The multiple occurrences of {1, 3, 4, 9,t} are different enough in their realization to be 
not heard as a theme but they create a kind of thematic allusion (similar to the trumpet 
melodies discussed above) as well as making an explicit connection between the sound 
of chord and line.   
 
 
Example 6.6 – ASKO Concerto, Ritornello 1 motivic sets and TTCs 
 
With vertical as well as linear emphasis given to pentad 31, it is worth considering the 
set relationships between the melodic lines and the AI chords which frame them. Staff 
(ii) in Example 6.6 shows that the clarinet/violins and the trumpet/oboe lines also 
unfold linear aggregates without pitch repetition. The clarinet/violins unfold hexachord 
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pentad 31 followed by hexachord 32. However, the ‘missing’ pc that creates hexachord 
31 and completes the aggregate, a C4, is heard in the bassoon, sustained during the 
trumpet/oboe’s quintuplet flurry.  Both these hexachordal pairs are found as vertical 
hexachords in the framing AI chords of the ritornello (hexachords 31/32 in the opening 
chord and hexachords 35/36 in the closing chord). The similarity between the vertical 
and horizontal is also extended to intervals: the linear aggregates are arranged into a 
near all-interval ordering and, like the AI chords, do not include compound intervals.494 
Even though the lines and chords are not related by any obvious systematic 
transformational process, they are connected by shared features—common hexachordal 
set types, subset emphasis and interval diversity. The AI chords present a temporally 
static yet spatial expansive arrangement of intervals and hexachords, while the linear 
aggregates present an expansive temporal treatment of the same material within a 
comparatively confined registral space. This opening passage, then, presents on a small 
scale the opposition of materials that on the large scale create the identity of the 
ritornello and concertino strands respectively. 
 
In summary, the chord types, their particular orchestration and their rhythmic realisation 
give the ritornello strand its unique sonic identity, enhanced by the thematic semblance 
of the trumpet’s melodies in the polyrhythmic sections of the first three ritornellos. The 
tutti ensemble playing, while not repetitious, is clearly fixed within the bounds of this 
material and is relatively static. The concertino strand with which the ritornellos 
alternate is, by contrast, varied and expressive. In the section that follows I will examine 
the way these two strands unfold independently as well as how they work together, 
giving a unique dramatic shape to the ritornello framework of the piece. 
6.4 Two formal processes - motion through space and time 
While the ritornellos are characterized by their thematic use of harmonies, tone colour 
and Scheinthemen, the concertinos are defined by the constantly varied motion and 
interaction of long melodic lines which creates the impression of being led through the 
twists and turns of a series of different musical conversations.  The expressive character 
of each concertino is built around the timbre and register of the different instrumental 
                                                
494 Despite each line repeating one of their intervals, the sound of the two lines avoids emphasizing any 
particular interval, just like the AI chords do. On maximal diversity and modifying constraints in Carter’s 
pitch organization see, for example, Guy Capuzzo, “The Complementary Union Property in the Music of 
Elliott Carter,” Journal of Music Theory 48, no. 1 (2004). 
 212 
combinations and this plays a particularly significant role in the concertino strand’s 
formal process.   
 
With his well-known penchant for exhausting combinatorial possibilities, Carter divides 
the sixteen-player ASKO ensemble into six separate concertinos in such a way that the 
registral spaces of high, mid and low, as well as all their pairings (high/low, high/mid, 
and low/mid) are covered by one of the concertino sections (see Example 6.7). These 
three registral spaces are first introduced in Concertinos 1 and 2. The first Concertino 
opens with a mid-range trio of oboe, horn and viola. In the second concertino, this space 
becomes enclosed by the high/low registral extremes of the duo for clarinet and 
contrabass. The next three concertinos follow an ascending trajectory, moving from the 
low register trio of bass clarinet, trombone and cellos, though the mid/high range of the 
trumpet and first violin duo, to the sparkling heights of the quintet concertino for 
piccolo, xylophone, celeste, harp and second violin.  This quiet, although rhythmically 
active and intense quintet gives way to the solo bassoon “cadenza” which brings the 
drama back down to earth, both in terms of its mid/low register as well as its humorous 
character (marked con umóre in the score).   
 
 
Example 6.7 – ASKO Concerto, temporal and spatial structures of the form 
 
In effect, the spatial trajectory of the concertino strand is directed towards this dramatic 
moment of the bassoon’s solo entry: the concertino sections have gradually climbed the 
vertical space—the piccolo reaching its highest note (A#7) towards the end of its last 
melodic line (m. 260), and the xylophone stretching up to B7 in its solo melody which 
ends the section (m. 261)—leaving the registral space of the next concertino with 
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contrasting the largest concertino ensemble (quintet) playing in the highest register with 
the smallest (solo) playing in a considerably lower range on a bass instrument.  The 
motion through registral space from one concertino to the next is, of course, not 
continuous since the small ensemble groupings are periodically drawn back into the full 
ensemble for the ritornello tuttis. Nevertheless, the gradual “lightening” over the course 
of the piece due to this registral ascent is clearly noticeable and something we also 
encountered in the Boston Concerto.   
 
While the concertino strand moves through registral space, the ritornello strand is 
undergoing a different trajectory. The ritornellos’ fortissimo tutti chords reach from the 
high down to the low extremes of the ensemble’s pitch space, neutralizing the spatial 
definition created by each concertino. The registral differentiation between these chords 
is very slight since the fixed five and a half octave span of each All-Interval (AI) chord 
needs the extreme registers of the high and low instruments.495 This is illustrated in 
Example 6.8 which shows the outer voices of the ritornello chords (compressed by an 
octave either side for ease of reading).496   
 
Example 6.8 – ASKO Concerto, registral boundaries of the ritornello strand 
 
The wide span of the AI chords means there is little room for shifts in vertical 
placement of the chords. Instead, the temporal dimension is harnessed to structure the 
continuity of the ritornello strand.  The structuring principle here is fairly 
straightforward and quite easily perceived: over the course of the piece, the duration of 
each ritornello becomes shorter.  Whereas the concertinos remain more or less constant 
                                                
495 See “Registral Constraints in All-Interval Rows in Elliott Carter’s Changes,” Intégral 21 (2007): 80. 
496 It is interesting to note the symmetrical placement of the outer-voice dyad C7-G#1.  This dyad occurs 
as outer voices in the first and last chord of the piece, and also as the only repeated outer-voice dyad in 











œ œ œ œb
œ œb œ œn
R.3
œ œ œ œ




R.5 œ œb œ#
œb œ œ
R.6 high point
int.7 œœ#( ) œ œ œ




averaging around one and a half minutes, the ritornellos start out at around 43 seconds 
and gradually reduce in duration to approximately seven seconds for Ritornello 6, with 
the final ritornello so short that it is more of a tutti cadence than a section as such.  The 
resulting formal shape of the ritornello strand is akin to the temporal equivalent of a 
funnel or wedge, longest at one end and shortest at the other (see Example 6.7). The 
ritornellos in fact begin to lose their ‘return’ function as their durations diminish, 
becoming instead more integrated into the concertino strand: the chords that fly by from 
Ritornello 4 onwards are perceived more as punctuations or transitions between 
concertinos than fully fledged sections.   
 
It is in their changed role as ‘transitions’ between concertinos that the slight difference 
in registral span of the ritornello chords take on greater significance. The registral 
spacing of Ritornello 5’s first chord dips downwards and then the following chords 
climb upwards again and reach a high point in the penultimate Ritornello 6 (see 
Example 6.8). The first chord of Ritornello 6 stretches up to the highest pitch of all the 
ritornello sections (E7), descending a semitone in the second chord (Eb7), and finally 
dropping an interval 7 (the largest interval between outer voices) to G#6 in the last 
chord.  The low note of this last chord (D1) is also the lowest pitch yet of an AI chord 
(with the descent continuing in Ritornello 7). This ritornello comes at that significant 
point in the musical drama in between the high quintet of Concertino 5 and the low solo 
bassoon cadenza of Concertino 6 mentioned above. It is so short that it functions as a 
kind of pivot between concertinos and mimics the registral shift downwards of the 
concertino strand, moving from highest chord to lowest chord of the ritornello strand so 
far. The descending range of the AI chords in Ritornello 6 thus supports the shift that 
occurs in the concertino strand.  This pivot moment initiates a rapprochement between 
the formal processes of the two strands. 
 
From this point onwards, the two formal processes—the concertino strand’s registral 
motion and ritornello strand’s temporal shrinking—become intertwined.  As the 
bassoon cadenza of Concertino 6 begins, twelve-tone chords continue regularly to 
punctuate the bassoon melody with brief staccato bursts, as if the chords had been 
ejected from the previous ritornello that was too short to contain them and had now spilt 
over into the following concertino. For the first half of the bassoon solo, these chords 
are evenly spaced every 16 triplet-eighth notes (mm. 268-275).  Example 6.9 shows the 
chord progression from Ritornello 6 into the first half of the bassoon concertino.  
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EXAMPLE 6.9 - ASKO Concerto, reduction of chords and their pulse stream in Concertino 6, first 
half 
  
The TTC chords coincide with the tremolos that the bassoon plays in its melody and the 
chords require the bassoon’s pitches to be full twelve-tone aggregates, in this way 
creating a connection between the vertical and the linear components of the texture. The 
featuring of tremolos in the solo bassoon line is in itself interesting since tremolos have 
up until now been a feature solely of the ritornello chords. Thus, while the chord-line 
opposition between bassoon and ensemble remains clearly audible, it is nonetheless 
mediated by the sharing of the pitch material between melody and chord and by the 
melodic reference to the chordal tremolo sonority. 
 
Halfway through the bassoon solo, the chords thin out to hexachords and pentads (from 
m. 276), thickening again a few measures before Ritornello 7 (m. 290).  As can be seen 
in Example 6.10, the familiar sets predominate in the staccato chords all the way to the 
end of the piece, including the hexachords 35 and 36, pentad 31, septad 31, and a few 
other hexachords and septads which are also supersets of the main set repertoire. The 
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were evenly spaced. However, from the half-way point (m. 276) into the final Ritornello 




EXAMPLE 6.10 - ASKO Concerto, reduction of the chords and their pulse stream in Concertino 6,  
second half 
 
At first there is only a slight speeding up with four attacks spaced at 14 triplet eighths 
apart. These are followed by five attacks at 12 triplet eights, four attacks at 7 triplet 
eighths, two attacks at 9 sixteenth notes, two at 8 sixteenths, two at 7 sixteenths, two at 
6 sixteenths and one attack at 4 sixteenths.497  The effect is one of forward propulsion, 
imbuing the vertical dimension that had been delineated by the previously static AI 
ritornello chords with a horizontal impulse.498 The accelerating chords can be heard as 
the end result of the gradual process of temporal shrinking in the ritornello strand. This 
shrinking has lead to a transformation in the function of the tutti chords: the sustained 
chordal material used to define an entire strand in the piece becomes so truncated it 
turns into a rhythmic pulse of which pulse acceleration is a further extension.  The 
chords are not so much accompanying the solo bassoon line as they are layered over (or 
under) it. It is as if the ritornello and concertino strands are still following their own 
continuities only now simultaneously instead of in alternation. 
 
After establishing an alternating ritornello-concertino pattern, then overlaying the 
material of the two strands in the bassoon concertino, Carter’s final dramatic gesture of 
the piece has chord and line each take on characteristics of the other.  This happens as 
the solo bassoon line flows seamlessly into the final Ritornello 7. This section is so 
                                                
497 The last part of this series is indicated at the top of the staff below in Example 6.11. 
498 Recall the accelerating polyrhythmic lines at the very beginning of the piece in Ritornello 1. There 
does not appear to be any specific relationship between speeds at which the lines move at the beginning 
of the piece and the acceleration rate of these later chords. 
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short that it functions less as a section and more as a cadential passage both to the 
bassoon solo and to the entire piece (see Example 6.11). 
 
One particular set type, pentad 31 (that was so prominent in the opening ritornello) is 
central to the transformational process that chord and line undergo. In m. 292, the 
bassoon draws its pitches A3, B3, D4, Eb4 and G#4—comprising the pentad 31 as pc 
set {9, e, 2, 3, 8}—from the surrounding TTCs in the ensemble, making a final melodic 
statement before merging with the tremolos of woodwind, brass and percussion in m. 
294.  The bassoon line and TTCs are reproduced on the analytical staff in the Example 
6.11. The strings do not participate in the final chord’s tremolos but instead hold a 
widely spread sustained chord till the end of the piece. Like the bassoon line, this string 
chord forms a pentad 31.  However, it stakes out its own territory as pc set {6, t, 1, 7, 0} 
having no overlapping pcs with the bassoon’s set.  These distinct sonic identities of 
bassoon line and string chord are, at the same time, presented as fully merged in the 
single ten-note chord of m. 293, where the harp plays the bassoon’s pc set and the 
piano, woodwind and brass play the strings’ pc set. Thus throughout this last passage, 
the same pitch material is shaped into both line and chord in a gesture of “merging” of 
materials.  However, the merging ends with a twist. While the bassoon line disappears 
in the last three measures engulfed by the dominant texture of a sustained TTC, the 
piece does not conclude with the static chord alone: projected out of the widely spaced 
string chord are the last accelerating staccato attacks (mm. 296-297) from the rest of the 
ensemble. These attacks continue the accelerating pulse stream that began at the start of 
the bassoon concertino and follow the piece’s linear impulse through to its conclusion. 
The piece thus concludes with a transformation of materials. Static chords are set into 
linear motion, while the last mobile line merges with the shimmering held chord. The 
spatial chords and the temporal lines transform in effect into their opposites.  
 
Example 6.11 – ASKO Concerto, Ritornello 7, mm. 291-296 
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*** 
 
The formal processes encountered in the design of ASKO Concerto take oppositions of 
musical material—pentad/septad, time/space, line/chord—and interweave them such 
that the cyclical nature of the ritornello form gains a number of linear impulses that 
distort the ritornello principle in interesting ways. The unfolding processes of shrinking 
time and climbing space in a sense reach their limit at Ritornello 6, where a 
transformational process is set in motion leading the piece to its end.  It is instructive to 
recall from Chapter 3 Parks’ idea of “kinetic form” in relation to Debussy’s music once 
again. According to Parks, “kinetic form” manifests itself through “tendencies,” for 
example:  
 a series of entrances separated by ever-shorter durations; [a series] of ever-expanding 
register extremes across a fluctuant register-field; or of ever contracting formal units 
... ; a coordinated series of any type, even embracing several parameters at once. 
Kinetic formal units are defined by the boundaries of tendencies of increase or 
decrease in any musical parameter and may be perceived as a sense of motion towards 
or receding from these boundaries.  A kinetic tendency may interact with other 
organizing features to capture the listener’s attention and induce a sense of activity 
which has, as its object, a goal or goals499 
The motion across the ASKO Concerto corresponds very nicely with this definition. The 
ritornellos can be understood as being driven by a kinetic tendency of “ever contracting 
formal units,” while the concertinos move towards “ever-expanding registral extremes.”  
At the moment where these extremes are reached for the piece, a transformation of 
material takes place that is dramatic in its breaking of the pattern as well as in its 
reshaping of essentially the same material as before but now with different relationships 
to each other. 
 
In fact, we can say finally that form in the both the Boston and ASKO concertos arises 
from Carter’s reshaping of the traditional ritornello principle to enable the “kinetic 
tendencies” of the musical content of each piece to unfold secondary formal processes. 
In the ASKO Concerto the process involves the diminishing of time occupied by the 
ritornello chords which threaten to disappear completely, combined with the ascension 
of the concertino lines through space towards inaudibility. In the Boston Concerto the 
                                                
499 Parks, The Music of Claude Debussy, 233. 
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process involves the transformation of chordal and linear textures in each strand to a 
maximal point of extremes where the melodic concertinos become chordal and the 
chordal ritornellos become melodic before returning again transformed yet 
recognisable. The tensions implicit in these processes create a forward trajectory to each 
piece that projects across the repetitive ritornello design.  
 
I have aimed to demonstrate in these analyses that repetition, sonority and the reuse of 
particular pitch materials shape the Boston and AKSO concertos in important ways. 
They are the materials which challenge and interact with the form’s framework. The 
reworking of the historical ritornello form finds place in the processes of these  
materials. In the following part of this study, I subject the perspective gained from these 
analyses to a second reflection. Rather than just examining the internal processes of the 
pieces, I reinterpret the understanding of each piece’s construction through the lens of 
mediated social content and sedimented historical content. 
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Chapter 7 
A critical interpretation of the Boston and ASKO concertos 
 
In this part of the study I engage with the category of critical analysis as a second 
reflection on what has been undertaken in the descriptive and interpretive analysis (as 
outlined in Chapter 4.1: Circles of analysis). Adorno claimed that a second reflection 
must be a socio-historical reflection and a philosophical critique of the structure of a 
composition.500 His aim was to uncover the truth content of a piece of music. A piece 
that unquestioningly reproduced the domination of society over the individual subject in 
its internal relations lacked truth content and was in effect an instrument of that 
domination. By contrast, the extent to which “modern music … uses that domination as 
a means of expressing the suffering of the subject affected by it,” it could be considered 
to hold truth content.501 Witkin notes that “[f]or Adorno, the dream of truth and integrity 
is to be sought here, in the structure of the music.”502 But as Max Paddison so 
powerfully argues, a nuanced understanding of mediation is required to comprehend 
properly the idea of truth content.503  If we accept that we cannot escape mediation—
that there is no such thing pure thought or pure material—then seeking a fuller 
understanding of the mediated nature of the object of an inquiry becomes an 
empowering pursuit. As discussed in Chapter 1.3: Music dialectics and Adorno’s legacy 
and again in Chapter 4.1: Circle of analyses, there have been diverse approaches within 
the discipline of music analysis to the linking of the social and the material. 
 
Paddison has written on a general level of theory about mediation, distilled in his essay 
“Music and Social Relations: Towards a Theory of Mediation” which is informed by 
Adorno’s aesthetic theory but not limited to it. His work provides a structuring 
framework that guides my reflections in Part 3 of this study, although I find some 
challenges in applying Paddison’s theory as an analytical model as such. The levels of 
mediation that he defines operate at the formal level, the social level and the historical 
level. The formal level involves the dialectic of content and form mediating social 
                                                
500 Adorno, “On the Problem of Musical Analysis,” 176-77. 
501 Witkin, Adorno on Music, 15. 
502 Ibid. 
503 Paddison, “Immanent Critique or Musical Stocktaking?,” 223. 
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critique. The social level involves mediation in the spheres of production, reproduction, 
distribution and consumption, in other words, composition, performance, reception and 
marketing of the work. At the historical level, mediation involves a dialectic between 
the formal and social levels, in other words, between music as autonomous artwork and 
music as cultural commodity. Mediation is to be understood as working on these three 
levels simultaneously. The categories are useful for structuring thinking about the 
complexities of mediation but at the same time their level of generality presents 
problems for actual examples of music analysis because, in the analysis of a particular 
composition, these universal levels of mediation are perhaps not all uniquely 
recoverable. For example, the historical level is concerned with the condition of art in 
late capitalism manifest as the dialectic of the “commodity” character and the 
“autonomy” character inherent in all new art work. To a large extent this condition must 
be analysed in the same way regardless of the particularities of the individual work: for 
example, much of what Paddison has to say about Ferneyhough’s “radical extension of 
autonomy” in his musical thought as manifest in his writings and his music can apply, 
with some adaptations, to Carter.504  As with Adorno’s technical analysis, the challenge 
(rather than the stumbling block) for the analyst becomes how to shape the discussion of 
concrete examples of music analysis at this critical or second reflection level.  
 
Taking up Paddison’s levels of mediation, I will trace a path that revisits firstly the 
relationship between form and content on the structural level of the Boston and ASKO 
concertos, attempting a critical evaluation of the experience of the musical relations in 
terms of a dialectic of subject and object, or individual material ‘needs’ and formal 
‘demands.’  The next reflection turns to the historical meanings embedded in the 
contemporary use of both the concerto genre and the ritornello form in terms of their 
sedimented social practices. Here, I situate Carter’s concertos within a dialectic of 
autonomous historical material and contextualized cultural commodity. The final 
reflection takes up the notion of the work as cultural commodity and moves to a broader 
discussion of Carter as a composer of music which partakes of the social structures of 
cultural exchange, situating both the composer and the music in a dialectic with the 
social world through the music’s modes of production and consumption. 
                                                
504 “Postmodernism and the Survival of the Avant-garde,” 113-20. 
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7.1 Mediated social critique—the dialectic of form and content revisited 
The organisation of materials in Carter’s two concertos examined in Part 2, each in their 
own particularized way, suggest an ideal: a collective orchestra that makes room for 
individual instruments to be expressive while nonetheless constraining that freedom 
within the bounds of a repetitive structure articulated by the collective.  In a sense, 
Carter’s utopian democracy is dramatized in a real-life way in performance by giving 
the ensemble of musicians a musical script that directs the individual performers to play 
out these utopian relations.505  In the Boston Concerto, the musical form democratically 
allots time and space to all sections of the orchestra to ‘have their say,’ while the 
orchestra constituting the whole collective intersperses its own voice with a unique 
sound as well as providing the structuring frame that facilitates the moves from one 
section of individuals to the next. In the ASKO Concerto, individual instruments group 
together to make unique dialogues and then re-group as a collective which, like in the 
Boston Concerto, has its own unique sound. The collective ensemble passes the word on 
each time to a new group of individual players, democratically organising the unfolding 
of interactions. In the ASKO Concerto, the small groups of individual instruments have 
the most to say in terms of the length of time they are allotted but their collective 
regrouping—brief as these moments become—remains essential to the piece’s form. 
The democratic conceit of the form in both concertos is utopian. But to what extent is it 
critical? To what extent does the organisation of musical materials in these pieces 
comment on, subvert, or otherwise critique the power relations between individual and 
collective through their materials? To what extent has the subjective been constituted in 
this music so as not to conceal the dialectic of form and content, subject and object? 
 
In the Boston Concerto, the ritornello material of the collective orchestra is clearly the 
dominating sonic feature of the music. Structurally, the persistent return to its 
distinctive sonority, that has a quasi-thematic effect, establishes the ritornellos as the 
stable organising force of the piece.  Furthermore, while in the concertino sections the 
individual families of the orchestra all have their chance to be heard, their right to 
express themselves remains bounded by the form of the piece: once they have said their 
bit, their voice as a group is muted and does not return again. There is a sense in which 
the concertinos acquiesce to the ritornellos. This is in contrast to Carter’s Concerto for 
                                                
505 See the quote below by Carter on his compositions as “auditory scenarios” in Bayan Northcott, 
“Crosstalk,” New Statesman 86, no. 2230 (14th December 1973). 
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Orchestra, for example, where the four layers of different instrumental groupings are all 
continually interacting with each other. This calls into question how ‘authentically’ each 
concertino—each group of individuals—has been represented. There is no further room 
for the material to follow its unique path and instead accommodates its return to the 
collective without protest. This aspect is especially apparent in the way the form quite 
quickly becomes predictable, in that the expectation that the music will move back to 
the ‘rain’ texture and then on to the next instrumental section is fulfilled over and over 
again, even if the specific utterances themselves can not be foretold. The sensuousness 
of the ‘rain’ texture, as we have noted previously, becomes attractive in itself and brings 
with it a kind of longing for its return that taps into a deception or phantasm of 
pleasure.506 
 
Nevertheless, it is also precisely the constant move away from the mesmerising ‘rain’ 
music that counterbalances the repressive potential of the ritornellos; but also the way in 
which content unfolds in both ritornello and concertino sections, in other words, the 
way the materials behave. Firstly, opposing the bounded expressions of the concertinos 
are the moments of ‘recall’ or referencing of small, subtle sound objects as we saw in 
the analysis of Chapter 5. These Scheinthemen suggest the fragile persistence of the 
subjective that occasionally comes to the surface as a reminder that there is more than 
the expected and predictable at work. In fleeting moments of undefined remembering, a 
gap appears in the rhetoric of the formal structure to give a glimpse of something that 
was otherwise forgotten. I suggest that it is precisely the subtlety—the transient, 
uncertain quality—of these ‘recall’ gestures that imbues them with a critical force, in 
the spirit of “utopian lightness” discussed in Chapter 3. Secondly, the expressive 
gestures of individuals are not limited to the space allocated to them in the concertino 
sections. The musical material of the ritornellos is itself laden with interjections from 
individual instruments: rather than a dominating collective, this music presents—amidst 
its defining spatially expansive tutti chords—an ever-changing, multi-coloured, multi-
perspective array of individuals, full of musical gestures that are unexpected and 
surprising (recall the trumpet solo of Ritornello 1, the marimba solo of Ritornello 2, the 
complete fragmentation of tutti chords in Ritornello 3, the Klangfarbenmelodie of 
                                                
506 A interesting web of ideas springs from this observation relating to Adorno’s dialectic of history and 
nature and his critique of immediacy and stasis in musical representations of nature. However, this 
extends beyond the scope of this study. Discussions can be found in Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of 
Music; and Witkin, Adorno on Music. Especially informative is Julian Johnson’s chapter “Webern, 
Nature and Modernism” in Julian Johnson, Webern and the Transformation of Nature (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 212-36. 
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Ritornello 4). The collective ritornello music becomes the space in which the expression 
of individuals takes flight, instead of these expressive moments occurring within the 
more homogenous timbres, and often more restrained lines, of the concertino material, 
the place where historically such subjective utterances would be expected.  A dialectic 
is at work here between ritornello content and concertino content, each expressing 
qualities of its oppositional partner as they follow their respective trajectories through 
the musical time of the piece.507 
 
The ASKO Concerto takes a different approach to a similar premise. While there is a 
clear delineation between ritornello and concertino sections, the listening experience is 
dominated by concertino playing. The groups of soloists take up most of the clock time 
of the piece while the ritornello sections shrink away to mere tutti punctuations.  The 
listening experience is of a whole lot of little chamber episodes interspersed by the 
ensemble coming together very briefly to switch to the next combination of soloists, 
except towards the end. I contend that it is the ending—the way the ensemble chords 
penetrate the final solo bassoon concertino—that hold the key to a level of critique that 
might be read into the ASKO Concerto. By bringing together the tutti chords and the 
bassoon solo at the end of the piece, the entire premise of the form (alternation of 
collective and individuals) is brought into question. As the only concertino in the piece 
approaching a true ‘solo’ section, it is in fact denied the space for the full subjective 
expression of its individuality because of the intruding tutti chords. While the other 
concertinos do include staccato interjections from the ensemble, the chords that 
penetrate the bassoon solo are present from the beginning of the section and gradually 
encroach on the bassoon’s voice. The chords become denser, louder and quicker, 
pressing in on and engulfing the bassoon, whose final phrase really does merge into the 
collective chords. Carter’s intention was a light-hearted one, the awkwardly leaping and 
fluttering bassoon solo is to be played “con umóre” and the increasingly violent slicing 
chords that chop into the bassoon solo are deliberately dramatic. As a kind of caricature, 
the bassoon’s melody seems to constrain its free expression. To my ears at least, when 
this section is played as Retracings for solo bassoon the experience is quite different—
the lyrical nature of the line is much more obvious, perhaps because as a solo 
performance there is greater room for expressive nuance that is not possible in the 
ensemble situation where the melody is being driven on by the insistent beat of the 
                                                
507 Jeff Nichols also finds a similar dialectical treatment of theme and accompaniment in the much earlier 
Variations for Orchestra (1955) in Nichols, “Mistaken Identities in Carter’s Variations for Orchestra”. 
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chords. Thus, the final section of the ASKO concerto might be read as an ironic 
commentary on freedom of expression:508 while most of the piece suggests a successful 
balance between the concertinos’ individual voices and the collective voice in the 
ritornellos, the false nature of the balance is exposed at the end where the collective 
chords and the individual solo line vie for the upper hand only to end up entwined in a 
cadence. 
 
In the reading of the two pieces I have given here, I argue for a dialectical treatment of 
content and form which mediates a critique of object-subject relations. The 
orchestration in each piece dramatizes the notions of collective and individual, recalling 
Carter’s oft-quoted statement: “I regard my scores as scenarios, auditory scenarios, for 
performers to act out on their instruments, dramatizing the players as individuals and 
participants in the ensemble.”509  The line and chord materials associated with the 
individual instrumental music and collective ensemble music respectively engage in a 
dialectical interplay that allows such auditory scenarios to be manifest musically and to 
shape the unfolding form of the piece. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, for Carter the specific way musical form and content took 
account of the temporal dimension of a piece was crucially linked to the way 
temporality shaped lived experience. In Chapter 3, I explored the notion that repetition, 
at this late point in modernity, had taken on new significance in the lived experience of 
time compared to the first two thirds of the twentieth century. The temporal experience 
of late modernity cannot avoid repetition but no reprise is necessarily identical. Carter’s 
treatment of ritornello form in the Boston and ASKO concertos addresses precisely this 
type of altered repetition within the experience of the flow of time.  However, an 
aesthetic of “infinite reprise” presents one significant problem: the ending. Adorno 
referred to this as “the problem of closure” in new musical form.510  As we saw in 
Chapters 1 and 2, for Adorno traditional closed forms presented what had become a 
false notion of a unified whole. Open forms, by contrast, avoided the necessity to tie up 
                                                
508 On the role of irony in modernist art for Adorno see Witkin, Adorno on Music, 100; and Paddison, 
Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music, 56. For a discussion of irony in Carter’s music see Capuzzo, Elliott 
Carter’s What Next?: Communication, Cooperation, and Separation, 19 and 84-98. 
509 Bayan Northcott, “Crosstalk,” New Statesman 86, no. 2230 (14th December 1973). See also Chau-Yee 
Lo, “Dramatizing the Harpsichord: The Hapsichord Music of Elliott Carter,” Mitteilung der Paul Sacher 
Stiftung 17 (March 2004). 
510 Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music., 181 
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loose ends or could even avoid altogether the suggestion that ending is inevitable.511  
For Adorno, a work’s “inability to close” was tied closely to its authenticity. Quoting 
Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, Paddison elaborates: 
What characterizes ‘modernist’ art for Adorno is that the inability to close is ‘turned 
into a freely chosen principle and expression.’ … Thus, Adorno’s notions of 
‘authenticity’ and of ‘consistency’ would seem to favour a nominalistic form ‘from 
below’ which freely chooses to go against the tendency of such forms towards 
integration and closure by denying the reconciliation of opposites and remaining 
deliberately open and fragmentary. This is seen as acting as an immanent critique of 
totality, of the universal, and of a wholeness which is seen as false.512 
As we saw in the discussion of Berg’s Op.1 in Chapter 1, Berg’s refusal to treat the 
musical threads in his Sonata to a neat resolution or to a recapitulation, as the form 
demanded, was considered by Adorno to be an authentic expression of the 
fragmentation and dissolution of the false totality that sonata form now represented. I 
argue that in Carter’s two concertos, the materials that are set up in opposition to each 
other go through a process of transformation in which they express qualities of their 
opposite but never resolve into each other. Opposition in these two Carter concertos is 
not reconciled. Neither do these pieces close decisively. The ritornello form is itself an 
open form having its origins in the rondo which does not include a specific gesture of 
ending but rather the idea of a possible never-ending. As Paddison notes 
 … open forms, including the traditional ones like the rondo, act as a critique of the 
appearance of unity and closure which characterizes ‘closed’ forms. Through the 
elements of arbitrariness in the structure of open forms (for example, further sections 
could always be added, or existing sections could be taken away), they throw into 
question the idea of ‘necessity’ and inevitability which characterizes the nominalism 
of closed forms.513 
In Carter’s two concertos, the sense of a possible never-ending return to the sonic 
worlds of the ritornellos keeps the form open and the refusal to merge the musical 
content of opposing streams into any grand closing gesture supports the utopian notions 
we encountered in Chapter 3 of music’s inexhaustibility, that it “goes on and on without 
stopping.”  
 
                                                
511 Ibid., 181-2 
512 Ibid., 181-2. Quote from Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 221. 
513 Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music, 181. 
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These ideas are remarkably well illustrated by the endings of both of Carter’s concertos.  
In the analysis of the Boston Concerto, I discussed the arresting moment of transition 
from the final string concertino to the final ritornello (Concertino 6 to Ritornello 7). At 
this moment of juncture, arguably the most expressive melodic lines of all the 
concertinos in the piece are juxtaposed with the most neutral rendering of the ‘rain’ 
texture in any of the ritornellos. There is no “linking” or transition passage between 
these two sharply contrasting section as there has been in the foregoing moves between 
sections. This moment dramatically exemplifies the notion of irreconcilable opposites: 
while both strands have gone through a process of transformation over the unfolding of 
the piece, they end up back where they started, not unchanged but not synthesized 
either.  This brings the piece in one sense full-circle, completing a frame around the 
piece made up of the opening and closing ritornellos which are the clearest “rain” 
textures employing full orchestral chords throughout the whole section.  However, as 
previously noted, the final ritornello does not make an expressive gesture of closure. 
There is no convincing finality to the piece, no synthesising climax or summation of 
materials, no processes that round off the musical experience.  Instead, the soft fading 
out of the rain sound seems to imply that the form could be ongoing, that the whole 
process could be repeated and varied ad infinitum like the rain itself. This again brings 
to mind the connection made in Chapter 3 between Carter’s forms and Beckett’s Il faut 
continuer as well as Calvino’s “persistence of what seems most fated to perish,” where 
maintaining a permanent or irreconcilable gap between opposites becomes the only way 
of continuing.  Williams’s poem associated with the piece also contains this imagery. 
The “worldly” objects of the outside are being transformed by the continually falling 
and flowing rain water. The inside is forever excluded from this wet exterior but finds 
its dialectical partner in the “unworldly” psychological interior where instead of water, 
it is love “falling endlessly /from /her thoughts.” There is no reconciliation possible, just 
a continuous flow of opposites. 
 
In the ASKO Concerto, opposites are equally irreconcilable but the processes at work 
are quite different.  Rather than an arch-shaped transformation and return such as that of 
the Boston Concerto, the transformation of materials reaches its fullest at the end of the 
ASKO Concerto. As discussed above as well as in the Chapter 6, the single line in the 
solo bassoon is confronted by the incessant tutti chords. Chords which have been quite 
static throughout the piece are now put into motion against the single line. There is no 
suggestion of a melody-and-accompaniment type relationship. Instead each continues 
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despite the other.  When the bassoon line reaches its end, it does in fact merge with the 
final sustained chord; however, the piece does not end with this merging. The linear 
impulse that set the tutti chords in motion is carried on by accelerating woodwind, brass 
and percussion attacks now from within a static string chord. The superimposition of 
bassoon line and tutti chord is transformed in the very last bars into a superimposition of 
a new concertino grouping pulsing forward within a sustained chord. In other words, the 
material opposition is maintained but in transformed form: what was the linear 
component in the bassoon is transferred to the trio of instruments that were part of the 
chordal component. The “gap” is not closed. Rather the piece ends at the point at which 
another transformation could occur: the accelerating staccato line in the woodwind, 
brass and percussion could potentially flourish into a three part counterpoint of a new 
concertino section. 
 
7.2 Genre and sedimented historical meaning 
In the previous section, I considered the mediation of social critique at the formal level 
of the music. I would now like to turn to the historical level of mediation to consider 
layers of sedimented cultural meaning in the form and genre of the Boston and ASKO 
concertos as well as the dialectic of the work as autonomous artefact and as cultural 
product. While Paddison’s model suggests that an analysis might first be made of 
mediation at the social level, in order to bring the formal and social together as 
“historical antinomies” at the level of historical meditation, I will leave the social level 
of mediation till last as I understand this level to be operating analytically in the most 
general terms of the three levels. Paddison also says that mediation must be “understood 
simultaneously on these three ‘levels’,” suggesting that an analytical second reflection 
need not following one single linear path through these levels. In this section then, I 
begin by considering one aspect of Paddison’s category of historical mediation: the text 
“in its relation to historically handed-down musical materials.” Paddison certainly says 
that “[t]his level of mediation revisits the formal level.” However, as indicated, 
historical mediation differs from mediation at the formal level in that it considers 
autonomous form in its oppositional relationship to its social context as “cultural 
commodity and institutional product.” In order to address this dialectic more precisely 
in relation to these two particular instances of music, I will complicate Paddison’s 
model slightly by introducing below Tia DeNora’s understanding of the social 
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meditation of music as historical praxis—as what was actually done—contrasting it 
with Paddison’s historical mediation of music as “philosophy of history” for reasons I 
will discuss below. This will then lead into the last section of the chapter, where 
mediation at the social level will be considered in terms of the “situated” composer and 
the music as cultural product. 
 
Carter titled his two pieces concertos and named them both after the musical ensembles 
for which they were written, the Boston Symphony Orchestra and the ASKO Ensemble. 
I have used the term ritornello form to described the form of both pieces.  While 
seemingly uncomplicated titles and descriptions, they carry with them a semantic ‘load’ 
which connects directly to the layers of history embedded in the materials.  As Arnold 
Whittall notes: “one of the most interesting consequences of the modernist aesthetic is 
the play of expectations that the use—or avoidance—of a generic title can create.”514  
The solo concerto, and its twentieth century adaptation to a concerto for orchestra, 
carries with it expectations of form, instrumentation and materials, which are part of its 
historical meaning and which inevitably bring a piece with such a title into a 
questioning relationship with the past.515  That relationship to the past is not merely 
located in the form’s structure but in the social meaning mediated by that form.516 A 
provocative questioning of the relevance of the historical concerto to the present day is 
put forward by the contemporary music ensemble Sequitur, in the program note to one 
of their CDs, which includes a recording of Carter’s Double Concerto for Piano and 
Harpischord: 
On this disc, [members of Sequitur] re-examine the contemporary American concerto. 
Although it dates back to Baroque composers in the late 17th century, the concerto 
reached its artistic pinnacle with Romantic composers of the 19th and early 20th 
century. But what does the concerto mean in the United States at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, when personal freedoms are threatened both by indiscriminate 
acts of terrorism and by responses that many find necessary in order to preserve safety 
and stability? For starters, the paradigm of “us versus them”—the message behind the 
concertino and ripieno of the Baroque concerto grosso as well as the heroic romantic 
solo concerto—seems outmoded. We shun the model of a group controlling an 
individual, just as we shun this model turned inside out. And our view of an individual 
                                                
514 Arnold Whittall, “The concerto since 1945,” in Cambridge Companion to the Concerto, ed. Simon P. 
Keefe (Camberidge: Camberidge Univeristy Press, 2005), 161. 
515 Ibid. 
516 Recall the discussion in Chapter 2 on the socially embedded meaning in rondo form in Adorno, “Form 
in the New Music. Translated by Rodney Livingstone,” 201. 
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now is rarely one of hero, or anti-hero, or even of complete self-determination. All of 
these ideas affect the concerto of today, where the role of the soloist is not always 
clearly defined, where other players may rise as soloists at times and then disappear 
again into the fabric, where sub-groups may compete with the soloist and with each 
other for prominence, where the soloist may not be poised to interact and hopefully to 
triumph. Even the word “concerto” may be suspect: Only Elliott Carter’s work among 
the four on this disc employs the word “concerto” in its title.517 
This performance group tackles questions about the social and historical meanings 
carried forth in the music they perform by way of the defining metaphors that have 
culturally come to be associated with the concerto as a genre and with the musical 
drama and materials normative of its forms: metaphors of the individual in relation to 
the group as manifest in the relationship of soloist(s) and orchestral group. The program 
note both observes and suggests the need for transformation of these norms in order that 
the genre remains a relevant means of expression in the present context. It identifies a 
dialectic of social and individual demands as it sees this constituted today, alluding to 
the complexity of this dialect compared to earlier periods in history. Questions of 
power, violence, control and freedom are presented as intrinsically embedded in the 
concerto genre today. This text is informative in so far as it exemplies a range of 
commonly accepted understandings of what constitutes present-day lived experience 
from a standpoint of early twenty-first century Western (American) politics: the 
perceived threat to a perceived individual freedom from various quarters, the lack of 
clarity of the position of the individual within the greater social fabric, in fact the lack of 
a sense of social cohesion beyond that imposed by those who “preserve safety and 
stability.” Sequitur stakes out this ideological position for the concerto genre in the 
modern age, claiming a critical role for the concerto in its changed relationships 
between traditional protagonists. The observation about Carter preserving the word 
“concerto” in the title of his work refers to his very first concerto from the 1960s (all 
other pieces on the disc are from the years surrounding the year 2000) but as we know 
Carter does indeed continue to use the word in his titles right up to some of his last 
concertos.518  Carter was certainly far from the only twentieth-century composer to do 
                                                
517 Program note at 
http://www.albanyrecords.com/mm5/merchant.mvc?Session_ID=fb25ac085625ae0da7d19395914446d9
&Screen=PROD&Product_Code=TROY607&Store_Code=AR&search=sequitur&offset=&filter_cat=&P
owerSearch_Begin_Only=&sort=&range_low=&range_high= (accessed 25 August, 2017) 
518 Although notably, in the last decade of his life he composed a series of works that were concertos in 
all but their title: Dialogues (2003), Dialogues II (2010), and Two Controversies and Conversation (2011) 
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this but many composers also chose to part from the association with tradition in their 
titles.519  
 
The contextualisation found in Sequitur’s note is problematic in a number of ways but 
what is most interesting for my discussion here is its stark contrast with the program 
note for the Boston Concerto by Paul Griffiths available on the Boosey and Hawkes 
website. Griffith’s note does not provide any context beyond the music itself. Of the 
form of this piece, Griffiths writes: 
Coming so soon after the Symphonia—and from a composer now in his nineties—this 
was an extraordinary flourish of orchestral rejuvenation. The pattern is similar to that 
of the intervening ASKO Concerto: music of one kind, often using rather full 
resources, is interleaved with episodes of different sorts for different ensembles. 
Among the latter are inventions for flutes plus clarinets and for single reeds, a slowly 
revolving brass object and a passionate strain from strings. The abiding spirit, 
however, is that of the rapid, shimmering main music—rain music, recalling a poem 
by William Carlos Williams in which love is seen, like showers, to “bathe every open 
object of the world.”520 
What is striking about this note—given here in its complete form—is the lack of any 
historical references, or even any musical terminology (‘episodes’ coming closest) to 
describe the form and effect of the piece. It is as if Griffiths makes a deliberate effort to 
avoid conjuring up any associations with known forms or genres, or any context outside 
of the work itself, almost awkwardly describing the alternations of musical material as 
if such a thing were completely novel. Yet terms such as  ‘concerto grosso,’ ‘Baroque 
concerto,’ ‘ritornello sections,’ ‘ripieno music’ have come to be associated with the 
Boston and ASKO concertos in most published reviews and CD notes. Commentators 
have opened up a conversation with history, as it were. By using a range of these terms, 
they tap into collective knowledge of the musical past vividly evoked by the 
immediately audible formal processes of Carter’s two compositions. 
 
                                                
519 The other titles on this recording are Harold Meltzer’s Virginal 2002 (harpsichord soloist), David 
Rakowski’s Locking Horns 2002 (horn soloist) and Thea Musgrave’s 1999 Lamenting with Ariadne 
(viola soloist). 
520 Program note at https://www.boosey.com/cr/music/Elliott-Carter-Boston-Concerto/26247 (accessed 25 
August, 2017) 
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One example is Bayan Northcott’s CD notes to the Bridge recording.521 Northcott draws 
attention to the form of these pieces (and Carter’s Cello Concerto) as follows:   
One of [Carter’s] favorite schemata has been a kind of concerto grosso form … In 
their very different ways, the ASKO Concerto (2000), the Cello Concerto (2001) and 
the Boston Concerto (2002), all comprise variants of this formal idea. [underline mine] 
But he also refers to the deviation from expectations in Carter’s realisation of this form 
in the Boston Concerto: 
But the rain image also suggested a striking reversal of the concerto grosso form-
scheme. Where one would naturally expect the fullest, weightiest textures to occur in 
the tutti links—as indeed they do in the ASKO Concerto and, to a degree, in the Cello 
Concerto—the tuttis of the Boston Concerto prove immaterial, evanescent, with the 
work’s more sustained writing confined to the intervening episodes for various sub-
sections of the orchestra.522 
Northcott’s use of the term ‘concerto grosso’ references the Baroque period and the 
expectations for orchestration that originated around that era and continued throughout 
the Classical-Romantic period, expectations still with us today. The term ‘concerto 
grosso’ evokes the image of alternating large and small instrumental groups, with the 
large group returning constantly to a kind of ‘refrain.’  While the terminology is 
technically imprecise (as I will clarify below), the image will be immediate even for a 
general audience, possibly due to the over-popularized and commercialized 
Brandenburg Concertos of Bach and The Four Seasons of Vivaldi.  The scheme of 
alternation that Carter uses is clearly audible on first listening; however Northcott’s 
explicit references to music practice of a past era will no doubt have an influence on the 
listening experience of those listeners who read the CD notes.  
 
Another example is the 2002 New York performance under Oliver Knussen of the 
ASKO Concerto (perhaps the American premiere) reviewed in the New York Times by 
Anthony Tommasini. Tommasini references not only the genre but also the historical 
period and introduces the term ‘ritornello’: 
                                                
521 The Bridge CD with recordings of the Boston Concerto and the AKSO Concerto (recorded live at its 
world premiere in Het Concertgebouw, Amsterdam) was released in 2005. 
522 Northcott, “Boston Concerto (2002).” (Liner notes for The Music of Elliott Carter Volume 7. Bridge 
Records 9184, 2005, compact disc, September 2005). 
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 The [ASKO] concerto, ingeniously scored for 16 instruments, is Mr. Carter’s homage 
to the Baroque concerto grosso. Ritornello sections for the entire ensemble, initiated 
with slicing chords and driving rhythms, are alternated with flightier episodes for 
diverse groups of soloists.523 [underlines mine] 
Similarly, Rodney Lister, in Tempo, reviews the premiere of the Boston Concerto 
introducing the term ‘ripieno’ as well as the explicit reference to Bach: 
The title of the work deliberately evokes Bach’s Brandenburg Concerti, and Carter 
describes it as a sort of concerto grosso. Set in the progress of the transparent and 
shimmering ripieno music, …, are six episodes of long-breathed lyrical music 
featuring different sections of the orchestra.524 [Underlines mine] 
Northcott, Tommasini, Lister and others offer past practice as understood in the present 
as a lens through which to hear Carter’s ‘new’ music.  It appears, however, that Carter 
himself was the one to introduce the connection between the Boston Concerto and the 
Baroque ‘concerto grosso,’ writing in his own program note to the premiere: 
[The piece] throws a spotlight on each of the remarkable sections of the orchestra, 
surrounding them with short orchestral pizzicato sections for the entire group, not 
unlike the plan of a concerto grosso.525 [underline mine] 
Interestingly, neither Carter nor other writers refer to this piece as a ‘concerto for 
orchestra’ although clearly the idea described here of putting different orchestral 
sections in the “spotlight” lies at the foundation of the concerto for orchestra genre (the 
twentieth-century adaptation of the solo concerto). It seems that the Baroque feature of 
‘return’ is more noteworthy. The Boston Symphony Orchestra program note to the 2008 
Tanglewood performance elaborates further: 
This transparent and shimmering texture is heard in the pizzicato strings and fluttering 
winds that open the work and returns throughout like the ritornello passage of a 
concerto grosso, the Baroque genre from which Carter borrowed the idea. (Both the 
form and the name of the Boston Concerto were suggested by Bach’s 
Brandenburgs).526 [underlines mine] 
                                                
523 Anthony Tommasini, “Catching up with Elliott Carter,”  The New York Times Music Review (April 27, 
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/27/arts/music-review-catching-up-with-elliott-carter.html. 
524 Lister, “Boston, Symphony Hall: Harbison’s ‘Requiem’ and Carter’s ‘Boston Concerto’,” Tempo 62, 
no. 225: 38. 
525 Elliott Carter, “Boston Concerto (2002),” (Program notes. Boston Symphony Orchestra. Ingo 
Metzmacher. Boston: Symphony Hall, April 3, 4 & 5, 2003), 31. 
526 “Notes,”  (Boston Symphony Orchestra. Oliver Knussen. Tanglewood festival of Contemporary 
Music: Seiji Ozawa Hall, July 24, 2008. Program Notes), 86. The Boston Concerto ends on the pitch B4. 
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In this note, the connection to the Baroque period is not left to choice of terminology 
but actually established with the link to Bach’s concertos; presumably this information 
came from Carter himself.  While it might not be very fruitful to pursue too far any 
direct influence of the Brandenburg Concertos on the Boston Concerto, there certainly 
is value in considering a number of principles that have accompanied the use of 
ritornello form from the past to the present, and how the meanings sedimented in these 
principles reverberate on some level when listening to the Boston and ASKO concertos.  
 
To begin, it is interesting to consider the change of meaning that the term ‘concerto 
grosso’ itself has undergone over time. Michael Talbot notes the terminological 
imprecision that today accompanies the term ‘concerto grosso.’ Talking about the 
growing popularity of the ‘new’ concerto genre at the end of the seventeenth century, he 
observes that the term ‘concerto grosso’ had a different implied meaning for composers 
at that time: 
Gregori’s recourse to the expression Concerti Grossi in a title prompts a reflection on 
the use of the term in historical and analytical writing today. It means, quite simply, 
‘large ensemble’, and by extension ‘works (concertos) for large ensemble’. As 
employed by Gregori and Baroque composers in general, it has nothing to do with the 
use, or non-use, of soloists, or with the number of soloists. It is really not a technical 
term at all, but simply conveys the idea that many players participate. So the 
opposition between a ‘concerto grosso’ (with plural soloists) and a ‘solo concerto’ 
(with only one) is unfortunate in terminological respects, even though the 
differentiation itself may be valid for the purposes of analysis.527 
In other words, concerto grosso was originally a generic term with a literal meaning 
implying nothing more about the music than the size of its ensemble. Over time it came 
to identify a composition with more specifically defined features, such as the number of 
soloists and the form of the piece. The first concerti grossi of the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth century by composers such as Torelli, Albinoni, Gregori and Corelli 
did alternate between small and large ensembles but did not include a ritornello form. 
Rather composers used a range of formal devices from the earlier developed 
instrumental compositions such as the sonata and sinfonia. It was not until Vivaldi’s 
                                                                                                                                          
In Chapter 5, I suggest this could be a reference to the title of the piece but equally (or coincidently) the 
reference might be to Bach and Brandenburg. 
527 Talbot, “The Italian Concerto in the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Century,” in Cambridge 
Companion to the Concerto, 41.  
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innovations with the solo concerto that ritornello form became a main feature of the fast 
movements of a concerto.  Thus orchestration and form became linked. 
 
Carter’s two concertos adopt the early Baroque orchestration principle of alternating a 
concerto grosso ensemble with a concertino ensemble. But in Carter’s concertos, the 
concertinos change their ensemble make-up each time, unlike the early Baroque 
concertino in which the instrumental group was fixed.528 As mentioned above, Carter’s 
approach follows the notion of the twentieth-century concerto for orchestra that each 
section of the orchestra receives a “spotlight” instead of featuring one soloist or a small 
unchanging group of soloists like we find in Bach’s Brandenburg Concertos. As for the 
form, the twentieth-century concerto for orchestra genre has remained true to the 
modernist aesthetic of experimentation, resulting in almost as many formal approaches 
as there are compositions.  In contrast to Carter’s Concerto for Orchestra, the timbral 
distinctions between ritornello and concertino material of the Boston and ASKO’s 
ritornello form do come closer to a number of Bach’s Brandenburg Concertos 
(especially No.2) with their highly delineated sonorities distinguishing tutti and 
concertino material. But there are also similarities to Vivaldi’s solo concertos, where the 
clarity between the soloist’s material and the returning thematic material of the 
ritornellos is of paramount importance. The ritornellos in Vivaldi’s concertos were 
novel at the time and Talbot offers an insightful and concise description of their 
function and content: 
A ritornello section, which stabilizes a tonal area, exposes the primary thematic 
materials, and treats the audience to a full orchestral sound, is an assembly of thematic 
units that recurs, generally in closed periods, in a least three tonalities (including a 
final tonic statement). Unlike the refrain of a rondo, a ritornello is a highly flexible 
structure amenable to modification on any restatement. It can be shortened by losing 
its beginning, middle or end; its units can be shuffled around or presented in new 
forms; it can be supplemented by newly introduced material. Generally speaking, 
Vivaldi likes to make the first ritornello statement the longest, and find various ways 
of abridging the remainder.529 [underlines mine] 
From this abstracted description, and leaving aside the tonal and thematic 
considerations, a number of treatments of the musical material (underlined) stand out as 
                                                
528 Sociological reasons for the origin of the concerto grosso are interesting, see ibid., 35-37 and 41-42. 
Talbot discusses how one reason for its origin was the physical characteristics of the church in Bologna; 
another reason, originating in Rome, reflected the professional/non-professional status of the musicians. 
529 Ibid., 45. 
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having resonance with Carter’s treatment of the musical material in his ritornello 
sections. Repetition in Baroque ritornello sections appears not to be as fixed as models 
of the form might imply. The treatment of material is much less rigid than, for example, 
the later sonata form would become. The flexibility of this historical form lends itself to 
reinterpretation in a contemporary musical idiom. Where Vivaldi (and others) would 
use “theme” as the basic distinguishing material for the ritornelli, Carter instead uses 
sonority in a similar way, as a “highly flexible structure amenable to modification on 
any restatement” which is also freely “supplemented by newly introduced material” in 
any of the ritornelli (as Talbot notes in the above quote).  A sense of directed motion 
was in fact also one of the features of the Baroque concerto grosso, where typically the 
ritornello’s thematic material was transposed through a large-scale tonal scheme that 
moved away from and back to the tonic.530 Carter’s directed motion is achieved by very 
different means but still shares the idea of forward motion within a cyclic pattern that 
originated in the Baroque.  
 
From an Adornian perspective, both Carter’s ritornello form and the various 
manifestations of ritornello form in the Baroque era engage with sedimented social 
content within the cyclic form, a social content that has its origins in the oldest type of 
social dancing found in many cultures, namely round or circle dancing. Adorno says:  
… the rondo evokes a spiritualised form of the round dance, with its distinction 
between couplet and refrain. in. To grasp it as a form always meant sensing this form, 
moulding to it, varying it. The contrasts between tutti and solo hidden in the rondo, 
between the individual and the totality, were made dynamic with the concerto and 
became essential for the decisive form of the modern age, the sonata.531  
Rondo form that once existed for the purpose of social, ritualistic dancing later 
internalised the social purpose into the tensions between the form and the new musical 
content. In Adorno’s words:  
The secret content embedded in the form animates the subtlest nuances of the musical 
flow, even in forms which have already become very free. Individual events 
increasingly turned into content. Not the least part of musicality meant the alibily to 
                                                
530 See for example Claude Palisca, Baroque Music (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 
148; McVeigh, The Italian Solo Concerto 1700-1760: Rhetorical Strategies and Style History, 6. 
531 Adorno, “Form in the New Music. Translated by Rodney Livingstone,” 201. 
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rediscover the sublimated contents in the form, as well as to respond to the changes in 
their function, their migration into specific [musical] instance.532 
The manner in which this response of form to content takes place in music differs in 
each era. Thus, abstract commonalities in the handling of tensions between cyclic and 
linear continuity within ritornello form might be found between Baroque composers and 
modernists; yet the musical as well as social “problems” which faced composers of 
Bach's time were distinctly different from those in Carter's world and thus the musical 
means with which this dialectical engagement occurs are clearly quite different. Karol 
Berger's non-dialectical reading of the difference between Bach’s handling of linearity 
compared to that of composers from the classical period onwards is equally relevant in 
this discussion, particularly since Berger ties the musical to a change in social world 
view of temporality from cyclic to linear.533 
 
 
This contemplation of features of Carter’s concertos in the light of its historical 
antecedents illustrates how so-called autonomous features of the work are in fact rooted 
in past practices on a formal level. However, meditation at the historical level, Paddison 
suggests, must not address the purely formal construct but be a reflection on “the 
‘autonomy’ of the musical work … as ideological through situating it in its 
heteronomous social context as a commodity and as a product of the institutions of art” 
[italics mine].534 In other words, while the work may appear to be only about its musical 
form, it inevitably contains “sublimated cultural norms” carried within the historical 
layers of the material itself. Most significantly it will have a “commodity character” 
dialectically opposing its “autonomy character.” While Paddison does not model how to 
undertake an analysis of a specific work in these terms in “Theory of Mediation,” it is 
possible to reflect on historical practice connected with the concerto which highlights 
the way commodity form and autonomy form continue to go hand-in-hand in an 
unquestioned manner.535 However, as Klumpenhouwer and Agawu have warned, 
transferring social metaphors onto musical materials is misreading Adorno and can 
produce dubious narratives.536 Tia DeNora expresses a similar caution but at the same 
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time models a more fruitful way to connect the musical and the social in her essay “The 
concerto and society” with examples of Bach, Mozart and Beethoven. In light of 
Carter’s comment that “both the form and the name of the Boston Concerto were 
suggested by Bach’s Brandenburgs,” DeNora’s critique of an analysis of social 
mediation in Bach’s Fifth Brandenburg Concerto is a particularly relevant example to 
consider here. 
 
DeNora approaches the problem of mediation from a sociological stand point, arguing 
that it is not so much a narrative of “the history of ideas, politics, economics” that 
should be read from a particular musical work but the “actual mechanics through which 
music plays a mediating role in social life.”537 The most significant mechanics reveal 
themselves 
 … at the local level [where] large-scale social trends are mediated by what is ‘do-
able’—by material culture, by the specific concerns of the patrons and other local 
contextual issues such as occasion and dedicatee, and by an individual composer’s 
particular appropriation of ideas, models and working materials.538 
In other words, DeNora is critical of analyses that detach concerns about practical music 
making from the form the music take and instead only link form to the social by way of 
abstract ideas. She argues for example that Susan McClary’s “narrative analysis”—
which reads social “values” directly into musical materials of Bach’s Fifth Concerto, in 
particular the extended solo harpsichord cadenza—gets the level at which social 
mediation occurs wrong.539 To McClary the use of the harpsichord as solo instrument in 
this piece “musically presents (and in an extreme form) then-emerging notions of 
individual freedom of expression” encountered in the developing form of solo concerto 
and that this was against the current social convention in which “social harmony and 
individual expression are mutually compatible.”540  But, DeNora argues, if the focus is 
changed to “local” social reasons that Bach gave the harpsichord this extended solo 
role, a different picture emerges, one that reads Bach’s piece as comfortably situated 
within the local norms of the day. The displaying of a newly purchased harpsichord 
with two keyboards, the dedication of the piece to the Elector of Musgrave, and the 
then-current practice of virtuoso improvisation all add up to a picture in which the solo 
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harpsichord cadenza can easily be situated “within the musical culture of Bach’s world” 
rather than against cultural norms, as McClary argues. Drawing in Paddison’s notion of 
historical mediation, it is possible to identify a dialectic between the “autonomy 
character” of the piece, its musical particularity (and especially the remarkable 
cadenza), and the “commodity character” of the piece, determined by the socio-cultural 
practices of exchange just identified. In other words, the socio-cultural demands of that 
historical period shaped the music-formal demands of that specific piece. 
 
Historical mediation of this sort can also be read into the Boston and ASKO concertos. 
Both the Boston and ASKO concertos were composed for and commissioned by musical 
groups and, in line with long-standing social practice such as Bach’s dedications, Carter 
dedicated the pieces to these respective commissioning groups.  But the materials and 
the form of the pieces were also shaped in a way to highlight the performance prowess 
of all the individual players and sections in the ensembles—a practice historically 
originating at the very birth of the concerto as exemplified in Bach’s Fifth Concerto. 
The Boston Concerto was a ‘thank you’ piece that Carter wrote because of the 
significant role the Boston Symphony Orchestra played in Carter’s early musical 
experiences.541 The ‘extraordinary’ sound of the rain music very uniquely shows off the 
orchestra as a whole, making it sound strange and beautiful in a way that is novel and 
arresting, mesmerising even—more so in a live performance (particularly by the Boston 
Symphony itself) than on the recording.  It is as if the music is saying: this is no 
ordinary orchestra.  Similarly, as Carter says in his program note, the concertinos are 
written to highlight each “remarkable” section of the orchestra. In the same vein, Carter 
wrote the ASKO Concerto specifically for the sixteen-instrument combination of the 
ASKO ensemble as a tribute to the group which has regularly performed Carter’s 
music.542 It is likewise constructed in such a way as to show off each of the individual 
instrumentalists: while the ensemble comes together in the ritornello sections, 
temporally the solos dominate in this piece, making it a genuine showcase piece for the 
group’s individual members. Thus, it could be argued that the social impetus for both 
these pieces motivated the fundamental form that the pieces would take. With the 
historical tradition of dedication originating with the concerto genre itself, the 
sedimentation of history is recoverable in the formal model of the pieces which 
immanently mediates a social practice of dedication and display.  
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At the same time, it is possible to comment more generally on the “commodity 
character” of these pieces. If the dedications were a thank-you for the promotion of 
Carter’s music, they are also a commercial exchange. Carter’s two pieces arose from 
commissions from two highly mainstream ensembles—one with a reputation in the 
earlier twenty-first century of straddling the divide between ‘classical’ and ‘new’ 
symphonic repertoire and audiences (especially under the artistic direction of James 
Levine); the other, one of the most prominent European chamber ensembles for 
contemporary music. Needless to say, the funding available to these groups means they 
fall into the expected structures of the arts economy of Western culture today, including 
government funding and private patronage along with a reputation that attracts paying 
audiences.  All performances of Carter’s mature music have involved music institutions 
and their commercial structures that collectively form part of sanctioned high culture 
today. Beyond pointing to that fact, however, I find it difficult to make a sustained 
critique of the “commodity character” of these particular pieces. I do not find that there 
is anything particularly unique about these pieces, given the historical situation of 
modernism, that has not been generically analysed frequently enough and that these 
pieces do not share with others of their type. I am loath to project onto the material of 
the individual pieces more than I believe they should have to carry—that is, I do not 
want to project into these pieces narratives of metaphorical social resistance any more 
than of commodification, keeping firmly in mind DeNora’s comment that “In short, 
there is no one-to-one connection between musical forms and the world of ideas.”543 
However, it is possible to consider more generally Carter’s music and position as a 
composer in relation to mechanisms of production and consumption, in other words 
how Carter’s music is mediated at what Paddison calls the social level. 
7.3 Composition and the “situated” composer 
On Paddison’s level of social mediation, the composer is dialectically engaged in the 
sphere of production. The composer is the labourer, working with musical materials to 
produce the work of art, an object of consumption that appears autonomous. Of this 
level of mediation Paddison says: 
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The mediation of music and society is dominated by the commodity form, as mediated 
labour which is no longer aware of its origins in labour. The apparent autonomy of the 
commodity form has, of course powerful affinities with the apparent autonomy of art. 
This level would also focus on the kinds of institutions through which music operates 
and by which it is shaped.544 
The apparent autonomy of the consumer product and the apparent autonomy of the art 
object share characteristics, as Paddison points out. However, the commercial exchange 
of music-as-performance is not as simple as that of an object-as-product and involves a 
complex of institutions and organisations in its social mediation.  John Link provides a 
critical assessment of the often-ignored influence of music institutions on the creation of 
new music, in this case around the last decades of the twentieth century which 
inaugurated Carter’s late musical style. Link argues that, in welcoming the rise of the 
more accessible Minimalist and New Romantic styles in the concert hall, there was: 
… a still-prevalent critical tendency to view the enormous changes taking place in 
contemporary concert music in the early 1980s as a proliferation of fresh new styles 
that swept away the hermetic narcissism of the post-war modernists. In addition to 
ignoring the aesthetic changes affecting modernist composers at the time, this 
narrative overlooks the importance of institutional changes that cut across stylistic 
boundaries.545  
In other words, while the new musical styles appeared to proliferate ‘purely’ as a 
musical reaction to modernism, in fact these changes were socially mediated. As Link 
argues, resources dwindled and rehearsal time shrank. Music of composers who had 
benefited from the somewhat contested Cold War patronage of modernism was now too 
expensive to rehearse due to the greater time needed to adequately perform unfamiliar 
styles and playing techniques compared to the ‘postmodern’ repertoire. The 
simplification of means found in Carter’s late style, Link argues, was partially a 
response to the desire to have compositions performed more frequently by orchestras 
and chamber groups operating under tighter financial constraints. This view is 
supported by Carter’s assessment of writing for orchestra in 1991:  
“I feel that the orchestra is a lost cause: it’s too expensive and too much trouble. If you 
write very original music, nowadays the orchestras in America haven’t time to 
rehearse it. They try sometimes, and with a good deal of good will they can raise the 
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thousands of dollars it takes to have the extra rehearsals. And then the public doesn’t 
see why they should have bothered to do it when they hear the music.”546 
A few years later Carter seems to have resolved this feeling as he embarked on the first 
piece in what was to become his late symphonic masterwork Symphonia: Sum Fluxae 
Pretium Spei. Thus, characteristics of Carter’s late-style music could be read as stylistic 
changes that were mediated by social values expressed in commodity terms. 
 
Carter’s career certainly provides enough evidence of the fact that ‘difficulty’ plays a 
considerable part in the decision by music institutions to program a piece. From 
Koussevitsky’s refusal to program Carter’s Holiday Overture,547 to the lack of success 
of Carter’s music for the ballets Pocahontas and The Minotaur,548 the challenge of the 
Concerto for Orchestra to its commissioning conductor Leonard Bernstein,549 and the 
general reluctance in the 1970s and 80s to program many of Carter’s pieces more than 
once despite his place among the ‘elite’ of modern composers,550 Carter’s mature music 
has a history of occupying a contested space because of its ‘difficulty.’ This points to 
the dominating influence of commercial values that underpins music practice, 
determined by socio-cultural values that permeate decisions about artistic value and 
commercial risk involved in programming ‘difficult’ music. In the Cold War period of 
so-called cultural diplomacy, these risks were determined quite differently from the 
early twenty-first century. Carter’s String Quartet No.1 provides a good example. 
Martin Brody puts on record the political machination of the staging of the 1954 
European première of Carter’s First String Quartet, the piece that launched Carter as an 
international figure in the new music world in spite of its ‘difficulty.’551 The First String 
Quartet won the prestigious Liège Prize only to be disqualified because of already 
having been performed and being under contract for publication at the time of the 
awarding.552 After this already controversial beginning to its international recognition, 
the piece was programmed in a new music festival in Rome only to have the contracted 
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quartet, the Parrenin Quartet, pull out of playing it because of it being “trop difficile.”553 
Wheels were set in motion by the Cold War cultural conspirator and friend of Carter’s, 
Nicholas Nabokov and his funding apparatus, ensuring the Parrenin Quartet performed 
the piece after all. All the risks were deemed to be worth it for the political gain that 
having Carter’s piece on the program would have for cultural power brokers in Rome at 
that important immediate post-war period. It is hard to conceive of such a dramatic story 
being told about the significance of a piece of new modernist music today. The system 
of cultural and political values around new music has changed. 
 
The reputation of being a composer of ‘difficult’ music followed Carter all his career, 
sometimes working in his personal favour and sometimes not. As noted, Link sees the 
simplification in Carter’s late style as partially a response to the consequences of that 
reputation. Link’s interpretation provides an interesting angle on the dialectic between 
composer-as-subject and music-as-object. In Paddison’s terminology, the sphere of 
reproduction and distribution (of performance, recording, music events) feeds back to 
the composer’s relationship to the sphere of production (composing, musical materials) 
since the composer him/herself operates within the social world that is responsible for 
the reproduction/distribution of the work and from this situated position can’t help but 
form a response to these (changing) social values. In fact according to Adorno it is 
precisely the composer’s response to the socio-historical nature of musical materials 
that forms a critique (or not) of those social values.554 But if Carter’s response was to 
simplify his means purely to gain access to performance opportunities, it would of 
course be entirely un-dialectical and would have doubtfully resulted in the (still 
complicated) music that Carter actually wrote. As Link says, such an assessment “risks 
portraying Carter as a composer in the grip of irresistible forces, compromising his 
ideals to reduce his and his performers’ workload and court popular acclaim.”555 
Likewise, as I have argued in my analysis of the Boston and ASKO concertos, Carter’s 
late musical style does not equate to a capitulation to ideology despite its use of 
repetition and traditional forms, precisely because of the dialectical manner in which 
Carter engages with his materials. Link notes that the constraints imposed by Carter’s 
simplified techniques (relative to his earlier music) were “a powerful imaginative 
stimulus, both inspiring new aesthetic directions and placing earlier achievements in a 
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new context.”556 Similarly in Chapter 3, I argued that the way Carter uses repetition, 
sonority and “recycling” of materials in his late music takes on a critical dimension 
rather than being solely a response to the aesthetic values of the day or the demands of 
commissioning bodies.  
 
On the other side of the equation, Carter himself was actively involved in music 
institutions and the promotion of new music through organisation such as the 
Interntional Society for Contemporary Music throughout a good deal of his life. The 
long-lasting personal connections and friendship that Carter formed with important 
people involved with such institutions were also significant for his music (for example, 
Daniel Barenboim, Oliver Knussen, Pierre Boulez, William Glock). This involvement 
brought Carter himself into the arena of the politics of promoting the aesthetic value of 
particular new musical directions. Meyer and Shreffler claim that Carter worked 
“tirelessly to improve conditions for composers and to support performances in a 
cultural environment that was not always supportive of complex post-tonal music.”557 
While these efforts clearly had significant benefits for the promotion of Carter’s own 
music, much of this work, they argue, had a different purpose: 
Carter’s lifelong participation in the “civic life” of new music can be explained by his 
conviction that cultural life does not come from the random coalescence of individual 
efforts, but rather from people working together to mould tastes and to give direction 
to musical life.558 
There is evidence that Carter felt an obligation actively to encourage “a sense of a 
public discourse and collective ownership of culture.”559 Thus the picture is complicated 
by the dynamic relationship of the composer to his environment—a multi-faceted 
subject dialectically engaged with a social world that facilitates but also shapes artistic 
expression. In considering such interactions it is worth heeding Martin Brody’s warning 
that  
… in exploring the ideologies, institutions, and systems of Cold War patronage, we 
need to be ever mindful of the perils of reifying the idea of artistic autonomy and its 
antithesis. We need, rather, a dynamic, nuanced model of the transaction between 
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composers and their patrons, one that articulates the space between the vanishing 
points of an utterly co-opted and a pristinely independent artist.560 
The balance Brody calls for recognizes that commercial transactions are also socio-
cultural (and ideological) transactions and the aesthetic finds itself in a dialectical 
relationship with these transactions. This is as true for the period of cold-war cultural 
politics as it is for the period of late-capitalist cultural pluralism. Carter was never naive 
about this relationship and in fact it was a driving force behind all the changing ways 
that he engaged with the materials of music over the span of his career. As I have 
argued throughout Part 1 of this thesis, Carter was consciously aiming to communicate 
a musical ‘message’ to a broad audience, to engage with society through music. The 
means for achieving this goal changed as socio-cultural values and institutions changed 
and as the historical meaning of musical materials also changed.  
 
In spite of, or perhaps because of, his efforts to promote the value of new music to the 
broader society, Carter also grappled with the apparent social uselessness of composing 
new music at various points in his career.561 One such time is documented on a private 
cassette recording that Carter made in November 1960.562 This recording is significant 
because it shows Carter thinking unguardedly about how to formulate in words what is 
a complex and often perplexing problem of the value of music to society. He 
approaches the questions he asks himself from a very personal and experiential 
perspective.  He begins the tape by stating: “The question of what a composition is in 
terms of our kind of society, what kind of an object it is, is a very interesting one, I 
think.” He goes on to explore what he calls “trade value” and its opposite, “good-turn 
value,” in objects, activities and music in society. Through this monologue, Carter is 
clearly trying to justify the sense of intrinsic value for society that he feels adheres to 
new musical composition but which is hard to rationalize in commodity terms: “Now 
composition seems to me to have very little trade value, certainly in America it has 
almost none. But its value, so to speak, as a good turn, is immense.”  Taking an example 
of the boy scout who helps an old lady cross the road, Carter argues that there is nothing 
to be gained in commercial terms from this act but rather that the boy “is giving a kind 
of demonstration of his beliefs that kindliness and help to other people is an activity that 
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is part of the operation of society and expresses his belief in the society itself and its 
continuation.” Similarly, the good-turn value in new music lies in its contribution to 
social beliefs and it is almost impossible to imagine 
 a culture without these, so to speak, fundamental works [of art] that raise the spirit 
and encourage the ideals of people and make them feel that what they are connected 
with as a society is something that is worth while and not something that is just 
concerned with materialistic aims. 
 
Of even greater interest is the way Carter describes the conviction required of the 
composer producing these works of music (or art): 
 Now the good turn, of course, on this level can only be done if a person himself who 
is doing it thoroughly believes in the good turn. That he could not understand life 
without such good turns being done. That is, that a man doesn’t make up his mind, as I 
have described, to do this kind of good turn and then do it; he feels that society itself 
could not go on unless there were such things as its basis and, like most musicians of 
the past, represents such a high standard of this particular quality of inspiration, let us 
say, that he feels that more should be created and he hopes that perhaps he can do it 
and therefore supply further useful works that help people to live their lives in more 
understanding and more happy, inspired and living way. This good turn aspect 
therefore has the other side that the individual who is doing this good turn cannot help 
do the good turn. 
Therefore musical composition is in this sense of enormous importance and since … it 
is assumed that the citizens in America do this thing without any encouragement on 
the part of society … or any real understanding of this operation on the part of the 
society … it is most important to realize therefore that a work of music particularly is 
done as … a kind of good turn to the society … It has nothing to do actually with 
publicity, it has to do with something in the souls of individuals. 
The composer is seen as working for society without necessarily gaining appreciation or 
acceptance from that society. The mission of a composer is in this sense a selfless one, 
done for the greater good. The strength with which Carter talks about the conviction 
required of an artistic person to follow their calling suggests that in the process of 
formulating his ideas in this private unedited recording, Carter may have been drawing 
considerably on his own personal experience of becoming a composer and particularly 
the conflict between himself and his family over the worthiness of his chosen career. 
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“Biographical material is dangerous,” warns Julian Johnson in his book Webern and the 
Transformation of Nature because “its immediacy is both beguiling and opaque at the 
same time.” But, he continues, “… its real importance lies in the relationship it exhibits 
to a wider social milieu whose partial realisation it is.” For example, in the case of 
Webern’s preoccupation with the idea of nature in his music, Johnson says:  
The social is mediated by the individual: Webern’s apparently personal expressions of 
enthusiasm for nature and subjective fusion of scientific and metaphysical ideas are a 
case study in social ideas. It is because the ideas and experience of nature are socially 
formed that they are worthy of analysis. This is not to take anything away from the 
subjective intensity of the experience. On the contrary, it redeems the experience as 
being of objective significance and in this it is like art itself, which embodies and 
reworks social ideas only through the mediation of an individual, subjective agency. 
The tension between the two goes to the heart of central questions about the claims of 
art, its social role and status.563 
Relating Johnson’s analysis to Carter, we can see the conflict between Carter’s personal 
conviction about the ‘good’ of becoming a composer of new music and the lack of 
meaning that this had for the hardworking business family in which he grew up as a 
personal experience that embodied the social shifts that were occurring in America at 
that time. Carter himself was fully conscious of and self-reflective on the matter of the 
interrelation between the social and the personal. In 1989 (at the age of 80) in interview 
with Enzo Restango, Carter insightfully said: “My family’s hostility remains a private 
fact … or rather the reflection of a social situation which it would probably be hard for 
you to imagine.”564 Ten years later, in interview with Meyer and Shreffler for their 
centenary book (Carter was almost 100), he said of the conflict with his parents: 
“[Material success] was what they were concerned with. They came from poor families, 
both of them, so … they were naturally concerned with that. I don’t hold it against 
them. Obviously my life is a revolt against all of this.”565 The generational difference 
between parents and child articulated here highlights the upward mobility that was 
becoming possible in America in the early part of the century. The relationship of 
economic mobility to culture is made vivid by Johnson in his discussion of the 
contrasting careers of Webern and Webern’s father, a highly successful mining engineer 
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turned government administrator and finally commissioner in the Ministry for 
Agriculture: 
The difference between their careers typifies a generational difference in which the 
wealth of an industrial patriarchy made possible the aesthetic culture of its offspring, 
an economic fact which goes to the heart of understanding Viennese culture of this 
period. In this way Webern senior and Webern junior exemplify the truism that the 
cultural network is not separable from the economic network.566 
While Carter was from the generation after Webern, this scenario rings true for Carter 
and his family in 1910s and 20s New York. We see a similar connection between Carter 
and his father, who ultimately enabled the cultural pursuits of his son’s as the ultimate 
progression in the line of social mobility: from a poor grandfather who built up a lace-
importing business from nothing as a young man after fighting in the Civil War, to a 
father who had to buy the business from the grandfather at a loss and struggled to bring 
it back to being what it once was (“the best lace curtain business in New York at that 
time”), to the son who, now no longer needing to struggle to attain material wealth, can 
turn his attention to a higher cultural pursuit.567 Carter’ s father is portrayed (in the few 
paragraphs that are in print about him) as a businessman but also “an idealist and 
pacifist with socialist sympathies” and as a hard-working man who was not necessarily 
steeped in wealth but who was nonetheless well-off thanks to his own efforts, especially 
in the first decades of the century when the lace trade was booming.568 Carter’s early 
experiences in the cultural world of modern music in 1920s New York and his Harvard 
education were clearly made possibly because of his middle-class upbringing. That 
Carter’s father permitted his son’s boyhood acquaintance with the much older Charles 
Ives would surely have had to do with Ives’ standing in the business world as a 
successful businessman for whom music composition was something to be done in 
earnest but in his spare time.569 When Carter chose composition as his main career, 
however, he was met with disapproval from his father, who had been grooming him to 
take over the family business.570 Carter’s father would have been voicing the 
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disapproval of a stratum of society at that time who could not see the value or relevance 
of pursuing something as arcane as new music composition. The American context 
differed in that sense starkly from Webern’s Viennese cultural milieu. But ironically, it 
was also Carter’s father who steeped his son in European culture from a young age, 
taking him on transatlantic boat trips and teaching him French, in other words preparing 
him, in his innocence perhaps, for a life in the high arts. Carter Sr.’s disapproval of this 
trajectory expressed itself materially, by giving his son only minimal financial support 
while studying in France in the 1930s.571 Reports on the inheritance Carter Sr. left his 
son are mixed: Schiff reports that Carter Sr. left his business to his employees on his 
death rather than to his only son, although Meyer and Shreffler tell a different story.572 
But probably worse than limited financial support was that his father did not attend 
performances of Carter’s music.573  There is a sense in the archival tape recording that 
Carter is working through a personal justification for his choice of a composing career, 
making a case for it not being a frivolous pastime turned into an occupation, but rather a 
labour of “immense” significance to society, perhaps couching its value in terms that a 
socialist business owner like his father might conceivably appreciate. The theme of the 
individual’s particular contribution to society at large was a broader social question 
manifest as a personal dilemma that Carter turned into an overarching motivation for the 
shaping of the materials of his music, as we have seen in the discussions in Chapters 2 
and 3. Thus, this dialectic between the composer and the musical materials can be seen 
as socially mediated, springing directly from a lived personal experience that was at the 
same time symptomatic of that period in social history.574  
 
The socio-cultural situation at the turn of the twenty-first century, however, was 
significantly changed compared to seventy years earlier during the depression of the 
                                                
571 Carter said in 1989: “With five hundred dollars [per year] I had very little to spare, so I often worked 
as a copiest. Nevertheless, you could live fairly well on very little, and life in Paris, with its restaurants 
and cafes, was very pleasant.” Restagno, Elliott Carter: In Converstaion with Enzo Restagno for 
Settembre Musica 1989, 12. Schiff reports “His father promptly cut his allowance to five hundred dollars 
a year. The punishment involved sacrifices if not squalor—Carter says his teeth never recovered from 
those years of neglect.” Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter, 16. 
572 Schiff notes that “… when he died he left the company to its employees.” The Music of Elliott Carter, 
24. Carter did inherit a portfolio of properties in New York, which he sold and invested in the Amphion 
Foundation to promote performances of new music, in Meyer and Shreffler, Elliott Carter: A Centennial 
Portrait in Letters and Documents, 24. 
573 Wierzbicki, Elliott Carter, 6. Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter, 14. 
574 While Carter’s specific situation was a personal one, it did not exist in isolation. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, particularly in the 1930s depression and during World War II many composers questioned the 
relevance of writing, as Carter put it, “advanced modern music with its élite audience,” Edwards, Flawed 
Words, 59-60. Charles Seeger and Ruth Crawford, for example, stopped composing altogether (see Tick, 
Ruth Crawford Seeger, 198.) 
  253 
1930 and even to fourty years earlier at the start of the 1960s when Carter made the tape 
recording. Paddison, in his chapter “Postmodernism and the Survival of the Avant-
garde,” addresses the socio-cultural condition of music at the turn of the twenty-first 
century. He argues that the view of art accompaning a modernist aesthetic that it must 
resist commodification dissolved into a view of art “which is accommodating and 
assimilated, and which embraces and celebrates commodification.”575 A concomitant 
change was the post-modern rejection of the idea of history, progress and future utopias, 
and indeed of the possibility of “The New.” This rejection he links to the treatment of 
time in the arts, postmodernism attempting to be timeless, against modernism requiring 
a sense of overarching continuity despite expressing a fractured experience of time. 
What Paddison takes to task most about the postmodern attitude in the arts is its 
inability to be critical of the social totality in which it so willingly immerses itself—
critical reflection becomes impossible as all positions are relative, including the 
historical:  
What is noticeably lacking is any sense of a critical self-reflection at work at a 
structural level in the relation to styles and forms of the past, or any acknowledgement 
that the interaction is with material made up of ideologically loaded handed-down 
gestures which are dynamic in character … In its rejection of the critical, oppositional, 
self-reflexive work of art, postmodernist art risks becoming merely a celebration of 
the commercialization of culture and the commodification of art.576 
Unlike some postmodern styles, Carter’s music responds much more dialectically to the 
change in socio-cultural values and musical styles at the turn of this century. The 
simplification of means in Carter’s late music does not embrace notions of the end of 
history or the end or art, nor does it embrace the commodification of art. Instead, it 
takes its own material and re-shapes it, and in doing so Carter’s music responds 
critically to the notion of postmodern stasis which is expressed through techniques that 
make time stand still, such as repetition and untransformed historical forms. Paddison 
describes musical postmodernism as adopting “a conception of time which is a-
teleological, with emphasis on the present moment, the ‘now’ either as the extension of 
the moment over large, unarticulated periods, or as the fragmentation of time into a 
series of perpetual presents—in both cases, however, without the tension created by 
assumptions concerning an underlying sense of continuity.”577 Carter’s late music 
                                                
575 Paddison, “Postmodernism and the Survival of the Avant-garde,” 205. 
576 Ibid., 209. 
577 Ibid., 208. 
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remains laden with precisely this tension between continuity and repetition. Yet, in its 
changed way of expressing this temporal tension, it also recognizes that the critical 
potential of musical materials is not fixed by modernism nor is it necessary for the path 
of new music to lead to complete social alienation for the sake of holding onto reified 
notions of what oppositional or resistant music should sound like. In the composition of 
the Boston and ASKO concertos Carter is unwilling to reject the present any more than 
the historical. Both pieces engage with material concepts characteristic of 
postmodernism but through an historical lens, in other words they use features and 
gestures that show a semblance of the postmodern but are re-formed critically into an 
ongoing tension or dialectic between content and form, with a modernist view of 
temporality as “polyphonic” and discontinuous, “plotted against an underlying 
assumption of continuity.”578  In this way, these pieces could claim to resist their 
commodity character despite being embedded in the social exchange that makes music 
performance, production and distribution possible. 
 
Carter clearly saw new music composition as something powerfully transformative, 
standing in direct opposition to the monotony and boredom of consumer culture. In the 
tape recording Carter says that, in the face of a work of music, “the desire to be, so to 
say, a consumer, quickly becomes surfeited.” He continues: 
Why should people earn money to buy new washing machines and new television sets 
and to be generally the kind of consumers we’re encouraged to be, merely to gain a 
comfortable life and then to retire in boredom once they have gotten it. It’s more 
important that they have something that spurs them on … whether these new comforts 
be gotten or not. And it is these works, this sort of … radiant energy or vitamin pill 
that, let us say, shines out in the culture and gives every part of it a certain direction 
and purpose.579 
This positive image of music composition, which Carter recorded in 1960, seems more 
in line with his statement in 2008 that he hoped people would take away “happiness” 
from hearing his music, than it does with Schiff’s description of this cold-war period in 
Carter’s career initiating “a mood of anxiety … the ironic despair of black comedy.”580 
And Carter’s optimism certainly runs as a theme thoughout his career. As we have seen 
above Whittall notes Carter’s lack of melancholy which sets his ongoing modernist 
                                                
578 Ibid. 
579 Cassette recording (1960), Elliott Carter Archive, Paul Sacher Stiftung. 
580 Schiff, The Music of Elliott Carter, 193. 
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project apart from an Adornian bleakness.581 The later music and earlier music remain 
connected by Carter’s own ideal, a modernist one that is at once critical and optimistic 
for music’s possibilities. But Carter was not alone in this view. Both Brody and Cohen 
obverse a similar optimism in Stefan Wolpe’s aesthetic, for example.582 In the face of 
the many social catastrophes that have challenged us already and that are still awaiting 
us in the twenty-first century, this attitude is perhaps evidence that resistance can be 
found in a positive view of continuing to pursue the things that are most human in all 
our endeavours. 
 
To sum up, in reflecting on social mediation I have remained at the level of praxis in 
DeNora’s terms rather than attempting to narrate the social directly from the materials 
of Carter’s compositions. I have explored various avenues through which the composer-
subject stands in relationship to the social: through the mechanisms of production and 
distribution of the musical commodity in the form of music institutions; through the 
dialectic of the social and the autonomous nature of the musical object with which the 
composer must grapple, as we saw in Carter’s framing of new music as a “good turn” to 
society; and through the socio-historical situation into which the composer is born that 
in the case of Carter manifested itself as social mobility within his familiy line, out of 
poverty into a cultural elite. More broadly, Paddison’s model of three levels of 
mediation that I have followed throughout this chapter has given access to a network of 
extra-musical considerations which have allowed a critical reflection on the musical 
materials of the specific pieces, my analytical approach to them as well as broader 




                                                
581 Whittall, “The search for order: Carter’s Symphonia and late-modern thematicism,” 71-2. 









The wide recognition of Elliott Carter’s position as one of the most significant and 
innovative modernist composers of the twentieth century is frequently accompanied by 
a familiar narrative of his musical career, development, style, techniques, influences and 
aesthetic position. Samuel Wilson argues that with such established composers (he cites 
Boulez as his example) there exists an “ossification” in the knowledge we have of their 
music and thought.583 While this “concretisation of knowledge” can be valuable, it 
means that a certain amount of breaking-up or breaking-through of the well-known 
narratives is needed before a fresh or critical contribution can be made to the discourse.  
This has certainly been the case with respect to the received knowledge around Carter’s 
music and biography for many decades. In recent years, however, a number of 
significant studies have broken through the solid, familiar narrative that accompanied 
(and often still accompanies) descriptions of Carter’s music.  John Link challenges the 
popular image of Carter as uncompromising modernist in his assessment and 
interpretation of Carter’s late-late music. Link shows that the last twenty years of 
Carter’s career involved him rethinking and responding to the changing musical world 
at the turn of the new century. Matthew Guberman examines Carter’s active role in 
engaging with funding bodies, performers and audiences during the Cold War years that 
demonstrates Carter to be far from the lone, heroic individualist labouring away in 
isolation and indifference to the world around him. Instead Guberman paints a picture 
of Carter as a motivated self-promoter, adapting to circumstances to benefit his career 
and responding consciously to the political climate.584 Felix Meyer and Anne Shreffler’s 
Centennial Portrait provides critical commentary on material in the Carter archive, also 
portraying a composer who took in many influences beyond those included in standard 
biographical narratives.585   
                                                
583 Wilson, “An Aesthetics of Past-Present Relations,” 22-23. 
584 Guberman, “Composing Freedom: Elliott Carter’s ‘Self-Reinvention’ and the Early Cold War.” 
585 Meyer and Shreffler, Elliott Carter: A Centennial Portrait in Letters and Documents. 
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My contribution in this study widens the critique in a different direction. I draw Carter’s 
music and writings into a discourse about musical modernism that has typically been 
reserved for European or ex-patriot European composers, often ones who have claimed 
affiliations or sympathy with Adorno’s thinking even if not accepting of all of his 
premises (Ligeti, Nono, Wolpe, Rhim for example). What I have offered here differs 
from other Carter studies in that I place Carter’s aesthetic into contact with an Adornian 
tradition of philosophical aesthetics. While Carter himself claimed his philosophical 
influences to be closer to home in Alfred North Whitehead, and to lie more in literature 
than music aesthetics, I have shown that this does not preclude drawing lines of 
connection between Carter’s musical thinking and that of Adorno’s, the most influential 
philosopher on music of the twentieth century. Adorno was after all a contemporary of 
Carter’s, his senior by only 5 years, and both were steeped in the modernism of the 
early twentieth-century cosmopolitan art world. Adorno died at the end of the decade in 
which Carter had just begun to write the music that was later to gain such international 
acclaim. Adorno might not have heard any of Carter’s music. By contrast, most of 
Adorno’s work was available to Carter and Carter had read everything that was 
published in the 1960s and 1970s.  What this study shows, however, is that much of 
Carter’s own writings that exhibit the greatest parallels with Adorno’s thinking were 
completed before Carter claims to have read any of Adorno’s work. Of most interest 
therefore in what I have shown in this dissertation is the mutual influence of a modernist 
mentality towards new musical composition that lay at the very fabric of the social and 
artistic milieu at that point in history.586 In examining parallels between Adorno’s and 
Carter’s writings, I have not looked for direct influence but rather for interpretations of 
Adorno’s philosophical formulations that can illuminate Carter’s musical aesthetics. I 
have focussed on Carter’s notions of a message carried within music that must 
nonetheless remain a “self-sufficient thing;” of new music needing to maintain a 
dialectical relationship to its history; of the importance of temporal flow in new music 
in order to remain true to human experience; and of the need for music to arise from 
both expression and construction, in other words, to contain a dialectic of freedom and 
relationship, or as Martin Brody so pointedly says of Wolpe’s late music, a “dialogue of 
mutuality and mutability.”587   
                                                
586 This mentality crossed international boundaries through figures such as Carter and Adorno who 
reached in opposite directions across the Atlantic absorbing ideas and carrying them back and forth 
between the United States and Europe. 
587 Brody, “‘Where to Act, How to Move’,” 208. 
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For Carter, the political dimension of such an aesthetic, I have argued, remained located 
within the music itself, as a utopian impulse accessible only through listening to the 
musical interactions—the “auditory scenarios”—that Carter lets unfold. My claim is 
that Carter’s musical realisation of these scenarios changed in response to a changing 
social world but that the dialectic itself did not alter from Carter’s earliest pieces to his 
late, late musical style. The lightness of Carter’s late music responds to a late century 
modernism that has bounced off its postmodern Other to seek new ways of resisting 
both total social alienation and complete absorption into the psychology of a 
consumerist twenty-first century. The elements of repetition, sonority and regeneration 
of the past have been harnessed by Carter in his late music to work against a negative 
dialectic that fears for the continuation of expressive subjectivity. Working with notions 
of lightness, fragility, effervescence, and a continual remaking of materials and form, 
Carter’s late music replaces the narrative of the cathartic opposition of chaos and order 
with a narrative of the persistence of the most fragile and therefore most human. 
 
In my analyses of the Boston and ASKO concertos, I have aimed to show how my 
construal of these features of Carter’s compositional aesthetic are at work in the 
materials and form of each piece. The formal premise of both pieces lies in a critical 
reinterpretation of the inherited ritornello form—a form to which repetition is intrinsic. 
The content of each piece works against the repetitive nature of the form by weaving in 
an overarching continuity. The trajectory is unfolded through the interaction of the 
materials themselves which are partitioned into line and chord, time and space—
dialectical partners in a tussle with the cyclical drive of the form and with their own 
kinetic drive toward their temporal and spatial extremes. With the analyses of the 
Boston Concerto and the ASKO Concerto I make a significant contribution to the 
growing body of large-scale analyses of Carter’s orchestral music.588 In particular, I 
offer an important original conception of flow and continuity in the music as well as 
conceptually framing line and chord, space and time as dialectical opposites whose 
interaction defines the form of the piece as a process of material transformation. 
 
                                                
588 Other recent important large scale analyses include Capuzzo, Elliott Carter’s What Next?: 
Communication, Cooperation, and Separation; Coulembier, “Analyzing simultaneous time layers in 
selected compositions by Elliott Carter and Claus-Steffen Manhkopf.”; and Theisen, “A Multifaceted 
Approach to Analyzing Form in Elliott Carter’s Boston Concerto.” 
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In subjecting the analyses to a ‘second reflection,’ I have tried to respond to the idea 
that ‘technical’ analysis and ‘critical’ analysis might be best undertaken as somewhat 
separated activities to prevent falling into the trap of a deterministic analytical model or 
of giving the musical structure a metaphorical agency it does not actually possess. At 
the same time a degree of mutual influence is perhaps necessary, since, as Marion Guck 
demonstrates, we need linguistic metaphors to translate the otherwise inaccessible 
musical experiences.589 In the same way, we need linguistic metaphors to show musical 
structures as homologous to social structures. In other words, the categorisation of 
different types of analytical methods is also somewhat illusory, something I have aimed 
to acknowledge in the notion of a ‘circle of analyses’ where the seemingly discrete 
methods nonetheless flow around into each other, with thoughts about musical structure 
influencing thoughts about mediated social content and vice versa.  
 
Nevertheless, by embarking on a separate critical reflection I have still attempted to 
open up the analyses to interpretations that are released from the need for empirical 
demonstration and that can create an imaginative linguistic interaction with the 
experience of the musical content. Thus the demands of form and content of the Boston 
and ASKO concertos are narrated as mediating a critique of individual and social 
interaction that concludes with a utopia of survival as its resolution. Furthermore, 
historical social relations are found mediated in the concerto genre, where the dialectic 
of commodity form and autonomy form of the music finds its origins in an historical 
context of musical patronage, dedication and virtuosity. And finally, the composer’s 
dialectic with the musical materials is told as a creative response to a lived personal 
dilemma that was at the same time symptomatic of a period in social history where 
participating in the advancement of modernist culture was seen by an earlier generation 
to be in conflict with contributing to the social good. In these ‘second reflections’ I 
pursue ways of drawing the outside in without burdening the music with metaphorical 
meaning but rather by showing the materials as mediating the outside on different levels 
of specificity. 
 
                                                
589 Guck, “Analytical Fictions.” Refer back to discussion in Chapter 4. 
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Limitations and further directions 
Nothing about this study can claim to be complete: I have not aimed to provide 
definitive technical analyses nor indeed to link Carter’s compositional aesthetic 
conclusively or singularly to Adorno’s theory of new music. Simon Jarvis comments 
that “[t]he self sufficiency of the analysis of a single musical work or movement is itself 
illusory … Indeed it is in Adorno’s view one of the primary virtues of the essay form 
that it frees the critic from the delusory and impoverished goal of ‘coverage’.”590   Thus 
like any study, the current one has its limitations and it is in the spirit of critical 
reflection to attempt to “stand outside” the work presented here and to attempt to locate 
some contradictory terms within the conclusions I have drawn.  
 
Firstly, a more complete picture of Carter’s compositional aesthetic would certainly be 
gained by drawing connections between the myriad influences that Carter himself 
identifies and that undoubtedly played a role in the cultural milieu of Carter’s earlier 
decades.  Jonathan Bernard has already made important inroads into this exploration.591 
As already mentioned, the world of New York political activists and intellectuals that 
Brody critically investigates in relation to Milton Babbitt is no doubt relevant to 
offering a more nuanced narrative of the development of Carter’s ideas about music and 
politics. Further investigation into primary sources would no doubt also be valuable in 
this regard. My study has relied, with only one exception, on secondary sources. The 
use of the Carter archive at the Paul Sacher Stiftung containing Carter’s letters and 
unpublished writing offers much potential for researching such questions.  
 
Secondly, a further probing into the influences on Carter’s notion of the temporal in 
music would seem to me necessary for any continuation of the work I have offered here. 
Alfred North Whitehead was certainly influential on Carter in this respect and markedly 
different in his notions of time from Adorno. It is also, I believe, in the finer conception 
of the temporal that Adorno and Carter can be shown to part ways.  Robert Witkin 
argues that Adorno’s understanding of the temporal is critically bound to his 
sociological model, in which a system of true social interaction must arise from the 
“emergent character of the present.” This means that it is only by people freely and 
spontaneously interacting that change and development, society and history, become 
                                                
590 Jarvis, Adorno: A Critical Introduction, 132-33. 
591 Bernard, “Elliott Carter and the Modern Meaning of Time.” 
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possible. As Witkin says: “This emergence, this temporality, is integral to sociality 
which Adorno sees in terms of the ‘going out’ from the self to the other and in the 
mediation of the self by the other. Temporality is constructed by social relations.” 
Witkin shows that Adorno was suspicious of the artistic exploration of the unconscious, 
the primitive, the non-rational, arguing that the historical dimension, and thus the 
freedom of subjective expression and action, is eliminated in the representation of such 
pre-determined collective emotional drives, leaving them open to totalitarian and 
authoritarian misuse. This lay at the heart of Adorno’s critique of primitivism in 
Stravinsky and in the Cubist movement.  
 
Witkin, on the other hand, argues that much of this avant-garde art, far from opening a 
crack to totalitarianism, in fact opened the audience’s sense apparatus to a new 
awareness of the act of seeing (Witkin approaches the question through the visual arts). 
Rather than taking seeing for granted, this movement of modernist art made the act of 
seeing itself the topic of exploration by making the individual aware of the internal, or 
intra-active, processes that are taken for granted in the act of looking at an object—what 
he has called “machineries for sensibility.” To achieve this awareness in the audience, 
the relationship of subject to object is manipulated through a collapsing of the temporal 
dimension (e.g. showing all view-points at once in a Cubist painting; bringing separate 
objects together into the same time-frame; non-linear narratives and stream of 
consciousness writing). By doing so, a greater understanding of the “second nature” that 
has become our constructed way of seeing can be opened up from which a new sociality 
can develop. 
 
While it is certainly the case, as I have argued in this study, that progressive temporality 
in music was an important means of expressing lived human experience for Carter, it is 
also true that Carter saw temporal simultaneity an especially important part of that lived 
human experience and this connects Carter in some respects to Surrealist notions of the 
collapsing of linear time onto a single moment.  Carter did not tolerate the overlaying of 
obviously unrelated musics. However, many of the influences that Carter names on his 
thinking about time and especially time in dream-states—for example Jean Cocteau’s 
film Le Sang d’une Poète, Joyce’s Ulysses, Proust’s À La Recherche du Temps Perdu, 
Beckett’s plays—deal with temporal experience as non-linear and intra-personal, 
drawing the reader/viewer into a heightened consciousness of their perception of time 
itself. While I have argued that stasis is an untenable musical state for Carter, and that 
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temporal progress, movement and change are the only means of a true human 
expression, the subtler complications that simultaneous musical layering and its 
momentary static effect bring to the question of temporality have not been explored or 
critiqued in this study. Similarly, this study has spoken about the illusion of repetition in 
the Boston and ASKO concertos, however it has only touched on how illusory repetition 
and uncertain points of memory recall, or distant referencing, might bring to the listener 
a “reflective awareness of one’s [listening].” These domains present important lines of 




The analytical interpretations I have presented in this study are significant for the field 
of interdisciplinary music study and the task of linking empirical analysis to social 
context. In the first part of this dissertation I have interpreted facets of Carter’s 
compositional aesthetic as articulated in his writings and interviews through the lens of 
an Adornian aesthetics of modernist music, showing how Adorno’s philosophical 
apparatus can be harnessed as conceptual and analystical tools to shed greater light on 
the meanings of Carter’s musical concerns. In particular I have shown that Adorno’s 
conception of the socially mediated nature of music has importance in understanding 
the way Carter conceived of the social role that his compositions played. Carter’s claim 
that his music communicated an important message is easily dismissed by younger 
generations of listeners who look for an all too obvious connection between music and 
rational meaning. I have demonstrated that Carter’s notion of artistic communication 
comes from the modernist mentality that locates the message firmly within the artistic 
means themselves and as such Adorno’s dialectical reasoning about the social mediation 
of music helps to reclaim the critical and communicative dimensions of Carter’s 
compositions that can be too quickly judged—in the contemporary landscape of 
pluralism—as recalcitrant or even out-dated formalism. 
 
An important contribution of this study is its multi-dimensional character. I have 
presented analyses of Carter’s writings from a philosophical perspective, I have offered 
analyses of large-scale compositions from a technical perspective, and I have presented 
a critical interpretation of both the formal and the social levels of mediation that these 
compositions contain as well as a broad interpretation of the situated nature of the 
composer in a dialectic with the musical materials from a particular socio-historical 
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position. In other words, I have suggested ways in which the nodes on the circle of 
analysis are both discrete and permeable as well as showing, in a sense, that the circle is 
never complete. I would like, rather boldly, to think that I have managed to come some 
way towards achieving what Kofi Agawu claims Adorno has made possible for the 
analysis of music: to suspend certainty for provisionality and take the risk that “what 
has been said may be false, incomplete, or inadequate, and that there is alsways more to 
say and especially to ask.” Agawu claims Adorno offers “an ethical stance” that is 
framed by “an embrace … of a simple yet powerful belief that it is possible—indeed 
desirable—for one musician-writer to write something that other musicians find 
edifying.”592 Elliott Carter’s music continues to offer a tantalising richness in the depth 
and variety of its expression and the complexities of its construction. My hope is that 
what I have to offer in this study will stimulate others to write about Carter’s music in 
whatever ethical and edifying way that provokes the imagination. 
  
                                                
592 Agawu, “What Adorno Makes Possible for Music Analysis,” 55. 
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